政府豫算의 效率性 檢定에 관한 硏究 : 公共選澤論的 接近을 중심으로

金幸範 인제대학교 1993 仁濟論叢 Vol.9 No.2

Bureaucrats are not just the decisional transmitter, rather with their own utility calculations they are the actors which possibly get something done in the field of public services. Public Choice analysts, though, don't agree on the efficiency of bureaucratic conduct, either in the output scale or in the budget quantity. 1 reviewed three main theoretical studies on this topic ; study by Niskanen(1971), by Williamson(1964), and by Migue'-Be'langer(1974). Following results were discovered. 1. All have common properties like 'biasing toward the oversupply-theory', ignoring the risk-aversion trend of bureaucrats', 'overestimating asymmetric monopoly'. Thus it is approach is necessary to establish the new approach which compasses both supply and demand side of bureaucratic output. For this purpose game-theoretic approach and/or principal-agent approach deserve much more attention. 2. All assumes different basic motives on bureaucratic conduct. And it looks like that Migue'-Be'langer theory has the further generality. 3. Each theory huts assumes different utility function determinants. As basic factor of such utility function, Niskanen model includes'budge', Williamson model,'quantity of output and staff', and Migue'-Be'langer model, 'quantity of output and discretionary budget'. The last, however, has more generality than others, and therefore with only utility function of Migue'-Be'langer model it is possible to explain all above utitlity functions. 4. The equilibrium output size of each bureaucrat of the three models chooses is summarized in the 〈table 5-1〉. The quantity of output in three types of bureaucrats can be arranged following, Niskanen type bureaucrats>Migue'-Be'langer type bureaucrats>Williamson type bureaucrats. Every type reveals oversupply problem. 5. In terms of price discrimination Williamson type bureaucrat has nondiscriminatory monopoly power. Whereas, both Niskanen type and Migue'-Be'langer type have N degree of discriminatory monopoly power. Therefore Williamson type bureaucrat has lower budget line than ethers, which causes less quantity of bureaucratic output than two other types of bureaucrats. 6. Efficiency problem should be reviewed in two dimensions, namely, technical efficiency and allocative efficiency according to H.Leibenstein(1966). First, in the light of technical efficiency, two type of bureaucrats is found to be efficient : 'low-level bureaucrat'in the Niskanen type bureaucrat,'output-oriented bureaucrat'in the Migue'-Be'langer type bureaucrat. Every type excepting above two is inefficient, and'rentoriented bureaucrat' which is one kind of three Migue'-Be'langer bureaucrats is the worst in the sense of technical efficiency. Second, in the light of allocative efficiency the rent-oriented bureaucrat', one kind of three Migue'-Be'langer bureaucrat, is the only that is efficient in the sense of allocative efficiency. And both 'low-level bureaucrat' in the Niskanen type bureaucrat and 'output-oriented bureaucrat' in the Migue'-Be'langer model are the worst in allocative efficiency. 7. The way bureaucrats reap utility from the organizational resources was analysed with the three models. Only Williamson type bureaucrat uses specific input(staff)-bias as the instrumental method of utility-reaping from the organization. Niskanen does not address the way by which bureaucrat reaps utility from the governmental budget, and Migue'-Be'langer never specify the concrete way of consuming the discretionary budget by which bureaucrat extracts any rents from the organizational resources.

