민사관습법에 대한 헌법적 통제

이홍민 단국대학교 법학연구소 2018 법학논총 Vol.42 No.3

Customary laws refer to practices that have become the rule of law because of theopinio juris sive necessitatis. The customary laws as such are recognized as standardsfor trials under Article 1 of the Civil Act despite that the grounds for recognizingtheir existence are not clear unlike written laws. However, in order for the customarylaws as such to be recognized as the rule of law, they should not violate theconstitution and there are conflicts of opinions regarding which judicial authoritybetween the court and the Constitutional Court should examine whether the customarylaws as such are in violation of the constitution. The Constitutional Court focuses onthe aspect of the effect of the customary laws and argues that the customary lawshave the same effect as the law and that since the Constitutional Court shouldexamine whether the law is in violation of the constitution, the Constitutional Courtshould also examine whether the customary laws are in violation of the constitution. On the other hand, the Supreme Court focuses on the aspect of the validity of thecustomary laws and argues that for the customary laws to have the effect as the law,the opinio juris sive necessitatis of the public in general should be recognized andsince the recognition as such requires judgments on facts, the court should examinewhether the customary laws are in violation of the constitution. However, both ofthese two positions are not valid. First, when the customary laws are assumed to be standards for trials, whether ornot to apply the customary laws is entirely up to the court, which is in charge oftrials. Since the constitutionality of general laws is assumed in a sense of respecting the legislative organization under the principle of division of powers, whether or noteach law is in violation of the constitution is not required to be examined in everytrial but the judgment on whether a law is in violation of the constitution isrequested to the Constitutional Court only when the law is particularly suspected tobe in violation of the constitution and judgment is made according to the result ofexamination by the Constitutional Court. However, constitutionality cannot be assumedfor customary laws since the principle of division of powers cannot be applied tocustomary laws. Therefore, for the opinio juris sive necessitatis of the public ingeneral to be recognized as a requirement for the validity of customary laws, itshould conform to the constitution. Therefore, for customary laws to be applied asstandards for trials, whether they are in violation of the constitution should beexamined by the court. Meanwhile, there are cases where the court cannot examine whether a customarylaw is in violation of the constitution. First, such cases include cases where whethera customary law is in violation of the constitution is related to whether a separatelaw is in violation of the constitution. In such cases, the customary law cannot bejudged to be unconstitutional without examining whether the relevant law is inviolation of the constitution, and since the examination of whether a law isunconstitutional or not is entirely up to the Constitutional Court, the court cannotexamine whether the customary law is unconstitutional or not until theConstitutional Court judges that the law is unconstitutional. Second, as withcustomary laws regarding inheritance, in cases where customary laws in the pastshould be judged, it is difficult to investigate and judge whether the customary lawswere in violation of the constitution when the customary laws were established. Insuch case, the court shall wait for the judgment of the Constitutional Court andproceed with trials based on the judgment because unlike the Constitutional Court,which can examine whether old laws are in violation of the constitution based onthe current constitution, the court should examine whether customary laws are inviolation of the constitution based on the constitution at the time when thecustomary l... 관습법이란 관행이 법적 확신에 의해 법규범으로 된 것을 의미한다. 이러한관습법은 성문법처럼 그 존재를 인식할 수 있는 근거가 명확한 것이 아님에도민법 제1조에 의해 재판기준으로 인정된다. 그런데 이런 관습법의 위헌 여부를 법원과 헌법재판소 중 어느 사법기관에서 심사할 것인지에 대해 견해의 대립이 있다. 그러나 기존의 논의는 관습법의 위헌 여부에 대한 심사를 법원과헌법재판소 중 어느 한 쪽 이 독점적으로 수행해야 한다는 것으로서, 법원과헌법재판소는 서로 대립하는 기관이 아니라 국민의 권리를 보호하기 위한 기능을 함께 담당하고 있는 사법기관으로서 서로 조화를 이룰 수 있도록 해야할 것이라는 점에서 동의하기 어렵다. 법원에서 관습법을 확인하기 위하여 관습법의 성립요건으로서 관행과 법적 확신이 존재하는지 판단할 때에, 헌법에 반하는 관습에 대한 국민 일반의 법적 확신이 인정될 수는 없으므로, 관습법을 인정하기 위해서는 필연적으로 당해 관행에 대한 법적 확신이 헌법질서에 반하는지 여부에 대하여 판단할 수밖에 없다. 이 점에서 법원은 관습법의 위헌여부에 대해 심사할 수 있다고 볼수 있다. 한편 관습법은 국민 일반의 법적 확신에 의하여 법규범성을 인정받게 된다는 점에서, 국민주권을 바탕으로 하는 헌법상 대의제를 통한 국회의입법이 가지는 정당성과 같은 수준의 정당성을 인정해야 하므로, 법률로서의효력이 인정된다고 할 수 있다. 이처럼 관습법에 대한 법률로서의 효력은 이미 대법원과 헌법재판소 모두 인정하고 있기도 하다. 그렇다면 관습법에 대한헌법재판소의 위헌법률심사 역시 가능하다고 해야 한다. 다만 법원과 헌법재판소가 중복하여 관습법의 위헌여부를 심사하는 것은재판소원을 금지하고 있는 취지에 반할 우려가 있다. 이러한 우려를 피하기위해서는 원칙적으로 법원이 관습법이 헌법에 합치하는지 심사한 경우 헌법재판소가 다시 심사하는 것은 적절하지 않다고 생각한다. 다만 이는 어디까지나두 사법기관의 중복된 심사를 피하기 위한 것이므로, 중복된 심사가 발생할우려가 없는 경우이거나, 또는 다른 사정에 의하여 법원에서 판단할 수 없는경우라고 한다면 재판소원을 금지하는 취지에 반할 우려가 없으므로, 헌법재판소에서 그 위헌여부를 심사해야 할 것이다. 이런 경우로는 과거의 관습법에대해 현행 헌법에 따라 판단해야 하는 경우와 관습법이 형식적 의미의 법률을전제로 하고 있어서 관습법의 위헌여부를 판단하기 위해서는 그 전에 법률의위헌여부에 대한 판단이 전제되는 경우, 두 가지 경우를 들 수 있다.

