韩国公企业的经验对中国公企业改革的启示

卢笑宇,김광록 한국기업법학회 2019 企業法硏究 Vol.33 No.4

Generally, Korean public enterprises perform the basic task of providing the necessary goods and services for the survival of members of society in order to pursue public interests and public welfare. These public enterprises play a functional role in economic development and meet the needs of the public through economic policies and the redistribution of income between different classes and regions. However, public enterprises have not only been criticized for violating the private economy and the basic rights of individuals, they have also distorted the economic process and ultimately reduced economic efficiency. At present, the state of highly complex administration has brought new changes to the realization of national public goals, requiring the state and society to play a new role in fulfilling their responsibilities. In this case, not only South Korea, but also Chinese state-owned enterprises Undertake various reforms. According to the data of the 2019 State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission's Communiqué, the total assets of China's state-owned enterprises in 2018 were 178.7 trillion yuan. Among the Fortune Global 500 companies selected by Fortune Magazine in 2019, there were 89 Chinese state-owned enterprises and central enterprises More than 11 billion yuan has been invested in targeted poverty alleviation counties. Chinese state-owned enterprises are an important part of the national economy, and Chinese public welfare state-owned enterprises are the support of the basic industries of the national economy, ensuring the normal development of residents' lives. Since 2015, China's state-owned enterprises have continuously strengthened the classification reform and achieved good results, but they have also encountered many difficulties, such as the need to improve the governance system of state-owned enterprises. Reform of China's state-owned enterprises is necessary to keep pace with the times. Korean public enterprises are similar to Chinese public welfare state-owned enterprises and occupy a large share of the national economy. Public enterprises are an economic means of economic development, a means of redistributing income among all social strata and regions, and have played a role in meeting public needs. Since the 1880s, South Korea has introduced modern corporate governance structures in public enterprises, pursuing a balance between corporate autonomy and public service goals. Therefore, based on the historical evolution of Chinese public welfare state-owned enterprises and Korean public institutions, this article studies the advantages and disadvantages of Chinese public welfare state-owned enterprises, draws on the effective experience of Korean public enterprises, and draws specific information about Chinese public welfare state-owned enterprises Development plan, with a view to playing a role in attracting new ideas to the reform of Chinese state-owned enterprises. 일반적으로 공기업은 공공복리라는 공익추구를 목적으로 그 사회를 구성하는 구성원의 생존에 필요한 재화와 용역의 공급이라는 기본적인 임무를 수행한다. 이러한 공기업은 경제정책 및 계층별․지역 간 소득의 재분배를 통하여 경제발전은 물론 공공에 대한 수요충족이라는 기능적 역할도 함께 수행한다. 그러나 공기업은 사적 경제를 침해하거나 사인의 기본권을 침해하는 것은 물론 경제활동 과정을 왜곡함으로써 궁극적으로 경제의 효율성을 해친다는 비판을 받기도 한다. 오늘날과 같은 고도의 복잡․다양한 행정현실은 국가가 그 임무를 수행하는 방식에 변화를 초래하였고 그 역할마저 변할 것을 요구하고 있다. 이러한 사정에서 한국은 물론 중국의 공기업도 다양한 변화를 요구받고 있다. 중국 국유자산감독관리위원회의 2019년 관보에 따르면, 2018년 중국 국유기업의 자산총액은 178억7000만 위안을 기록했다. 2019년 포츈(Fortune)이 선정한 세계 500대 기업 중에서 중국 국유기업은 89개를 차지하였다. 중국의 중앙기업은 빈곤타파를 위한 무상 원조를 위해 110억 위안의 자금을 투입하기도 하였다. 이러한 사정에서 중국의 공기업, 구체적으로는 중국 국유기업은 국민경제의 중요한 부분을 구성하고 있으며, 중국 공익류 국유기업은 국 민경제의 기초산업을 지탱하고 주민들의 생활을 정상화 하는데 큰 역할을 하고 있다. 이러한 중국 공기업의 역할은 2015년 이후 특히 강화되어 왔지만 아직까지도 그 지배구조를 비롯한 체계가 완전하게 갖추어지지 못한 사정이다. 결국 공기업에 대해서도 다양한 변화를 요구하는 오늘날 중국 공기업도 시대의 변화에 따른 발전을 위해서는 어느 정도 개혁을 감수해야만 한다. 한편, 한국 공기업은 이미 국민경제의 큰 부분을 차지하고 제 역할을 잘 수행하고 있다. 특히 한국은 1980년대부터 공기업에 대한 지배구조를 개선하면서 기업의 자치목표와 공공 서비스 목표의 균형을 잘 발전 시켜왔다. 따라서 이 연구는 한국 공기업의 효율적인 경험을 거울삼아 중국 공기업에 대한 구체적인 발전 방안을 도출하고자 한다.

