탄소국경조정제도의 국제적 비교 현황과 국내 도입에 관한 제어국가의 법정책적 과제

성봉근(Sung, Bong-Geun) 유럽헌법학회 2021 유럽헌법연구 Vol.- No.37

전 지구적인 환경체인 안에서 탄소감축을 위한 공동의 노력이 계속 진행중이다. 그러나, 소극적인 국가나 기업들에 의하여 탄소감축노력이 상쇄되는 현상인 ‘탄소누출(carbon leakage)’이 일어나고 있어 효과가 반감되어 왔다. 국제사회에서 소극적인 태도를 제재하거나 강제하는 것은 어렵다는 한계를 극복하지 못하고 있었다. 게임이론상 모두가 합심하여 탄소감축 하는 것이 가장 좋은 전략이지만, 그렇지 못하였다. 탄소누출을 근본적으로 막고 함께 탄소감축 노력을 하는 방향으로 게임의 방향을 전환시키기 위한 게임체인저로서 탄소국경조정제도 도입이 주장되어 오다가 이제 본격적으로 시행되는 단계에 이르렀다. ‘탄소국경조정제도’(CBAM; Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism)는 탄소집약적인 상품을 수입하거나 수출할 때 탄소감축노력에 대한 평가를 하여 기준치보다 초과하는 탄소량에 대하여 추가적으로 ‘부담금을 부가’하고, 기준치보다 많이 감축된 노력에 대하여는 보조금처럼 ‘환급’하거나‘부담을 면제하거나 감경’하여주는 조절메카니즘을 의미한다. 탄소국경조정제도는 시멘트, 철강, 철, 알루미늄, 비료, 전기 등을 첫 적용대상으로 하지만, 점차 그 대상과 범위를 확대해 나가게 될 것이다. 우리는 EU와 미국 등 수출과 수입에 크게 의존하면서 탄소감축제품과 탄소집약상품을 동시에 거래하고 있다. 우리 정부와 기업이 어떻게 EU와 미국 등지의 탄소국경조정제도에 대비하고, 우리의 탄소배출권거래시장을관리하며, 산업계 전반에 걸쳐 탄소감축노력을 어떻게 할 것인지에 따라 탄소국경조정제도는 큰 충격이 되거나 아니면 새로운 경쟁력확보의 기회가 될 것이다. 탄소국경조정제도는 환경보호와 경제성장을 반비례관계로 설정하던 종래의 패러다임을 크게 전환하여 양자를 비례관계로 설정하려고 하는 것이라고 생각된다. 탄소국경조정제도에는 재정조치의 유형과 비재정조치의 유형이 모두 포함된다. EU 탄소국경조정제도는 탄소배출권거래제와 연동하여 탄소배출권의 주간 거래 종가 평균가격으로 CBM인증서를 구매하도록 하면서, 탄소감축노력 만큼 이에 대한 혜택을 주는 방식으로 운영하게 된다. 배출권구입의무의 성질은 보는 관점에 따라 세금과 동일한 재정적 조치로 보는 관점도 있다. 탄소국경조정메카니즘에의하여 부과되는 탄소배출권구입의무부과방식의 경우는 조세와 유사하지만, 세수확보목적없이 반대급부를 전제로 하므로 일종의 비재정조치로서 환경규제라는 법제도로보는 것이 보다 타당하다고 생각한다. 탄소국경조정제도는 그동안 비협조적 게임이론(non-cooperative game theory)이 적용되던 환경분야를 협조적 게임이론(cooperative game theory)이 적용되는 것으로 구조적으로 변모시킬 수 있는 역할을 할 수도 있다. 탄소국경조정제도라는 나무는 기후변화 대책이라는 숲과의 관계에서 생각하여야 한다. EU는 시행착오를 거치면서 파리협정이후로 보다 완화되면서도 자율성을 강조하면서 속도조절을 고려하는 방식으로 탄소배출권거래제를 새롭게 꺼내 들게 되었다. 이것을 우리는 EU의 그린뉴딜 정책이라는 관점으로 바라볼 수 있다. EU는 역내에서의 탄소감축노력들이 반감되는 것을 방지할 수 있도록 탄소국경조정제도를 실시하게 되었다. 동시에 탄소국경조정제도를 운영하는 기준으로서 탄소배출권거래시장의 경매가격으로 설정하도록 하고 있다. 한편 탄소국경조정제도는 불필요한 과도한 무역규제가 아닌지, 따라서 국제자유무역거래질서를 파괴하는 또 다른 환경장벽이 아닌지 논란이 심각하게 되고 있다. 미국과 중국 등을 중심으로 GATT 제III조 내국민대우의무, 제I조 최혜국대우의무 위반 여부 등이 논란이 되고 있다. 그러나, EU는 GATT 제XX조 환경보호를 위한 예외규정을 원용함으로써 EU 탄소국경조정제도의 법적 정당성을 주장하고 있어 논리적인 충돌이 일어나고 있다. 자유롭고 공정한 경쟁의 자유는 국제사회가 공존할 수 있는 핵심적이고 중대한 가치이자 질서이다. 그러나 탄소감축노력을 통하여 기후변화에 대처하여야 하도록 하는 환경보호의 이익은 결코 열등한 가치라고 볼 수 없다. 양자는 대등한 가치질서에 해당하며, 어느 하나를 일방적으로 우선시킬수 없다. 따라서 이를 규범조화적해석방법으로 접근하여야 할 필요가 있다고 생각한다. 또한 사안에 따라서 그때 그때 이익형량을 비례의 원칙에 부합하게 하여야 한다고 생각한다. 따라서 경쟁의 자유를 존중하되, 환경보호라는 정당한 이익이 있는 경우에는 GATT의 예외규정을 완화하여 해석하여 적용시키는 논리가 가장 타당하다고 생각된다. 따라서 본 연구에서는 EU의 입법 패키지인 핏포55(Fit for 55) 등 입법관련 내용, 미국의 자국의 이익에 따라 변화되는 입법내용, Joint efforts to reduce carbon within the global environmental chain are ongoing. However, the effect has been halved because ‘carbon leakage’, a phenomenon in which carbon reduction efforts are offset by passive countries or companies, has occurred. The international community could not overcome the limitation to sanction or enforce a passive attitude. In game theory, it is the best strategy to reduce carbon by working together, but it was not. The introduction of the carbon border adjustment system as a game changer to fundamentally prevent carbon leakage and change the direction of the game toward a joint carbon reduction effort has been argued, but has now reached the stage where it is being implemented in earnest. The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) evaluates