政府의 공공서비스 供給論理에 관한 Game 理論的 硏究

金幸範 인제대학교 1995 仁濟論叢 Vol.11 No.2

In the accumulative studies on the inquiry for Logic of Provision of Public Services was so many approaches. One of the approaches is the game-theoretic method. Traditionally, however, dominant fashion of game-theoretic analyses on that subject focused mainly on Prisoner's Dilemma Game. The scheme on provision of public services are not simple. In the light of various contexts under which public service is supplied, other game schemes should be employed. Under different schemes, there should come different solutions for the cooperation. Here I used three basic game-theoretic schemes : Assurance Game(AG), Chicken Game(CG), Prisoner's Dilemma Game(PDG). Some findings were derived to reach the cooperation among members of governmental unit. When service provision is under the condition of AG, it is very important to identify the 'honest non-cooperators' and 'free-riders'. And there should be the assurance for the reciprocal cooperation so that the 'isolators' can continually provide contribution. The small size of governmental unit is far more effective than large one. For the former, it is reportedly very easy to identify the 'honest non-cooperator' and 'free-riders'. As for the scheme of CG, it seems to be difficult to achieve the solution for the The scheme of PDG could be employed to well explain the 'Tragedy of Commons', 'Test-Ban Treaty', 'Market for Lemons'. In PDG scheme, the TFT(Tit-For-Tat) seem to be very effective strategy to induce cooperations. For the TFT to work as effective strategy the discount parameter needs to be high, chance of reunion to be large. This implies the condition for the super game must be established. Under a certain conditions, TFT can spread itself even in the: environment in which the strategy of defection is extremely prevalent. According to eight propositions by Axelrod(1984), I extracted several suggestions for TFT to well work in the real provision of public goods. Partly Axelrod seems to have exaggerated the probability of cooperation. Specifically his 'temptation ratio' has to be modified according to McLean(1987). All above findings can be used as the basis for theory development and practical inference in the field of public services.〈The End〉.

政策分析에 있어서 社會的 衡平性, 倫理性을 수용하기 위한 새로운 分析的 視覺에 관한 硏究 : - 傳統的 方法論에 대한 批判的 考察 -

金幸範,金勇珠 인제대학교 1991 仁濟論叢 Vol.7 No.2

The purpose of new analytical perspective for public administration is not in the new perpective itself, but in the construction of methodological reference frame for the desirable public administration. And the key point of 'desirable one' is the public administration for the citizen. As a basic philosophical themes for the 'desirable one'- democratic administration, the phenomenological perspective is to be examined. There is a tendency to change the studying perspective of the public administration into the perspective orienting the policy. By the way, to promote the citizen's sorial welfare, the public service is to be aimed how to accomplisch the social equity(justice) in the citizen's real life. Therefore policy analysis must compass the normative value-especially morality. And then policy analysis have to clearly identify the coincidence policy alternatives with such a normative valve. It is the same context to introduce phenomenological perspective into the study of public administration. As anti-thesis to the empiricism which has dominated the traditional administration, the study by phenomenological method makes it possible to access to the administration phenomenon. However, it is a important matter that how much the uncontrolable intuition and the meta physical aspects are considered. And it is anticipated that more relevant, scientific and sophisticated phenominological frame as a dialectic synthesis would be showed.

行政規制와 Rent-Seeking에 관한 公共選澤論的 硏究

金幸範 인제대학교 1996 仁濟論叢 Vol.12 No.1

Deregulation of various administrative regulations in Korea stands at the core of reform policies. Before practicing concrete programs should the theoretical rationale for the deregulation be clearly argued. Here in this article I adopted some existing studies on rent-seeking field for the frame of reference. Especially theories of Tullock, Corcoran, Karels were on the main focus of this article. Some suggestions were derived through intensive review of arguments in the rent-seeking literatures. Above all, the critical purpose of rent-seeking should be to find out some leverages to reduce rent-seeking activities and rent-seeking costs. This purpose is far more important in the Asian developing countries, which generally have common administrative phenomena of cultures of corruption, perquisites. Korean adminstration system has leaded the economic development with the tools of so many regulative programs since 60's, and its success of that role brought her good reputation among NIC's. It was inevitable phenomena, however, that administrative regulations also caused so many rent-seeking activities. With the clear theoretical foundation Korea needs to eliminate the sources of rent-seeking around the administrative regulations. Through the previous studies some policy implications were derived as following. 1) Reducing of the numbers of candidates for the rent-seeking is necessary. In a sense, to introduce the notion of nepotism is recommendable in the the distributing process of rents. 2) Establishing the some institutions which enforce steeply rising of marginal costs of rent-seeking activities. 3) Introduction of a certain bias into the selection process of rent-taker reduces rent-seeking expenditures, which, however paralyzed with the equal opportunity. 4) Encouraging existing players to bet at the minimum level between pre-emptory bet range does reduces the rent-seeking expenditures. 5) It can be a recommendable measure to regulate against hardball competition by which entrants forces to gain accommodations from the incumbents. Hit-and-Run competition is preferable to hardball competition. 6) In the case of Hit-and-Run competition, collusion solutions seems marginally preferable to Cournot-Nash solution. In the case of Hardball competition, Cournot-Nash solutions seems marginally preferable to collusion solution. We need to design right institutions along with these different situations. 7) Imposing the lump-sum cost (transaction-costs) on the rent-seeking activities reduces the total expenditures by an equal amount in this sense we need to contemplate to introduce rent-seeking license. 8) More basically, the present settings which enables for administrative systems to have too much powers and resources should be changed in the long-term sense.

