김정일 체제하 북한 군사정책의 변화 가능성

한용섭 한국전략문제연구소 1996 전략연구 Vol.3 No.2

North Korea's military policy does not show any sign of change on the strategic level even after Kim Il-sung's death. The reason why North Korea can not change its military policy is threefold: (1) Under the Kim Jong-il regime, Kim Jong-il can not change overnight policy prioirty the top of which had been laid on military build-up and consequent communization of South Korea through military means for the past five decades: (2) Kim Jong-il is afraid that resource diversion from military sector to economic sector may undermine his power base because the military circles have been playing a key role in upholding the Kim Jong-il regime in the post-Kim Il-sung era, and: (3) Since North Korea has an edge only in military competition with South Korea, Pyongyang intends to maximize the utility of military cards as a means to obtain concessions from U.S. counterparts by setting Seoul hostage to its coercive diplomacy on the other hand. The last point is, in particular, worrisome because North Korea's economy as well as its entire system is experiencing the worst period--either collapse or bare survival. Pyongyang's options become narrow. It may either opt for a military clash with Seoul before its military advantage becomes obsolete ortry to avoid domestic crisis by causing an external crisis as opposed to Seoul. North Korea started to take a dual-track approach to the outside world so as to escape domestic crisis. One is to improve relations with the United States and the other is to antagonize South Korea to the maximun extent Pyongyang decided to suspend its nuclear program in exchange for diplomatic normalization and provision of economic support including less weapon-prone nuclear reactor by the United States. Pyongyang further intends to maximize its success in engaing the United States while trying to isolate South Korea from the scene. To counter North Korea's dual-track approach more effectively, South Korea should design a more comprehensive policy regarding how to build peace regime on the Korean Peninsula by accommodating recent development in U.S.-North Korean relations. On the other hand, Seoul should develop policy options to prevent North Korea's habitual threat of war effectively. This papaer suggests five broad policy options. Two options are summarized here. One policy option will be to increase Seoul's defense budget to redress military imbalance within a shorter time period than originally planned. Another will be to strengthen South Korea-U.S. joint security policy developing mechanism on the basis of more accurate analysis of North Korea's dire situations. In this light, the most recent joint proposal for 4 party talks on peace-building for Korea is perfectly timely. Now, Seoul and Washington should develop conrete measures to induce China and North Korea to the 4 party talks by promoting an active participation in the policy developing process from goverment officials as well as relevant experts.