중국의 정부감사와 기업의 관리효율성: 중국 중앙기업 상장자회사 분석

최국현,손관 국제지역학회 2018 국제지역연구 Vol.22 No.4

In China, different from the private enterprises or the locally-administered state enterprises, central state-owned enterprises generally spread over cornerstone industry which is greatly influenced by the public policy, which results in the objective existence of government influence in their productive activities. As the strategic resource, listed companies controlled by central state-owned enterprises, mostly distributed in the lifeblood and security of key industries.Therefore, listed companies controlled by central state-owned enterprises’ governance efficiency play an important role in optimal allocation of state-owned assets, improve capital operation, improve the return on capital, and maintain state-owned assets safety. As the immune systems of national governance, the government audit strengthen the supervision of listed companies controlled by central state-owned enterprises in case of the loss of state-owned assets and significant risk events occur, to ensure that the value of state-owned assets. As an important component of national governance, government audit produced in entrusted with the economic responsibility of public relationship. Government audit can play an important role in maintaining financial security and corruption, and also improve listed company's accounting stability and transparency. While government audit can improve governance efficiency and maintain state-owned assets safety, present literature is scarce. Under the corporate governance theory and the economical responsibility theory, the thesis select data from 2010-2017 to verify the relationship between government audit and listed companies controlled by central state-owned enterprises’ corporate performance. Results show that listed companies controlled by central state-owned enterprises are more likely to be audited by government of poor performance. Results also show that the government audit will have a promoting effect on listed companies controlled by central state-owned enterprises, and through to the improvement of the governance efficiency will enhance its companies’ value. The results show that China’s government audit has appealing role in accomplishing central state-owned enterprises to realize the business objectives and in promoting the governance efficiency. 중국은 국민 경제 주력인 중앙기업이 일반 국유기업이나 민영기업과 달리 대부분 국가 정책적 영향을 받는 산업의 기업이다. 국유기업 시장화 개혁과정 중 중앙기업의 지주회사는 대부분 국가 경제발전과 안전보장에 대한 영역에 집중되어 있다. 이에 따라 중앙기업 지주회사의경영성과는 국유자본 분포, 자본의 규범적 운행 , 높은 수익과 자본안전의 유지 등에 막대한영향을 미치고 있으며 정부 감사가 중앙기업의 지주 상장회사에 대한 관리와 감사를 강화시켜 국유자산 유출을 방지하고 국유자산의 가치를 증가 지킬 수 있다. 정부감사는 부패 척결, 재정적 금융안전유지 등에 중요한 역할을 할 수 있을 뿐만 아니라, 상장기업의 회계 안전성 및 회계투명성 등을 개선 할 수 있다. 정부감사는 중앙상장기업의 경영성과를 향상시킬 수 있고 국유자본 안전의 보장, 국유자산 유출 방지, 국유 자산의 가치를 증가 시킬 수 있을 것으로 기대되나, 기존연구는 중국의 정부감사와 중앙상장기업의 경영성과나 관리효율 간의 관계에 대한 분석이 부족한 상황이다. 본 논문은 2010~2017 년 중앙상장기업을 표본으로 회사관리이론과 공공수탁경제책임이론을사용하여 정부감사가 중앙상장기업의 관리효율에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다. 연구결과 중앙상장기업의 경영성과가 나쁠수록 정부감사를 받을 가능성이 커지며 정부감사가 중앙기업의 관리효율을 향상시킬 수 있는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 중국의 정부감사가 중앙상장기업의 경영목표를 달성하고, 경영효율을 제고하는 수단으로서 의미있는 역할을 수행하고 있음을 시사한다.

