CEO 교체 형태가 고유변동성과 기업 투자 및 재무 정책에 미치는 영향에 대한 연구

민재훈(Jae Hoon Min) 대한경영학회 2015 大韓經營學會誌 Vol.28 No.10

본 연구는 CEO 교체 기간 동안의 주식 수익률의 고유변동성(idiosyncratic risk)을 향후 기업 전략과 신임 최고 경영자의 능력에 대한 외부투자자의 불확실성을 대리하는 변수로 삼고, CEO 교체의 원인과 신임 CEO의 출신 등 CEO 교체와 관련된 형태에 따라서 고유변동성이 CEO 변경 공시에 다르게 반응하는 가에 대해서 조사해 보았다. 또한 CEO 공시 전 · 후 기간의 고유변동성이 최고 경영자의 위험회피성향을 반영한다고 가정하고, 특이 변동성의 변화에 따라서 CEO 교체 이후의 기업의 투자 및 재무 정책에 미치는 영향에 대해서 조사해 보았다. CEO의 교체 유형에 따라서 CEO 공시를 전 · 후로 고유변동성은 차별적인 움직임을 보였다. 고유변동성은 CEO의 변경이 자발적으로 이루어진 경우보다 비자발적으로 이루어졌을 때 높게 나타났다. 또한 CEO가 교체될 때 대주주가 이사회 임원으로 직접 경영에 참여하는 경우가 그렇지 않은 경우에 비해서 고유변동성의 변화가 작게 나타났다. CEO 교체 공시를 전 · 후로 한 1년 동안 고유변동성은 대주주가 경영에 참여하지 않는 전문경영인 기업에서 전임 CEO가 비자발적으로 물러나고 외부인사에 의한 신임 CEO의 영입이 이루어진 경우가 대주주가 이사로 직접 경영에 참여하는 소유경영기업에서 자발적인 CEO의 퇴임과 내부인사에 의한 승계가 이루어진 경우에 비해 약 12% p나 높은 것으로 나타났다. 이와 같은 결과는 외부투자자가 새로운 CEO의 기업 정책과 능력에 대한 예측이 어려울수록 리더십에 대한 불확실성이 높고 이에 따라서 고유변동성이 높게 나타난다는 가설을 입증한다. 또한 대주주의 경영 참여와 조정 능력이 리더십의 교체에 따른 외부투자자의 불안감을 완화시키는 데 기여하는 것으로 입증되었다. 한편 고유변동성의 증가가 최고 경영자의 위험회피성향을 높여서 향후 R&D나 비유동자산 투자와 같은 위험 투자 규모를 축소시키고 현금성 자산 등의 보유를 늘리는 등 재무적 안정성을 추구할 것이라는 경영자 위험 회피 가설은 실증 분석결과 지지되지 않았다. 오히려 신임 CEO는 고유변동성이 증가할 때 현금성 자산을 줄이는 동시에 R&D나 고정자산투자를 늘리는 등 과감한 투자를 단행하였으며, 특히 경영 성과가 저조한 기업의 경영자의 경우 현상황을 타개하기 위해서 더욱 공격적인 경영을 하는 것으로 나타났다. The purpose of this study is to examine any differential impact of CEO turnover according to the types of CEO changes. This study hypothesizes that idiosyncratic risk of stock return at the time of CEO turnover can reflect outside investors’ anxiety about leadership uncertainty with respect to corporate strategy change and new CEO’s ability. In this regard, this study predicts that idiosyncratic risk rises relatively higher surrounding CEO turnover when a new CEO from outside of the firm replaces the incumbent CEO who is forced to leave a company compared to the case that a new CEO from inside of the firm succeeds to a former CEO who steps down voluntarily. In addition, this study hypothesizes that presence of major shareholders including founder’s family in the board of directors can mitigate investor’s anxiety about leadership uncertainty around CEO changes. Each individual CEO turnover is classified into three types: i) whether CEO turnover is voluntary or forced, ii) whether newly appointed CEO is from inside or outside the firm, and iii) whether major shareholder participates in firm management as a member of the board of directors at the time of CEO turnover. Results from an univariate analysis suggest that the type of CEO turnover has a differential impact on idiosyncratic risk surrounding the announcement of CEO changes. First, idiosyncratic volatility is greater about 6% p per annum in case of involuntary resignation compared to voluntary resignation or additional appointment of CEO without resignation surrounding CEO turnover. Investors seem to have both expectation and anxiety about the future course of action new CEO will take to improve the firm performance when a new CEO replaces retiring CEO who is forced to step down. Second, new CEO’s background is also associated with the size of idiosyncratic volatility. When a new CEO comes from inside of the firm, the idiosyncratic volatility is about 7% p per annum lower than when he comes from outside of the firm. This fact supports the CEO ability hypothesis in that investors worry about the new CEO’s leadership since he has no track record about his ability in the firm. Third, presence of major shareholders in the board of directors plays an effective role of reducing investors’ anxiety over the leadership change. When major shareholders including founder’s family members participate actively in firm management, idiosyncratic volatility is about 6% p per annum lower than the case where major shareholders do not involve in firm management as B.O.D. members. Overall, idiosyncratic risk is 12% p per annum greater when CEO turnover is involuntary, and when new CEO comes from outside of the firm, and when major shareholder does not participate directly in firm management, than when CEO turnover is voluntary, and when insider succession is made, and when major shareholder involves in firm management as a director. These results support the strategy and ability hypotheses that predict a higher idiosyncratic volatility when investors have difficulty to forecast a new CEO’s future business policy and capability. This study also attempts to investigate whether a new CEO who is hypothesized to be a risky averter tries to reduce risky investments such as R&D expenses and capital expenditures and to increase cash holdings in an effort to restore organizational stability after CEO changes, and whether the type of CEO turnover is associated with a new CEO’s investment and financial decision. In conclusion, a rise in idiosyncratic volatility surrounding CEO changes does not seem to raise a new CEO’s risk aversion. Rather, R&D expenditures and investment in fixed asset tend to increase whereas corporate cash holdings tend to decrease following CEO turnover. Especially in the firms where their profitability is low, new CEOs seem to try to invest more aggressively in R&D and fixed assets to overcome the current poor business situation. The type of CEO turnover also seems to m