한반도 위기사태 유형과 효과적 위기관리

한용섭 한국전략문제연구소 1999 전략연구 Vol.6 No.3

Will crisis occur in the Korean Peninsula? This is the most frequently raised question nowadays when North Korea is assessed to be likely to collapse under the worsening economic and systemic situations. If North Korea is likely to create situations which might be developed into a crisis where South Korea and the United States should challenge those North Korean provocations, what shape will the crisis take and how will South Korea resolve it effectively? Regarding the plausible courses of actions to be taken by North Korea in the future, two major scenarios are being drawn up: war scenario and crises shot of war. War scenario is the most frequently envisioned one among all the relevant scenarios regarding North Korea as North Korea is experiencing total system failure nowadays. An all-out war as a result of the North Korean leader's miscalculation is the one that is the most worrisome. It is, of course, controversial whether or not North Korea will actually initiate a war despite its most difficult economic situations. Based on the low possibility of the conventional war, some experts adds that Pyongyang will likely start a war with chemical and biological weapons because chances for North Korea's win in the conventional warfare are so low that Pyongyang has no option but to resort to the unconventional warfare. In addition, various scenarios for crises short of war are predicted. Among them, the most dangerous is Pyongyang's possible provocation in the process of its internal political turmoil. Pyongyang may attempt to turn its internal crisis into an external opportunity where they can run South Korea's life at risk out of desperation. Although it is not likely that Pyongyang will win the war, they may inflict an enormous damage on Seoul as well as on North Korea, in return. Then, the damage will be too great to recover within a foreseeable future even if Korea is unified under South Korea. Pyongyang may try to occupy islands in the western sea near the DMZ while insisting on the return of North Koreans who fled from North Korea for the pursuit of food and freedom. During the military engagement, South Korean armed forces may try to counterattack North Korean armed forces not to allow the North to occupy the islands in the western sea. This is another crisis scenario whose consequences are not so trivial as to overlook. Or the North may attempt to assassinate South Korea's top political figures so as to create a turmoil inside South Korea, while covering up the fact that they have done. Such kind of terrorist act will add to an internal instability inside South Korea, which will in turn, to the North Korean leader, provide an opportunity to the North Korean leader to play South Korea's vulnerability to his favor. Therefore, it is important for the South Korean Government to prepare against those crisis scenarios beforehand. To deter and prevent a North Korean attack, South Korea will need security alliance with the United States. Thus, bilateral alliance between Seoul and Washington is a requirement even in the post-Cold War unless North Korea explicitly abandons a military option. To augment deterrence, South Korea's cooperation with China is significant at the time when North Korea may attempt to use the military option out of desperation. To plan against the possibility of crisis short of a major war, cooperative mechanism among South Korea and countries in the region is required In this regard, four party talks to address the lack of security regime on the Korean Peninsula had been proposed and now, await a full operation with North Korea's full participation. To deal with North Korea's collapse prudently, constructive engagement by South Korea and regional countries is demanded rather than containment. In this process, wise division of labor between South Korea and the United States will bring about a smooth transition of the North as the United States and West Germany had spelled out their sharing of roles and missions to accelerate the German unification cleverly. Indeed, China's cooperation is crucial to holding the transition under a tight control by Seoul and Washington. To tackle non-conventional crisis scenarios properly, the South Korean Government should mend the fences before the advent of the crises. By reviewing the past record of crisis management thoroughly, it should identify trouble spots deep inside the management system. First of all, the Blue House should strengthen the Situation Room so that it can utilize the sophisticated ability of information gathering and analysis of all relevant agencies to the maximum extent. Second, the Blue House should facilitate policy discussion among heads of relevant government agencies at the event of crisis instead of relying on the United States too much. Above all, the South Korean Government should take initiative to turn the crisis into a major issue between the two Koreas instead of absorbing it as an internal problem as to how effectively the South Korean Government will handle the North Korean provocation within the limits of South Korea. The last point will help South Korea to face the crisis more actively to transform the crisis into an opportunity to take advantage of its strength as opposed to the fatal weaknesses of the North. If that is the case, North Korea will abandon military adventures after all.

남·북한 군비경쟁의 심화와 북한의 전쟁도발 억제방안

한용섭 한국외교협회 2016 외교 Vol.117 No.0

국군의 위상과 통일한국군의 위상과 남북한 군사력 통합 방안

한용섭 한국군사학회 1998 군사논단 Vol.14 No.1

건축유감(목구회 건축평론집을 읽고)

한용섭,Han, Yong-Seop 대한건축사협회 1975 建築士 Vol.1975 No.2

부유식 천연액화가스(LNG) 터미널의 설계 기술 개발

한용섭,이정한,김용수 한국가스학회 2002 가스산업과 기술 Vol.5 No.1

주한미군 재배치와 21세기 한국의 신안보전략 개념

한용섭 재단법인 동아시아연구원 2004 EAI 워킹페이퍼 Vol.- No.-

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한용섭 한국국제정치학회 2008 한국국제정치학회 학술대회 발표논문집 Vol.- No.-

21세기(世紀) 동북아(東北亞) 핵환경(核環境)과 북한(北韓)의 핵문제(核問題)

한용섭 평화문제연구소 1993 統一問題硏究 Vol.5 No.2

특집/총점검,한반도에서의 평화협정체제 : 북한식 평화협정론은 대미접근전략의 일환 -북한의 평화협정체결 공세와 전망-

한용섭 평화문제연구소 1995 통일한국 Vol.139 No.-