기업성과와 전략변화도 간의 관계

성연달,박종훈 한국전략경영학회 2014 한국전략경영학회 학술대회발표논문집 Vol.2014 No.4

본 연구는 기업의 전략변화를 중심으로 기업 상황요인, 최고경영자 특성, 기업 특성, 산업 특성 등이 전략변화 정도에 어떠한 영향을 미치는지 살펴본다. 기업의 전략변화는 기업이 변화하는 환경에 적응하고 생존하기 위해 끊임없이 겪게 되는 현상이다. 따라서 전략분야에서는 기업의 전략변화 정도와 이에 대한 영향요인이 중요한 연구주제로 다루어져 왔다. 본 연구는 기업의 전략변화의 정도를 전략변화도로 정의하고, 국내 코스닥 등록 제조기업을 대상으로 전략변화도의 영향요인을 살펴보기 위한 종합적 접근을 시도한다. 구체적으로 본 연구는 전략변화도의 영향요인 모형에서 ‘기업성과’, ‘최고경영자 산업경험기간’, 기업규모’, ‘산업역동성’을 영향요인으로 고려하고, 기업성과와 전략변화도 간의 관계를 중심으로, 최고경영자 산업경험기간, 기업규모, 그리고 산업역동성의 조절효과를 살펴보았다. 분석결과에 따르면, 기업성과와 전략변화도 부(-)의 관계가 확인되었다. 또한, 이 관계를 바탕으로 한 조절효과 분석에서는 최고경영자 산업경험기간, 기업규모의 산업역동성의 효과를 검증할 수 있었다. 본 연구결과는 전략변화의 필요성이 제기되는 상황에서 경영자, 기업, 산업수준의 특성들이 전략변화 수준에 영향을 미친다는 점을 시사한다. This study examines the relationship between firm performance and strategic change, and the moderating effects of CEO industry tenure, firm size and industry turbulence in the relationship. Using data from the KOSDAQ listed firms of 2005, we found the negative relationship between firm performance and strategic change, and the evidence that CEO industry tenure and firm size weaken the negative relationship between firm performance and strategic change, while we did not fully confirm the moderating effect of industry turbulence. Our finding draws attention to the need for a comprehensive approach to explain how firms have different level of strategic change, supporting the argument that the longer the CEO industry tenure is and the bigger the firm size, the weaker the drive to change strategy is in suffering firms from poor performance.

개발도상국 내 기업의 기업-정부 관계와 기업성과 간의 관계: 국가별 제도화 수준의 조절효과

백유진,성연달 한국국제경영학회 2015 國際經營硏究 Vol.26 No.3

본 연구는 개발도상국 내 기업들의 정부와의 관계가 기업성과에 미치는 영향과 둘 간의 관계에 있어 국가의 제도화 수준의 조절효과를 살펴보았다. 개발도상국의 제도 수준은 선진국의 제도 수준에 비교해보았을 때 덜 체계화 되어 있으며 미흡한 특징을 가진다. 따라서 기업은 제도적 상황에 맞는 독특한 자원의 보유를 필요로 하는데 본 연구에서는 그것을 기업-정부 관계에서 비롯하는 정치적 자원이라 주장한다. 본 연구는 제도주의 이론과 자원기반관점을 결합하여 이와 같은 논의를 진행하였다. 본 연구에서 고려한 기업-정부 관계는 구체적으로 실질적 관계와 관계를 위한 노력이라는 두 가지로 구분되는데, 전자에는 기업이 정부와 계약을 체결하였는지 여부와 정부로부터 재정적 지원을 받았는지 여부가 포함되고, 후자를 대표하는 변수로는 최고경영진이 정부 규제로부터 부과된 요구조건들을 다루는 시간의 비중이 고려되었다. 본 연구는 개발도상국 내 24개 국가, 10,629개 기업을 대상으로 가설을 검증하였다. 연구결과 정부와의 실질적 관계인 계약체결과 재정적 지원은 성과에 긍정적인 영향을 준 반면, 최고경영진이 정부규제에 할애하는 시간은 기업성과와 역U자형 관계를 나타내었다. 또한 국가의 제도화 수준이 낮은 경우, 정부와의 계약체결여부와 최고경영진이 정부규제에 쏟는 시간할애가 기업성과에 미치는 긍정적인 효과가 강화되었다. 이 결과는 기업-정부관계라는 정치적 자원이 제도화 수준이 미약한 국가에서 더 큰 가치를 가진다는 점을 시사한다. Firms in emerging economies are mostly facing institutional voids. We argue that firms in that markets have to possess valuable resources in order to overcome this institutional weaknesses. In this situation, we believe firm-specific political resources stemming from business-government relations have a positive effect on firm performance. By combining institutional theory and resource-based view, this study examines the relationship between business-government relations and firmperformance and moderating effect of countries’ institutional development levels. We specifically consider two different types of business-government relations. One is substantive relations with government like conclusion of a contract and subsidies from the government and the other is senior managers’ time spending on regulations imposed by the government. We test hypotheses with the sample of 10,629 firms from 24 emerging market countries. As a result, we find that substantive relations with government have a positive impact on firm performance, while senior managers’ attention on government regulations has an inverted U-shaped relationship with firm performance. Furthermore, we show the moderating effect of institutional development levels, such that strong institutional environment weakens positive relationship between contract with government and firm performance. Higher level of institutional development also attenuates the positive effect of senior managers’ time spending on firm performance. It implies that political resources resulting from business-government interfaces are more valuable for firms in emerging economies with weak institutional environment.