국제투자중재에서의 공기업 관련 국제법적 문제

장석영(Chang, Sok Young) 국제법평론회 2019 국제법평론 Vol.0 No.53

Since the mid-1990s, there has been a significant increase in the number of international investment disputes and dozens of new investment disputes are brought to international arbitration every year. Moreover, the investors tend to submit the claims directly against the host states when the dispute arises out of a contractual breach by state-owned enterprises, and Dayyani v. Korea is one of them. In Dayyani v. Korea, Korea has become a respondent state due to the conduct of the state-owned entity, and this kind of investment disputes raises a number of issues concerning the status of state-owned enterprises in public international law. However, problems related to the status of state-owned entities in international investment arbitration have not been discussed in much detail so far, and moreover, the existing research in this field is usually focused on the protection of investors or the substantive standards of treatment. Therefore, it is important to identify some common problems regarding the relationship between state-owned enterprises and the host states that could be raised at each stage of arbitral proceedings. By looking at the issues regarding personal jurisdiction, state responsibility, and the enforcement of arbitral awards, this thesis seeks to explore the ways that the host states, including Korea, could deal with these problems in arbitral proceedings. First, with regard to the establishment of the jurisdiction of ICSID, there can be two kinds of respondents in investor-state arbitration: state-owned company as a respondent, or host state as a respondent state. Regarding the latter, it is questionable whether the host state could be responsible for the breach of investment contract by state-owned enterprises. In order to answer this question, two elements, which are (i) attribution of conduct to the host state, and (ii) breach of an international obligation, should be analyzed. Also, regarding the execution of arbitral awards, the question arises whether the properties owned by state-owned enterprises could enjoy immunity from execution when the investor intends to enforce an arbitral award against them, in case the award that was rendered against the host state is not executed voluntarily. Overall, it could be concluded that state-owned enterprises under municipal law might be considered as state organs under international law, and thus, it is possible for the host state to be a respondent state and be held internationally responsible for the act of its state-owned entities. Accordingly, it is required to look at the factors that are taken into account when examining the relationship between state-owned enterprises and the host states in each problems. The decisive factors include, in general, the ownership of corporation’s shares, the power to appoint members of the board of directors, and the control over corporation by approval of plans. In addition, when it has been established that the host state is responsible for the act of its state-owned enterprise, it could be understood that the close relationship between state-owned enterprise and the host state has already been recognized. And thus, it raises a question whether the host state might be able to argue at the enforcement stage that the state-owned entity exists separately from the state so that its assets cannot be equated with those of the host state. The host state might be able to make such argument as the threshold required for identifying the state-owned entity as the host state at the enforcement stage is higher than that required for establishing jurisdiction or state responsibility of the host state. Moreover, even if this argument is not accepted and as a result, the properties of the state-owned entity is equated with those of the host state, the host state might still be able to argue that noncommercial assets of the state-owned enterprise are immune from execution. Considering that investment arbitration claims are continuo

OECD 공기업지배구조 지침에 대한 연구

성승제 한국법제연구원 2013 법제연구 Vol.- No.45

2005년 OECD가 제정 및 공표한 국가소유기업에 대한 기업지배구조지침(OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises)은 사기업에 대한 OECD의 기업지배구조원칙(OECD, Principles of Corporate Governance)이 큰 영향을 미치고 있다. 왜냐하면 OECD 공기업지배구조지침도 공기업이 원활하고 효율적으로 작동할 수 있도록 하기 위하여, 정부로 하여금 OECD 기업지배구조원칙 등 사기업에게 적용되는 방안이 유용하게 활용될 수 있도록 권장하고 있다. 그 뿐만 아니라, 공기업에 대한 법령 및 규정체계 등이 OECD의 기업지배구조원칙에 기초하고 있다. 그리하여 공기업지배구조지침과 기업지배구조원칙이 서로 대립하는 것이 아니고 사실상 유사한 기준에 의하여 편성되어 있다. 결국 공기업도 사실상 OECD 기업지배구조원칙이 적용된다는 점과 일반적인 기업지배구조 원칙이 공기업에서 유용하게 적용된다는 점을 보여주고 있다. 공기업도 착한 일(공공성 발휘)을 하려면 수익성을 좇는 것이 목적은 아닐지라도 적어도 부채가 누적되어 부도가 나는 등의 사태로 말미암아 정부 재정에 부담을 주지는 말아야 할 말아야 할 필요가 있기 때문이다. 이러한 원칙은 오늘날 경제위기가 정부의 재정위기로 비화되는 일이 자주 발견되고 있기 때문에 외면하기 힘들다고 할 것이다. OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance applied to private enterprises plays a great role in Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises enacted and proclaimed by OECD in 2005. This is due to in order for state-owned enterprises to function effectively, OECD’s Guideline on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises recommends the use of principles which are applicable to private enterprises, such as principles of corporate governance, to be applied to state-owned enterprises. Furthermore, regulations and legal systems regarding state-owned enterprises bases on Principles of Corporate Governance of OECD. In other words, Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises and Principles of Corporate Governance does not conflict with each other, but is established based on similar standard. As a result, we can examine that OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance and general principles of corporate governance are also applied to state-owned enterprises. For state-owned enterprises to promote its primary goal (its public goal), it is necessary for corporate to avoid from being burden on government with cases of bankruptcy. These principles cannot be disregarded today, where economic crisis results into government’s financial crisis.

