양면시장에서의 시장획정 및 시장지배력 평가

김현수 ( Hyeon Soo Kim ) 안암법학회 2011 안암 법학 Vol.0 No.34

Two-sided markets have existed since ancient times, a certain number of these having significant economic importance. With the plummeting of communication costs, the increase in computer capacity and the advent of a new Internet-based infrastructure, business models wherein different customer groups tied together into a single two-sided market have become less costly to establish. Technological progress has also made possible new highly flexible virtual platforms, as an alternative to easily saturated physical platforms. Such two-sided markets are of particular importance under competition law, as two-sided markets form a complex ecological structure through close and highly correlative connections. As platforms serve as the central link between such co-dependent connections, businesses which control these platforms can control the entirety of the related industry. Taking our current stage of accelerating digital convergence into consideration, the market conduct of the two-sided platform which has established its customer base in a related or adjacent market is enough to attract the attention of competition authority. The two problems concerning the application of competition law on two-sided markets are first the conceptual problem wherein these markets are operated according to different economic principles compared to one-sided markets, and second the practical problem wherein an analysis which takes this into account is highly complicated. It is, however, inappropriate to inflate these obstacles, and the fact remains that the rules of competition law are still valid be it in one-sided or two-sided markets. What must be kept in mind is the need to precisely understand the co-dependence of the two sides in a two-sided market. Studies on two-sided markets only attempt to deal with the other side of what has been discussed concerning network effects, and as such, previous discussions on network effects, such as lock-in effects or barriers to entry, are not rendered meaningless. Studies on two-sided markets simply imply the possibility of such an effect to be controlled to some extent, or to be accepted for the sake of increased efficiency. Under such considerations, attempts to limit the application of competition law under a generalized principle based on studies concerning two-sided markets should be regarded with caution.

