창원시 학교급식 식재료 구매 실태 및 공급업체 수행도 평가

정회정(Hoi-Jung Jung),김현아(Hyun-Ah Kim) 한국식품영양과학회 2012 한국식품영양과학회지 Vol.41 No.6

향후 학교급식 식재료 공급업체에 대한 합리적인 관리 및 평가 체계 구축을 위한 기초 자료를 제공하고자 본 연구에서는 공급업체 선정방법(경쟁입찰계약, 수의계약)에 따른 학교급식 식재료 구매실태와 공급업체 수행도를 비교 분석하고자 하였다. 본 연구의 목적을 달성하기 위해 창원시 관내 초ㆍ중ㆍ고등학교 영양(교)사를 대상으로 설문 조사를 실시하였다. 2010년 6월 29일부터 9월 28일까지 총 190부를 배부하여 167부(회수율: 87.9%)가 회수되었고, 이 중 응답 내용이 불충분한 16부를 제외하고 총 151부(분석율: 79.5%)를 최종 분석 자료로 사용하였다. 첫째, 조사대상자의 일반 사항으로서, 영양(교)사는 전부 여성이었으며 평균연령은 36.87세로 31∼40세 이하가 49.0%로 가장 많았고, 직위는 영양교사가 52.3%로 약간 더 많았으며 54.3%가 초등학교에 근무하고 있었다. 학교근무경력은 평균 10.86년이었으며, 평균 1일 식수인원은 931.17명이었고 78.8%가 1일 1식을 급식하고 있었으며, 평균 1식 순수 식재료비는 1,937.50원이었다. 둘째, 경쟁입찰계약을 이용한 식재료 구매실태 조사 결과, 91.4%의 학교에서 경쟁입찰계약에 의해 식재료를 구매하고 있었고, 그중 제한경쟁입찰 계약 방법을 주로 사용하고 있었다. 경쟁입찰계약으로 구매하는 식재료는 일반 농산물, 일반 가공품, 친환경 농산물(과일), 친환경 가공품, 일반 가금류, 수산물, 친환경 곡류, 무항생제 가금류, 일반 곡류, 김치류, 육류, 우유류 순으로 많았다. 셋째, 수의계약 방법을 이용한 식재료 구매실태를 조사한 결과 78.8%의 학교에서 식재료를 수의계약으로 구매하고, 단일견적 계약이 59.7%로 조금 많았다. 수의계약을 사용하는 식재료는 육류 84.9%, 김치류 47.9%, 수산물 42.0%의 순으로 많이 이용하였다. 넷째, 식재료 구매 품목별로 경쟁입찰계약과 수의계약에 의한 구매 방법의 차이를 분석한 결과 김치류를 제외한 전 품목에서 유의한 차이가 있었다. 즉 육류(p<0.001)와 우유류(p<0.001)와 같은 단일품목은 주로 수의계약방법에 의해 구매가 이루어지고 있었으며, 일반 농산물(p<0.001), 수산물(p<0.001), 일반 가금류(p<0.001), 무항생제 가금류(p<0.001), 친환경 곡류(p<0.001), 친환경 농산물(과일)(p<0.001), 친환경 가공품(p<0.001), 일반 가공품(p<0.001), 일반 곡류(p<0.001)의 품목들은 주로 경쟁입찰계약에 의해 구매가 이루어지고 있었다. 다섯째, 경쟁입찰계약과 수의계약의 학교급식 공급업체의 수행도를 비교 분석한 결과 경쟁입찰계약이 수의계약보다 제품의 가격에 대한 수행도만 유의적으로 높았고(p<0.001) ‘전반적인 수행도(p<0.01)’와 ‘제품의 포장 상태(p<0.01)’, ‘납품 시 제품 품질(p<0.001)’, ‘제품의 위생(p<0.001)’, ‘현품설명서와의 일치도(p<0.001)’, ‘반품 및 교환의 신속함(p<0.001)’, ‘비상시 배송 능력(p<0.001)’, ‘배송직원의 서비스(p<0.05)’, ‘불만사항에 대한 처리(p<0.001)’의 세부 항목에서 수의계약에 의한 공급업체의 수행도가 경쟁입찰계약에 의한 공급업체의 수행도 수준보다 높았다. 본 연구 결과를 토대로 향후 학교급식 식재료 공급업체의 공정한 선정과 합리적인 평가를 위해 제언을 하면 다음과 같다. 첫째 학교급식에 있어서 구매 관리에 대한 인식 전환이 필요하다. 즉 학교급식에서 구매 관리를 단순히 급식에 필요한 식재료를 구매하는 활동으로 인식하는 것이 아니라 급식 품질 경영도구 및 급식 운영의 핵심적인 기능으로써 인식되어야 할 것이다. 둘째, 학교급식 식재료 공급업체에 대한 합리적인 평가 기준과 평가 체계가 이루어져야 할 것이다. 기존의 위생관리 위주의 단면적인 평가에서 벗어나 학교급식 식재료 공급업체 수행도에 대한 다각적 측면에서의 평가를 하여야 할 것이다. 즉 현재 주로 이루어지고 있는 시설 설비 위주의 평가에서 벗어나 학교급식 식재료 공급 능력에 대한 전반적인 평가로 범위를 넓혀가야 할 것이다. 즉 조달 및 배송 능력(식재료 조달 능력, 배송 체계, 비상시 배송 능력 등), 식재료(품질, 가격, 위생, 포장상태, 구매명세서와의 일치도 등), 서비스(배송 직원의 서비스, 입고시간 준수, 반품 및 교환의 신속함, 불만사항에 대한 처리 등), 행정 사무(회계 관련 서류, 위생 관련 서류 등)의 다양한 측면에서의 평가가 이루어져야 하겠다. 