법령에 대한 헌법소원에 관한 고찰

여운국 사법발전재단 2011 사법 Vol.1 No.15

“모두 헌법을 읽자!”는 표어로 전 국민 헌법 읽기 운동이 전개되고 있다. 우리가 그 동안 우리의 실정헌법에 얼마나 관심과 애정을 가졌는지, 그리고 헌법 조문 하나하나를 정성스럽게 읽어 본 있이 있는지 자문해본다. 특히 우리나라는 근대화 이후 서양의 법체계를 받아들인 이른바 계수법 국가이다. 우리는 그 동안 우리 실정헌법 조문에 관심을 가지기 보다는 외국 헌법에 대한 비교법적 연구에 치중해온 점을 부인하기 어렵다. 헌법소원심판은 1987년 여야 합의에 의한 개헌안 마련 과정에서 도입되었는데, 당시에는 독일식 헌법소원제도에 대한 이해가 부족한 상태였다. 헌법 입안자들은 협상을 서두르기 위하여 헌법소원의 대상은 장래 법률로 정하기로 하고 성급하게 헌법소원제도를 도입했다. 우리가 독일 기본법 및 연방헌법재판소법에 관한 비교법적 연구를 함에 있어 항상 주의할 바가 있다. 우리나라의 헌법ㆍ헌법재판소법과 독일의 기본법ㆍ연방헌법재판소법은 그 내용이 다르다는 점이다. 우리 헌법상 사법권은 대법원을 정점으로 한 법원에 속하지만, 독일 기본법상 사법권은 연방헌법재판소를 정점으로 한 각 재판소에 속한다. 우리 헌법 제107조 제2항은 “명령ㆍ규칙 또는 처분이 헌법이나 법률에 위반되는 여부가 재판의 전제가 된 경우에는 대법원은 이를 최종적으로 심사할 권한을 가진다.”고 규정하고 있는데, 독일 기본법상으로는 이러한 조항 자체가 없다. 헌법재판소법을 살펴보면, 독일 연방헌법재판소법 제93조 제3항, 제95조 제3항은 명문의 규정으로 ‘법률을 직접 대상으로 하는 헌법소원’을 인정하고 있으나, 우리 헌법재판소법에는 그러한 조항이 없다. 따라서 헌법 제111조 제1항 제5호가 정한 ‘법률이 정하는 헌법소원에 관한 심판’ 부분을 해석함에 있어서도 독일의 판례와 학설을 무비판적으로 수용해서는 안 될 것이다. 우리 헌법재판소는 ‘법원의 제청에 의한 법률의 위헌여부’ 심판을 담당한다(헌법 제111조 제1항 제1호). 우리 헌법을 순수하게 문리해석하면 국민의 대표인 국회에서 제정된 법률을 위헌으로 결정하기 위해서는 ‘법원의 제청’이라는 1차적인 심사절차를 거치도록 하고 있다. 또한 우리 헌법 제107조 제2항은 명령ㆍ규칙에 대한 최종적인 위헌심사권을 대법원에 부여하고 있다. 독일에서는 법률 및 명령ㆍ규칙을 직접 대상으로 한 헌법소원이 인정된다. 그러나 이러한 독일식 헌법소원제도는 우리나라의 실정헌법 및 헌법재판소법 조항과는 합치되지 않는다. 법률 및 명령ㆍ규칙을 직접 대상으로 한 헌법소원은 우리나라의 현행 헌법 및 헌법재판소법 하에서는 허용될 수 없다고 본다. 즉 우리 헌법 제111조 제1항은 구체적 규범통제제도를 채택하여 법률이 헌법에 위반되는 경우 그것이 재판의 전제가 된 경우에 한해서 그 효력을 다툴 수 있도록 하고 있다. 따라서 법률에 의해 국민의 기본권이 침해된 경우라고 하더라도 그 문제가 구체적인 쟁송사건으로 법원에 계속되지 않는 경우에는 위헌심판이 불가하고, 헌법소원의 대상도 되지 않는다. 또한 명령ㆍ규칙의 경우에도 헌법 제107조 제2항이 대법원의 최종적인 심사권을 명확히 규정하고 있으므로 헌법소원의 대상으로 보기 어렵다. 그럼에도 불구하고 법률 및 명령ㆍ규칙에 대한 헌법소원이 가능하다는 것이 확고한 헌법재판소 판례로 자리를 잡은 상태이다. 이는 일종의 헌법변천이라고 할 ... One Korean law professor advocated a slogan, “Let's read our Constitution!” in recent years. We, regretfully, lack interests in and love for our own Constitution. It is well known that Korea adopted western law system. Also, it is hard to deny that we paid little attention to our own Constitution and focused too much on issues regarding comparative researches between the Korean Constitution and foreign Constitutions. The Constitutional complaint was established in 1987 by the consensus between the then ruling party and the opposition party during the process of Amendment to the Constitution. At that time, most of Korean people did not have much understanding about the German style Constitutional complaint. The drafters of the Korean Constitutional Amendment rushed to draw a conclusion and adopted the Constitutional complaint system leaving too much upon congressional legislation. Whenever we conduct a comparative research on the German Constitution and the Federal Constitutional Court Act, we need to be fully aware of the fact that the Korean Constitution and the Constitutional Court Act is different from those of Germany in many aspects. Above all, whereas the Korean Constitution provided that judicial power is endowed to the courts, the German Constitution vests the Constitutional Court and other subordinate courts with Judicial power. Moreover, while the Article 107 (2) of the Korean Constitution says that “The Supreme Court shall have the power to make a final review of the constitutionality or legality of administrative decrees, regulations or actions, when the constitutionality or legality thereof is at issue in a trial.”, there is no such corresponding provision in the German Constitution. Similarly, while the German Federal Constitutional Court Act clearly allows a Constitutional complaint directly targeting laws which are supposedly against the Constitution, the Korean Constitution does not so. Therefore, when we interpret the Korean Constitution Article 111(1)(5), dealing with ‘Constitutional complaint as prescribed by laws’, we should not uncritically accept German precedents and theories without the full understanding of undeniable differences between the German Constitution and the Korean Constitution. The Korean Constitutional Court shall have the jurisdiction over the constitutionality of a law upon the request of a court pursuant to the Article 111(1)(1) of the Korean Constitution. If we interpret the Korean Constitution purely literally, the invalidation of laws enacted by the National Assembly requires “the request of the courts” as a prerequisite thereof. In addition, the Supreme Court of Korea shall have the power to make a final review of the constitutionality of administrative decrees and regulations. The Constitutional complaint about laws, administrative decrees and regulations are allowed in Germany. However, this German style constitutional complaint system in not analogous to the Korean Constitution and the Constitutional Court Act. I think the Constitutional complaints directly targeting laws supposedly against the Constitution is not in conformity with the Korean Constitution. In other words, we can invalidate a law pursuant to the Article 111(1)(1) of the Korean Constitution only when the constitutionality of a law become an issue in a trial. Therefore, even though a person's Constitutional right is infringed upon by a law supposedly against the Constitution, the review of that law by the Constitutional Court is impossible and the Constitutional complaint about that law is not allowed unless the constitutionality of that law is not at issue in a trial. Moreover, administrative decrees and regulations can not be invalidated by the Constitutional complaint since the Article 107(2) of the Korean Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall have the power to make a final review of the constitutionality or legality thereof. Nevertheless, a Constitutional complaint about laws, ...