중국 국유기업과 비국유기업의 현금보유정책 비교

만군,정형록,김미옥,연사배 한국세무학회 2020 세무와 회계저널 Vol.21 No.5

One of the important features under Chinese socialist economic system is corporate governance. In terms of corporate governance, Chinese enterprises are divided into state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. Chinese state-owned enterprises are enterprises in which the central or local government has a dominant influence. On the other hand, non-state-owned enterprises are those whose investors are operated and controlled by private individuals rather than the state. There may be differences in cash holding and incentives in several dimensions, such as the organizational environment, business operation, and government support of state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. Therefore, it can be expected that the cash retention policy, which is an important factor in corporate decision-making, differs depending on the corporate governance structure. So far, there are few studies that have directly investigated the relationship between the corporate governance of Chinese companies and their cash holding policy. In order to analyze these factors, this study verified what kind of correlation exists between the type of corporate governance of Chinese companies and the cash holding policy. The summary of the analysis results of this study is as follows. First, the state-owned firms holding more cash inside the firm. Second, the state-owned enterprises as a slow adjustment by the state-owned company’s from the company’s actual cash holding level to the target cash holding level. As a result, the government controlled state-owned enterprises, holding more cash inside the enterprise and slowly adjusting it from the excessive cash holding level to the target cash holding level may be an act against the corporate value or to the interests of minority shareholders. It may have a negative impact, but it can be seen as a long-term decision to develop society and economy and increase social efficiency. In addition, state-owned enterprises with deficient cash reserves are believed to be attributable to the relationship between state-owned enterprises and state-owned commercial banks that the slow rate of adjustment of their cash reserves. 중국의 사회주의 경제체제 하에 중요한 특징 중의 하나는 기업지배구조이며 국유기업과 비국유기업으로 구분된다. 중국 국유기업은 중앙 혹은 지방정부가 지배적인 영향력을 가지는 기업을 말한다. 반면에 비국유기업은 투자자가 국가가 아닌 민간인이 운영하고 통제하는 기업을 말한다. 기업의 모든 의사결정은 자금사용과 관련돼 있다고 해도 과언이 아니다. 기업의 현금보유정책은 경영환경 변화에 대응하는 과정에서 중요한 의사결정 요소이다. 현금보유정책은 크게 현금보유수준과 현금보유조정속도로 구분된다. 국유기업과 비국유기업의 경영환경, 경영활동, 정부지원 등 여러 가지 차원에서 현금보유수준과 유인에 차이가 발생할 수 있다. 본 연구는 중국기업의 지배구조(국유기업 여부)와 현금보유정책 사이에 어떤 상관관계가 존재하는지를 검증하였다. 분석 결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 국유기업이 비국유기업에 비해 더 많은 현금을 보유하는 것으로 나타났다. 둘째, 국유기업이 평균적으로 실제현금보유수준에서 목표현금보유수준으로 느리게 조정하는 것으로 확인되었다. 국유기업과 비국유기업의 현금보유정책에 차별성이 존재하는 것을 알 수 있다. 정부가 통제하는 국유기업이 더 많은 현금을 보유하고 현금보유수준을 느리게 조정하는 것은 기업가치에 역행하는 행위일 수도 있고 소액주주의 이익에 부정적 영향을 줄 수도 있지만, 사회와 경제를 발전시키고 사회적 효율성을 높이려는 장기의사결정으로도 볼 수 있다. 그리고 부족현금보유수준인 국유기업이 현금보유조정속도가 느린 것은 국유기업과 국유상업은행 간의 관계에 기인한 것으로 판단된다. 본 연구의 시사점은 다음과 같다. 첫째, 본 연구는 기업지배구조와 현금보유정책 간의 관계를 직접 분석하였다는 점이다. 둘째, 본 연구는 정태적, 동태적 측면에서 기업지배구조와 현금보유수준, 현금보유조정속도 간의 관련성을 분석하였다. 마지막으로 중국 국유기업의 현금보유정책을 확인함으로써 국유기업 자원 배분과 조정 측면에서 실무적 시사점을 제공한다는 점이다.