政府政策에 대한 壓力團體 활동의 理論模型에 관한 公共選擇論的 硏究

金幸範,文景柱 인제대학교 1997 仁濟論叢 Vol.13 No.1

The role of interest group in policy process cannot be emphasized too much. But there are variant approaches to this policy subject. Public Choice approach is new promising focus in the study of public administration as was suggested by Vincent Ostrom. This article reviews interest groups(pressure group) which were analyzed by the approach of economic model. We selected four models as a typical topics : (1) Olson Model, (2) Peltzman Model, (3) Virginians Model. (4) Becker Model. all of them were reviewed in desultory fashion by the policy scientist perspective. Each model was reviewed in separate section. We could identify the strength and the shortcomings of the models. Even though 4 models were built on the same economic perspectives, they show different implication, in both description and prescription, some of which are contrasting rather than being just different. Comprehensive comparison of these models needs common standard, so that we could make an useful conclusion on interest group and its role in policy process. But it was difficult to devise such common standard by which we can do comparison. Despite the danger of arbitrariness, five standards were extracted for comprehensive comparison of the models. According to such comparison following conclusion were derived. ① Olson Model is the model focusing on the formulation and establishment of the interest group : It concentrates on internal management of members of group to avoid free riding, and then to establish interest group. All others are models on 'activity', not formulation, of already well-established interest group. ② They suggest disparate preference for the competitiveness of the interest groups. According to Olson model competitiveness of the interest groups harms national economic growth. But Peltzman model does not make clear view on the competitiveness of the interest grouts. Virginians model most strongly emphasizes the harmful effect on the social welfare, by inventing the concept of 'rent-seeking' Becker stands at far different position : he suggests competitiveness of the interest groups results in efficiency, rather than inefficiency, in subsidy and taxation. ③ On the active phase of government which is a supplier of regulatory policies, we could find some difference, too. Olson model ignores the active role of regulator. In Peltzman's model, regulator is not just a captive of the regulated; he considers the both sides of beneficiary group and non-beneficiary group. Peltzman appears to recognize a little more active role of regulator than Olson. Virginians regard government as an active creator of the rent which interest groups are eager to win. Becker model regards role of the government just as that of pluralists. ④ Which interest group is going to be winner in policy benefit distribution? Olson model, when we extend his logic on the formulation of interest group to this problem, seems to consider the small group the future winner. Peltzman model says both producer interest group and consumers interest group can be the winner. Virginians never make it clear which group is going to win ; they just focus on total and mutual activity which result in the harmful effect on social welfare. Becker model suggests relatively efficient group is going to be winner. ⑤ On the prescription to evade undesirable result of. interest groups, Olson suggests restoration of free market. Peltzman model is not sensitive to the possible undesirable effect of interest groups on societal welfare ; he, therefore, does not show clear comment on the prescription to that problem, either. Virginians are easer to devise effective ways to remove inefficiency caused by interest groups and their rent-seeking activity. Their fundamental remedy seems to be constitutional change to decrease the power for government to create rent. Becker suggests perfectly different prescription ; the strengthening of the activity and competition among interest groups.

김해시 인력ㆍ기구의 적정규모와 효율적 조직체계의 구축

김행범,강성철,이광수 인제대학교 김해발전연구소 1997 김해발전연구 Vol.1 No.1

과민성 장증후군 환자에서 베타 아드레날린 수용체 기능의 활성도와 불안 수준

강은호,이풍렬,이준행,김현서,이종철,유범희 大韓神經精神醫學會 2004 신경정신의학 Vol.43 No.1

Torque Sensor Embedded Actuator Module for Robotic Applications

Kim, Yong Bum,Kim, Uikyum,Seok, Dong-Yeop,So, Jinho,Lee, Yoon Haeng,Choi, Hyouk Ryeol IEEE 2018 IEEE/ASME transactions on mechatronics Vol.23 No.4