The "Highest Court" In Federal Systems

( George A. Bermann ) 국제헌법학회, 한국학회 2005 世界憲法硏究 Vol.11 No.2

The courts of last resort within States bear an enormous responsibility for the law, since unless and until the political branches of government have spoken, it is these courts, that ultimately decide what the law means, and it is they who take responsibility for legal coherence within the polity they serve. Of course, even that statement does not go nearly far enough: some - not all - highest courts also determine whether and to what extent decisions taken by the political branches comply with the polity`s basic constitutional precepts and are entitled to be enforced. Such "highest courts" are thus also "constitutional" courts in the fullest sense of that term. My focus is highest courts in federal systems, and federal systems immediately raise threshold definitional issues. First, what is the "highest court" in a federal system? Is it, almost as if definitionally, the highest court at the federal level? Or does it also include (within a sphere that has to be delineated of course) the highest courts at the level of the constituent states? Second, when there happens to be a multiplicity of nominally supreme courts at either the state or the federal level, which court is "the highest" among them? Is it the court or court whose job it is to give authoritative interpretations of legislation (to state what the law is - be it state or federal - and what it means), or is it the court - assuming that a separate one exists at the federal level for these purposes - that authoritatively determines the constitutionality of legislation, if challenged? All this is to say that, as in other areas of human endeavor - notably architecture - form follows function. It is idle to designate a court or courts as "highest" without first identifying the judicial functions to be performed. Thus, in a judicially complex federal system, there can be (a) a highest court and (depending on specialization) possibly several highest courts for the interpretation and understanding of the law of the constituent states. (b) a highest court for determinations of the constitutionality of constituent state law under the state constitution, (c) a highest court and (depending on specialization) possibly several highest courts for the interpretation and understanding of federal law, and (d) a highest court for determinations of the constitutionality of federal law, and possibly also state law, under the federal constitution. It is auspicious, for heuristic purposes, that we are sitting in Germany. But even this laborious catalogue of conceivable highest courts can be further complicated by the possibility of having yet a separate court - on the French Tribunal des Conflits model - whose function is to decide in which order of courts within a complex court system a given case belongs, in the event of conflict over that purely jurisdictional question. If I am correct that there are numerous logically defensible ways in which to organize "supreme" judicial authority within federal systems, the designers of federal constitutions have considerable architectural license. Whatever the drafters or the U.S. Constitution may have originally and specifically intended, they created - or left open - the possibility that centralized in the U.S. Supreme Court would be final authority to determine both the meaning and federal constitutionality of federal law and the federal constitutionality of state law. The further and related, but really not surprising, move that the Supreme Court made was to consider that questions of state vs. federal legislative competence represent constitutional questions and that, as such, their resolution therefore also fell within the Supreme Court`s purview. And so, it is today unquestioned - though it is still not inscribed in the U.S. federal constitutional document - that the Supreme Court would ultimately determine the outer limits of federal legislative authority and state legislative authority vis-a-vis each other. It has, we might say, Kompetenz/Ko

노동법적 시각에서 본 헌법재판소의 입법정책기능

문무기 한국법정책학회 2008 법과 정책연구 Vol.8 No.2

The numerous revisions of Labor-related Laws since 1960s were focused on maintaining political stability and national security at the expense of the Fundamental Labor Rights of workers. The fruits of rapid economic growth were not distributed equally among the stake-holders. The changes seen in the labor following 1987 in Korea can be classified into those driven by the Great Worker Struggle and the democratization movement following the "6·29 Democratic Declaration" which continued up to 1997. And the subsequent series of revisions between Feb. 1998 to Nowadays, sparked by the Asian financial crisis and the "2·6 Compromise" of 1998. Labor-related Laws prior to 1987 had been characterized by restriction and suppression of labor movements and the three basic labor right, and the compensatory over-protection offered to the workers. In the light of the situation, the discussions on and the revision of Labor Laws following 1987 up till nowadays took on a new paradigm. Efforts were made to eliminate the rigidity of Labor laws and to reverse their restrictive keynote. This paper has made analysis of 46 judicial cases of the Constitutional Court following 1987 up till nowadays in statistic analysis and legal research. In the field of the Law-making of Labor-related Laws, the role of the Constitutional Court was not be satisfied with legislative results, in roughly speaking. To makes thing worse, the Constitutional Court had not maintained neutrality between progressivism and conservatism. They had kept conservative ideas and gone backward to the main stream of the democratization movement at sometimes. Therefore it required to reconsider what was the constitutional principles of three Fundamental Labor Rights of workers when it enacted in 1948. The numerous revisions of Labor-related Laws since 1960s were focused on maintaining political stability and national security at the expense of the Fundamental Labor Rights of workers. The fruits of rapid economic growth were not distributed equally among the stake-holders. The changes seen in the labor following 1987 in Korea can be classified into those driven by the Great Worker Struggle and the democratization movement following the "6·29 Democratic Declaration" which continued up to 1997. And the subsequent series of revisions between Feb. 1998 to Nowadays, sparked by the Asian financial crisis and the "2·6 Compromise" of 1998. Labor-related Laws prior to 1987 had been characterized by restriction and suppression of labor movements and the three basic labor right, and the compensatory over-protection offered to the workers. In the light of the situation, the discussions on and the revision of Labor Laws following 1987 up till nowadays took on a new paradigm. Efforts were made to eliminate the rigidity of Labor laws and to reverse their restrictive keynote. This paper has made analysis of 46 judicial cases of the Constitutional Court following 1987 up till nowadays in statistic analysis and legal research. In the field of the Law-making of Labor-related Laws, the role of the Constitutional Court was not be satisfied with legislative results, in roughly speaking. To makes thing worse, the Constitutional Court had not maintained neutrality between progressivism and conservatism. They had kept conservative ideas and gone backward to the main stream of the democratization movement at sometimes. Therefore it required to reconsider what was the constitutional principles of three Fundamental Labor Rights of workers when it enacted in 1948.