최고경영자 교체와 조세회피

고윤성(Yun Sung Koh),기은선(Eun Sun Ki) 한국경영학회 2014 經營學硏究 Vol.43 No.4

In this paper we examine the association between CEO turnover and tax avoidance. Further, we also examine whether the effects of CEO turnover on tax avoidance vary with the types of turnover (voluntary/forced turnover). On the on hand, given the top statutory tax rate of 22%, minimizing corporate taxes can greatly enhance after-tax cash flows and firm value. Also it increases after-tax earnings, consequently improving the chances to meet earnings targets. Therefore, CEOs have the incentive to inflate after-tax earnings by minimizing corporate taxes in order to obtain higher bonus or to extend their tenure. On the other hand, tax avoidance canbe costly for CEO because he/she may face potential reputational damage or accusation forillegal tax evasion in the event a strategy is overturned. The benefits from tax avoidance are immediate. However, the costs are often determined by a tax authority’s investigation after afew years. Indeed, there is often a lag period between benefiting from tax avoidance and bearing costs. A conflict of interest might arise when the CEO who benefits from tax avoidance is different from the CEO who takes risk. For example, departing CEO in his/her last year can shift therisk of aggressive tax avoidance onto incoming CEO, while he/she still enjoys the benefits of tax avoidance such as compensation increase. In this case, departing CEO is likely to be more aggressive to implement a tax avoidance strategy because expected costs of tax avoidance reduce. Meanwhile, incoming CEO tries to remove accumulated tax risk due to a former CEO’s aggressivetax avoidance in his/her first year rather than implement new tax avoidance strategies. Therefore, we expect departing CEO is more aggressive for tax avoidance than incoming CEO. However, the effects of CEO turnover on tax avoidance may differ for voluntary turnover and forced turnover. CEO turnover can be classified as voluntary or forced. Voluntary turnover is the case where departing CEO leaves the company voluntarily, while forced turnover is the case where CEO departure is forced. In case of voluntary turnover, a departing CEO typically remainsa member of the board of directors. Since a departing CEO is still an insider after retirement, he/she might take the responsibility for previous tax avoidance if the strategy is overturned. Therefore, we expect departing CEO of voluntary turnover is less aggressive for tax avoidancethan departing CEO of forced turnover prior to the CEO change year. We analyze 851 CEO turnovers from 2001 to 2011 for firms listed on Korea Stock Exchange and KOSDAQ. We measure corporate tax avoidance using the book-tax differences not attributable to discretionary accruals (Desai and Dharmapala 2006). The empirical results are as follows. First, we find CEO turnover firms shows significant decrease in tax avoidance following turnover. Second, CEO turnover firms have lower levels of tax avoidance after turnover, compared tonon-CEO turnover firms with similar size in the same industry. Third, such results are observedonly when CEO is forced to leave. We do not find significant relation between CEO turnover and tax avoidance in case of voluntary departure. These results indicate that CEOs have differential incentives for tax avoidance around their turnovers depending on the types of turnover. This paper has several contributions to the literature. First, to our knowledge, ours is the first study to find the effects of CEO turnover on tax avoidance. Second, this study shows that CEO turnover causes temporal variation in levels of a single firm’s tax avoidance, while priorstudies focus on the cross-sectional determinants of tax avoidance. Third, the evidence of thisstudy suggests the need for more rigid monitoring for tax avoidance around CEO turnover.

최고경영자 교체 빈도와 이익의 질

전성빈,박상수,이아영 韓國公認會計士會 2007 회계·세무와 감사 연구 Vol.45 No.-

최고경영자 교체는 기업의 영업활동, 투자활동, 재무활동 등 경영활동뿐만 아니라 회계 정책, 회계 추정 등 기업 내 회계시스템 전반에 변화를 초래할 수 있는 중요한 사건이라 할 수 있다. 선행연구에 의하면 최고경영자 교체 전후에 자산 상각이 많이 발생하고 있으며, 또한 새로운 최고경영자의 부임 시점에 이익조정이 많이 이루어지는 것이 보고되었다. 최고경영자의 잦은 교체로 자산 상각과 이익조정이 자주 일어나면 발생액과 이익은 큰 폭의 변동을 나타내고, 따라서 최고경영자 교체가 빈번한 기업은 그렇지 않은 기업에 비해 이익의 질이 떨어질 것이다. Dechow & Dichev(2002)가 개발한 이익의 질 측정치 및 Jones 모형으로부터 도출한 재량적 발생액의 표준편차를 이익의 질 대용치로 이용하여 분석한 결과, 최고경영자 교체율이 높은 회사가 이익의 질이 현저히 낮았다. 다중회귀분석 결과, 최고경영자의 교체율이 높아질수록 이익의 질은 떨어졌고 이는 통계적으로 유의하였다. 최고경영자 교체율이 외생변수가 아니라 경영성과, 이익이 질 등에 영향을 받는 내생변수일 수 있다. 최고경영자 교체율의 내생성 문제를 완화하기 위해 2단계 최소자승법(2SLS) 분석을 실시하였다. 추가 분석에서도 최고경영자 교체율이 높아질수록 이익의 질은 낮아진다는 일관된 결론을 얻었다. 본 연구는 시계열 자료를 이용하여 산출한 최고경영자 교체율을 이용하여 최고경영자의 빈번한 교체가 이익의 질에 부정적 영향을 미친다는 것을 보임으로써 최고경영자 교체에 관한 연구 범위를 확대하였고, 이익의 질에 영향을 주는 요인에 최고경영자 교체율을 추가함으로써 이익의 질에 관한 연구에 시사점을 제공한다. CEO turnover is a critical event that could cause the changes in a firm's operating, investing and financing activities as well as in the accounting system of the firm. Existing studies have documented that earnings management and discretionary write-offs are associated with CEO turnover. Using a sample of non-financial firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange over the 1994~2004 period, we investigate the relation between quality of earnings and CEO turnover ratios. The test results can be summarized as follows. First, we ran multiple regressions to analyze the relation between the quality of earnings and CEO turnover controlling for the frequency of negative earnings, magnitude of sales volatility, operating cycle, firm size, etc. The result shows that CEO turnover ratio has a significantly negative relation with the quality of earnings. With a restricted sample which includes only firms with at least one CEO change during 1994~2004 period, the negative relation between CEO turnover ratio and the quality of earnings turns out to be more pronounced. Second, we used 2SLS (two-stage least squares) to consider the simultaneous association between the quality of earnings and CEO turnover ratio. While the CEO turnover ratio affects the quality of earnings, CEO turnover ratio might be affected by the quality of earnings. The result of 2SLS shows that there exists an interaction between the quality of earnings and CEO turnover ratio. This provides the evidence that high CEO turnover ratio results in low quality of earning and high quality of earning results in low CEO turnover ratio. This study contributes to the research area related to CEO turnover by showing the negative relationship between CEO turnover ratio and the quality of earnings. It also contributes to the research area in earnings quality by adding CEO turnover ratio variable to the factors influencing earnings quality.