그와 함께 주기적인 평가를 실시하여 학교급식식재료의 공급이 안정적이고 효율적으로 이루어질 수 있도록 하여야 할 것이다. This study was conducted to investigate the purchasing status and to compare supplier performance evaluations between competitive bidding and negotiated contracts in school foodservice in Changwon, Korea. A total of 190 questionnaires were distributed and 167 (return rate 87.9%) were collected from June 29 to September 28, 2010, and then a total of 151 (analysis rate 79.5%) were used for the final analysis. First, 91.4% of food product purchases for school meals were contracted through competitive bidding, especially limited competitive bidding. It mainly consisted of agricultural products, processed food, and eco-friendly agricultural products (fruit). Second, 78.8% of schools purchased food products by negotiated contracts, while single negotiation accounted for 59.7%. Food products by negotiated contract consisted of meat, kimchi, and fish. Third, the purchase status of competitive bidding and negotiated contracts showed a significant difference in agricultural products (p〈0.001), fish (p〈0.001), meats (p〈0.001), poultry (p〈0.001), antibiotic-free poultry (p〈0.001), eco-friendly grain (p〈0.001), eco-friendly agricultural products (fruit) (p〈0.001), eco-friendly processed food (p〈0.001), processed products (p〈0.001), milk (p〈0.001) and general grain (p〈0.001) except for kimchi. Fourth, comparative analysis of supplier performance evaluation (on a 5-point Likert scale) of school foodservice showed that price of product of competitive bidding (3.73) was significantly higher than that of negotiated contract (2.95) (p〈0.001), and the overall performance level of the negotiated contract (3.85) was significantly higher than that of competitive bidding (3.61) (p〈0.01). The supplier performance evaluation levels of product packaging (p〈0.01), product quality at the time of delivery (p〈0.001), hygiene of products (p〈0.001), consistency to specification (p〈0.001), swiftness of return and exchange (p〈0.001), emergency delivery (p〈0.001), service of delivery staff (p〈0.05), and handling of complaints (p〈0.001) of negotiated contracts were significantly higher than those of competitive bidding of school foodservice. In conclusion, school foodservice selected food suppliers both by adopting competitive bidding and negotiated contracts. And there was a significant difference of school foodservice supplier performance between competitive bidding and negotiated contracts in Changwon, Korea.