carbon reduction efforts when importing or exporting carbon-intensive products, and additionally adds a levy for the amount of carbon that exceeds the standard value. It refers to a control mechanism that refunds or exempts or reduces burden like a subsidy for more reduced efforts. The carbon border adjustment system is initially applied to cement, steel, iron, aluminum, fertilizer, and electricity, but will gradually expand its scope and boundary. We trade carbon-reducing products and carbon-intensive products at the same time, relying heavily on exports and imports from the EU and the US. Depending on how the Korean government and companies prepare for the carbon border adjustment system in the EU and the United States, manage our carbon trading market, and make efforts to reduce carbon throughout the industry, the carbon border adjustment system may be a big shock or an opportunity to secure new competitiveness. The carbon border adjustment system includes both types of fiscal measures and types of non-fiscal measures. The EU carbon border adjustment system will be operated in a way that provides benefits as much as carbon reduction efforts while allowing the purchase of CBM certificates at the average weekly price of carbon credits in conjunction with the carbon trading system. Depending on the point of view of the nature of the obligation to purchase emission permits, some view it as the same financial measure as tax. In the case of the obligation to purchase carbon credits imposed by the carbon border adjustment mechanism, it is similar to tax, but it is premised on the return of benefits without the purpose of securing tax revenue. The carbon border adjustment system may play a role in structurally transforming the environmental field where non-cooperative game theory has been applied to one where cooperative game theory is applied. The tree of the carbon border adjustment system should be considered in relation to the forest as a climate change countermeasure. Through trial and error, the EU came up with a new carbon emission trading system that has been relaxed since the Paris Agreement, while emphasizing autonomy and considering speed control. We can view this in terms of the EU s Green New Deal policy. EU is claiming the legal legitimacy of the EU carbon border adjustment system by invoking the GATT Article XX exceptions for environmental protection, and a logical conflict is occurring. Freedom of free and fair competition is a core and important value and order for the international community to coexist. However, the benefits of environmental protection, which require efforts to cope with climate change through carbon reduction efforts, cannot be regarded as inferior. Therefore, I think that it is necessary to approach this as a norm-harmonic interpretation method. In addition, I think that depending on the case, the punishment should be in accordance with the principle of proportionality. Therefore, in this study, the EU s legislative package, Fit for 55 , etc., the legislative contents that change according to the interests of the US, China and other countries are reviewed to draw implications.

