http://chineseinput.net/에서 pinyin(병음)방식으로 중국어를 변환할 수 있습니다.
변환된 중국어를 복사하여 사용하시면 됩니다.
개별검색 DB통합검색이 안되는 DB는 DB아이콘을 클릭하여 이용하실 수 있습니다.
통계정보 및 조사
예술 / 패션
<해외전자자료 이용권한 안내>
- 이용 대상 : RISS의 모든 해외전자자료는 교수, 강사, 대학(원)생, 연구원, 대학직원에 한하여(로그인 필수) 이용 가능
- 구독대학 소속 이용자: RISS 해외전자자료 통합검색 및 등록된 대학IP 대역 내에서 24시간 무료 이용
- 미구독대학 소속 이용자: RISS 해외전자자료 통합검색을 통한 오후 4시~익일 오전 9시 무료 이용
※ 단, EBSCO ASC/BSC(오후 5시~익일 오전 9시 무료 이용)
North Korea's military policy does not show any sign of change on the strategic level even after Kim Il-sung's death. The reason why North Korea can not change its military policy is threefold: (1) Under the Kim Jong-il regime, Kim Jong-il can not change overnight policy prioirty the top of which had been laid on military build-up and consequent communization of South Korea through military means for the past five decades: (2) Kim Jong-il is afraid that resource diversion from military sector to economic sector may undermine his power base because the military circles have been playing a key role in upholding the Kim Jong-il regime in the post-Kim Il-sung era, and: (3) Since North Korea has an edge only in military competition with South Korea, Pyongyang intends to maximize the utility of military cards as a means to obtain concessions from U.S. counterparts by setting Seoul hostage to its coercive diplomacy on the other hand. The last point is, in particular, worrisome because North Korea's economy as well as its entire system is experiencing the worst period--either collapse or bare survival. Pyongyang's options become narrow. It may either opt for a military clash with Seoul before its military advantage becomes obsolete ortry to avoid domestic crisis by causing an external crisis as opposed to Seoul. North Korea started to take a dual-track approach to the outside world so as to escape domestic crisis. One is to improve relations with the United States and the other is to antagonize South Korea to the maximun extent Pyongyang decided to suspend its nuclear program in exchange for diplomatic normalization and provision of economic support including less weapon-prone nuclear reactor by the United States. Pyongyang further intends to maximize its success in engaing the United States while trying to isolate South Korea from the scene. To counter North Korea's dual-track approach more effectively, South Korea should design a more comprehensive policy regarding how to build peace regime on the Korean Peninsula by accommodating recent development in U.S.-North Korean relations. On the other hand, Seoul should develop policy options to prevent North Korea's habitual threat of war effectively. This papaer suggests five broad policy options. Two options are summarized here. One policy option will be to increase Seoul's defense budget to redress military imbalance within a shorter time period than originally planned. Another will be to strengthen South Korea-U.S. joint security policy developing mechanism on the basis of more accurate analysis of North Korea's dire situations. In this light, the most recent joint proposal for 4 party talks on peace-building for Korea is perfectly timely. Now, Seoul and Washington should develop conrete measures to induce China and North Korea to the 4 party talks by promoting an active participation in the policy developing process from goverment officials as well as relevant experts.