입찰담합 규제에 대한 비교법적 연구 - 경쟁법과 공공조달법의 통합적 관점에서

김대인 한국경쟁법학회 2020 競爭法硏究 Vol.41 No.-

There are many regulatory tools toward bid-rigging such as corrective measure & surcharge under ‘Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act’, punishment for bidding interference, disqualification from bidding, and civil liabilities. Despite these various tools, bid-rigging is happening continually in Korea. To enhance the effectiveness of bid-rigging regulation, it is necessary to approach this issue from the holistic perspective of competition law and public procurement law. Korea and Japan are vulnerable to bid-rigging in comparison to United States (US) and European Union (EU) member states. The reason can be explained by Korea and Japan have 1) excessive competition structure in construction industry, 2) weak public procurement system to prevent bid-rigging, and 3) deficiencies in bid-rigging regulation effectiveness. US and EU member states are implementing flexible & competition-freindly contracting system such as competitive negotiation (US) and competitive dialogue (EU), and effective disqualification system such as administrative agreement (US) and self-cleaning (EU). Furthermore, US has strong competition law enforcement system which contributes to curtailing bid-rigging. Based on this analysis, following improvement can be suggested to regulate bid-rigging. First, bid-rigging, as a hard-core cartel, should be strictly regulated, and various regulation tools should be enforced according to the principle of proportionality. Second, public procurement system should be improved to allow more flexible and competition-friendly bidding mechanism. Third, the level of intensity of criminal sanction should be strengthened, self-cleaning system should be introduced in relation to disqualification system, and cooperation between relevant institutions should be enhanced.

계약자유의 관점에서 본 경쟁입찰의 문제점― 건설공사도급계약을 중심으로 ―

김세준 서울시립대학교 서울시립대학교 법학연구소 2014 서울법학 Vol.21 No.3

A competitive bidding is one of the way of contract that the state is a party. This could be a restriction to Liberty of Contract by forcing of certain method. Then it needs to examine whether the restriction is legal in the Civil Law. Following ‘Act on Contract that the State is a Party’, it is regulated that a successful bidder should be decided in order of who bidded for the lowest price. Lowest Bidding System is an outstanding example of such bidding. By the way Lowest Bidding System has a problem which is indirectly forced to orders received with a low price. So a bidder have to conclude a contract with loss. It is occurred to two problems, unfair exploitation of Article 104 Korean Civil Code and asymmetric information between contracting parties. And these are connected to a violation to Liberty of Contract. The common factor is that the price is the decisive factor in the bidding. Therefore the solution is needed. The one is that another factors are considered in the decision of successful bidder besides the price, and the other is that information exchanges are formed to be symmetric information by free dialogue between contracting parties. This can be made to an institutional form of Best Value Bidding System and Contract by Dialogue. This kind of institutional methods exclude a possibility of violation from Lowest Bidding System on free contract and can be approved as legal restriction of Liberty of Contract. 국가를 당사자로 하는 계약에서는 경쟁입찰이 계약체결의 한 방법이 된다. 경쟁입찰에서는 계약체결에 특정한 방식이 요구될 수 있고, 그 방식이나 내용에 따라 계약자유의 원칙이 제한될 가능성이 있다. 그렇다면 그 제한이 민법적으로 정당한 것인지에 대한 검토가 필요하다. ‘국가를 당사자로 하는 계약에 관한 법률’에 따르면 입찰자 중 최저가격으로 입찰한 자의 순으로 낙찰자를 결정하도록 되어 있다. 이를 대표적으로 보여주는 방식이 최저가낙찰제이다. 그런데 최저가낙찰제는 저가수주를 간접적으로 강제하는 구조적 문제점을 가지고 있으며 그에 따라 입찰자는 손해를 보는 계약을 체결하여야 하는 부담을 안게 될 수도 있다. 이는 민법 제104조의 불공정한 법률행위와 계약당사자 간의 정보비대칭성이라는 두 가지의 문제점으로 나타나며, 그 결과 계약자유에 대한 침해로 이어질 수 있다. 이 두 가지에 공통으로 원인이 되는 것은 가격이라는 요소가 입찰에 있어서 절대적인 기준이 된다는 점이다. 따라서 이에 대한 해결방안으로서 가격 외의 다른 요소를 낙찰자 결정기준으로 포함하는 것, 그리고 그러한 다양한 기준에 대해 계약당사자 간에 자유로운 협상을 통한 정보교류가 이루어져 정보대칭 상태를 형성하는 것이 필요하다. 이것은 최적가치낙찰제(혹은 종합평가낙찰제) 및 협상에 의한 계약체결방식이라는 제도적 형태로 구성할 수 있다. 이러한 제도적 제한은 기존의 최저가낙찰제가 가지고 있던 계약자유에 대한 침해가능성을 배제시키고 계약자유의 원칙에 대한 정당한 제한으로 인정될 수 있다.