EC법상 이행강제소송에 관한 소고

김두수 ( Kim Doo-su ) 한국외국어대학교 법학연구소 2006 외법논집 Vol.21 No.-

The Court of Justice either finds the infringement made out or dismisses the application. The judgment finding the failure to fulfil obligations is purely declaratory. The infringement existed before the Court made its finding. It does not have the power to require specific measures to be taken in order to give effect to the judgment. At the most, it may indicate such measures as it considers necessary in order to eliminate the infringement found. In addition, the Court may not set a period of time for compliance with its judgment, since Article 228(ex Article 177) of the EC Treaty does not confer power on it to do so. Equally, the Court may not declare acts(or failures to act) on the part of a Member State unlawful, void or not applicable. Only the national courts have the power to do so under national law. The Court of Justice may find only that the act(or failure to act) was or was not contrary to Community law. Article 228( ex Article 171)(1) of the EC Treaty puts the Member State which has been found by the Court of Justice to have failed to fulfil its Treaty obligations under a duty to take the necessary measures to comply with the Court's judgment. That duty, which also arises because the judgment has the force of res judicata, entails a prohibition having the full force of law against applying a national rule held to be incompatible with Community law and an obligation to take every measure to enable Community law to be fully applied. The duty to give effect to the Court's judgment is borne by all institutions of the Member State concerned within the fields covered by their respective powers. The legislative and executive authorities have to bring the offending provisions of domestic law into conformity with the requirements of Community law. The courts of the Member State concerned have to disregard those provisions in determining cases. The judgment finding the infringement of Community law does not as such confer any rights on individuals. Individuals may not rely directly on such a judgment before the national courts, but only on the “provision” of Community law having direct effect which the judgment finds has been infringed by the Member State. In the event that an individual pleads a provision of Community law in his defence which does not have direct effect, but which has been found by the Court of Justice to have been infringed by the Member State concerned, the national court, as an institution of that Member State, must ensure in the exercise of its functions that it is complied with by applying national law in such a way that it is compatible with the obligations that-according to the judgment of the Court-ensure from Community law for that Member State. The finding of a failure to fulfil obligations may potentially form the basis for liability on the part of the Member State concerned. However, it appears from the case law that a Member State may incur liability only in the case of a sufficiently serious breach of Community law. A judgment finding a failure to fulfil obligations is in itself not enough, certainly not for loss or damage which arose before judgment was given. The requirement for a “sufficiently serious breach” of Community law does not square completely with the strict or objective nature of an action for failure to fulfil obligations, since the Court of Justice also takes other factors into account where the Member State had a discretion in applying Community law, such as whether or not the breach was intentional and whether any mistake of law was excusable. It is self-evident that if the failure to fulfil obligations continues after delivery of the judgment declaring the Member State concerned to be in breach of its obligations, that itself will constitute a sufficiently serious breach of Community law and cause the Member State to incur liability to make good any loss or damage which occurred in that period. In addition, it must be noted that the Community provision infringed must confer a “right” on individuals in order for the issue of state liability to arise. It follows that a finding of an infringement in proceedings under Articles 226~227( ex Articles 169-170) of the EC Treaty does not automatically result in the Member State concerned incurring liability under Community law. Yet it may well be that the Member State will incur liability in damages under national law for loss or damage caused by an infringement of a Community provision even though that provision does not directly confer any “right” on individuals. The Treaty itself does not specify the period within which the judgment must be complied with, but the Court of Justice has held that the process must be initiated at once and completed as soon as possible. Because the judgment has the force of res judicata,the Commission may not make an application for interim measures pursuant to Article 243(ex Article 186) of the EC Treaty in order to require the Member State to desist from an infringement of Community law which has already been found by judgment of the Court of Justice. This is because the Member State is required to take the necessary measures under Article 228(ex Article 171)(1) of the EC Treaty. No further decision of the Court, in interlocutory or other proceedings, is required. Where the Commission sought such interim measures, the Court held that they were not necessary within the meaning of Article 243 of the EC Treaty.

