[지역뉴스 부문_제128회 이달의 방송기자상] 모순된 현실을 바로잡기 위한 시작 : 〈‘공공임대 아파트는 건설사 먹잇감?’ 연속보도〉 2019년 4월 19일~5월 13일 보도 KBS대구 이재민, 박순고, 전민재, 신상응 기자

이재민 (사)방송기자연합회 2019 방송기자 Vol.49 No.-

[면역리허설2] 베르톨트 브레히트의 ‘거리두기’ 효과 극대화를 위한 연출과 연기술 연구: 코로나 바이러스(Covid19) 中心으로 : 불편함의 미학

이재민 공연과이론을위한모임 2020 공연과 이론 Vol.- No.79

시계열 분석을 통한 고속도로 통행수요함수의 추정

이재민,박수신 대한교통학회 2005 대한교통학회지 Vol.23 No.7

The objective of this study is to estimate highway trip demand functions in Korea. In order to estimate them, I propose various socio-economic variables that affect the highway trip demand functions. I use the unit root test for each variable and the cointegration test to find the relationships among variables. Finally, I use the vector error correction model, to get the highway trip demand functions. The implication which I derive from the estimation is that real GDP and highway tolls have positive and negative effects, respectively, on the highway trip demand. 고속도로 통행수요함수를 추정하기 위하여 시계열자료를 이용하여 회귀분석을 시도하였다. 기존의 연구들이 시계열자료를 이용하여 통행수요함수를 추정함에도 시계열자료의 특성을 고려하지 않았다는 점에서 한계가 있었는데 본 연구에서는 이를 고려한 모형을 제시하였다. 고속도로 통행수요에 영향을 미치는 다양한 물리적 및 사회경제적 변수를 선택하여 통행수요함수 추정을 시도하였다. 이를 위해 개별 변수들에 대해 단위근 검정을 하였고 공적분 검정을 시도하여 개별 변수들간의 관계를 고찰하였다. 그리하여 벡터오차수정모형을 이용하여 고속도로 통행수요함수를 추정하였는데 실질 GDP가 증가하면 고속도로 이용대수가 증가하는 것으로 나타났다. 그리고 실질 통행료가 증가하면 고속도로 이용대수가 감소하는 것으로 나타나서 일반적인 예측과 일치하였다.

상변환재료를 활용한 블랙아이스 저감 콘크리트 개발에 관한 연구

이재민,양희준,정승현,김성겸,장일영 한국재난정보학회 2022 한국재난정보학회 학술대회 Vol.2022 No.10

老舍與張恨水敍述的北京的官僚與知識靑年文化-淸末民初至解放前

이재민 중국문화연구학회 2005 중국문화연구 Vol.0 No.7

명대 이후 줄곧 중국의 수도로서의 역할을 담당하였던 베이징에서 관료의 의미는 기타 지역의 그 것에 비하여 훨씬 깊으며 또한 광범위한 영역에서의 영향력을 가진 것이었다. 또한 직간접적으로 정치에 관심을 가지고 모여들었던 지식인들 특히 지식청년 또한 베이징만이 조성할 수 있는 특수성을 가지고 있었다. 특히 만청 시기와 중화민국 초기에서 시작되어 중화인민공화국 설립 이전까지 이어지는 시기는 과거의 질서가 무너지고 새로운 체계가 확립되지 않은 일종의 춘추전국 시기와도 같은 특수한 시기였다. 본 문장에서는 베이징을 재현했다는 평가를 받고 있는 라오서와 장헌수 두 작가가 베이징의 관료와 지식인 그리고 그 주변 인물들을 어떻게 서술했는지를 분석해보고, 이를 통해 베이징의 문화가 가지는 특성과 더 나아가 베이징이라는 도시가 이 두 작가의 서술에 어떻게 작용하고 있는지를 분석하고자 한다.

지방자치단체가 체결하는 국제 합의서의 조약법적 고찰

이재민 한국지방자치법학회 2006 한국지방자치법학회 학술대회 자료집 Vol.13 No.-

CCE 군집방법의 수렴 특성 분석을 통한 더 빠른 알고리즘의 제안

이재민,한민석,이종석 대한산업공학회 2020 대한산업공학회 추계학술대회논문집 Vol.2020 No.11

시스-코어형 LM PET를 바인더로 한 PET 부직포의 제조 조건에 따른 물성 변화 연구

이재민,김동은,최지범,허정우,권미연,이승구 한국섬유공학회 2022 한국섬유공학회지 Vol.59 No.1

Numerous studies have been conducted on the use of nonwoven fabrics for avariety of automotive parts. In particular, thermally bonded polyethylene terephthalate(PET) nonwoven fabrics, prepared from PET staple fibers, are widely used because of theirexcellent heat insulation, sound absorption ability, moldability, morphological stability, andlow weight and cost. In this study, thermally bonded PET nonwoven fabrics were preparedby using sheath-core-type low melting point (LM PET) staple fibers as binders. These fabricsare composed of a sheath (LM PET) and a core (regular PET), which allow the fabricationof the PET-only nonwoven composites without the use of any additional binders. During the heat treatment of the nonwoven fabrics, the sheath portion melts easily at acertain processing temperature and serves as a binder for the nonwoven composites. Furthermore,the effects of the manufacturing conditions, such as the processing temperature,time, and pressure, on the physical properties of the PET nonwoven fibers wereinvestigated. The macroscopic morphology, fracture behavior, shore hardness, anddynamic properties of the PET nonwoven fabrics were analyzed as a function of the manufacturingconditions.