최고경영자 교체와 이사회 영향력 : 사회정치학적 관점

박종훈,정무관,성연달 한국인사조직학회 2010 인사조직연구 Vol.18 No.2

지배구조에 관한 선행연구에서는 주로 대리인 이론에 기반하여 이사회를 최고경영자의 사적이익 추구행동을 막고, 주주의 이익을 보호하는 존재로 보았다. 따라서, 이들 선행 연구들은 이사회가 본연의 임무를 잘 수행하게 하기 위해서 이사회 영향력을 증대시킬 필요가 있다고 주장하였다. 하지만, 사회정치적 관점에 기반한 선행연구들은 이사회 영향력에 대해서 상이한 견해를 제시하였다. 이들 선행 연구들은 이사회도 다양한 이해관계가 존재하는 집단이기 때문에 이사회가 주주의 이익 대신 이사회 자신이나 다른 이해관계자들의 이익을 위해서 활동할 수도 있다고 주장하였다. 본 연구의 목적은 이사회 영향력이 최고경영자 교체에 미치는 영향에 대하여 기존의 연구에서 주장하는 대리인 이론과 함께 사회정치학적 관점도 고려할 필요가 있는지를 검증하는 것이다. 이를 위해서, 본 논문에서는 기업성과 및 이사회 영향력이 최고경영자 교체와 어떠한 관계가 있는지를 살펴보고, 기업성과와 이사회 영향력의 상호작용이 미치는 효과에 대해서 연구하였다. 'KOSPI 200'에 속한 기업들을 대상으로 2001년부터 2007년까지의 자료를 바탕으로 실증분석을 실시한 결과, 기업성과가 나쁠수록, 이사회 영향력이 클수록 최고경영자 교체가 증가하는 것으로 나타났다. 또한, 기업성과와 이사회 영향력의 상호작용은 최고경영자 교체와 유의한 정(+)의 관계를 보였다. 두 변수의 상호작용의 효과를 보다 명확하게 파악하기 위하여 기업성과를 기준으로 고성과 집단과 저성과 집단으로 구분하여 분석을 실시하였다. 그 결과, 고성과 집단보다 저성과 집단에서 최고경영자가 교체될 확률이 높았지만, 이사회 영향력이 크고 기업성과가 좋을 경우에는 최고경영자 교체 가능성의 증가가 더욱 크게 나타났다. 이러한 연구결과는 최고경영자가 주주의 이익을 대변하지 못할 경우에는 교체될 수 있다는 대리인 이론의 주장을 뒷받침함은 물론, 이사회와 최고경영자간의 파워게임의 결과로 최고경영자가 교체될 수 있다는 사회정치학적 이론의 주장 또한 지지하고 있다. 따라서 이사회 영향력이 최고경영자 교체에 미치는 영향을 보다 명확하게 파악하기 위해서는 대리인 이론과 함께 사회정치학적 관점도 고려해야 함을 확인할 수 있었다. The board of directors has long been the subject of research on corporate governance. The most prominent reason for this attention is the belief that the board of directors can significantly affect the interests of shareholders. The board of directors has various functions: control and monitoring, resource acquisition, and service. The board' control and monitoring activity includes selecting and dismissing CEO and other top managers, evaluating their performance, designing their compensation packages, and supervising internal and external auditing; All of these activities are designed to improve firm performance and protect shareholders' interests. However, the board still appears to vary in their effectiveness in making appropriate managerial changes such as CEO turnover by assessing firm performance; we sometimes observe CEO turnovers under high firm performance while CEOs holding the position under poor firm performance. Why is this happening? Does the board of directors always behave for the benefits of shareholders?This study aims to answer those questions based on both the agency and sociopolitical theories, which provide different perspectives on the board's activities. Based on the agency theory, prior studies on corporate governance argued that the board of directors plays an important role in mitigating the agency problem of top managers and protecting the interests of shareholders. Accordingly, they suggested that publically listed corporations should strengthen the influence of the board to appropriately monitor the misbehavior of top management for the benefits of shareholders. However, another stream of prior research that relied on the sociopolitical theory has provided a different perspective from the agency theory regarding the influence of the board. Viewing the board as one of political coalitions in the firm, they argued that board members can make decisions for their benefits rather than for the benefits of shareholders. The purpose of this study is, therefore, to investigate whether the agency theory and the sociopolitical theory are substituted or complemented to each other in the context of CEO turnover by assessing the relationship among firm performance, board's influence and CEO turnover. The firm performance is a key contextual factor in CEO turnover, because poor firm performance signals incompetence of the incumbent CEO. Therefore, when firm performance is poor, board can make a decision that the incompetent CEO is dismissed and new one is named. We therefore expect the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 1: Firm performance is negatively associated with CEO turnover. The board influence can also affect CEO turnover. CEO turnover is often characterized by political manipulations and power struggles. Boards in board-dominated firms often challenge CEOs, and sometimes replace them if necessary. therefore, we expect the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 2: The board influence is positively associated with CEO turnover. This study considers, therefore, two antecedents of CEO turnover such as firm performance and board influence. There exists a controversy about the direction of an interaction effect of firm performance and board influence on CEO turnover. Based on the agency theory, prior researchers argued that the lower the firm performance and the bigger board influence, the higher the likelihood of CEO turnover for shareholder's benefits. Based on the sociopolitical theory, however, the higher firm performance and the bigger board influence, the higher the likelihood of CEO turnover for board members' benefits. Hence, this study examines not only the main effects of both firm performance and board influence on CEO turnover, but also the interaction effect of firm performance and board influence on CEO turnover. Following such an argument, we argue the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 3: Firm performace positively moderates the positive relationship between the board influence and CEO turno...