최고경영자 유명도가 경영진 해임에 미치는 영향

박종훈(Park Jong-Hun), 성연달(Sung Yun-Dal), 김창수(Kim Changsu) 한국인사관리학회 2013 조직과 인사관리연구 Vol.37 No.3

Chief executive officers (CEOs) endeavor to protect their status in firms as they maximize their firm performance and impress shareholders and boards of directors with their success. However, if a CEO did not achieve the expected level of performance, what could he or she do? We propose executive dismissal as a defense mechanism of CEO dismissal in scapegoating perspective and argue that CEO celebrity may decrease the likelihood of CEO dismissal and increase that of executive dismissal. This study provides supports for the effects of CEO celebrity on CEO and executive dismissals using data on 170 large Korean listed firms. We find that poor firm performance increase the likelihoods of CEO dismissal and that of executive dismissal, respectively. We also find that high CEO celebrity weakens the negative relationship between firm performance and CEO dismissal whereas it strengthens the negative relationship between firm performance and executive dismissal.

프로스포츠 감독교체 시기와 조직성과에 관한 연구

박종훈(Park Jong-Hun), 성연달(Sung Yun-Dal), 이동현(Lee Dong-Hyun) 한국인사관리학회 2012 조직과 인사관리연구 Vol.36 No.2

Our study examines the relationship between timing of leader succession and team performance in Korea Pro-sports organizations based on the dataset from Korean professional baseball league during the 1982-2010 period. Drawing on organizational learning theory, we argue that it takes time for a new team leader to take charge of the team and that the new leader who has more time to interact with team members and to remodel the team can improve the team performance. The results show that previous-season succession has a positive impact on team performance while within-season succession has a negative impact. In addition, the results show that the subsequent team performance of between-season succession is better than that of within-season succession, and also demonstrate that the subsequent team performance of previous-season succession is better than that of between-season succession. Our findings imply that the timing of leader succession in sports teams is a significant factor for team performance.