독일의 사회법 분쟁 해결과 사회법원의 역할

차성안 한국사회보장법학회 2019 사회보장법학 Vol.8 No.1

The German social court is one of five German courts divided into five sectors. The German social court handles between 300,000 and 400,000 social law litigation cases each year. This amounts to 10% of the total cases filed every year in all German courts. German social court judges are appointed as judges of social courts and are dedicated to social law cases in separate social courts. There is no reshuffle of judges between the social courts and other courts. As a result, social court judges have a very high level of expertise in social law cases. In addition to the professional judges, the social courts have the lay judge system in which citizens participate in judgement. The lay judge system enhances the transparency of the social court decision process and enables the participation of experts in judgement. Particularly, participation of ordinary citizens as lay judges brings the development of intensive oral argument system and increases the persuasiveness of judgments. There are plaintiff-friendly procedural principles that enhance access of the beneficiaries to litigation in social court proceedings. The exemption from the litigation expenses for beneficiaries, the generous legal aid for attorneys' fees, the representation of litigants by personnel (including non-lawyers) of the organizations for social security beneficiaries, mitigating the formality of litigation documents such as complaints and the principle of ex officio investigation. These principles of plaintiff-friendly procedure greatly alleviate the burden of litigation when the plaintiff sues. The mandatory type of injunction in social court proceedings could be useful, when lawsuits are brought against the denial of benefits. In order to improve the procedure of social security litigation in Korean courts, there can be proposed the establishment of social courts dedicated to social law cases, the establishment of labor-social courts dedicated to labor cases and social law cases or the establishment of special department of social law cases in the administrative courts. In addition, the amendment of the procedural law, which introduces principles of plaintiff-friendly procedure to improve access to social security litigation procedures, needs to be reviewed. In this process, it is necessary to think in the Korean context about issues such as the function and role of the lay judges, the exemption of litigation expenses for the beneficiaries and the expansion of the legal aid. However, the Korean social security legislation delegates excessively legislative enforcement to the (presidential) Enforcement Decree and the (ministerial) Enforcement Regulations. This multi-level delegated legislative structure effectively deprives judges of the right to interpret the social law on the requirements and effects of social security benefits. Without fundamentally correcting these legislative situations, it is difficult to fundamentally improve the social law litigation procedure. 독일 사회법원은 독일의 5개 분야별로 존재하는 법원들 중 하나이다. 독일 사회법원은 매년 30~40만 건의 사회법 분쟁 소송사건을 처리하고 있다. 이는 독일의 모든 법원들이 매년 처리하는 전체 소송사건의 10%에 달한다. 독일 사회법원 판사들은 사회법원 판사로 임용되어 특별한 사정이 없는 한 평생 분리된 사회법원에서 사회보장 사건만을 전담한다. 다른 분야의 법원들과의 법관 인사교류가 없다. 이로 인해 사회법원 판사들은 사회보장법 사건에 관하여 매우 높은 전문성을 가지게 된다. 사회 법원에는 직업법관들 외에 일반시민이 참심 형태로 참여하는 명예법관 제도가 1, 2, 3심에 모두 존재한다. 명예법관 제도는 사회법원 판결과정의 투명성을 높이고, 전문가의 참여를 가능케 한다. 특히 일반 시민이 명예법관으로서 판결에 참여하는 것은 집중구술심리 제도의 발달을 가져오고, 판결의 설득력을 높여 준다. 사회법원 소송 절차에는 소송에 대한 접근성을 높여주는 원고친화적인 절차원칙이 존재한다. 수급자에 대한 소송비용 면제, 변호사 비용에 대한 광범위한 소송구조, 사회보장수급자 단체 직원(비변호사 포함)에 의한 소송대리, 소장의 형식성 완화, 직권탐지주의 등이 그것이다. 이런 원고친화적 소송절차 원칙들은 원고가 소송을 제기할 때 지는 부담을 크게 완화시켜 준다. 의무이행 또는 일반적 이행소송이나 가명령 등은 수익적 급여의 거부처분에 대하여 소송을 제기할 때 유용한 소송유형이다. 한국 법원의 사회보장 소송절차의 개선방안으로는 사회보장 사건을 전담하는 사회법원 설치, 노동 사건과 사회보장 사건을 함께 전담하는 노동사회법원 설치 또는 행정법원 사회보장 전담부 설치 등이 제시될 수 있다. 그와 별도로 사회보장 소송절차에 대한 접근성을 높이기 위한 원고친화적 원칙들을 도입하는 소송절차법의 개정도 검토될 필요가 있다. 이 과정에서, 명예법관의 기능과 역할, 소송비용 무상원칙, 소송구조의 확대 등의 쟁점들에 관한 한국적 맥락에서의 고민이 필요하다. 다만 한국 사회보장입법은 사회보장 수급권의 구체적 내용에 관한 입법을 시행령, 시행규칙에 과도하게 단계적으로 포괄위임하고 있다. 이러한 입법방식은 사회보장급여의 수급요건과 효과에 대한 법관의 법해석권을 사실상 박탈하고 있다. 이런 입법상황의 근본적인 개선 없이는 사회보장구제절차의 근본적 개선 또한 어렵다.