<P>Measuring accurate torque is a core ability of advanced robotic technologies. However, embedding torque-sensing systems into robot joints are still a challenge due to limitations including size, weight, and cost. Moreover, the influence from axial forces/torques (<I>x</I>- and <I>y</I>-axis) and the sinusoidal effect from the harmonic drive make it difficult to measure torque accurately. This paper presents a novel actuator module for robotic applications that includes a torque sensor, harmonic drive, motor, and encoder. The torque sensor adopts the capacitive sensing scheme, which can allow for self-decoupling of the axial influences through the use of a symmetric arrangement of sensing cells. Moreover, the torque ripple cancellation method, which can reduce the sinusoidal effect from the harmonic drive, is introduced. Finally, the detailed design of the actuator module is described, and its performance is experimentally evaluated.</P>

대장선암종에 수반된 폐쇄성 대장염 1 예

김영수,최원,김범수,김영배,이진우,신용운,이돈행,박상현,김형길,정석,권계숙,조현근 대한소화기내시경학회 2000 Clinical Endoscopy Vol.21 No.5

Obstructive colitis is an ulceroinflammatory lesion occurring proximal to an obstructing lesion in the colon. It is the result of ischemia due to impairment of blood supply secondary to elevation of the intraluminal pressure and other factors which impair adequate perfusion. The incidence among patients with colonic obstruction is reported to be between 1 and 7%. The patients are predominantly female and usually have hypertension, diabetes, or other prior chronic disease. Obstruction is occurred most commonly in the rectosigmoid area. In half of the patients, this is caused by adenocarcinoma. There is always an abrupt transitional zone between affected and normal bowel. A segment of preserved mucosa is usually presented on the proximal side of the stenosis. Areas of colitis occurs either as circumscribed ulcers or confluent circumferential lesions. They can occur as early mucosal hemorrhage and edema, and transmural necrosis. Microscopically, lesions are composed of granulation tissue with mixed acute and chronic inflammatory cells that replace the mucosa and often the submucosa. We report a case of obstructive colitis occuring proximal to colon cancer with a brief review of relevant literature.