환경보호를 위한 무역규제와 대응방안 - 탄소국경조정을 중심으로 -

최원목 ( Choi Won-mog ) 한국외교협회 2022 외교 Vol.143 No.0

파리협정 체제가 설정한 탄소중립 목표를 달성을 위한 효과적인 이행수단으로 탄소국경조정이란 무역조치가 취해질 전망이다. 그 합리적인 발전방향을 국제사회가 도출해내고, 이에 대응해나가는 일은 중요하다. 탄소관세 국경조정은 국제적 관세분류체계를 점차로 개편해서 환경 친화적 상품을 별도로 관세 분류할 수 있게 하여, 비 환경 친화적 상품과 구별해서 관세를 투명하게 부과할 수 있도록 유도해야 한다. 탄소조세 국경조정은 명백한 국제(관습)법을 이행하는 차원에서 초래되는 경쟁력 약화를 만회하기 위한 목적의 적절한 정도의 국경세조정만을 허용하는 방식으로 발전시켜나가야 한다. 그래야 환경보호 목표달성과 보호주의 견제라는 두 가지 가치를 모두 수호할 수 있다. 한국은 야심찬 탄소중립 목표를 수립하고 국제공동체에 제시했다. 그만큼 앞으로 한국이 이행해나가는 고강도의 환경규제들이 우리 산업경쟁력의 일방적 악화로 이어지지 않도록 노력하는 일이 중요해진다. 그런 의미에서 이러한 탄소국경조정의 합리적 발전방향을 국제적으로 선도해나가는 것이 필요하다. 그것은 2050 탄소중립 그룹이라는 환경선진국 대열에 자발적으로 나선 반대급부를 챙기는 일이기도 하다. Trade measures called “carbon border adjustment mechanism” will be eventually taken as an effective means of implementing the carbon neutrality goals set by the Paris Agreement system. It is important for the international community to derive a rational direction of its development and to respond to it. The carbon tariff border adjustment should gradually revamp the international tariff classification system to allow for the separate tariff classification of environmentally friendly goods, thus inducing the transparent imposition of tariffs to distinguish them from non-environmentally friendly goods. Carbon tax border adjustments should be developed in such a way that they only allow for an adequate degree of border tax adjustment aimed at making up for the weakening of competitiveness caused by the implementation of clear international (customary) laws. Only in this way can we uphold both the values of achieving environmental protection goals and keeping protectionism in check. The Republic of Korea (South Korea) has set ambitious carbon neutrality goals and presented them to the international community. As such, it becomes important to try to ensure that the high-intensity environmental regulations that South Korea implements in the future do not lead to a unilateral deterioration of our industrial competitiveness. In that sense, it is necessary to lead the international direction of rational development of this carbon border adjustment. This is also a way to take advantage of South Korea’s joining the 2050 Carbon Neutral Group of environmentally developed countries.