외재적 보상과 내재적 보상이 조직유효성에 미치는 영향: 중국 국유기업과 사유기업의 경우

유류 ( Liu Liu ),이금희 ( Jinxi Michelle Li ) 아시아.유럽미래학회 2017 유라시아연구 Vol.14 No.1

1978년 11기 3중 전회를 계기로 중국은 개혁과 개방 정책을 시행하였다. 1992년 계획경제에서 시장경제로의 성공적인 전환을 거쳐 현재 중국은 국유기업, 집단소유제 기업, 사유기업 및 외자기업 등 여러 가지 형태의 기업이 공존하는 기업 체제를 확립하였다. 그중에서 국유기업과 사유기업은 기업의 규모, 조직구조, 인적자원관리, 고용 안정성, 보상 등의 측면에서 현저한 차이가 있다. 본 연구는 중국 국유기업과 사유기업을 대상으로 외재적 보상(금전, 복리후생)과 내재적 보상(직무)이 직무만족과 직무노력에 미치는 영향을 살펴보고, 이 두 가지 기업유형의 차이점을 감안하여 기업유형(국유기업, 사유기업)과 분배 공정성을 조절변수로 설정하여, 기업유형과 분배공정성의 인식에 따라 보상이 조직유효성(직무만족, 직무노력)에 미치는 영향이 어떻게 다른지를 살펴보고자 하였다. 연구 대상 총 403명(사유기업 종업원 215명, 국유기업 종업원 188명)에 대한 설문조사를 근거로 한 다중회귀분석결과는 다음과 같다. 외재적 보상과 내재적 보상은 직무만족과 직무노력에 모두 정(+)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났고, 내재적 보상이 직무만족과 직무노력에 미치는 영향은 모두 외재적 보상보다 더 컸다. 기업유형은 내재적 보상과 직무만족 간의 관계, 그리고 외재적 및 내재적 보상과 직무노력 간의 관계를 조절하는 것으로 나타났다. 구체적으로 살펴보면, 국유기업이 사유기업보다 외재적 보상과 직무노력 간의 정적 관련성, 내재적 보상과 직무만족 간의 정적 관련성이 더 강하게 나타났고, 사유기업이 국유기업보다 내재적 보상과 직무노력 간의 정적 관련성이 더 강하게 나타났다. 또한 분배 공정성은 외재적 보상과 직무만족 및 직무노력 간의 관계, 그리고 내재적 보상과 직무노력 간의 관계를 조절하여 분배 공정성을 높게 인식할수록 외재적 보상이 직무만족, 직무노력에 미치는 영향이 더 크고, 내재적 보상이 직무노력에 미치는 영향이 오히려 더 작은 것으로 나타났다. 이는 분배 공정성이 낮을수록 내재적 보상이 직무노력에 미치는 영향이 더 큼을 의미하는 것으로서, 분배 공정성을 낮게 인식할 경우 내재적 보상을 제공함으로써 직무노력을 크게 증대할 수 있음을 의미한다. 분배 공정성은 주로 외재적 보상에 대한 인식으로서 분배 공정성이 높은 집단은 외재적 보상에, 분배 공정성이 낮은 집단은 내재적 보상에 더 동기부여 된다. 그리고 인지평가이론에 의하면, 외재적 보상은 과업의 내재적 동기를 감소시킴으로써 원해서 하는 것보다는 해야 하는 것으로 느끼게 한다. 따라서 분배 공정성이 높을 때의 외재적 보상은 내재적 동기를 낮추기 때문에 내재적 보상이 직무노력에 미치는 영향은 오히려 더 감소할 수 있다. 본 연구는 전통적으로 금전보상에만 치중하던 중국기업들이 관리관행을 바꾸어서 내재적 보상도 함께 제공해야 함을 시사하고 있다. 중국 실정에 맞는 내재적 보상으로는 학습조직구축, “선진근로자(先進工作者)”, “기술명수(技術能手)”, “혁신상(革新奬)”, “절약상(節約奬)” 등이 있다. 국유기업은 사유기업에 비해 보상, 분배 공정성, 직무노력 등이 모두 더 낮은 것으로 나타났다. 이는 모두 국유기업의 평균주의보상제도에 따른 것으로서 이러한 “平均奬(평균상)”은 중국의 유교사상인 “不患寡而患不均, 不患貧而患不安(적게 소유하는 것보다는 불균등한 배분이 더 걱정스럽고, 가난보다는 평화롭지 못한 생활이 더 걱정스럽다)”에 의해 잘 설명된다. 특히 국유기업은 핵심인재에 대한 금전적 보상을 늘림으로써 이들의 유출을 막아야 한다. 또한 국유기업은 비효율적인 관리와 경영자의 부패문제에 대한 해결방안으로 경영자선발 및 평가에 대한 보다 합리적이고 과학적인 방법을 모색해야 할 것이다. After the implementation of reform policy in 1978 and the successful transition of planned economy to a market economy in 1992, China has established various types of enterprises including state-owned enterprises, collective ownership enterprises, private enterprises and foreign-funded enterprises. Among them, state-owned and private enterprises are significantly different in terms of size, organizational structure, human resources management, employment stability and compensation. This study aims to investigate the effects of extrinsic(money, benefits) and intrinsic(job) rewards on organizational effectiveness(job satisfaction and work effort) among the private and state-owned enterprises in China. Moderating roles of enterprise types(state-owned and private enterprises) and distributive justice between the two types of rewards and organizational effectiveness were also examined. Survey data from 403 Chinese employees(215 private firms, 188 state-owned enterprises) were tested using hierarchical regression analysis, which confirmed significant effects of extrinsic and intrinsic rewards on both job satisfaction and work effort. Intrinsic rewards had a stronger effect than extrinsic rewards on both job satisfaction and work effort. Furthermore, enterprise types were found to moderate the relationship between intrinsic rewards and job satisfaction, extrinsic rewards and work effort as well as between intrinsic rewards and work effort. Specifically, extrinsic rewards had a stronger effect on work effort in state-owned enterprises(than private firms), intrinsic rewards had a stronger effect on job satisfaction in state-owned enterprises(than private firms), and intrinsic rewards had a stronger effect on work effort in private firms(than state-owned enterprises). Moreover, distributive justice moderated the relationship between extrinsic/intrinsic rewards and organizational effectiveness. To be specific, extrinsic rewards had a stronger effect on both job satisfaction and work effort among the group with high distributive justice, while intrinsic rewards had a stronger effect on work effort among the group with low distributive justice. Distributive justice is about extrinsic rewards such as pay, thus the group with high distributive justice is more likely to be attracted by extrinsic rewards, while the group with low distributive justice tends to be motived by intrinsic rewards. Therefore, intrinsic rewards could maximize work effort in the case of low distributive justice. According to cognitive evaluation theory, extrinsic rewards such as pay will reduce intrinsic motivation in a work. In other words, when people are paid for work, it feels less like something they want to do and more like something they have to do. Thus, intrinsic rewards couldn`t function well in the case of high distributive justice because of the extrinsic rewards and the effect of intrinsic rewards on work effort will decrease accordingly. This study implies that Chinese enterprises need to provide intrinsic rewards as well as extrinsic rewards. The intrinsic rewards that fit Chinese reality are the establishment of learning organization and psychological awards such as “advanced workers”, “technical expertise”, “innovation award”, and “energy-saving award”. State-owned enterprises were inferior to private firms in rewards, distributive justice and work effort. These are all due to the equal reward systems in state-owned firms, and this “average prize” refers to the Chinese Confucian ideology “Do not suffer from oligopoly and suffer from uneven, not suffering from poverty and suffering from anxiety”. State-owned enterprises should increase pay level(extrinsic rewards) for top talents to avoid their turnover. Furthermore, state-owned enterprises need to use scientific indicators to evaluate the performance of CEOs and to select qualified CEOs who used to be dispatched by Chinese government.