Will crisis occur in the Korean Peninsula? This is the most frequently raised question nowadays when North Korea is assessed to be likely to collapse under the worsening economic and systemic situations. If North Korea is likely to create situations which might be developed into a crisis where South Korea and the United States should challenge those North Korean provocations, what shape will the crisis take and how will South Korea resolve it effectively? Regarding the plausible courses of actions to be taken by North Korea in the future, two major scenarios are being drawn up: war scenario and crises shot of war. War scenario is the most frequently envisioned one among all the relevant scenarios regarding North Korea as North Korea is experiencing total system failure nowadays. An all-out war as a result of the North Korean leader's miscalculation is the one that is the most worrisome. It is, of course, controversial whether or not North Korea will actually initiate a war despite its most difficult economic situations. Based on the low possibility of the conventional war, some experts adds that Pyongyang will likely start a war with chemical and biological weapons because chances for North Korea's win in the conventional warfare are so low that Pyongyang has no option but to resort to the unconventional warfare. In addition, various scenarios for crises short of war are predicted. Among them, the most dangerous is Pyongyang's possible provocation in the process of its internal political turmoil. Pyongyang may attempt to turn its internal crisis into an external opportunity where they can run South Korea's life at risk out of desperation. Although it is not likely that Pyongyang will win the war, they may inflict an enormous damage on Seoul as well as on North Korea, in return. Then, the damage will be too great to recover within a foreseeable future even if Korea is unified under South Korea. Pyongyang may try to occupy islands in the western sea near the DMZ while insisting on the return of North Koreans who fled from North Korea for the pursuit of food and freedom. During the military engagement, South Korean armed forces may try to counterattack North Korean armed forces not to allow the North to occupy the islands in the western sea. This is another crisis scenario whose consequences are not so trivial as to overlook. Or the North may attempt to assassinate South Korea's top political figures so as to create a turmoil inside South Korea, while covering up the fact that they have done. Such kind of terrorist act will add to an internal instability inside South Korea, which will in turn, to the North Korean leader, provide an opportunity to the North Korean leader to play South Korea's vulnerability to his favor. Therefore, it is important for the South Korean Government to prepare against those crisis scenarios beforehand. To deter and prevent a North Korean attack, South Korea will need security alliance with the United States. Thus, bilateral alliance between Seoul and Washington is a requirement even in the post-Cold War unless North Korea explicitly abandons a military option. To augment deterrence, South Korea's cooperation with China is significant at the time when North Korea may attempt to use the military option out of desperation. To plan against the possibility of crisis short of a major war, cooperative mechanism among South Korea and countries in the region is required In this regard, four party talks to address the lack of security regime on the Korean Peninsula had been proposed and now, await a full operation with North Korea's full participation. To deal with North Korea's collapse prudently, constructive engagement by South Korea and regional countries is demanded rather than containment. In this process, wise division of labor between South Korea and the United States will bring about a smooth transition of the North as the United States and West Germany had spelled out their sharing of roles and missions to accelerate the German unification cleverly. Indeed, China's cooperation is crucial to holding the transition under a tight control by Seoul and Washington. To tackle non-conventional crisis scenarios properly, the South Korean Government should mend the fences before the advent of the crises. By reviewing the past record of crisis management thoroughly, it should identify trouble spots deep inside the management system. First of all, the Blue House should strengthen the Situation Room so that it can utilize the sophisticated ability of information gathering and analysis of all relevant agencies to the maximum extent. Second, the Blue House should facilitate policy discussion among heads of relevant government agencies at the event of crisis instead of relying on the United States too much. Above all, the South Korean Government should take initiative to turn the crisis into a major issue between the two Koreas instead of absorbing it as an internal problem as to how effectively the South Korean Government will handle the North Korean provocation within the limits of South Korea. The last point will help South Korea to face the crisis more actively to transform the crisis into an opportunity to take advantage of its strength as opposed to the fatal weaknesses of the North. If that is the case, North Korea will abandon military adventures after all.