탄소세 및 배출권의 국경조정에 대한 주요 법리적 쟁점 검토

이중교(Lee, Joong-Kyo) 강원대학교 비교법학연구소 2018 환경법과 정책 Vol.20 No.-

2015년말 파리협정의 채택에 따라 선진국뿐만 아니라 개발도상국도 일정 부분 온실가스 감축의무를 부담하게 되었다. 일부 국가들은 온실가스를 효과적으로 감축하기 위하여 탄소세 또는 배출권거래제 등의 제도를 도입하여 시행하고 있다. 그러나 국제적 공조가 뒷받침되지 않은 개별국가 차원의 온실가스 감축노력은 한 국가의 온실가스 감소가 다른 국가의 온실가스 증가로 상쇄되는 탄소누출(carbon leakage)을 초래하여 그 효과를 반감시킬 수 있다. 그 해결방안으로 거론되고 있는 탄소세 또는 배출권의 국경조정 조치가 시행되려면 GATT, 보조금협정(SCM) 등 국제무역규범과 조화를 이루는 것이 중요하다. 그러나 아직 WTO의 선례가 없어서 그 허용여부에 대하여 의견 대립이 있으므로 본고에서는 탄소세 또는 배출권의 국경조정에 대한 주요 법리적 쟁점에 관하여 그동안의 논의를 바탕으로 의견을 제시하였다. 먼저 탄소세의 국경세조정에 대한 주요 법리적 쟁점을 검토한 결과 탄소세는 탄소를 함유한 제품에 부과하므로 간접세에 해당하나, 탄소가 최종제품에 물리적으로 포함된 투입요소라고 할 수 없고, 탄소함유량은 제품의 동종성을 결정하는 기준이라고 할 수도 없으므로 탄소에 근거한 차별대우는 내국민대우원칙과 최혜국대우원칙에 위반될 가능성이 높다. 그러나 탄소세 국경세조정은 GATT 제20조의 환경예외조항에 의하여 정당화될 수 있는 여지가 있다. 다음 배출권의 국경조정에 대한 주요 법리적 쟁점을 검토한 결과 배출권 구입비용은 배출권의 경제적 가치를 인정하는 이상, 반대급부가 있는 것이어서 조세에 해당하지 않으므로 재정적 조치로서 국경조정이 가능하다고 볼 수 없으나, 배출권의 제출은 상품에 영향을 미치는 조치이므로 비재정적 조치로서 국경조정은 가능하다고 볼 여지가 있다. 한편 배출권의 무상할당은 보조금협정 (SCM)에 의한 보조금에 해당하고, 특정산업에 대한 선별적인 무상할당은 금지보조금 또는 조치가능보조금에 해당한다고 볼 여지가 있다. 국제적인 차원의 효과적인 온실가스 감축을 위하여는 향후 무역과 환경이 조화를 이루는 범위에서 탄소세 또는 배출권의 국경조정제도를 도입하려는 노력이 필요하다. In late 2015 the Paris agreement was adopted and developing countries as well as developed countries are obliged to cut greenhouse gas emissions. Several countries introduced carbon taxes or cap-and-trade programs in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions effectively. However, the emissions policy of a country without international cooperation can cause carbon leakage, which means the increase in emissions outside a region as a direct result of the policy to cut emission in this regions. Border adjustments of tax and emission allowance which are mentioned as a solution for carbon leakage should be in harmony with GATT and SCM. The legal compatibility of border carbon adjustment with WTO rules is uncertain for lack of precedent cases at the WTO. This paper examines with main legal issues on the border adjustment of carbon tax and carbon emission allowance. First, direct taxes are taxes on producers and indirect taxes are taxes on products. Indirect taxes are qualified for border tax adjustment under the destination principle. The carbon tax is indirect tax because it is levied on the product which contains carbon. The carbon is not physically incorporated into the final products and cannot be criteria which distinguish likeness of products. The discrimination based on the carbon will thus violate WTO rules such as national treatment principle(GATT Article Ⅲ) and Most Favored Nation Treatment(GATT Article Ⅰ). However, environmental exceptions (GATT Article ⅩⅩ) provides possibility to justify violations of other GATT provisions. Secondly, the cost of carbon emission allowance is not a tax because it lacks in unrequited payments. If a firm buys emission allowance, it gets the privilege of discharging of carbon. Surrender requirement of carbon emission allowance is not suitable for fiscal measures, but it can be justify as non-fiscal measures under GATT Ad Article Ⅲ. Free allocation of carbon emission allowance is a kind of subsidy, but overall free allocation seems not to be inconsistent with the SCM agreement.