LOYALTY TRANSFER IN TWO-SIDE MARKETS: THE CASE OF ONLINE PAYMENT PLATFORMS

So-Young Lee 글로벌지식마케팅경영학회 2018 Global Marketing Conference Vol.2018 No.07

Introduction With the opening of the 4th revolution era, platform business started to come into the spotlight. It was in the early 2000s that academics started full-scale research on platform based on the two-sided market theory but in fact the two-sided market is a business model that has existed around us since before. Examples include credit card industry, real estate brokering, and auctions. These industries are creating value through the interaction of two markets of different needs through a company that provides a specific platform (Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006). Recently, with the widespread use of services and products based on high technology, platform business is pouring into our lives at an amazing speed. With a single ID, you can shop, pay for, and receive shipping from a variety of online stores, without having to go through a lot of memberships. You do not have to search every single hotel for the best price, best location. You can even find a room in the house and see the reviews of customers who have stayed there. Compared to traditional pipeline business, one of the key differentiating features of the platform business is a two-sided network effect where consumers and consumers, producers and producers, and consumers and producers interact with each other. This two-sided network effect, with a positive feedback loop, has become a major driver of platform company growth. In the two-sided market, the platform‟s value to any given user largely depends on the size of the users on the other side of the platform due to the indirect network effect (Evans, 2003; Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005). Therefore, increasing the size of one side market, including the issue of „chicken or egg‟, is an indispensable task for the platform managers to maximize platform performance. But more important than increasing the size of one side of the market is transforming the new customers to loyal customers and creating positive feedback loops. This study explores the process of online payment platform users signing up, forming user loyalty, and spreading the loyalty to the sellers and platform providers. More specifically, this study examines (1) what causes the consumers to join the online payment platform at the beginning (2) what are the drivers that lead new members to the active, loyal users (3) whether the loyalty to the payment platform has a positive effect on the attitude toward the sellers (the other side market) and the platform company (platform provider). Theoretical Background and Hypotheses Two- Sided Markets and the Platform The definition of the two-sided market is varied by scholars. Chakravoti and Roson (2006) defines the two-sided market as a market where two different groups of users interact through the platform and the value created at this time is influenced by the indirect externalities of the network. Here, the platform is a physical, virtual, or institutional environment that allows different groups of users to facilitate transactions or interactions. According to Evans (2003), three necessary conditions for two sided platform markets are: (1) there are two distinct groups of customers; (2) there are externalities associated with customer A and B becoming connected or coordinated in some fashion; (3) an intermediary can facilitate that coordination efficiently than bi-lateral relationships between the members of the group. For example, we can think of a credit card company. There is a group of card holders and merchants and the demands of these two groups are very different. There is also a network effect between the two groups. Customers will not use credit cards with fewer merchants. The greater the number of merchants, the greater the benefits the customers have. Likewise, the more cardholders there are, the more profitable the merchants can generate. The intermediary role of the two groups of users to interact is a credit card company. Perceived value and Loyalty to the Online Payment Platform The loyalty to the online payment system can be expressed as the level of participation and commitment the member has over other similar payment systems. O‟Brien and Jones (1995) argue the value perception as an important prerequisite factor in developing brand loyalty; that is, only after the customer has perceived the online payment system as valuable, then would the customer become loyal to the system. The expectations that the perceived value can affect the loyalty to the online payment platform may be explained in terms of “Social Exchange Theory” (Thibaut and Kelly 1959). Within this framework, the customer will remain in the platform only when he or she perceives the value, which is defined as a trade-off between costs and benefits (Woodruff and Gardial 1996) is sufficient. Overall, perceived value of the online payment platform would affect customer loyalty. More specifically, it is expected that non-economic values such as simplicity in account setting, convenience in use will have a more meaningful effect than the economic value including sign-up grant at the stage of attracting new customers. But in the process of new customers becoming active and loyal users, the economic value including mileage points, discount coupons and free trial coupons will play a more important role in addition to this convenience. For example, benefit of being able to use the accumulated mileage or discount coupon on any online store within the platform will make consumers to stay on this payment platform and become loyal customers. Based on such argument, we put forward the following hypothesis. H1: Non economic value has a positive effect on online payment platform loyalty H2: Economic value has a positive effect on online payment platform loyalty. Loyalty Transfer According to Eisenmann et al. (2006), the platforms exhibit two types of network effects: A same-side effect, in which increasing the number of users on one side of the network makes it either more or less valuable to users on the same side; and a cross-side effect, in which increasing number of users on one side makes it either more or less valuable to the users on the other side. In case of online payment platform, it is expected that there will be a positive cross-side network effect. As the number of consumers using a specific online payment platform increases, the number of partner shops participating in the platform will increase, allowing consumers to shop in more diverse online stores. Once customers experienced the value of a specific online payment system, they would insist on paying by this method when shopping online (Parker, Alstein and Choudary, 2016), that is, becoming a loyal customer. Oliver (1999) defines customer loyalty as a deeply held commitment to re-buy or re-patronize a preferred product or service consistently in the future, thereby causing repetitive same brand purchasing. The loyal customers will be among the many online stores selling the same products/services at a same price, shopping at stores that show their favorite online payment system logo, and encouraging friends and family to use the payment system. The frequent transactions will affect consumer‟s attitude towards a certain brand or store and diffuse their loyalty. The customers that are loyal to the payment platform will not only actively try to earn points but also be willing to go and shop at the stores participating in the platform. Some customers may prefer a store among many even though they have not used it before because it belongs to the platform. The loyalty to the platform also can be transferred to the loyalty on the platform provider. Customers will have a favorable attitude when the platform providers do other business (for example, online banking, debit card business, etc.). Given the above, we put forward the following 3 hypotheses. H3: Platform loyalty has a positive effect on the loyalty toward the sellers, the other side market. H4: Positive attitude toward the sellers within the platform has a positive effect on attitude toward the platform company H5: Platform loyalty has a positive effect on the attitude toward the platform company. Conceptual Framework Data Analysis and Results The data used in this study were obtained from a survey of 562 online payment platform users. Data analysis shows that non-economic values such as simplicity, convenience, and platform reliability have a more significant impact on platform loyalty than economic values such as sign-up bonus. However, it was found that economic factors such as mileage points, and discount coupons are more influential factors in the process of converting new members to active users. In addition, loyalty to the payment system has a positive effect on attitudes towards sellers where one can use the means of payment. Also, it can be seen that the customer loyalty to the platform and the favorable attitude toward the sellers make a favorable attitude toward the platform company providing and managing the two-sided market. Conclusion and Discussion This study may contribute to a better understanding of platform business in three particular ways. First, understanding the loyalty diffusion mechanisms within the platform can support platform companies to develop effective strategies to attract new consumers to the platform and to transform them into active users. Second, even though the study uses the data collected from individual consumer level, the findings may provide some inspiration for B2B relationships. For example, as the number of loyal buyers and sellers sharing the platform increases, the value of the platform increases and the platform company can use it as a powerful bargaining power when it comes to third business. Third, the study may help us to understand the role of Platform in two-sided market and how the customer loyalty becomes diffused. Although this study explored the loyalty formation and diffusion using the sample of the major payment systems in Korea, it may be premature to generalize the findings at this stage. It is important to note that there may be negative network effects. They need to be evaluated further through careful research.