공기업의 기업지배구조에 대한 검토

장덕조(Jang, Deok-Jo),이종규(Lee, Jong-Kyu) 서강대학교 법학연구소 2016 서강법률논총 Vol.5 No.1

This paper introduces legal issues of the corporate governance in the ‘Act on the Management of State-owned Enterprises’. The corporate governance in Korea was adapted after IMF economic crisis and major corporations’ accounting frauds and focused on the accounting system. And then the meaning of "corporate governance" has begun to gain ground since 1999 with the introduction of Internal Control System and Compliance Officer in the field of financial law. On the other hand, OECD issued ‘OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-owned Enterprises’ in 2005 for state-owned enterprise(or public enterprise)’s publicness after ‘OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-owned Enterprises’ in 2005 for the publicness of the state-owned enterprises (or public enterprises) after ‘OECD Principle of Corporate Governance’ was issued in 2004. It gave a profound impact on the enactment of the Act on the Management of State-owned Enterprises in January, 2007 and it has been applied to most of the management of State-owned enterprises in Korea since then. Even though it has been revised continuously, the problems have been pointed out. It still has insufficient regulatory aspects and limitations in applying under the current law. Therefore, this paper is going to describe the development direction of corporate governance to be developed and improved in Korea. The problem of State-owned enterprises is a significant social issue and many scholars are also claiming its improvement these days. This study ultimately aims at figuring out the meaning of State-owned enterprises and indicating the problems of an external audit and dispatched workers from government agencies under the Act on the Management of State-owned enterprises.