입찰담합 : 입찰/경매 방해죄(형법 제315조)의 엄격한 적용 대상

이상현(Lee, Sang-Hyun) 한국형사법학회 2009 刑事法硏究 Vol.21 No.2

A bid-rigging, which causes much damages to bid-offerer, restrict competition on merits, and obstruct fairness of bid procedure, has been condoned by lenient interpretation of criminal bid/auction interference provision (Criminal Code sec.315) of Supreme Court of Korea as well as low penalty of the provision, although Fair Trade Commission has energetically run its surcharge on bid-riggers. On the other hand, the United States, Germany, and Japan has enacted severe penalty against bid-rigging by criminalization of collusive bidding. Even international organizations adopted resolutions recommending that member countries enact domestic law prohibiting hard core cartels including bid-rigging. Among penalty provisions targetting at bid-rigging in other laws, sec.315 needs to operate as general law penalizing collusive bidding as rules interpreting sec.315 and sentencing under the section can influence rules and sentencings under Monopoly Restraint Fair Trade Act and Construction Industries Standard Act which includes penalty against bid-rigging. Hesitant attitudes of Supreme Court regarding punishing collusive bidders, based on obsolete defense of destructive competition, should be replaced by strong penalty along with straightforward application of sec.315. Systematic improvement of bid/auction institutions will more effectively address concerns about low-quality product and destructive competition than the existent lenient practices.

A Strategy Bayesian Model to Predict Profit of Construction Projects

Sunghyuk Park,Sangyong Kim 대한건축학회 2011 Architectural research Vol.13 No.3

Competitive bidding in construction is concerned with contractors making strategic decisions in respect of determination of bid price if contractors opt to bid. This study presents a strategy model for deciding optimum tender price with reflecting appropriate profit in competitive bidding using Bayesian regression analysis (BRA). The purpose of the developed model is to help contractors to secure suitable profitability by predicting the actual profit based on key variables. They may affect construction cost at bidding phase, ultimately which help contractors to secure high quality output. The model was tested empirically by application to a bidding dataset collected from a large South Korea contractor. BRA allows contractors to estimate more accurate actual profit by reflecting not only objective information but also subjective experiences and judgments. Consequently, the model can contribute to improvement of decision-making process for setting an optimum tender price.

A Strategy Bayesian Model to Predict Profit of Construction Projects

박성혁,김상용 대한건축학회 2011 Architectural research Vol.13 No.3

Competitive bidding in construction is concerned with contractors making strategic decisions in respect of determination of bid price if contractors opt to bid. This study presents a strategy model for deciding optimum tender price with reflecting appropriate profit in competitive bidding using Bayesian regression analysis (BRA). The purpose of the developed model is to help contractors to secure suitable profitability by predicting the actual profit based on key variables. They may affect construction cost at bidding phase, ultimately which help contractors to secure high quality output. The model was tested empirically by application to a bidding dataset collected from a large South Korea contractor. BRA allows contractors to estimate more accurate actual profit by reflecting not only objective information but also subjective experiences and judgments. Consequently, the model can contribute to improvement of decision-making process for setting an optimum tender price.

A Strategy Bayesian Model to Predict Profit of Construction Projects

Park, Sung-Hyuk,Kim, Sang-Yong Architectural Institute of Korea 2011 Architectural research Vol.13 No.3

Competitive bidding in construction is concerned with contractors making strategic decisions in respect of determination of bid price if contractors opt to bid. This study presents a strategy model for deciding optimum tender price with reflecting appropriate profit in competitive bidding using Bayesian regression analysis (BRA). The purpose of the developed model is to help contractors to secure suitable profitability by predicting the actual profit based on key variables. They may affect construction cost at bidding phase, ultimately which help contractors to secure high quality output. The model was tested empirically by application to a bidding dataset collected from a large South Korea contractor. BRA allows contractors to estimate more accurate actual profit by reflecting not only objective information but also subjective experiences and judgments. Consequently, the model can contribute to improvement of decision-making process for setting an optimum tender price.