양면시장의 정의 및 조건

이상규 ( Sang Kyu Rhee ) 정보통신정책학회 2010 정보통신정책연구 Vol.17 No.4

양면시장에서는 기존의 전통적 산업조직이론이 적용되지 않거나 수정이 필요하다. 이는 양면시장의 가장 큰 특징 중에서 하나인 교차네트워크 외부성에 의한 것이다. 따라서 양면시장에서는 시장획정, 시장지배력 평가, 불공정행위 판단 등에 대한 기준이 단면시장에서의 그것과는 달라져야 한다. 경제이론에서는 시장이 주어진 하나의 조건이지만 현실에서는 정의하여야 할 대상이다. 따라서 특정시장이 양면시장인지 아닌지의 여부를 명확히 판단하는 것은 중요한 과정이라 할 수 있다. 하지만 현재까지 특정시장이 양면시장인지의 여부를 판단하는 기준이 미흡한 것이 실정이다. 이는 관련 플랫폼에 대한 명확한 이해와 정의, 참여 소비자 그룹의 정확한 정의(identification) 등이 부족하기 때문이다. 이에 따라 본 본문에서는 양면 시장의 정의와 특정시장이 양면시장인지의 여부를 판단하는 조건 등을 살펴보고자 한다. The traditional theories in industrial organization economics such as inverse elasticity pricing rule, price discrimination may not applied or should be modified when we deal with two-sided markets. This comes from the special characteristic of two-sided markets especially cross network externality between two different groups of consumers (or suppliers). For the same reason, the traditional market definition methods, market power evaluation, criteria for anti-competitive behaviors should be modified in two-sided markets. Thus if we use the traditional theories without modification when we consider issues of two-sided market, there is possibility to commit type I or type II errors. For example, the pricing under marginal cost of dominant firm is regarded as predatory pricing in one-sided market. But in two-sided market it is not anti-competitive predatory pricing but just profit maximization behavior. Therefore it is very important to clarify whether the market is one-sided or two-sided(or multi-sided). However the structure of market is just treated as a given condition when we construct a theoretical model. But in the real world, market is not a given condition but an object to be defined. But until now there is no clear definition and criteria to decide whether the market is two-sided or not. The only academic definition is the Rochet & Tirole (2004)`s definition. And the most popular conditions of two-sided market is Evans (2003), and Evans & Schmalensee (2008)`s condition. But the condition is only necessary condition for two-sided market. Thus this paper tries to introduce more clear definition and decision criteria of two-sided markets. We introduce axioms of no-side-payment, cross network externality etc to define two-sided market. And we introduce an algorithm to decide whether a market is two-sided or not.

양면시장의 정의 및 조건

이상규 ( Sang Kyu Rhee ) 정보통신정책학회 2014 정보통신정책연구 Vol.21 No.4

양면시장에서는 기존의 전통적 산업조직이론이 적용되지 않거나 수정이 필요하다. 이는 양면시장의 가장 큰 특징 중에서 하나인 교차네트워크 외부성에 의한 것이다. 따라서 양면시장에서는 시장획정, 시장지배력 평가, 불공정행위 판단 등에 대한 기준이 단면시장에서의 그것과는 달라져야 한다. 경제이론에서는 시장이 주어진 하나의 조건이지만, 현실에서는 정의하여야 할 대상이다. 따라서 특정시장이 양면시장인지 아닌지의 여부를 명확히 판단하는 것은 중요한 과정이라 할 수 있다. 하지만 현재까지 특정시장이 양면시장인지의 여부를 판단하는 기준이 미흡한 것이 실정이다. 이는 관련 플랫폼에 대한 명확한 이해와 정의, 참여 소비자 그룹의 정확한 정의(identification) 등이 부족하기 때문이다. 이에 따라 본 본문에서는 양면시장의 정의와 특정시장이 양면시장인지의 여부를 판단하는 조건 등을 살펴보고자 한다. The traditional theories in industrial organization economics such as inverse elasticity pricing rule, price discrimination may not applied or should be modified when we deal with two-sided markets. This comes from the special characteristic of two-sided markets especially cross network externality between two different groups of consumers (or suppliers). For the same reason, the traditional market definition methods, market power evaluation, criteria for anti-competitive behaviors should be modified in two-sided markets. Thus if we use the traditional theories without modification when we consider issues of two-sided market, there is possibility to commit type I or type II errors. For example, the pricing under marginal cost of dominant firm is regarded as predatory pricing in one-sided market. But in two-sided market it is not anti-competitive predatory pricing but just profit maximization behavior. Therefore it is very important to clarify whether the market is one-sided or two-sided(or multi-sided). However the structure of market is just treated as a given condition when we construct a theoretical model. But in the real world, market is not a given condition but an object to be defined. But until now there is no clear definition and criteria to decide whether the market is two-sided or not. The only academic definition is the Rochet & Tirole (2004)`s definition. And the most popular conditions of two-sided market is Evans (2003), and Evans & Schmalensee (2008)`s condition. But the condition is only necessary condition for two-sided market. Thus this paper tries to introduce more clear definition and decision criteria of two-sided markets. We introduce axioms of no-side-payment, cross network externality etc to define two-sided market. And we introduce an algorithm to decide whether a market is two-sided or not.