시장성과가 경영자교체에 미치는 영향

이해영,신범철,신지숙 한국기업경영학회 2015 기업경영연구 Vol.22 No.2

There have been voluminous prior studies which have analyzed the corporate accounting performance as a major factor of CEO turnover, but there are lacks of the studies on the effect of corporate market performance on CEO turnover in Korea. This study empirically analyzes the effect of CEO turnover on corporate market performance in Korea Stock Market. The corporate market performance is measured by the annual rate of return and market value to book value ratio. This paper uses unbalanced panel data for listed companies in the Korea Stock Exchange, both KOSPI and KOSDAQ markets over the period from 2000 to 2012. Unlike previous studies, this study employs the 2 Stage RE(random-effect) panel probit model to control for endogeneity of market and market performance variables. The major empirical results are as follows. First, a decrease in the annual rate of return and market value to book value ratio is found to lead to an increase in the CEO turnover probability significantly. This implies that the higher the market performance are the less the CEO turnover probability. Second, an increase in the equity ratio of the foreign investors is found to lead to a decrease in the CEO turnover probability significantly. But an increase in the equity ratio of the largest shareholder is not found to lead to a decrease in the CEO turnover probability significantly. Third, both the sales growth rate and stock return volatility are significantly negatively related to the probability of the CEO turnover, but the debt ratio is not. This results means that the more growth firm and the larger risk firm is the less the CEO turnover probability. Fourth, annual rate of return and market value to book value ratio are negatively associated with the CEO turnover probability in small and medium sized enterprises, whereas only annual rate of return is significantly associated in the large firms. In the large firms market to book value ratio are positively associated with the CEO turnover probability. Fifth, the increased market value to book value ratio over last year has a moderating effect of the lower CEO turnover probability in a relation between the MB ratio and the CEO turnover. But the increased annual rate of return over last year has no a moderating effect of it. Finally, the increased stock volatility over last year has no a moderating effect of the lower CEO turnover probability in a all sized firm. There are some caveats, however, in our study to be mentioned. The types of the CEO turnover, either voluntary or disciplinary, can differently affect firm performance. Furthermore, the effects of CEO turnover on corporate performance could be determined by the personal characteristics and the number of CEOs. In the future study, effects of a personal characteristics, the number of CEOs, and industry structure should be considered. Also, the integrated analysis on the accounting performance and market performance effect of CEO turnover will need to go on. 본 연구에서는 선행연구와는 달리, 불균형 패널자료와 시장성과의 내생성 문제를 고려한 2단계 임의효과 패널 프로빗 모형을 활용하여 기업의 시장성과가 경영자교체에 미치는 영향에 대해 분석하였다. 기업의 시장성과는 주식수익률과 MB비율로 측정하였으며, 표본은 2000년 1월부터 2012년 12월까지의 코스피시장과 코스닥시장에 상장된 금융업을 제외한 모든 기업을 분석대상으로 하였다. 실증분석결과, 첫째 시장성과인 주식수익률과 MB비율이 낮을수록 경영자교체확률이 유의하게 높아지는 것으로 나타났다. 둘째, 최대주주지분율은 경영자교체에 유의한 영향을 미치지 않으나, 외국인투자자지분율은 경영자교체에 유의한 음(-)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 분석되었다. 셋째, 매출액성장률과 주가변동성이 높을수록 경영자교체확률은 유의하게 높아지나, 부채비율은 비유의적인 것으로 나타났다. 넷째, 표본을 대기업과 중소기업으로 분류하여 재추정한 결과, 중소기업에서는 주식수익률과 MB비율이 높을수록 경영자교체 확률이 유의하게 낮아지는 것으로 나타났다. 그런데 대기업에서는 주식수익률이 높을수록 경영자교체 확률은 유의하게 낮아지나 MB비율은 높을수록 경영자교체확률도 유의하게 높아지는 것으로 분석되었다. 또한 대기업의 경우 소유구조 변수 중 외국인투자지분율만 경영교체에 유의하게 음(-)의 영향을 미치나 중소기업은 최대주주지분율과 외국인투자자지분율 모두 유의한 음(-)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 한편, 대기업은 부채비율이 높을수록, 중소기업은 주가변동성이 높을수록 경영자교체확률이 유의적으로 높아지는 것으로 분석되었다. 다섯째, 시장성과와 경영자교체와의 관계에 있어서 MB비율의 향상은 경영자교체 가능성을 더욱 낮춰주는 조절효과를 가지는 것으로 분석되었으나, 주식수익률의 향상은 주식수익률과 경영자교체간의 관계에 있어서 경영자교체 가능성을 조절하는데 영향을 미치지 못하는 것으로 분석되었다. 여섯째, 기업의 시장성과와 경영자교체간의 관계에 있어서 주가변동성, 즉 기업위험의 확대는 경영자교체 가능성을 조절하는데 유의한 영향을 미치지 않는 것으로 나타났다.