최고경영자 자기과신과 경영자 통제기제

박종훈,성연달,김창수 한국전략경영학회 2013 한국전략경영학회 학술대회발표논문집 Vol.2013 No.3

본 논문의 목적은 선행연구에서 제시되었던 최고경영자 자기과신과 기업성과 간의 부의 관계를 확인하고, 이들 관계가 경영자 통제 상황에 따라 어떻게 달라지는가를 연구하는 것이다. 최고경영자 자기과신(CEO hubris)은 전략적 의사결정 과정에서 오류를 발생시킬 수 있으며, 이는 결과적으로 저조한 기업성과로 이어질 수 있다. 그러나 이와 같은 관계의 강도는 경영자가 어떻게 통제되고 있는가에 따라 달라질 수 있다. 경영자 통제가 강할 때 최고경영자 자기과신이 기업성과에 미치는 영향이 감소할 수 있으며, 반대로 통제가 약할 때는 그 영향이 증대될 수 있다. 이는 조직 내외부의 경영자 감시 및 통제기제가 작동할 때 최고경영자 자기과신이 지업의 실제적 의사결정으로 이어질 가능성이 감소하기 때문이다. 이에 본 연구는 한국 기업환경에서 경영자 통제기제로 이사회와 재벌을 제시하고, 이러한 통제기제들이 최고경영자 자기과신과 기업성과 간의 관계에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다. 분석결과, 최고경영자 자기과신과 기업성과 간의 관계는 부의 관계가 확인되었으며, 이러한 부의 관계는 이사회의 독립성이 높거나 기업이 재벌에 속해 있는 경우 감소하였다. 본 연구 결과는 최고경영자에 대한 통제기제가 잘 갖추어져 있는 경우 최고경영자의 인지적 편향성이 기업에 미치는 부정적인 효과가 줄어들 수 있음을 시사한다. This study examines the moderating role of the management controlling system in Korea, involving board and cheabol, in the relationship between CEO hubris and firm performance. Using data from the Korean public firms of 2004 and 2005, we found that board independence and chebol weakens the relationship between CEO hubris and poor firm performance, repectvely. Our findings suggest that the stronger the management controllin system is, the weaker the problem of CEO hubris is. Our finding draws attention to the negative consequence of CEO hubris and the mitigating role of board and cheabol, and offers a practical implication suggesting that a well-established independent board and the cheabol’s controlling role over affiliated firms be used to check and balance the unhealthy influence of CEO hubris on firm performance.

When Star CEO Departs: Moderating Effects of Industry, Firm, and Departing CEO Characteristics

백유진,김언수,성연달 한국경영학회 2015 經營學硏究 Vol.44 No.3

Since Hambrick and Mason’s watershed essay on upper echelons, there has been much discussion concerning the performance effect during a CEO’s tenure in office. In this research stream, the current study notes the limitation that there is a lack of understanding of a CEO’s departure situation. Among various characteristics of CEOs, this study focuses on the CEO celebrity, because we believe that a star CEO’s departure has a significant impact on firm performance. To explain the interrelationship between star CEO departure and firm performance, we adopt a resource-based view and human capital theory. Unlike prior research, we highlight a resource-loss situation rather than a resource acquisition. The current study posits that the star CEO’s human capital is more valuable and non-substitutable for the firm; thus, resource loss resulting from the star CEO’s departure leads to negative performance. Moreover, this study suggests that star CEO departure effects are context-specific and there are more negative performance consequences of star CEO departure when the firm highly depends on the CEO. We have four moderators in order to examine whether the effect of star CEO departure is contingent on certain situations. Using the data on CEO succession events during 2005-2012 in Korea, we find that star CEO departure has a detrimental effect on subsequent firm performance relative to the case of non-star CEO departure. Tests on moderating effects show that the effect of star CEO departure is more negative when the industry is highly dynamic, the firm has low level of slack, or the departing CEO has had long tenure as the CEO. Finally, we close the study with implications and future research directions.