EU 탄소국경조정 메커니즘의 WTO 규범과의 합치성 연구

김명자 국제법평론회 2021 국제법평론 Vol.- No.60

Nowadays, climate change is a global concern, and the international community has been constantly making efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to climate change by concluding the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement. Among various countries taking the initiative, the EU has set the highest greenhouse gas reduction target and has been active in preparing effective implementing rules to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and mitigate climate change. Nevertheless, since the parties of the Paris Agreement are not obliged to set a unified goal, the commitments made by each country may vary significantly in level and scope. One country or region’s greenhouse gas reduction efforts could be offset by the increasing greenhouse gas emissions of other countries. Therefore, the EU proposed the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) as one of the key instruments to implement the ‘European Green Deal’. This study mainly focuses on the compatibility of EU CBAM with the WTO Agreements. Firstly, it introduces the three policy options of EU CBAM and examines respectively whether they are compatible with the WTO Agreements. Among the three, the option of an extension of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) to imports, a mechanism based on the EU single market, has the most potential to be adopted. Secondly, it examines the legal basis of the Border Adjustment Mechanism (BAM), which could be divided into two categories, fiscal measures and non-fiscal measures. Thirdly, it then reviews whether the obligation to purchase emission allowances for imports is compatible with the WTO Agreements. Under the WTO system, the difference of PPMs is basically not considered a factor to distinguish like products, so the carbon-intensive products and the low-carbon products would be deemed as like products. Therefore, different treatment to the carbon-intensive products and the low-carbon products would be a violation of the National Treatment Principle (NT) and Most-Favored-Nation Treatment Principle (MFN) under the GATT Agreement. However, if EU CBAM is carefully designed with the main purpose of preventing carbon leakage and contributing to climate change mitigation, it could be justified under the general exceptions clause of Article XX of GATT. On the other hand, if EU CBAM is aimed at protecting the interests of EU industries and raise the financial resources for economic recovery in the post-COVID19 period, it would be difficult to be justified under Article XX of GATT. This will be determined depending on the design or structure of EU CBAM, whether it is to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions or to collect tax revenues. Although the European Commission has officially published the draft CBAM legislation, it is expected that it will not be easy to be fully compliant with the WTO Agreements while gaining industry support within the EU. Attention will be paid to whether the CBAM can be introduced in 2023 as planned, and whether it is designed compatible with the WTO Agreements.

EU 탄소국경세 도입에 대한 우리 수출기업의 대응방안

김수정(Soo-Jung Kim) 한국관세학회 2022 관세학회지 Vol.23 No.3

The carbon tax and carbon emission trading system related to the carbon border tax have already been introduced in several countries, and Korea has also introduced the carbon emission trading system in 2015. According to the draft law disclosed in June 2023, the carbon border tax is scheduled to be introduced in 2025. After the system is implemented, it is difficult to remove it, and for countries that do not implement the system, it can be like a trade barrier like a free trade agreement. The preparation stage for carbon neutrality in Korea is the leap stage, and Korea’s trade structure carbon neutrality centered on manufacturing is an irresistible system, and organic chemicals, plastic, hydrogen, and ammonia were added in addition to the items in the EU CBAM draft. After 2025, when implementation is expected in earnest, it is highly likely that the number of items will increase to other item groups in addition to the items currently being discussed, and the items will gradually expand. Regarding the global carbon neutrality issue, countries are aiming to zero carbon emissions in 2050 and 2060. The direction for carbon neutrality in individual countries is to develop renewable energy to supply eco-friendly energy and prevent global warming, and it is judged that the EU has presented the most specific and clear goals for this global movement. In the case of Korea, the emission trading system for carbon neutrality has already been systematically implemented, and if the international community continues to emphasize such institutional efforts and domestic companies’ efforts to prepare for carbon borders, it is believed that even if the EU actually imposes carbon borders.

中国碳税开征的理论逻辑与政策选择

金兴华(Xinghua Jin) YIXIN 출판사 2024 Journal of China Studies Vol.2 No.1

碳税作为一种碳减排的政策工具已在全球多个国家实施,中国“双碳”战略目标提出后,开征碳税日显必要。本研究在政治经济学框架内阐明了碳税的理论基础,解析了中国碳税的性质和结构,提出了推进碳税开征的政策实施路径。研究表明:基于负价值理论,碳税是一种碳定价方式,自带财政收支中性;它以社会再生产过程中排放的温室气体为征收对象,按一定税率所征税到的碳税收入总量与温室气体的负价值总量相等;要重视碳税与碳排放权交易、环境保护税的协调,注重碳税收入的合理使用,积极参与国际合作,促进合理边境税收调节机制的形成,适时稳妥开征碳税。 As a policy tool for reduction of carbon emissions, carbon tax has been implemented in many countries around the world. After “double carbon” strategic goal was put forward, it is the general trend for China to levy carbon tax. On the basis of clarifying the theoretical basis of carbon tax within the framework of political economy, this paper analyzes the nature and structure of China’s carbon tax, and put forwards a policy implementation path for promoting carbon tax collection. The research shows that, based on the negative value theory, carbon tax is a carbon pricing method with neutral fiscal revenue and expenditure; It takes greenhouse gases emitted in the process of social reproduction as the object of levying carbon tax, and the total amount of carbon tax revenue taxed at a certain rate is equal to the total amount of negative value of greenhouse gases; China should pay attention to the coordination of carbon tax, carbon emissions trading and environmental protection tax, and to the reasonable use of carbon tax revenue, actively participate in international cooperation, promote the formation of a reasonable border tax adjustments , and timely and steadily levy carbon tax.