말레이시아의 이슬람사법제도에 대한 연구

김용운 법조협회 2011 法曹 Vol.60 No.8

Malaysia is a Muslim country, which has a dual law system comprised of civil and Islamic laws(Syariah). Although Malaysia has English law background since colonial times, it has kept and developed Islamic laws. Every state(negeri) has a autonomous Syariah court(Mahkamah Syariah) system, and also every state has the Syariah Appeal Court, Syariah High Court, and Syariah Subordinate Court as civil courts system according to the Federal Constitution. The Syariah Courts have two jurisdiction over civil areas such as marriage, inheritance, and zakat, and also over crimes who violate Syariah. The judges of Syariah court are called 'hakim' who are appointed by Sultan or King(Yang Di-Pertuan Agong). The contemporary Syariah law system of Malaysia has been completed by the federal government and Muslim lawyers who educated in law school of public universities through the Syariah reform in 1980s. The Syariah courts was backward in modernization from human resources and physical point of view before 1980s. Therefore, the Syariah reform leaded by the UMNO government has upgraded Syariah courts system to the same rank with civil courts for example introduction of the thirtieth, better treatment of judges and legal officials. In addition, every state has legislated enactments(enakmen) about family law, Islamic administration law, and Syariah criminal law following the national standard Syariah act established by the federal government. It is a fact that Syariah reform led by Muslim elite has systemized Syariah law system of Malaysia and has promoted Islamization of justice system. Meanwhile, it is dilemma that the disadvantage of Malaysian Muslims is left unsettled on the double structure of civil courts and Syariah court. 말레이시아는 이슬람을 공식종교로 정한 무슬림국가로 일반사법과 이슬람사법의 이원적인 사법체계를 갖고 있다. 연방헌법의 위임에 따라 각 주마다 자치적인 샤리아법원제도를 갖추고 있으며 각 주마다 일반법원과 동일한 샤리아상고법원, 샤리아고등법원, 샤리아하급법원의 3심 체계를 이루고 있다. 샤리아법원의 판사는 하낌이며 각 주의 조례에 정한 자격조건을 갖춘 자 중 이슬람종교회의의 자문을 얻어 국왕 또는 술탄이 임명한다. 샤리아법원은 일반법원과 마찬가지로 민사와 형사로 관할이 구분되며 이에 따라 샤리아형법, 샤리아형사소송법, 샤리아민사소송법, 샤리아법원증명법 등 관계법률이 제정되어 있다. 일반사법과 마찬가지로 샤리아검사, 샤리아변호사가 있으며 이슬람종교청의 종교집행공무원은 경찰의 역할을 수행한다. 말레이시아의 현재 샤리아사법체계는 1980년대 연방정부와 무슬림법조인들이 주도한 샤리아개혁을 통해 완성되었다. 종전의 샤리아법원은 일반법원에 비해 인적・물적 여건이 낙후되었으나 샤리아개혁을 통해 일반법원과 동일한 3심체계를 갖추고 샤리아판사와 법원직원의 수준을 일반법원과 동등하게 격상시켰다. 또한 각 주는 연방정부의 표준 샤리아법을 따라 각종 이슬람가족법, 이슬람행정법 등 조례를 제정함으로서 이슬람법을 체계화하여 사법의 이슬람화를 촉진시켰다. 경제적 우대정책을 통해 성장한 무슬림엘리트들이 주도한 샤리아개혁을 통해 이슬람사법제도를 근대적으로 혁신한 사례로 주목 받고 있으나 무슬림들이 일반법원과 샤리아법원의 이중구조 속에서 겪는 불이익의 문제는 해결하기 어려운 과제로 남아 있다.

‘살아있는 법’ 이론을 통한 한정위헌 갈등의 해소

김동훈 한국법학원 2022 저스티스 Vol.- No.189