중국 국유기업 구조조정과 노동자 마음 : 몫을 잃은 자들의 마음

장윤미 한양대학교 아태지역연구센터 2017 중소연구 Vol.41 No.1

As the restructuring of state-owned enterprises in China began in the late 1990s, many workers lost their jobs and are now on the verge of a second tide of laid-off. This paper examines the ‘minds’ of state-owned enterprise workers who are forced to work in unemployed or dismissed jobs due to state-owned enterprise reforms. State-owned enterprises are not simply 'jobs' for workers that solve the problems of eating and living in Socialist System China. There are the home of the workers who gave birth to and raised a child, and are a ‘house’ of their own with special minds and emotions. First of all, this paper analyzed the reality of the changed state-owned enterprise workers and workers' thoughts and minds about state-owned enterprise reform. And this paper analyzed the 'minds' of workers in terms of how they accept and understand the problems in the state-owned enterprise reform process. In conclusion, workers think that their legitimate share is lost in the process of reform and discourse. The share of workers in the state-owned enterprise principle of participating in decision-making and sharing of profits for state-owned enterprise reform has been thoroughly ruled out as well as the share of working hard. 1990년대 후반부터 중국 국유기업의 구조조정이 본격적으로 진행됨에 따라 많은 노동자들이 일자리를 잃었으며, 현재 제2차 해고사태를 앞두고 있다. 이 논문은 국유기업 개혁으로 인해 해고된 혹은 불안한 일자리에서 힘겹게 살아가는 국유기업 노동자들의 ‘마음’을 살펴본다. 사회주의체제 중국에서 국유기업은 노동자들이 먹고사는 문제를 해결하는 단순한 ‘직장’이 아니라, 자식을 낳고 키우며 세대를 거쳐 땀으로 일궈낸 삶의 터전이자 특별한 마음과 감정이 담긴 자신의 ‘집’이다. 이 논문에서는 우선 개혁의 주류적 담론과 함께 변화된 국유기업 노동자들의 현실을 짚어보고, 국유기업 개혁에 대한 노동자들의 생각과 마음을 분석한다. 국유기업 노동자들에게 국유기업이란 어떤 존재인지, 그리고 노동자들은 국유기업 개혁과정에서 나타난 문제를 어떻게 받아들이고 이해하는지 노동의 관점에서 이들의 ‘마음’을 살펴본다. 결론적으로 개혁의 과정과 담론에서 노동자들은 자신의 정당한 몫을 빼앗겼다고 생각한다. 열심히 일한 것에 대한 몫 뿐 아니라 국유기업 개혁에 대한 의사결정참여와 이익 공유라는 국유기업 원칙에서도 노동자들의 몫은 철저히 배제되어왔다.

주식회사 모델에 기초한 공기업 지배구조의 개선 방향

김원기,박성진 전남대학교 법학연구소 2008 법학논총 Vol.28 No.2

In our country, State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) still represent a substantial part of GDP, employment and market capitalisation. Moreover, SOEs are often pre- valent in utilities and infrastructure industries, such as energy, rural development, whose performance is of great importance to broad segments of the population and to other parts of the business sector. Consequently, the governance of SOEs will be critical to ensure their positive contribution to a country’s overall economic efficiency and competitiveness. Fundamentally, corporate governance difficulties derive from the fact that the accountability for the performance of SOEs involves a complex chain of agents (ownership entities, ministries, management, board), without clearly and easily identifiable principals. To structure this complex web of accountabilities in order to ensure efficient decisions and good corporate governance is a challenge. In order to carry out its ownership responsibilities, the state can benefit from using tools that are applicable to the private sector, including the ‘Korean Com- mercial law’, the ‘OECD Principles of Corporate Governance’ and the ‘OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprise’. The followings are the characteristic features obtained from this study. First, the ownership entity should be held accountable to representative bodies such as the Parliament. In order to increase the public confidence in the way the state manages ownership of SOEs, it is important that ownership entity roles are clarified and explained to the general public. Second, governments should base themselves as much as possible on corporate law and avoid creating a specific legal form when this is not absolutely necessary for the objectives of the enterprise. Streamlining of the legal form of SOEs would enhance transparency and facilitate oversight through benchmarking of Commercial law. Third, the state should let SOE boards exercise their responsibilities and respect their independence. The boards of SOEs should be composed so that they can exercise objective and independent judgement. They should have the power to appoint and remove the CEO like a Stock Company. The boards of SOEs should be assigned a clear mandate and ultimate responsibility for the company’s per- formance. Finally, ownership entities and SOEs should observe high standards of trans- parency. They should disclose material information on all matters described in the ‘OECD Principles of Corporate Governance’, ‘OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprise’, and in addition focus on areas of signi- ficant concern for the general public. This study is intended to provide opinion that will assist governments in im- proving the corporate governance of SOEs. This study also suggest that the state plays a positive role in improving corporate governance across all sectors of our legal system. In our country, State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) still represent a substantial part of GDP, employment and market capitalisation. Moreover, SOEs are often pre- valent in utilities and infrastructure industries, such as energy, rural development, whose performance is of great importance to broad segments of the population and to other parts of the business sector. Consequently, the governance of SOEs will be critical to ensure their positive contribution to a country’s overall economic efficiency and competitiveness. Fundamentally, corporate governance difficulties derive from the fact that the accountability for the performance of SOEs involves a complex chain of agents (ownership entities, ministries, management, board), without clearly and easily identifiable principals. To structure this complex web of accountabilities in order to ensure efficient decisions and good corporate governance is a challenge. In order to carry out its ownership responsibilities, the state can benefit from using tools that are applicable to the private sector, including the ‘Korean Com- mercial law’, the ‘OECD Principles of Corporate Governance’ and the ‘OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprise’. The followings are the characteristic features obtained from this study. First, the ownership entity should be held accountable to representative bodies such as the Parliament. In order to increase the public confidence in the way the state manages ownership of SOEs, it is important that ownership entity roles are clarified and explained to the general public. Second, governments should base themselves as much as possible on corporate law and avoid creating a specific legal form when this is not absolutely necessary for the objectives of the enterprise. Streamlining of the legal form of SOEs would enhance transparency and facilitate oversight through benchmarking of Commercial law. Third, the state should let SOE boards exercise their responsibilities and respect their independence. The boards of SOEs should be composed so that they can exercise objective and independent judgement. They should have the power to appoint and remove the CEO like a Stock Company. The boards of SOEs should be assigned a clear mandate and ultimate responsibility for the company’s per- formance. Finally, ownership entities and SOEs should observe high standards of trans- parency. They should disclose material information on all matters described in the ‘OECD Principles of Corporate Governance’, ‘OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprise’, and in addition focus on areas of signi- ficant concern for the general public. This study is intended to provide opinion that will assist governments in im- proving the corporate governance of SOEs. This study also suggest that the state plays a positive role in improving corporate governance across all sectors of our legal system.