WTO 체제에서의 탄소관세(국경세 조정)에 관한 연구

장근호(Chang Keunho) 한국국제조세협회 2010 조세학술논집 Vol.26 No.1

This paper studies the trade law legality of Carbon Tariff(Border Tax Adjustment) for a greenhouse gas emission trading system. After the Copenhagen climate change negotiation fell apart without binding agreement, countries were left alone for cutting greenhouse gas in a fight against climate change. Because unilateral action increases domestic industries’ burden compared with foreign competitors leading to possible carbon leakages, the move toward a carbon tariff in developed countries is expected to gain its momentum. Under these circumstances, this paper questions and analyses whether a carbon tariff can be justified under the GATT/WTO regime and applies the legal argument developed here to the United States Climate Security Act of 2008(Lieberman-Warner Bill) to obtain some insight. Especially, we conclude that a Carbon Tariff is highly likely to be legal not only under the GATT ⅩⅩ (environmental exception) but also under other GATT clauses including non-discrimination principle. In other words, a carbon tariff may be regarded as one of the Border Tax Adjustment under the WTO regime. This conclusion is reached after reviewing a series of recent WTO Panel/Appellate Body decisions where the equal treatment under the GATT Ⅲ:2 requires the comparison of actual tax burden including prior stage taxes. This means identical tax burden on products that contain equal amount of carbon can pass National Treatment test as well as Most Favored Nation test, even though different nominal taxes are levied on domestic product and imports. Also such interpretation eliminates what is required for a legal border tax adjustment, that is, physical incorporation and prior stage cumulative taxes test. It was claimed that, because accurate estimation of carbon emission for import is nearly impossible, carbon tariff could not be implemented in real world. However, calculating emission permits based on such criterion as industry average rate rather than actual emission does not always violate the WTO rules. Armed with proper procedure and objective standard, emission permit calculation may be based on other legal criteria. As the environmental exception requires justifiable treatment, not identical treatment, the burden for a admissible environmental regulation is less than the burden for legal border tax adjustment. On the other hand, the implementation is much more complex for the former measure because it must satisfy different treatment for countries under different condition. However, environmental exception contain much more room for arbitrary manipulation. This may be one of reason why the Lieberman-Warner Bill was structured for GATT ⅩⅩ.

기후변화와 자유무역 – EU의 CBAM을 중심으로 –

류병운 홍익대학교 법학연구소 2024 홍익법학 Vol.25 No.1

From October 1, 2023, the EU began implementing CBAM. In a situation where the climate change crisis is accelerating, CBAM is an additional policy to achieve the European Green Deal goals along with the EU's ETS. The purpose of CBAM is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by imposing a carbon tax on products imported into the EU, and to prevent 'carbon leakage', which causes companies within the EU to shift production to countries with less stringent carbon emissions standards, increasing global carbon emissions. However, unlike ETS, which is a free contract method of trading carbon in the market, CBAM is a more restrictive measures for international trade through mandatory import tariffs. The EU CBAM may violate Article I of GATT due to the possibility of differential treatment of imported goods according to the carbon pricing system of their country of origin and the fact that it is designed in a way that the industries covered by the CBAM have a greater impact on the exports of certain countries. The increase in additional financial costs due to the purchase of CBAM certificates is a violation of the existing EU concession obligations under GATT Article II, and the change in the tariff concession schedule that increases tariff rates is also judged to be in conflict with the principle of trade liberalization. The cost of the obligation to purchase and submit a CBAM certificate imposed by the EU is a discriminatory financial burden on the importer, and the importer's obligation to submit a CBAM report and certification materials and apply for CBAM declarant approval are related to laws and regulations and their application. This may constitutes violation against GATT Article III. Of course, such violations can be justified under GATT Article XX. Regarding the justification requirement, the satisfaction of the necessity requirement is questionable in that ‘less restrictive’ alternatives, i.e. more market-friendly measures, can be considered rather than mandating the purchase and submission of CBAM certificates. Suspicions still remain that the EU is imposing disguised protectionist trade regulations for industries covered by CBAM. The EU did not choose to directly implement more intensive carbon emission reduction policies within the EU or to strengthen international cooperation within the existing UNFCCC system. Rather, the EU unilaterally introduced CBAM under the justification of using the purchasing power of the huge EU market as a weapon and promoting the reduction of carbon emissions in countries outside the region that export carbon-intensive products to the EU. However, in order to harmonize the CBAM of the WTO and the EU, it is necessary to institutionalize CBAM within a multilateral, free trade framework through negotiations and revision of the agreement in the WTO.