The history of the conflicts about the decision of limited unconstitutionality between the Korean Constitutional Court and the Korean Supreme Court is as long as 30 years. Italian theories and experiences provide important implications for resolving these conflicts. In Italy, the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court had a 40-year conflict over the interpretive rejection decision, but through the 'provision-norm theory' and 'living law theory’ prepared in the process, they shared their roles, and the conflicts are now resolved. In Italy, “disposizione”(provision) is the text of a statute and “norma”(norm) refers to the meaning given to the regulation by the interpretation of the courts. If the court's interpretation of the law becomes a firm precedent, that interpretation becomes the norm as a 'living law' (diritto vivente). The Italian Constitutional Court is adopting the double sentence structure of ‘interpretive rejection decision-(living law)-interpretive acceptance decision’. First of all, if an interpretation of the law in conformity with the Constitution is possible, the Constitutional Court renders an interpretative dismissal decision to dismiss the request for unconstitutionality on the premise of such an interpretation. However, if a judge does not accept this and the Supreme Court establishes a precedent that is different from the interpretation of the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court will now have no choice but to examine the judge's interpretation of the law as it has become a "living law". If it is judged to be unconstitutional, a interpretive acceptance decision is issued, which binds the judge. The Italian method above is to respect the court as much as possible by acknowledging the court's authority to interpret the law, while acknowledging the exercise of the constitutional adjudication of the Constitutional Court on the norm formed by the court, which would be acceptable to both parties. The Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court should recognize that they are in a cooperative relationship toward the common goal of constitutional review rather than a rivalry. The Constitutional Court and judges should have an ‘permanent dialogue’ with each other. 헌법재판소와 대법원 간 한정위헌 갈등의 역사는 30년이나 된 오랜 것이다. 이 갈등을 해소하는 데 이탈리아의 이론과 경험이 중요한 시사점을 제공한다. 이탈리아는 해석적 기각판결을 둘러싸고 헌재와 대법원이 40년에 걸친 갈등을 벌였으나, 그 과정에서 마련된 ‘규정-규범론’과 ‘살아있는 법’ 이론을 통해 각자의 역할 분담을 이루었고 이제 갈등이 해소되었다. 이탈리아에 있어 ‘규정’은 법령의 텍스트이고 ‘규범’은 법원의 해석에 의해 그 규정에 부여된 의미를 가리킨다. 규정에 대한 법원의 법해석이 확고한 판례가 될 경우 그 법해석은 ‘살아있는 법’(diritto vivente)으로서 규범이 되는데, 헌재는 그러한 규범을 심판대상으로 삼아 위헌심사를 행하게 된다. 이탈리아 헌재는 ‘해석적 기각판결-(살아있는 법)-해석적 인용판결’이라는 이중 선고 구도를 택하고 있다. 우선 헌재는 합헌적 법률해석이 가능하면 그런 해석을 전제로 하여 위헌제청을 기각하는 해석적 기각판결을 내린다. 그런데 만약 법원이 이에 따르지 않고 헌재의 해석과 다른 판례를 확립하는 경우, 이제 헌재는 법원의 이 법해석을 ‘살아있는 법’이 된 것으로 보아 그에 관해 심사할 수밖에 없게 된다. 이때 위헌이라고 판단하면 해석적 인용판결을 내리게 되고, 이것은 법원을 기속한다. 위와 같은 이탈리아의 방식은, 법원의 법률해석권한을 인정하여 법원을 최대한 존중하는 것인 한편, 그렇게 법원에 의해 내용이 형성된 규범에 대해 헌재의 위헌심판권 행사를 인정하는 것인바, 이는 양자 모두가 받아들일 수 있는 묘안이 된다. 헌법재판소와 대법원은 경쟁관계라기보다는 위헌심사라는 공통의 목표를 향한 협력관계에 있음을 인식하여야 하고, 이를 위해 헌재와 법원 및 판사들은 서로 ‘영원한 대화’를 하여야 한다.