최고경영자 교체와 이사회 영향력 : 사회정치학적 관점

박종훈,정무관,성연달 한국인사조직학회 2010 인사조직연구 Vol.18 No.2

지배구조에 관한 선행연구에서는 주로 대리인 이론에 기반하여 이사회를 최고경영자의 사적이익 추구행동을 막고, 주주의 이익을 보호하는 존재로 보았다. 따라서, 이들 선행 연구들은 이사회가 본연의 임무를 잘 수행하게 하기 위해서 이사회 영향력을 증대시킬 필요가 있다고 주장하였다. 하지만, 사회정치적 관점에 기반한 선행연구들은 이사회 영향력에 대해서 상이한 견해를 제시하였다. 이들 선행 연구들은 이사회도 다양한 이해관계가 존재하는 집단이기 때문에 이사회가 주주의 이익 대신 이사회 자신이나 다른 이해관계자들의 이익을 위해서 활동할 수도 있다고 주장하였다. 본 연구의 목적은 이사회 영향력이 최고경영자 교체에 미치는 영향에 대하여 기존의 연구에서 주장하는 대리인 이론과 함께 사회정치학적 관점도 고려할 필요가 있는지를 검증하는 것이다. 이를 위해서, 본 논문에서는 기업성과 및 이사회 영향력이 최고경영자 교체와 어떠한 관계가 있는지를 살펴보고, 기업성과와 이사회 영향력의 상호작용이 미치는 효과에 대해서 연구하였다. 'KOSPI 200'에 속한 기업들을 대상으로 2001년부터 2007년까지의 자료를 바탕으로 실증분석을 실시한 결과, 기업성과가 나쁠수록, 이사회 영향력이 클수록 최고경영자 교체가 증가하는 것으로 나타났다. 또한, 기업성과와 이사회 영향력의 상호작용은 최고경영자 교체와 유의한 정(+)의 관계를 보였다. 두 변수의 상호작용의 효과를 보다 명확하게 파악하기 위하여 기업성과를 기준으로 고성과 집단과 저성과 집단으로 구분하여 분석을 실시하였다. 그 결과, 고성과 집단보다 저성과 집단에서 최고경영자가 교체될 확률이 높았지만, 이사회 영향력이 크고 기업성과가 좋을 경우에는 최고경영자 교체 가능성의 증가가 더욱 크게 나타났다. 이러한 연구결과는 최고경영자가 주주의 이익을 대변하지 못할 경우에는 교체될 수 있다는 대리인 이론의 주장을 뒷받침함은 물론, 이사회와 최고경영자간의 파워게임의 결과로 최고경영자가 교체될 수 있다는 사회정치학적 이론의 주장 또한 지지하고 있다. 따라서 이사회 영향력이 최고경영자 교체에 미치는 영향을 보다 명확하게 파악하기 위해서는 대리인 이론과 함께 사회정치학적 관점도 고려해야 함을 확인할 수 있었다. The board of directors has long been the subject of research on corporate governance. The most prominent reason for this attention is the belief that the board of directors can significantly affect the interests of shareholders. The board of directors has various functions: control and monitoring, resource acquisition, and service. The board' control and monitoring activity includes selecting and dismissing CEO and other top managers, evaluating their performance, designing their compensation packages, and supervising internal and external auditing; All of these activities are designed to improve firm performance and protect shareholders' interests. However, the board still appears to vary in their effectiveness in making appropriate managerial changes such as CEO turnover by assessing firm performance; we sometimes observe CEO turnovers under high firm performance while CEOs holding the position under poor firm performance. Why is this happening? Does the board of directors always behave for the benefits of shareholders?This study aims to answer those questions based on both the agency and sociopolitical theories, which provide different perspectives on the board's activities. Based on the agency theory, prior studies on corporate governance argued that the board of directors plays an important role in mitigating the agency problem of top managers and protecting the interests of shareholders. Accordingly, they suggested that publically listed corporations should strengthen the influence of the board to appropriately monitor the misbehavior of top management for the benefits of shareholders. However, another stream of prior research that relied on the sociopolitical theory has provided a different perspective from the agency theory regarding the influence of the board. Viewing the board as one of political coalitions in the firm, they argued that board members can make decisions for their benefits rather than for the benefits of shareholders. The purpose of this study is, therefore, to investigate whether the agency theory and the sociopolitical theory are substituted or complemented to each other in the context of CEO turnover by assessing the relationship among firm performance, board's influence and CEO turnover. The firm performance is a key contextual factor in CEO turnover, because poor firm performance signals incompetence of the incumbent CEO. Therefore, when firm performance is poor, board can make a decision that the incompetent CEO is dismissed and new one is named. We therefore expect the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 1: Firm performance is negatively associated with CEO turnover. The board influence can also affect CEO turnover. CEO turnover is often characterized by political manipulations and power struggles. Boards in board-dominated firms often challenge CEOs, and sometimes replace them if necessary. therefore, we expect the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 2: The board influence is positively associated with CEO turnover. This study considers, therefore, two antecedents of CEO turnover such as firm performance and board influence. There exists a controversy about the direction of an interaction effect of firm performance and board influence on CEO turnover. Based on the agency theory, prior researchers argued that the lower the firm performance and the bigger board influence, the higher the likelihood of CEO turnover for shareholder's benefits. Based on the sociopolitical theory, however, the higher firm performance and the bigger board influence, the higher the likelihood of CEO turnover for board members' benefits. Hence, this study examines not only the main effects of both firm performance and board influence on CEO turnover, but also the interaction effect of firm performance and board influence on CEO turnover. Following such an argument, we argue the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 3: Firm performace positively moderates the positive relationship between the board influence and CEO turno...