WTO협정상 배출권 국경조정의 가능성에 관한 연구

이천기(LEE Cheon-Kee) 대한국제법학회 2017 國際法學會論叢 Vol.62 No.2

2020년 이후 적용될 파리협정에서는 모든 당사국들이 자신의 제출한 국가별 기여방안에 따라 탄소감축노력에 참여하게 된다. 그러나 파리협정의 국가별 기여방안은 자발적인 상향식 접근법을 취하고 있고 또한 대다수 경우 국가 단위의 탄소감축노력에만 초점을 맞추고 있으므로, 산업ㆍ상품 차원에서는 여전히 탄소누출이 발생할 수 있다. 따라서 파리협정 체제 하에서도 국가들은 자국 기후정책의 실효성을 확보하고 탄소누출을 방지하기 위해 다양한 해결방안을 논의하고 있다. 그 중 한 가지가 “탄소국경조정”이다. 탄소국경조정은 재정적 국내조치 즉 내국간접세에 대한 수출ㆍ입 국경세조정 뿐 아니라 비재정적 국내조치를 수입상품에 대해 국경에서 부과하는 경우 즉 배출권거래제를 운영하고 있는 국가가 국내 탄소집약산업 및 기업에 부과하고 있는 배출책임을 국경에서 수입 탄소집약상품에 대해서도 부과하는 비재정적 성격의 조치(“배출권 매입ㆍ제출 요건”)를 포괄하는 개념이다. 탄소국경조정은 특히 배출권 매입ㆍ제출 요건의 WTO협정 합치성을 확보하기 위한 방안으로서 논의되어 왔다. 탄소국경조정 주장의 핵심 근거는 GATT 부속서I의 Ad Article III에 있다. 탄소국경조정 긍정설은 Ad Article III에 쓰인 “상품에 대하여 적용” 요건을 광의로 해석해야 한다고 주장하면서, EC-Asbestos 사건 패널보고서를 그 근거로 제시한다. 또한 탄소국경조정 긍정설을 주장하는 또다른 일각에서는, Ad Article III에 근거하지 않고도 수입업자에 부과되는 배출권 매입ㆍ제출 요건에 제III조 4항이 곧바로 적용될 수 있다고 주장이 제시된 바 있기도 하다. 긍정설에 따를 경우 배출권 매입ㆍ제출 요건은 수량제한금지라는 엄격한 의무를 규정한 제XI조 1항이 아니라 상대적 의무를 규정한 제III조 4항의 적용을 받게 된다. 그러므로 수입국이 배출권 매입ㆍ제출 요건을 통해 수입상품에 국내상품보다 불리한 대우를 부여하지 않는 한 해당 조치는 WTO협정상 적법한 것으로 인정받을 가능성이 높아진다. 반면 배출권에 대한 탄소국경조정 부정설은 US-Tuna I 사건과 US-Tuna II 사건 패널판단에 비추어, Ad Article III가 적용되기 위해서는 동일한 성질의 조치가 “수입상품에 대하여 그리고 동종 국내상품에 대하여 적용”되어야 한다고 주장한다. 배출권은 수입국 국내적으로 상품을 기준으로 부과되는 조치가 아니라, 탄소배출을 야기한 행위자 또는 탄소배출행위에 대해 부과된 조치이므로 최종상품에 관련성을 가지는 조치라 보기 어렵다. 또한 수입 측면에 대해 ‘상품’을 기준으로 배출권 매입ㆍ제출 의무가 부과되는 경우라 하더라도, 수입국 국내적으로는 탄소배출행위와 행위자를 상대로 배출책임이 부과되고 있으므로 수입 측면과 수입국 국내 측면에서 “동일한 성질”의 조치가 부과되고 있다고도 보기 어렵다고 주장한다. 이러한 배경에서, 본고는 탄소국경조정 개념의 구체적인 내용을 살펴보고, 그러한 주장이 WTO협정의 관련 규정, 특히 GATT Ad Article III에 관한 학설과 판례의 입장에 비추어 볼 때 허용될 수 있는지를 논의한다. Unlike the previous Kyoto protocol, under the Paris Agreement all Parties will get to participate in greenhouse gas emission reduction efforts, and are expected to fulfil its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) previously submitted in 2015 to the UNFCCC. However, there still remains a possibility of carbon leakage in terms of a specific product and/or industry sector because details of each Party’s NDC are of a voluntary nature, and was decided on a bottom-up basis. One of the solutions that has come up rather recently is the concent of Border Carbon Adjustments (BCAs). BCAs include carbon-related border tax adjustments (BTAs) on the import and export side, and more importantly for the purpose of this paper, the surrender requirement of greenhouse gas emission allowances which is to be imposed at the border upon the importers of carbon-intensive products. Some countries and scholars have argued that under GATT Ad Article III, such imposition of surrender requirement (which is non-fiscal) can be justified in the same way as carbon-related BTAs (which is fiscal), only to be subject to national treatment obligation under GATT Article III. For such arguments, they stress that the Panel in EC-Asbestos interpreted the Chapeau of GATT Ad Article III in a rather flexible manner unlike previous GATT Panels. Since Article III allows more policy space than Article XI to regulating Members, following this line of argument, it becomes more likely that BCAs are to be recognized as consistent with WTO law. On the contrary, the scholars who argue in opposition to the BCA argument stress that as repeatedly confirmed by GATT Panels in US-Tuna I and US-Tuna II, in order for Ad Article III to be applied to the surrender requirements under the emission trading systems, such requirements should be applied ‘on a product basis’ and the measures applied to domestic and imported products should be ‘of a similar nature.’ Since the emission trading systems impose emission liabilities domestically on domestic industries and producers, not on domestic products, they argue that the BCA argument cannot be accepted under WTO law. Against this backdrop, in this paper the author aims to examine in detail the argument which have been presented by both sides for and against BCAs; and to discuss whether such argument can be accepted as a legitimate ground under WTO law, especially in light of GATT Ad Article III.