The first-ever Korean summit in June 2000 was a remarkable event. Not only did the two heads of state sign a joint declaration, but the leaders repeatedly insisted that it would be implemented. Noticeably absent from the joint statement, however, was any mention of the need how to ease military tension and build a durable peace on the peninsula, Such issues were apparently raised by President Kim Dae-jung, but nothing was agreed. In October 2000 following the inter-Korean rapprochement, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright met with the North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-il to discuss state-sponsored terrorism and missile testing and export issues. The meeting appeared fruitful, but it will likely take time and require a de facto "reward" to North Korea. There was also a joint communique before the visit on the need for steps replacing the 1953 Armistice Agreement with permanent peace arrangements. Despite the breakthrough achieved at the inter-Korean summit and the follow-up talks, the omission of conventional-warfare security issues should be a major concern-especially to South Korea. We should not forget North Korea's formidable conventional military threat to South Korea. Therefore, we need to address conventional security issues at the next inter-Korean summit without any reservation. Seoul's and Washington's engagement policy thus far has been a step-by-step approach starting from talking about political and economic issues, with security issues presumably coming up eventually. With the advent of George W. Bush Administration in Washington, its approach toward North Korea will change entirely, because President Bush and his secretaries frequently emphasized the need for being "tough" on North Korea's military threats-conventional and unconventional alike. At the same time, South Korean government reexamines the achievements and future approach toward North Korea in light of changes in domestic economic performance, public opinion, and US administration. This paper proposes a more ambitious, holistic and adaptive approach. It is based on the belief that for the engagement policy of Seoul and Washington to be sustainable and productive, it should include concrete steps now to reduce conventional military threats on the Korean Peninsula and build a peacefully coexisting Korean Peninsula. Simultaneous political, economic, and security negotiations would have the best chance of inducing the desired behavioral changes in the North. All security issues could be addressed in a single forum except for the US missile deal with North Korea. The English paper was originally published in the December 2000 issue of Arms Control Today under the title of "Time for Conventional Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula. Later, the author rewrote in Korean with substantial adjustment to the new situations in and around Korea. The Korean paper recommends South Korea's genuine approach to the conventional arms control issue from a holistic perspective with more effective strategy than ever.
Military Confidence Building has become a top policy agenda in the midst of South Korea's Sunshine Policy, North Korea's Open Door Policy toward the world, the normalization talks between Tokyo and Pyongyang, and increasing US interest in resolving the military issues on the Korean Peninsula from a holistic perspective. The recent revelation of North Korea's secret nuclear program could overshadow the importance of the confidence building issue but to find out a fundamental resolution of the nuclear issue, we need a comprehensive approach from the military confidence building and conventional and nuclear arms control perspective lest we would be entrenched in the issue-oriented approach again. This paper intends to define military confidence building and its measures and analyze past successful cases in Europe and elsewhere. As a result of the analysis, policy guidelines and policy measures are suggested specifically for the Korean peninsula. In conclusion, three sets of policy recommendations are followed: Conducting tripartite security talks including South Korea, North Korea and the United States, focusing more on constraint measures than on traditional confidence building measures, and establishing a linkage between economic assistance to Pyongyang and its intent to accept confidence building measures from Seoul and Washington. 한국의 햇볕정책, 북한의 대외 개방정책, 북일 수교 교섭과 미국의 한반도 군사문제 전체에 대한 관심 표명으로 한반도 군사적 신뢰구축이 2002년 최대의 화두로 떠올랐다. 최근의 북한 핵문제로 인해 신뢰구축이 뒤로 미루어질 가능성도 있지만, 그 근본해결책은 종래의 이슈별 해결보다는 포괄적인 군사적 신뢰구축과 군비통제의 틀 내에서 찾아질 수 있다. 본 연구에서는 군사적 신뢰구축에 대한 개념을 정의하고, 유럽과 기타지역에서 성공한 군사적 신뢰구축의 사례를 분석해서 한반도에 적용할 수 있는 유용한 정책지침과 군사적 신뢰구축조치 대안을 제시하고자 하였다. 결론에서 남북한, 미국 삼자간 안보대화체제 구축과 각종 신뢰구축조치를 포함한 제한조치의 채택, 북한과 신뢰구축 합의에 이르기 위해 북한의 경제지원 획득 동기와 한미 양국에 의한 신뢰구축설득을 연계시킬 것을 제안하고 있다.