최고경영자 교체에 대한 기업지배구조 통제메커니즘과 재벌의 역할

박종훈(Jong Hun Park),성연달(Yun Dal Sung),정무관(Mu Goan Jeong) 한국경영학회 2010 한국경영학회 통합학술발표논문집 Vol.2010 No.08

최고경영자(CEO)의 경험과 기업의 국제화: CEO 영향력의 조절효과

박종훈 ( Jong Hun Park ),성연달 ( Yun Dal Sung ),이동현 ( Dong Hyun Lee ) 한국국제경영학회 2014 국제경영연구 Vol.25 No.1

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between CEO experience and the internationalization of a firm and to further investigate the moderating effect of CEO power for the relationship between CEO experience and firm internationalization. More specifically, we measured CEO experience in terms of his/her foreign experience and job experience, and examined the effects of both the CEO foreign and job experiences on firm internationalization. We propose that CEO foreign experience has a positive effect on firm internationalization, and that those CEOs with outcome-oriented job experiences tend to have greater firm internationalization than those with processoriented job experiences. Further, we propose that CEO power strengthens such relationships between CEO experience and firm internationalization. The results from the sample of 85 Korean firms in the manufacturing industries for the period of 2002 to 2006 generally confirm our hypotheses. Our findings imply that CEO experience influences a firm`s strategic decisions for firm internationalization and that the internationalization effect of CEO experience depends on CEO power across firms.

최고경영자 자기과신과 기업성과

박종훈(Jong Hun Park),성연달(Yun Dal Sung),김창수(Chang Su Kim) 한국경영학회 2013 경영학연구 Vol.42 No.3

This study examines the moderating role of the management control mechanisms in Korea, involving board and chaebol, in the relationship between CEO hubris and firm performance. This study begins with the negative effect of CEO hubris on firm performance. It is argued that hubris-infected CEOs are likely to become overconfident and committed to the risky and problematic decision-making, resulting in poor firm performance. Hypothesis 1: CEO hubris is negatively associated with firm performance. If CEO hubris is associated with poor firm performance, then what factors can alleviate or exacerbate its performance consequence? Faced with the inherent principal-agent problem, weak board independence may allow agency problems. Moreover, the inherent agency problems may be amplified by the other problem associated with CEO hubris. Circumstances exist, however, that may promote board independence in reducing agency problems. We focus on two circumstances of strong board independence: a high proportion of outsiders on the board and the separation of the CEO and chair positions. We argue that CEO hubris is in check when the outside directors are prevalent in a board, potentially restraining the negative consequence that the CEO hubris might engender. It is also critical to separate the CEO and chair positions by means of ensuring board independence. We argue that, when the board chair and CEO positions are separated, CEOs may have less incentive and discretion to enable their hubris to drive the firm in their managerial interests. Hypothesis 2a: The higher the outside director ratio in a board, the weaker the relationship between CEO hubris and poor firm performance. Hypothesis 2b: The relationship between CEO hubris and poor firm performance will be weaker in the case of the separated CEO and chair positions. In Korea, large family-run, diversified business groups, termed chaebols, dominate the economy. In general, a strong group control on personnel decisions limits the discretions of CEOs in individual affiliates under chaebol. In other words, chaebol group headquarters play the role of monitoring and controlling CEOs of group affiliated firms. Therefore, it is argued that the agency problems arising from hubris-infected CEOs will be less of a concern when the firm belongs to chaebol. Hypothesis 3: The relationship between CEO hubris and poor firm performance will be weaker in the case of chaebol firms as opposed to non-chaebol firms. Using data from the Korean public firms of 2004 and 2005, we found that both board independence and chaebol affiliation weaken the relationship between CEO hubris and poor firm performance. These findings draw attention to the negative consequence of CEO hubris and the mitigating role of board independence and chaebol affiliation. Our study offers a practical implication that the unhealthy influence of CEO hubris on firm performance can be checked and balanced by a group control mechanism, as well as an independent board.