기후변화 대응조치와 WTO규범과의 충돌가능성 -탄소세(carbon taxes)를 중심으로

이영희 ( Young Hee Lee ) 한국환경법학회 2010 環境法 硏究 Vol.32 No.2

UN기후변화협약과 교토의정서가 채택되어 온실가스감축은 법적구속력이 있는 의무가 되었다. 현재 교토의정서상 온실가스 감축의무국들은 국내적으로 다양한 기후변화대응 정책 및 입법을 추진하고 있으며, 한국과 같이 온실가스 감축의무가 없는 국가들도 기후변화 대응을 위한 다각적인 노력을 기울이고 있다. 무역관련 기후변화 대응조치는 온실가스감축의무를 위한 효율적인 수단으로 활용될 수 있는 한편, 비차별을 주된 원칙으로 하는 WTO규범과 상충여부가 문제될 수 있다. 또한 국제무역에 `무역장벽`으로 작용할 가능성이 있어 타국과의 첨예한 통상마찰을 야기할 가능성이 존재한다. 특히 `탄소세`는`온실가스 감축`을 위한 효율적인 조치로 거론되고 있으나 WTO규범과 충돌될 가능성이 있는바 이에 대한 통상법적 검토가 요구된다. Carbon taxes are deemed as one of the effective policies to combat climate change. Carbon taxed can be categorized into three types: purely internal measure which applies to domestic and imported goods in proportion to carbon dioxide emissions; unilateral border carbon adjustment(BCA); globalization of carbon costing which means all countries adopt internal carbon taxes. Among theses, unilateral BCA is highly likely to be incompatible with WTO Rules, in particular non-discrimination principle. BCA`s legal basis lies in GATT Article Ⅱ:2(a), but many relating issues remain unclear including issues of NPR PPMs and inputs not physically incorporated into final products such as fuel or carbon. Unilateral BCA on the imported goods originating from non-Kyoto protocol or post-Kyoto regime parties is highly likely inconsistent with GATT Articles Ⅲ:2 and I. Even though GATT-inconsistent measure can be justified under GATT Article XX, it is difficult for present a complete and documented prima facie case. In order to avoid BCA issue from serving as a catalyst for escalating trade disputes among WTO members, it is necessary to reach an international agreement on BCA.