최고경영자 교체가 경영성과에 미치는 영향

이해영,신지숙 한국기업경영학회 2013 기업경영연구 Vol.20 No.3

There have been many studies under the subjects of the poor corporate performance as a major factor of CEO turnover, the earning management at the time of CEO turnover, and the stock market reaction to the announcement of CEO turnover. However, few researches seem to be found on the effect of CEO turnover on corporate performance in Korea. The purpose of this study is to analyse the effect of CEO turnover on the corporate performance in Korea. In other words, it is to analyse if CEO turnover leads to improving corporate performance in terms of an increase in corporate value and in accounting profit. The corporate performance in the stock market was measured by a total market value (CPV). The accounting performance was measured by the ratio of an operating income to total assets (ROA) and the ratio of a net income to total assets (ROE). Specially, unlike previous studies done by others, this study used the panel data analysis method to resolve the heterogeneity and the multi-collinearity problems. And 2 Stage Probit-MLE model was applied to control the endogeneity problem. This study is conducted using 401 samples of listed companies in the Korea Stock Exchange for the period of 10 years from 2001 to 2010. In this study, the independent variable is a dummy variable where it takes the value of 1 if there is CEO turnover and 0 if otherwise. The control variables are divided between the variables related with the ownership structure (the equity ratios of the largest shareholder, institutional investors and foreign investors) and the variables related with the corporate performances (the debt ratio, the ratio of sales growth, and the age of the corporation). And the empirical analysis is applied to the fixed effect model of a panel data analysis by testing of Hausman. The CEO turnover was analysed to be affected by the existence of endogeneity on the three factors of corporate performance variables (CPV, ROA, ROE). It suggested that if the three factors are not considering the endogeneity problem in analysing, it can draw a biased conclusion. The results of this study are as follows. First, the CEO turnover has a significantly positive relation to the total market value. It means that the CEO turnover leads to the increase in the value of stocks. Second, the CEO turnover has a negative effect on the accounting profits, which include the ratio of the operating income to total assets and the ration of the net income to total assets. Third, in the control variables related with ownership structure, the equity ratio of the largest shareholder has a significantly negative effect on the total market value. But the equity ratios of institutional investors and foreign investors are positively related with it. On the other hand, the accounting performance has a significantly positive coefficient with the ratios of institutional investors and foreign investors. But the equity ratio of the largest shareholder does not a significantly affect on the accounting performance. Fourth, the debt ratio is statistically less significant with coefficients for the total market value and the ratio of accounting profit. But the ratio of sales growth has a significantly positive effect on all the corporate performances. The age of the corporation seems to have a significantly positive effect on the total market value, but it has a negative effect on the accounting performance. Fifth, this study separately analysed the effect of CEO turnover on corporate performance with samples classified according to the size of the firm (small, middle, and large companies). As a results, the CEO turnover has a significantly positive effect on the market value and a negative effect on the accounting profit ratios in all types of companies. These results suggest that CEO turnover occurs in the year of a poor corporate performance and doesn't lead to improving an accounting performance at in the pertinent year. But it leads to the increase in the total market va... 본 연구에서는 2001년부터 2010년까지 한국거래소에 상장된 401개 표본기업을 대상으로 최고 경영자의 교체가 경영성과에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다. 즉 최고경영자의 교체가 기업가치 상승이라는 시장에서 형성된 경영성과의 향상, 회계적 이익 상승이라는 경영성과의 향상으로 이어지는지를 실증분석하였다. 시장 에서의 경영성과는 시가총액으로, 회계적 성과는 총자산영업이익률과 총자산순이익률로 측정하였다. 또한 본 연구에서는 이전의 연구와는 차별적으로 패널자료를 이용한 패널자료분석법과 내생성 문제를 완화한 2단계 프로빗-MLE 모형을 연구 방법으로 사용하였다. 실증적 분석 결과, 최고경영자 교체는 시가총액에 양(+)의 영향을, 회계적 성과인 총자산영업이익률과 총자산순이익률에 대해서는 음(-)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 확인되었다. 이는 최고경영자 교체가 일반적으로 경영성과가 저조한 경우에 이루어진 경우가 많으며, 최고경영자 교체 당해 연도에는 회계적 이익 향상으로 직접 이어지지 못하나 그 이후 연도부터는 이익이 개선될 것이라는 기대가 시장에 영향을 미쳐 교체 연도의 주가상승으로 이어진 것으로 보인다. 시가총액에 대해 소유구조 관련 통제변수 중 최대주주지분율은 음(-)의 영향을, 기관투자자지분율과 외국인투자자지분율은 양(+)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 회계적 이익률에 대해서는 기관투자자지분율과 외국인투자지분율만이 양(+)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 분석되었다. 한편 부채비율은 시가총액과 회계적 이익률 모두 음(-)의 영향을, 매출액성장률은 양(+)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 기업연령은 시가총액에 대해서는 양(+)의 영향을, 회계적 이익률에 대해서는 음(-)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 분석되었다. 또한 표본기업을 중소기업, 중견기업, 그리고 대기업으로 분류하여 분석한 결과, 모두 동일하게 시가총액에는 유의적인 양(+)의 영향을, 회계적 성과에는 음(-)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 분석 되었다.

최고경영자 교체와 이익조정

이아영 ( A Young Lee ),전성빈 ( Sung Bin Chun ),박상수 ( Sang Su Park ) 한국회계학회 2007 會計學硏究 Vol.32 No.2