Scholars and Experts on Strategic Theory and Common Security hold a wide-spread view that more defense-oriented thinking and missile defense system improve security of both countries which are involved in the arms competition, thus not causing security dilemma to the other side. However, Russia and China argued against the US deployment of missile defense system for similar and different reasons. Similar reason lies in that Russia and China tend to regard that the US missile defense system undermines strategic stability and their security interests though the United States argues that it strengthens mutual defense without affecting security of Russia and China negatively. Different reason is that Russia contends that global strategic balance and security is undermined between the United States and Russia, whereas China is more concerned about the possibility that China will lose its favorable strategic stability in the East Asian and Western Pacific region in terms of intermediate and short range nuclear and conventional missiles vis-a-vis the United States which lacks the intermediate and short range missiles due to the US observance with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Reduction Treaty with the former Soviet Union which was agreed in 1987. As a result, China’s argument against the US deployment of THAAD is misleading because China is really concerned about disclosure of its intermediate and short range missile ssuperiority through the US X-Band Radars of the THAAD system. If China intends to reduce US threat of missile defense system, China needs to come to the arms control talks with the United States in order to reduce or abolish intermediate and short range missiles in the East Asia and the Western Pacific, To do so, China has to improve transparency and openness ultimately to reach a negotiated arms control and reduction of its intermediate range missiles. This is why China has put informal sanctions on South Korea to urge South Korea to give up the US THAAD instead of negotiating with the United States. This is why China’s pressure on South Korea will not hold for long. 전략이론가들이나 안보전문가들은 한 국가가 공격보다는 방어가 우세하다는 인식을 갖고 방어용 무기를 증강하는 것은 상대 국가의 안보를 악화시키는 안보딜레마를 조성하지 않고 오히려 안보를 증진시킨다고 생각해 왔다. 미국은 이러한 인식을 갖고 외부의 미사일 위협에 대해서 MD체계를 개발하여 배치하고 있다. 그러나 러시아와 중국은 미국의 MD체계에 대해서 크게 반발하고 있는데 그 이유들에는 유사점과 차이점이 있다. 유사점은 미국의 MD체계가 전략적 균형을 파괴하고 그들의 안보이익을 저해하며 안보딜레마를 조성한다고 주장하는 점이다. 또한 러중 양국은 이란, 북한 등 핵미사일 위협에 당면한 지역 국가들의 안보에 대해서는 무관심하다. 차이점은 러시아는 동유럽에 배치되는 미국의 MD의 요격미사일의 위협을 중시하며 이에 대응하기 위해 다탄두탄도미사일 등 공격용 미사일을 증강 혹은 질적 개선을 추진하고 있다. 중국은 미국과의 전지구적 차원의 군비경쟁은 상대적으로 덜 주목하면서, 동아시아와 서태평양에서 지역적으로 우세한 중단거리 미사일의 전략균형을 유지하기 위해 미국의 MD체계의 한 부분인 THAAD체계의X-band 레이더를 집중적으로 비판하고 있다. 또한 중국은 미국의 MD 배치를 수용한 한국에 대해서 외교적ㆍ경제적 압박을 행사한 바 있다. 그런데 미국과 러시아 간에는 전지구적 안보딜레마와 군비경쟁을 해소할 수 있는 핵군축과 중거리미사일폐기조약 등의 핵군축레짐과 경험이 존재하고 있어, 미-러관계가 개선되면 언제든지 MD논쟁을 군비통제 방향에서 해결할 수 있다. 반면에 미국과 중국 간에는 동아태 지역에서 중단거리 미사일 및 MD 문제를 군비통제방향으로 해결할 수 있는 양국간 군축레짐과 경험이 없다. 이런 이유로 중국은 한국에 대해서 압박을 행사했고 일단 이 문제는 임시적으로 봉합되었다. 그러나 중국이 제기한 MD문제는 중국이 미국과 직접대화를 통해 상호 투명성 증진, 신뢰구축, 군축 등 군비통제방향으로 나아가야 근본적으로 풀릴 수 있는 문제라고 하겠다.
Spot welding is one of the important welding processes for the construction of thin metal sheet. Because of low investment cost, alternating welding current is widely applied for power source. Direct current type could be, however, recommened for high quality weldment. In this study, the effect of welding current type on the weldability and the electrode life in spot welding of aluminium alloy were investigated. Various welding tests were done by using three phase direct and alternating welding current, respectively. In spite of high variation of welding force, weld quality and electrode life with alternating welding current were shown better results than those with direct current for 2mm thick alumininum alloy sheets. This was due to excessive erosion of the positive electrode in direct welding current compared with the negative one. On the contrary to 2mm sheets, the welding parameters of alternating current for 1mm sheets must be carefully selected.