공정거래법상 입찰담합규제 활성화 방안에 관한 고찰 -건설시장을 중심으로-

신영수 한국상사법학회 2008 商事法硏究 Vol.27 No.1

As the new government launches, the role of the Korean Fair Trade Commission(herein after ‘KFTC’) as the regulatory agency on large conglomerates is forecasted to be rapidly diminished. Inherent function of the KFTC as the competition authority on the other hand is expected to be getting more emphasized. In this transforming circumstances, the regulations on cartel, especially on ‘bid-rigging’ seems to be one of core area on which the KFTC would concentrate its enforcement capacity. Bid-rigging is the representative sort of naked cartel under the competition law, but, as for the KFTC, regulating it has been a very difficult work to catch and eradicate. Particularly in the korean construction market, so it is, in that bid-riggings have been arising from various complicated reasons. First of all, construction companies protest that the korean market faces oversupply due to recent deregulation on the market, so bid-rigging should be understood as a inevitable response in order to survive. Another important cause is current construction policies and systems which are inclined to induce the anticompetitive agreement around bidders. Especially regarding the latter aspect, unilateral legislative or practical improvement of the current construction institutions for the purpose of removing the cartel inducing factors is not only uneasy to propel but also indesirable considering complex regulatory factors such as safety and quality of construction. In this context, this article attempted to some institutional suggestion to activate the regulation on bid-rigging mainly with the antitrust angle. For that purpose, it made on analysis of anticompetitive practices and environments in the korean construction market, and reviewed legitimacy and limitation of the current legal system. Upon this basis of examination on the recent regulatory reformation against bid-rigging in U.S. and Japan, it suggested overall directions and several concrete ideas for early perception and effective restraints of bid-rigging. As the new government launches, the role of the Korean Fair Trade Commission(herein after ‘KFTC’) as the regulatory agency on large conglomerates is forecasted to be rapidly diminished. Inherent function of the KFTC as the competition authority on the other hand is expected to be getting more emphasized. In this transforming circumstances, the regulations on cartel, especially on ‘bid-rigging’ seems to be one of core area on which the KFTC would concentrate its enforcement capacity. Bid-rigging is the representative sort of naked cartel under the competition law, but, as for the KFTC, regulating it has been a very difficult work to catch and eradicate. Particularly in the korean construction market, so it is, in that bid-riggings have been arising from various complicated reasons. First of all, construction companies protest that the korean market faces oversupply due to recent deregulation on the market, so bid-rigging should be understood as a inevitable response in order to survive. Another important cause is current construction policies and systems which are inclined to induce the anticompetitive agreement around bidders. Especially regarding the latter aspect, unilateral legislative or practical improvement of the current construction institutions for the purpose of removing the cartel inducing factors is not only uneasy to propel but also indesirable considering complex regulatory factors such as safety and quality of construction. In this context, this article attempted to some institutional suggestion to activate the regulation on bid-rigging mainly with the antitrust angle. For that purpose, it made on analysis of anticompetitive practices and environments in the korean construction market, and reviewed legitimacy and limitation of the current legal system. Upon this basis of examination on the recent regulatory reformation against bid-rigging in U.S. and Japan, it suggested overall directions and several concrete ideas for early perception and effective restraints of bid-rigging.

C2C 옥션 플랫폼 사용자의 충동적 입찰행동에 관한 연구

박상철 ( Park Sang Cheol ),김종욱 ( Kim Jong Uk ) 한국정보시스템학회 2016 情報시스템硏究 Vol.25 No.4

Purpose While the popularity of C2C auction platforms such as eBay is gradually decreased, this domain is still undermined to explain online bidding behaviors. Online bidders sometimes engage in impulsive bidding due to some of the online auction characteristics. Therefore, this study develops and tests a model of the impulsive bidding exhibited by online bidders in C2C auction platforms. Based on S-O-R framework, our model posits that both perceived time-pressure and competition intensity affect cognitive absorption which ultimately influences the impulsive bidding. Design/methodology/approach This study collected survey data from 214 C2C auction participants, who have prior experience on impulsive bidding and tested both measurement model and structural model by using CB-SEM (covariate-based structural equation modelling) technique. In this study, by using AMOS 20.0, we tested the measurement model for its overall fit, item reliability, and validity and further conducted the structural model to test our proposed hypotheses. Findings Based on our results, we found that perceived tim-pressure and competition intensity were positively related to cognitive absorption. We also found that the cognitive absorption was positively associated with impulsive bidding behavior. In this study, by developing our research model in S-O-R framework, we provide an alternative theoretical mechanism to describe online impulsive bidding behavior.