중국의 당정체제와 국유기업: 정치적 지배논리와 공공선택의 한계

이상빈 ( Lee Sang Bin ),이상윤 ( Lee Sang Youn ) 현대중국학회 2017 現代中國硏究 Vol.18 No.4

중국 정부는 공공재(public goods)와 경쟁적 시장 환경을 보호하는 외재적(外在的)인 중립기구인 동시에 정부 자신의 이익을 추구하는 내재적(內在的)인 경제참여 행위자로서의 역할을 수행하고 있다. 현재 중국의 국유기업은 구조조정 이후 일련의 개혁으로 국유기업의 분포 구조뿐만 아니라 기업제도와 현대기업 관리체계에서의 변화가 있기는 하나, 중국의 국유기업은 여전히 정부의 공공사무의 관리기능과 국유자산관리소유자의 직책의 상호 분리(政資分離)가 해결의 실마리가 되지는 않았다는 것이다. 즉 당정체계를 중심으로 한 정부와 중국의 국유기업과의 근본적 관계와 함께 확립된 이중적 지배구조(twin governance)는 여전히 법적으로 확립한 현대 기업지배구조의 한계로 나타나고 있다. 중국 국유기업은 CEO, 이사회, 감사회 등 기업지배구조체제와 국유기업 내 당위원회 조직이라는 이중적 지배구조(twin governance)를 가지고 있다. 국유기업개혁과 관련된 제도적 한계는 국유기업의 기업 경영차원에서 기업지배구조가 기본적인 구조를 형성했으나, 근본적인 변화는 이루어지지 않고 있다. 또 다른 실질적인 문제는 국유자산감독관리위원회가 국유기업에 대한 구조조정뿐만 아니라, 국유기업의 업적 평가, 변경 주식 비준, 국유자산 관리 및 경제책임 추궁 등을 책임지는 동시에 관리자로서의 역할을 감당해야 하기 때문에 기본적으로 관리위원회의 과도한 관리를 벗어나기 어렵다. 국유기업 관리체계 혁신의 제도적 한계는 글로벌 경쟁력강화를 위한 국제화전략이 적극적으로 진행되고 있음에도 불구하고 국유기업의 경쟁력 개선에 장애가 되고 있다. Chinese government has been playing an vital role not only for an external arbitrator but also as an internal game player that seeks his own profit. Transformational changes of corporate governance and modern management system have been made, not only those of distribution and structure have been achieved, after restructuring with the new set of reform measures. But it is still very hard to accelerate opportunities for separating government functions of public affairs from managerial functions of State-owned assets owner. Twin governance structure focused on party-state system has been established to define the relationship between government and management, and has been providing some limits for corporate governance. Chinese State Owned Enterprises have a corporate governance system that includes CEO, Board of Directors, and Audit & Supervisory Committee, and also have the Communist Party Committee organization, so they have been establishing the twin governance structure. The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council not only is responsible for the restructuring of State Owned Enterprises, but evalutes the performances of State Owned Enterprises, manages the state-owned assets of the enterprises under the supervision of the government, and hold to account State Owned Enterprises in which they own shares. The State Owned Enterprises corporate governance reforms that has systematic limitations has been an obstacle to the enhancement of competitiveness of State Owned Enterprises, although global strategies have been implemented aggressively.