본 연구는 2001년부터 2005년의 기간 동안 최고경영자 교체가 이루어진 표본을 대상으로 최고경영자 교체연도에 나타나는 신임경영자의 재량적 회계선택에 의한 이익조정 현상을 Kothari 등(2005)의 성과대응 재량적 발생액을 이용하여 살펴본다. 신임경영자는 교체연도에 성과가 저조한 사업부를 매각하거나 불필요한 자산 등을 과감하게 상각하는 등의 소위 ``big bath``를 통해 미래의 이익을 증가시키고자 하며 자신의 미래 성과평가에 대한 기준치를 낮추고자 한다. 기존의 선행연구에서 사용된 발생액 측정치에서 나타날 수 있는 변수의 측정오차 문제 및 경영성과에 관한 부분이 적절히 통제되지 않았다는 한계점을 고려하여 성과대응 재량적 발생액을 이용하여 최고경영자 교체와 이익조정 현상을 재조명하고자 한다. 추가적으로 최고경영자 교체 시기, 최고경영자 교체 이후에도 전임경영자가 남아있는지의 여부 그리고 신임 경영자의 영입유형에 따라 재량적 상각의 정도에 차이가 있는지 살펴본다. 실증연구 결과, 최고경영자 교체연도에 재량적 발생액이 유의한 음(-)의 값을 보여 신임경영자가 교체연도에 이익을 감소시키는 방향으로 재량적 발생액을 증가시켜 이익조정을 하는 것으로 나타났다. 특히 신임경영자의 재량적 상각이 최고경영자 교체 시기가 3월 이후인 경우가 3월 이전인 경우에 비해 유의적으로 더 크게 나타났다. 이러한 결과는 신임경영자가 교체된 연도에 자신이 지게 되는 경영성과에 대한 책임이 작을수록 더 많은 상각을 한다는 것을 의미한다. 한편 전임경영자의 존재유무 및 신임경영자의 영입유형이 재량적 상각 정도에 영향을 미친다는 증거를 찾지 못하였다. This study examines the empirical evidence on earnings management associated with CEO turnover using performance-matched discretionary accrual measures.It is suggested that a new CEO has an incentive to report lower earnings by using income-decreasing discretionary accruals, because he/she can blame the prior CEO for poor performance of the period during which he/she was newly appointed as a CEO. This practice would allow new management to take credit for improving performance in the following periods. This can be accomplished through initial large discretionary write-offs because this behavior sets a low benchmark against which future performance is judged. Existing studies have used discretionary accrual measures that could cause measurement error problems by not controlling for the effect of performance to test earnings management. We attempt to re-examine earnings management associated with CEO turnover controlling for the effect of performance. We additionally investigate whether the degree of discretionary accruals varies with the timing of CEO turnover, voluntary vs. forced CEO turnover, and the CEO succession type (insider vs. outsider). We estimate Equation (5) to examine earning management associated with CEO turnover after controlling other variables including firm size, debt ratio, audit firm and ownership structure, which have been considered to affect discretionary accrual in prior studies. Table 8 displays the results. The fiscal year in which the CEO changes is defined as the transition year; thus the year preceeding the transition year is the prior CEO`s last full fiscal year, and the transition year is the first partial year for the new CEO. Year 0 is the transition year. The TY dummy variable is coded as zero in years -3 to -1 and one in year 0. The TY coefficient is negative and significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level. This negative association between CEO turnover and performance matched discretionary accruals implies income-decreasing earnings management of a new CEO. Additionally, to investigate whether the degree of discretionary accruals varies with the timing of CEO turnover, the voluntary vs. forced CEO turnover, and the CEO succession type (insider vs. outsider), we estimate Equation (6) which adds TY*Month, TY*Remaining and TY*Inout variables in Equation (5). These variables are the multiplication of TY dummy variable and each variable, Month, Remaining and Inout. ``Month`` is one when the timing of turnover is ``after March`` and zero otherwise. ``Remaining``is one when the prior CEO still remains in the company and zero otherwise. ``Inout`` is one when a new CEO comes from outside the company and zero otherwise. The regression result of Equation (6) is reported in Table 9. The TY*Month coefficient is negative and significant. This evidence suggests that discretionary write-offs are greater in the case of ``before March`` turnovers compared to ``after March`` ones and this is consistent with the argument that when the responsibility for the performance in a transition year can be attributed to the predecessors, new CEO`s tend to write off more. However other two variables in the regression, TY*Month and TY*Inout, are not statistically significant and we could not find any evidence that a voluntary vs. forced CEO turnover or the CEO succession type affects the degree of the discretionary write-offs.

경영자 교체가 기업의 위험에 미치는 영향 및 경영자의 임기가 이들 관계에 미치는 영향

신유진 ( Yoojin Shin ),김정옥 ( Jeong Ok Kim ) 한국회계학회 2023 회계학연구 Vol.48 No.6

본 연구는 경영자 교체 및 교체의 특성이 고유변동성과 주가붕괴위험으로 측정한 기업의 위험에 미치는 영향을 분석한다. 본 연구의 결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 경영자 교체는 교체가 발생된 연도 뿐만 아니라 교체 다음연도의 기업위험을 높이는 것으로 나타났다. 둘째, 기업의 위험이 경영자의 임기에 따라 달라지는지를 분석한 결과 경영자의 임기에 따라 기업의 위험은 U-shape로 변화하는 것으로 나타났다. 이에 본 연구는 경영자의 교체가 기업의 위험에 미치는 영향이 전임경영자의 임기에 따라 다른지를 분석하였다. 분석결과 경영자 교체로 인한 기업의 위험은 전임경영자의 재임기간이 초단기에 해당하는 연속교체가 발생한 경우일수록 그렇지 않은 경우에 비해 유의하게 높아졌다. 그러나 전임경영자의 재임기간이 길어 교체주기가 길어지는 경우에는 경영자의 교체가 기업의 위험에 유의한 영향을 미치지 않았다. 다음으로 외국인 지분율에 따라 경영자의 교체가 기업의 위험에 미치는 영향이 달라지는지를 분석한 결과, 5% 이상의 외국인투자자 지분율이 존재하는 기업일수록 그렇지 않은 기업에 비해 경영자 교체로 인한 기업의 위험이 낮아지는 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구의 결과는 경영자의 교체가 전임경영자의 능력에 대한 회의적인 요소와 새로운 경영자에 대한 불확실성으로 인하여 기업의 위험을 대체로 높이며, 이는 전임경영자의 재임기간 및 외국인투자자 존재유무 등에 따라 다르다는 실증결과를 제시한다는 측면에서 공헌이 있다. In this study, we analyzes the effect of CEO turnover and the type of CEO turnover on the corporate risk which are measured by the crash risk and the idiosyncratic volatility. The CEO tenure and CEO turnover are determined by their contribution, those are used as measuring the corporate risk by the investor under Efficient Market Hypothesis. We found that the relationship between CEO tenure and the company risk (the crash risk and the idiosyncratic volatility) were showed a U-shaped form. Also the company risk was positively affected by the CEO turnover. However, the effects of CEO turnover on the company risk showed differently according to the type of CEO turnover. Next, as a result of analyzing whether the effect of the CEO turnover on the risk of the company depends on the foreign equity ratio, it was found that the risk of the company due to CEO turnover is lower than the company that do not have more than the 5% foreign ratio. The results of this study contribute to the fact that the CEO turnover generally increases the risk of a company due to skepticism about the ability and uncertainty of new CEO. And this study suggest that the effect of CEO turnover on the company risk depends on the tenure of CEO and the presence of foreign investors.