Social Justice : Cognition on Libertarian Perspective

Haeng-Bum Kim 한국제도∙경제학회 2021 제도와 경제 Vol.15 No.1

프랜시스 후쿠야마는 시장경제의 승리 선언에 좀 더 겸비했어야 했다. 마르크스가 말한 공산주의 혼령이 사라진 자리에 지금 ‘사회정의’라는 외장의 새 혼령이 나타나 모든 사회 경제 정책을 주관하며 마땅히 지켜야 할 경계를 넘어 사적 자유와 재산까지 침해하고 있다. 그럼에도 사회정의는 으레 정부에 의한 분배를 수반하는 것이라는 그릇된 믿음이 만연하고 있다. 정의가 분배주의적 가치 규범과만 결합하는 것은 아니 다. 개인의 자유를 중시하는 자유주의 철학의 정의론을 발굴하기 위해, 하이에크와 노직의 문헌을 통해 정의에 관한 명제들을 광범위하게 도출했다. 하이에크의 자유주의 적 정의론 내용은 존재론, 인식론, 도덕론, 사회의 인격화, 분배기준으로서의 ‘응당 받을 몫’(Desert), 격세유전(Atavism)의 6개 명제로 요약했다. 노직의 이론들로부터 취득의 정의, 이전의 정의, 부정의의 교정, 소유의 한계, 선천적 자질의 인정이란 6 명제로 요약했다. 종속변수인 하이에크와 노직의 정의론 인식은 각각 이 6명제 수준들 로 발현된다. 나아가, 한국 지식인 집단을 A(자유주의 관련 강의 수강 경험이 있는 학생), B(자유주의와 무관한 일반 교수들), C(자유주의 성향의 교수들) 세 집단에 자유 주의 정의론이 어떻게 인지되는가를 ‘다변량 분산분석’ 기법으로 분석했다. 그 결과 다음과 같은 주요 사항들이 발견되었다. 첫째, 하이에크나 노직에 관한 오스트리아학파의 직관적․질적 타당성은 계량적 분석을 통해 보강될 수 있다. 둘째, 하이에크나 노직의 정의론 인식은 세 집단의 성질에 따라 큰 차이를 보인다. 셋째, 자유주의적 교수들(C)은 학생(A) 및 일반 교수(B)에 비해 하이에크 및 노직의 정의론 의 인지도가 가장 높다. 넷째, 자유주의적 교수들은, 학생 및 일반 교수와는 달리, 노직에 비해 하이에크에 대해서는 응답자의 의견 차이가 상대적으로 크다. 다섯째, 하이에크뿐 아니라 노직을 다 감안한 세 집단의 전반적 인지도 순서는 B≤A<C 패턴 을 보인다. 즉, 자유주의 수업 경험이 있는 학생은 더 오래 더 많이 배우고도 자유주의 와 무관한 성향의 교수들보다 자유주의적 정의론을 더 잘 수용한다. 여섯째, 하이에크 와 노직 전체를 비교하면, 하이에크보다 노직의 정의론에 대한 인지도가 더 높고 이는 세 집단에 공통된 현상이다. 그러나 본 연구는 다음과 같은 제약으로 일반화에 유의해야 한다. 첫째, 표본 수가 더 확대되어야 한다. 둘째, 다변량 분산분석이 전제한 종속변수의 등분산 가정이 완전 히 충족되지 못했는데 이는 자유주의 교수들이 소수의 동질적 집단의 구성원이기 때문 에 다양한 분포에서 추출된 다른 집단과 분산이 다르기 때문이었다. 분석상의 보완조 치를 가했지만, 추후 이 점을 더 보완할 필요가 있다. 결론 해석에 겸손해야 한다는 제약에도 불구하고 한 가지는 분명해 보인다. 진정한 의미의 ‘사회정의’가 존재한다면, 어느 정치체제가 자신의 정치적 이해로 규정한 특정 상태가 바로 그것과 동일한 것이 될 수는 없음을 자유주의적 사회정의론은 시사한다. 이제는 자유 속박의 도그마로 자리 잡은 분배중심의 사회정의로부터 벗어나 대안적 정의론도 탐색할 때이다. 자유주 의적 정의론은 그 한 대안이 될 수 있다. 가장 중요한 점은 분배주의에 빠진 ‘사회정의’ 가 아니라 ‘정의로운 정의’이어야 한다는 것이다. Francis Fukuyama needed to be more modest. A new spectre with cloak of ‘Social Justice’ came back and now rules over every socio-economic policies. Distribution by government is being identified with Social Justice. This paper extracts the Libertarian justice theories andstudies on notions of intellectuals on Libertarian justice arguments of Friedrich A. Hayek and Robert Nozick. Hayek’s justice arguments were categorized into 6 premises: Ontology, Epistemology, Personification, Desert Norm, Atavism. Nozick’s justice arguments as 6 premises: Just Acquisition, Just Transfer, Rectification of Injustice, Limitation of Holding, Minimal State, Natural Asset. Cognitions of those justice were measured among 3 groups: A(Students with some exposures to Libertarian classes), B(Ordinary, non-libertarian professors), C(Libertarian_professors). By MANOVA(multivariate analysis of variance), their cognition on Libertarian justice were tested. First, existing intuitive and qualitative analyses on Hayek and Nozick can be tested, supplemented and reinforced by the quantitative analysis. Second, Libertarian justice cognition is disproportionately revealed according to 3 groups. Third, Libertarian_professors show the highest cognition than Students and Ordinary_professors. Fourth, they have relatively more various views on Hayek than on Nozick. Fifth, among A, B and C groups, there are robust pattern of degree of cognition on Libertarian justice: B≤A<C. Sixth, for all groups Nozick’s justice premises are more perceived than Hayek’s. This research has some caveats. First, sample sizes need to be enlarged. Second, MANOVA’s ideal assumption of homogeneity of variances of dependent variables were not fully satisfied. Third, justice arguments from Hayek and Nozick may not be sufficient, leaving room for validity problem of scales. Finally, one thing seems to loom clear. Libertarian justice theory suggests that if anything like justice in true meaning exists, never it would be one which a political entity arbitrarily impose as justice for their political consideration. It is time to turn from dogmatic distributionist’s justice to other ones like libertarian notion of justice. What’s most important is not ‘Social Justice’, but ‘Just Justice’.