공공투자사업의 입·낙찰 분석

김정욱 한국개발연구원 2010 KDI Journal of Economic Policy (KDI JEP) Vol.32 No.2

This paper considers the effect of various types of procurement auction system on competition focusing on the rate of successful bidding. We analyze the number of bidders and the rate of successful bids using online procurement data of the Public Procurement Service. The average number of bidders is 301 and the average rate of successful bids is 87.42% while the weighted average rate is 75.13%. These numbers show that there is quite strong competition among bidders and the rate is lower as the expected price is higher. When we analyze the data of price procurement auction, the rate is also shown to be lower as the expected price is higher. Furthermore, the rate decreases as the number of bidders increases which naturally makes the competition stronger. Meanwhile, the analysis finds that the inclusion of the onsite bidding, the PQ(Pre-Qualification) result, or major-10 winning companies cannot explain the rate much in our data. In case of turnkey-alternative, the average rate of successful bidding for 484 cases record 90.20%. The average is 84.89% with 120 alternatives and 91.97% with 364 cases of turnkey. The reason why the rate of turnkey-alternative is lower than that of price procurement auction is the lack of competition as well as the systematic difference. By setting up a model, we are able to explain the difference in rate caused by the respective reason. When we suppose there are 3 bidders in case of price procurement auction for a project that exceeds 100 billion won, the rate is expected to be around 64%. This implies that difference of 26% is caused by the systemic difference and 3% by the lack of competition. Therefore, we conclude that the difference in rate between turnkey-alternative and price procurement auction is caused mainly by the systemic difference. In case of PPP(Public Private Partnership) projects, among 154 projects in total, only 40% has more than 2 bidders that compete. The average number of bidders is 1.88 which is less than 2, and the average rate of successful bids is 90%. In sum, under the price procurement auction, there is strong competition which is reflected by the rate of successful bids. However, there is room to decrease the rate by strengthening the competition under the turnkey-alternative. Also with PPP projects, we expect the rate can be steadily reduced with revived competition among bidders. 공공투자사업에서는 최저가낙찰제, 턴키제도, 대안입찰제 등 다양한 방식이 사용되고 있다. 최근 가격경쟁을 통한 효율성 제고를 주목적으로 하는 최저가낙찰제가 확대되어 시행되고 있다. 본 논문은 우리나라 입·낙찰제도의 현황과 특징을 파악하고 대형공공투자사업에 주로 적용되는 최저가낙찰제, 턴키·대안 입찰제도하에서의 가격경쟁효과가 직접적으로 드러나는 낙찰률을 비교 분석하는 것에 의미가 있다. 각 입찰제도의 성과는 경쟁의 행태에 달려 있음을 고려하여 경쟁률과 낙찰률을 중심으로 여러 입찰제도의 입·낙찰 현황을 분석하였다. 1,000억원 이상 사업의 경우 최저가낙찰제하에서 평균입찰참여자 수가 33.75명이며 평균 낙찰률은 61.18%로 나타났다. 이는 턴키․대안입찰제의 평균 입찰참여자수 2.94명과 평균 낙찰률 90.20%와 큰 차이를 보이며, 최저가낙찰제의 경우 규모의 차이를 고려한다 하더라도 낙찰률이 현저히 낮으며 경쟁의 정도가 심한 것을 확인할 수 있다. 이러한 낙찰률의 차이는 근본적으로 제도의 차이로 해석할 수 있으며 경쟁의 차이로도 일부 해석할 수 있다. 민간투자사업의 경우, 평균 입찰자참여자수는 1.88이며 평균 낙찰률은 90%에 이르고 있어 경쟁 활성화로 인해 효율성을 제고할 여지가 있음을 제시하였다.