한국 대규모기업집단과 최고경영자교체

신지숙,이해영,신범철 한국기업경영학회 2017 기업경영연구 Vol.24 No.2

This study empirically analyses the effect of the Korean large conglomerate(the Chaebol) on the CEO turnover. we uses unbalanced panel data for listed companies in the Korea Stock Exchanges over the period from 2000 to 2012. Corporate performances, financial ratios, and equity ratios were collected from KIS-VALUE DB provided by Korea Investors Service and TS2006 provided by Korea Listed Companies Associate. Materials regarding CEO turnover were surveyed from KIND, corporate disclosure system of the Korea Exchange. We control for endogeneity of corporate performance variables and CEO turnover by employing the Two-Stage Random Effect(RE) panel probit model. The major empirical Results are as follows. First, Korean large conglomerate is significantly positive related to the CEO turnover, that is, the companies belonged to the Chaebol is the significantly higher the CEO turnover probability than them belonged to the non-Chaebol. Second, an decrease in the equity ratio of the largest shareholder and the foreign investors are found to lead to a increase in the CEO turnover probability significantly. On the other hand, the lower rate of return on stocks, which measure an market performance of company, shows the significantly higher the probability of the CEO turnover. But. the lower ratio of operating income to total assets, which measure an accounting performance of company, does not significantly. Third, the ratio of sales growth has a significantly positive effect on the CEO turnover, but the debt ratio has a non-significant effect. Forth, In large companies, the large conglomerate show a significantly positive effect on the CEO turnover. The equity ratio of the foreign investors is positively related to CEO turnover but the equity ratio of the largest shareholder is non-significant. Accounting and market performance variable of large companies are significantly negative effect on the CEO turnover, but the debt ration is significantly positive effect on it. Meanwhile, in small and medium sized companies, the large conglomerate is not significant effect on the CEO turnover. The equity ratio of the foreign investors is significantly negative related to CEO turnover probability but the equity ratio of the largest shareholder is not significantly related to it. It shows that ratio of operating income to total assets in the small and medium sized companies is significantly positive effect on the CEO turnover, but the rate of return on stocks is significantly negative effect on it. Fifth, we analyses on the moderating effect of the increase of equity ratio and corporate performance between the large conglomerate and CEO turnover. The empirical study shows that in the total sample and the large companies, the higher the equity ratio of the foreign investors, the lower the CEO turnover probability even if that is the companies including the large conglomerate. This study has a significance in the way that it produced a meaningful result by direct analyzing the effect of the large conglomerate on the CEO turnover. Depending on whether the CEO turnover is voluntary or forcible, the effect of the large conglomerate on the CEO turnover could be different. In the future, more researches on how the types of the CEO turnover may affect the results should be needed. 본 연구는 본 연구에서는 최고경영자교체와 기업성과 변수간의 내생성 문제를 고려한 2단계 임의효과 패널 프로빗 모형을 활용하여 대규모기업집단 여부가 최고경영자교체에 미치는 영향에 대해 분석하였다. 연구대상 은 2000년 1월부터 2012년 12월까지 한국거래소 코스피시장과 코스닥시장에 상장된 기업 중 금융업을 제외한 모든 기업을 분석대상으로 하였으며, 분석을 위해 불균형 패널자료를 구성하였다. 실증분석결과, 첫째 대규모 기업집단 여부가 최고경영자교체에 유의한 양(+)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 분석되었다. 즉, 대규모기업집단에 속한 기업일수록 최고경영자교체 확률이 유의하게 높아지는 것으로 나타났다. 둘째, 최대주주지분율과 외국인 투자자지분율이 낮을수록 최고경영자교체 확률은 유의하게 높아지는 것으로 분석되었다. 한편 기업성과 중 시 장성과인 주가수익률은 최고경영자교체에 유의한 음(-)의 영향을 미쳤으나, 회계적성과인 총자산영업이익률은 비유의적인 것으로 나타났다. 셋째, 매출액성장률이 높아질수록 최고경영자교체확률은 유의하게 높아졌으나, 부채비율은 비유의적인 것으로 나타났다. 넷째, 표본을 대기업과 중소기업으로 분류하여 재분석한 결과, 대기 업에서는 대규모기업집단 여부가 최고경영자교체에 유의한 양(+)의 영향을 주었으며, 외국인투자자지분율은 유의한 음(-)의 영향을 주었으나 최대주주지분율은 비유의적인 것으로 분석되었다. 한편 기업성과변수는 모두 유의한 음(-)의 영향을 주었으며, 부채비율이 높아질수록 최고경영자교체 확률이 유의하게 높아지는 것으로 나 타났다. 그런데 중소기업에서는 대규모기업집단 여부가 최고경영자교체에 유의한 영향을 주지 않는 것으로 분 석되었으며, 최대주주지분율은 유의한 음(-)의 영향을 주는 것으로 나타났다. 기업성과 변수 중 총자산영업이익 률은 최고경영자교체에 유의한 양(+)의 영향을, 주가수익률은 유의한 음(-)의 영향을 주는 것으로 분석되었다. 다섯째, 지분율의 증가, 기업성과의 증가가 대규모기업집단과 최고경영자교체에 있어서 미치는 조절효과의 영 향에 대해 분석한 결과, 전체 표본과 대기업에서 외국인투자자지분율의 증가가 대규모기업집단과 최고경영자 교체와의 관계에 있어서 최고경영자교체 확률을 유의하게 낮추는 것으로 나타났다.