미국ㆍ유럽연합 대형 민간항공기 보조금 분쟁

이재민 국제거래법학회 2011 國際去來法硏究 Vol.20 No.1

The United States and the European Union have been engaged in a series of high-profile subsidy disputes since 2004. These disputes involve large civil aircrafts that are manufactured by Boeing of the United States and Airbus of the EU. As the competition between the two corporations in the international market intensifies,the two countries criticized each other of providing illegal subsidization in many forms to Boeing and Airbus, respectively. Ultimately both of the countries brought an action at the WTO against each other. The WTO panel in the dispute where the United States is the complainant (EC-LCA) issued a decision last June. The panel found that the subsidization program of the EU and its member states generally constitute illegal subsidies within the meaning of Articles 1 and 2 of the SCM Agreement. The decision of the panel in EC-LCA discusses a wide range of important issues. In particular, two issues attracted attention of the international community in this respect: one is the definition and scope of the general infrastructure under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement and the other is the de facto export subsidy contingency determination. Regarding the first issue, the two sides presented different views regarding the definition and scope of the term “general infrastructure.” This term sets forth an important concept because the SCM Agreement carves out general infrastructure from the definition of the financial contribution by the government, hence from the scope of the SCM Agreement. The EU proposed a definition where the term “general infrastructure” carries a categorical meaning which excludes certain types of infrastructure establishment program from the SCM Agreement categorically, so that countries’ discretion to administer their social development programs are not interfered. On the other hand, the United States proposed a definition where the term “general” and “infrastructure” are separately interpreted, so that only certain infrastructure at a particular point in time can fall under the scope of the Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii). The panel mainly accepted the U.S. position on this issue. The panel’s approach,however, poses a serious concern that undermines the structure of the SCM Agreement and restricts the legitimate authority of the Members’ governments to develop their social infrastructure programs. The second issue presented was about how to confirm the de facto export contingency under Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement. The panel ruled that a wide range of circumstantial evidence can be considered in the totality of circumstances analysis in the course of finding de facto export contingency. This is a departure from the traditional concept of “tied to,” which means that the de facto export contingency should only be found when the actual or the provision of the subsidy are directly tied to the anticipated export performance. The new standard lowers the bar in confirming the de facto export contingency. The panel’s decision raises concern on the part of many countries. This dispute raises various issues that may directly affect Korea’s trade interest in the future because Korea has been implicated in various subsidy disputes recently. A closer scrutiny of the decision from the Appellate Body in the appeal of the EC-LCA and the decision from the panel and the Appellate Body in U.S.-LCA is in necessary.

One Stone One Bird vs. Two Stones One Bird: A Critical Analysis of the Proposed“ Remand”Mechanism in the WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure

이재민 한국법경제학회 2009 법경제학연구 Vol.6 No.2

One of the main topics being discussed at the Doha Development Agenda “( DDA”) negotiations is the proposed amendment of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (“DSU”). The gist of the DSU amendment negotiation is to introduce more procedural guidelines, safeguards and hurdles, much more similar to domestic litigation procedures. One of the key issues being discussed at the DSU amendment negotiation is the introduction of the “remand” procedure. The remand procedure is a mechanism through which the WTO Appellate Body can send a case back to an underlying panel to complete the analysis based on a proper jurisprudence as pronounced by the Appellate Body, or to gather further factual information and complete factual analysis as necessary. Most of the appellate courts in domestic litigation systems do have a remand authority as most of the time this is how a dispute is resolved. Surprisingly, however, the current DSU does not have a remand system. All the Appellate Body is authorized to do is to uphold, modify or reverse a panel decision. As an appellate court, it cannot send the case back to the panel for further discussion. At the same time, the Appellate Body cannot engage in its own fact finding mission. Fact gathering and analysis are entirely within the authority of the panel and the Appellate Body can only review legal errors committed by the panel. So, the combination of the two inherent limitations basically means that the Appellate Body cannot embark on its own factual analysis and only the panel can do it, but that there is no way for the Appellate Body to ask the panel to carry out a new or different factual analysis in the same dispute. If the Appellate Body does not like the panel’s decision, all it can do is to reverse the decision. The problem arises when the Appellate Body reverses the jurisprudence or methodology adopted by the panel. In this kind of situation, the Appellate Body simply reverses the panel’s conclusion and the case terminates once and for all. Since the problem of the lack of remand has been showcased by many disputes, there seems to be consensus among the membership at the DSU negotiation table as far as remand is concerned. In light of the obvious consensus, the chairman of the DSB amendment negotiation provided his own proposal for remand. The proposal, however, seems to have a fundamental problem; it presupposes two separate decisions for the same case when the remand mechanism is utilized. More particularly, the chair’s proposal for the remand system apparently contains fundamental problems which may nullify all the intended benefits of the remand system. Under this scheme, there will be two different sets of reports for the same case under the chair’s text’s scheme. The existence of multiple reports would probably prolong the dispute rather than shorten it, because practically the losing Member will not or cannot implement the previous DSB ruling and recommendations unless and until the subsequent decision is rendered through a remand, at which point it could have a full grasp of the implementation obligation. At the same time, the likely conflict between the two decisions may even hinder final settlement of the dispute. Such being the case, a more appropriate remand system in the WTO dispute settlement procedure context would be the system where only one report is finally adopted. In this system, the Appellate Body procedure may be put on hold during the pendency of the remand procedure. Once the panel passes on its decision on the remand issue to the Appellate Body, it can go on and make a final decision at the end of the day. This system of single and comprehensive decision may better serve the interest of the Members in the WTO dispute settlement procedure.