家庭法院の機能強化と国際私法

青木 清 전북대학교 동북아법연구소 2015 동북아법연구 Vol.9 No.1

This paper deals with the permission of Korean Family Court for an adoption. The amendment of Korean Family Law in 2012 introduced an adoption system which requires the permission of Family Court when an adoptee is minor. Until then, Korean adoption system required just both consents of an adopter and an adoptee. When an adoptee was under 15, the consents of his/her parents or guardian should be granted instead of the consent of the adoptee. Korean Family Court took no part in adoptions at that time. The amendment in 2012 attempted to expand the function of Korean Family Court in the family law field. It shall be estimated much positively. When an adoption is made inside Korea, this amendment is very understandable. If it is made by Korean people outside Korea, how does the amendment work to the adoption, especially Korean people residing in Japan? This is the main purpose of this paper. When a Korean couple makes an adoption in Japan, Korean Law shall be applied to this case according to Article 31 of Japanese Private International Law(Ho no Tekiyou ni Kansuru Tsusokuho). Thus, they are required requisites stipulated in Korean Family Law. The above permission of Korean Family Court is also necessary for the adoption. Of course, there is no Korean Family Court inside Japan. But Japanese Family Law has the similar system in which Family Court’s permission is required in an adoption when an adoptee is minor. In this situation, the Korean Supreme Court which directs the nation registry, has decided it relating to the nation registry that the permission of Japanese Family Court can’t take place the permission of Korean Family Court in adoptions. On the contrary to this decision, this paper insists on the substitution of Japanese Family Court in such cases. General speaking, the theory of Private International Law tries to admit substitution to systems of applicable law in the forum’s systems. It shall be admitted when both systems are almost same in functions, purposes, proceedings and so on. This paper analyses the high similarity of both Family Court’s permissions. Therefore, Japanese Family Court’s permission shall be substitute to Korean Family Court’s permission in an adoption when an adoptee is minor.

국제법 준수를 위한 국내재판소와 국제재판소의 새로운 관계 정립

이주윤(Lee, Joo Yun) 국제법평론회 2016 국제법평론 Vol.0 No.45

While classic international law usually regulates external relations among nations which constitute international community, modern international law deals with various internationalized internal matters such as international human rights law, international investment law, international criminal law and international environmental law, etc. The areas which the jurisdiction between international courts and domestic courts interacts are gradually increasing, and there are rule of exhaustion of local remedies, principle of complementarity under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, margin of appreciation doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights and preliminary rulings procedure of the Court of Justice of the EU which handle with this interaction in international law. First, the rule of exhaustion of local remedies makes international courts to focus upon material international legal problems which could be difficult to solve in national courts, but it can still be short of legal remedies of individuals. In addition, while international courts play an incidental role compared to domestic courts according to the principle of complementarity under the Rome Statute of the ICC and the margin of appreciation doctrine of the ECtHR, the preliminary rulings procedure of the CJEU can enable national courts to depend on international courts. It thus follows that there hardly exist consistent principles and rules concerning the relationship between international courts and domestic courts. In conclusion, it is essential to strike a balance in the relationship between international courts and domestic courts in order to comply with international law. Therefore, some proposals could be made that international courts should decide which courts are the best interpreter and executor in the cases involved, contribute to strong compliance with international law, and an international institution has to be established to make jurisdictional criteria. Besides, from the perspective of domestic courts so as to comply with international law, it seems that the interpretation of friendliness towards international law, the acceptance of binding character of international courts judgments, the use of international law experts in national court proceedings, international law education for domestic judges, and the opportunity for dialogue between national judges and international judges are needed.