최고경영자 교체유형과 이익조정 행태간의 관련성

곽영민 ( Young Min Kwak ),최종서 ( Jong Seo Choi ) 한국회계학회 2011 會計學硏究 Vol.36 No.2

최고경영자는 자신의 교체시점을 전후하여 사적 이익을 도모한 이익조정을 하는 것으로 알려지고 있다. 최고경영자의 교체에는 전임경영자와 신임경영자의 두 당사자가 연루되며 이에 따라 두 가지의 독립적인 이익조정 문제가 개입된다. 선행연구에 의하면 전임경영자는 자신의 마지막 재임기간에 보수수준을 증대시키거나 퇴임 후의 재취업 가능성을 제고할 목적으로 이익 상향조정의 동기를 갖는 반면 신임경영자는 미래에 양호한 이익을 보고하기 위한 가능성을 높이기 위하여 취임년도의 이익을 하향조정하려 한다고 제시되고 있다. 그러나 최고경영자의 교체를 전후한 이익조정의 동기는 획일적이 아니라 구체적인 교체유형에 따라 전임경영자와 신임경영자가 각각 상이한 이익조정의 동기를 지닐 수 있는 것으로 추론된다. 예컨대 전임경영자가 퇴임 후에도 회사 내부에 남아있는 경우에는 신임경영자가 이익조정을 할 수 있는 기회는 제한되는 반면 전임경영자가 회사에 잔류하지 않을 경우에는 취임년도의 이익조정을 시도할 수 있다. 또 신임경영자가 내부승진을 통해 영입되는 경우에는 외부영입의 경우에 비해 전임경영자와의 이해관계가 더 첨예할 수 있고 이익조정의 수단에 대해서도 더 정통할 수 있다. 이러한 관점에서 최고경영자의 교체시점을 전후한 이익조정에 대하여 검증력이 높은 분석을 확보하기 위해서는 이익조정의 유인과 기회에 차별적 효과를 초래할 수 있는 교체의 유형을 식별하는 것이 바람직할 것으로 판단된다. Anecdotal and empirical evidences suggest that the CEOs(Chief Executive Officer) engage in earnings management to bolster self-interests around the time of their change. CEO turnover involves two distinct decision makers, the departing(predecessor) CEO and the incoming(successor) CEO. Turnover then raises two independent earnings management issues: how the predecessor manages accounting earnings and how the successor manages them. Previous research suggests that a departing CEO tries to inflate earnings to obtain higher bonus in the last year of operations or to obtain better employment after retirement, while an incoming CEO deflates earnings in order to build reserves of reported income. However, type of CEO turnover provides different incentives for departing and incoming managers to make opportunistic earnings management. If the departing CEO stays with the company after retirement on the board of directors, the incoming CEO might not have opportunity for earnings management because of monitoring by former CEO. On the other hand, the incoming CEO takes a bath in his first year by recording big charges, so long as the departing CEO does not remain in the firm as a director. Therefore, to construct a powerful test of earnings management in the CEO turnovers, it is useful to identify types of CEO turnover that would provide differential incentives and opportunities for earnings management. This study was motivated by the suspicion that types of CEO turnover influence earnings management around CEO turnover. Specifically, we first examine the association between earnings management and types of departing CEO which were classified into voluntary departure and forced departure according to the rules used by Huson et al.(2001). Second, we investigate whether types of incoming CEO, whereby the types are classified into internal promotion and external recruitment, affect earnings management around CEO turnover. Finally, we explore whether earnings management around CEO turnover are distinguishable depending on the types of departing CEO and those of incoming CEO combined together. By understanding the motives or incentives for earnings management in conjunction with specific contexts of CEO turnover, one can develop adequate intuition into circumstances surrounding certain types of CEO turnover, which will help various stakeholder groups to make proper judgement in reviewing financial statement around CEO turnover. To achieve the afore-mentioned research objectives, we first examine the magnitude of discretionary accruals and abnormal real activities around the CEO turnover. In particular, we calculate discretionary accruals using the modified Jones model and variants of this model that correct for the bias due to extreme operating performance (Kothari, Leone and Wasley, 2005). Proxies for real earnings management activities are developed using the models suggested by Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010). We next examine whether the proxies of accrual and/or real earnings management are systematically related with the each type of CEO turnover using single equation and Heckman`s two stage equation models. In addition, we also examine whether earnings management around CEO turnover tends to be alleviated by sound governance mechanism but intensified by higher agency costs. The analysis yields following key findings. First, when we classified sample into four portfolios based on the joint types of departing CEO and incoming CEO, different patterns of earnings management are observed for each portfolio around the turnover. In particular, when departing CEO leaves the company voluntarily and incoming CEO is invited from outside the company, there is an evidence of upward earnings management in year t, when the incoming CEO is promoted from inside the company, he or she did not manage earnings on the other hand. And, there was an evidence indicating upward and downward earnings management in year t-1 and year t, respectively, when former CEO leaves the company under forced turnover context and incoming CEO is promoted from inside the company. However, we can not observe earnings management, when former CEO leaves the company on a compulsory basis and incoming CEO is invited from outside the company. These results suggest that CEOs have differential incentives for earnings management around their turnover depending on the types of departing and incoming CEO combined together. Second, after controlling for the possible endogeneity stemming from the linkage between corporate performance and executive change by using Heckman`s two stage approach, we find evidence to support previous results based on single equation-based analysis. Finally, the opportunistic earnings management around CEO turnover tends to be alleviated by sound governance mechanism but intensified by higher agency costs. This paper contributes to the existing earnings management literature in Korea in a number of respects. First, we incorporate recent innovations in measuring earnings management into our research design by combining the accrual and real activity based metrics and show that these innovations substantially alter the inferences in the CEO turnover context. The results provided in this paper mark significant evidence to support that the circumstances surrounding certain types of CEO turnover provide incentives for departing and incoming CEO to engage in opportunistic earnings management. Second, the results documented in this paper provide an important implication for diverse interest groups participating in the CEO turnover decisions and a logical underpinning on the relationship between the CEO turnover and quality of accounting information. The evidence obtained herein suggests the need for more rigid screening for financial statement around CEO turnover.