다면적 플랫폼 사업자에 대한 공정거래규제

황창식(Hwang Chang Sik) 한국정보법학회 2009 정보법학 Vol.13 No.2

Multi-sided platforms where a transaction takes place among many demand customer groups have become one of the most important business areas due to advancement in technology, including Internet-based technology. However, since the competitive characteristics of multi-sided platforms are quite different from those of traditional one-sided markets, a traditional analysis and approach might cause a serious error and mistake in the new multi-sided platform businesses. Market definition and market dominance determination based on market shares and price-margin analysis might lead to an erroneous conclusion without taking into account indirect network externalities which have greater impact on the utility of a demand group as the number of other demand groups becomes larger. In particular, a high market share in one side cannot give the multi-sided platforms market dominance because indirect network externalities may play a deterrent effect on their ability to increase the price by decreasing demand on one side, then decreasing demand on the other side and then decreasing demand again on the first side (i.e., feedback loop effect). This deterrent effect can become much stronger in case of multi-homing which is common in Internet-based platforms. Thus, these competitive characteristics of two-sided markets must be fully considered in applying competition law to multi-sided platform businesses. However, caution is required when applying the two-sided market theory which has been developed as an economic theory to the actual competition cases. First of all, if the two-sided market theory is so widely expanded that it is viewed that all the sides of the multi-sided platforms constitute a single relevant product market and that competitive analysis is conducted only in connection with similar multi-sided platforms, the likelihood of an erroneous conclusion becomes greater because multi-sided platforms have more sides and conduct various businesses in a complex manner. In order to significantly reduce the risk of an erroneous conclusion, competitive analysis should be conducted side by side, as long as their competitive condition and circumstances are different from each other. In this context, the Supreme Court decision in T-broad Gangseo Cable TV case is significant. The Supreme Court took the right approach in that it acknowledged that a cable TV operator is a multi-sided platform with the characteristics of a two-sided market; determined that there existed different markets between its side relating to the program providers and its side relating to the cable TV viewers based on their different competitive conditions and circumstances; and then conducted an analysis of whether T-broad Gangseo Cable TV has market dominance in the side relating to the program providers where the abusive acts took place. In addition, on the issue of monopoly leveraging doctrine, the Supreme Court held that a multi-sided platform which has market dominance in one side cannot be deemed to have market dominance in the other side merely based on the interaction of demands between two sides. This holding is correct not only from the perspective of the market definition and competitive analysis, as explained above, but also from the perspective of the application of monopoly leveraging doctrine. Monopoly leveraging means an exclusionary act, such as tying, by which a monopoly power in one market is transferred to a neighboring market. It is quite clear that unilateral change in the channel placement of a home shopping channel by the cable TV operator cannot be such exclusionary act. 인터넷기술을 비롯한 신기술의 발달로 다수의 고객집단을 연결해주는 거래장소로서의 다면적 플랫폼이 중요한 사업영역으로 각광을 받고 있다. 그러나 다면적 플랫폼에서는 종래 단면시장에서와는 다른 경쟁적인 특성이 작용하고 있어서 전통적인 경 쟁법 틀을 그대로 적용할 경우 중대한 오류를 초래할 수 있다. 즉, 고객집단간의 상호관계에 따라 각 고객집단의 효용이 달라지게 되는 소위 간접적 네트워크 효과에 의하여 단순한 시장점유율 및 마진 분석에 기초한 시장획정 및 시장지배력 분석은 잘못된 결론에 이를 수 있다. 특히, 다면적 플랫폼의 경우에는 이러한 간접적 네트워크 효과에 따라 한 측면에서 시장점유율이 높다고 하더라도 다른 측면에 미치는 영향으로 인하여 가격을 경쟁수준으로 인상할 수 있는 시장지배력을 갖기가 어려우며, 이는 멀티호밍의 경우에 더욱 뚜렷하여진다. 따라서 다면적 플랫폼 사업에 대한 경쟁법 적용에 있어서는 양면시장적 특성을 충분히 반영하여야 한다. 그러나 동시에 경제학 이론으로 발달해온 양면시장 이론은 실제 경쟁법 사례에 적용함에 있어서는 상당한 주의가 필요하다. 특히, 양면시장이론을 확대하여 다면적 플랫폼 자체를 하나의 별도 시장으로 획정하고 다른 동일 혹은 유사 플랫폼과의 경쟁만을 대상으로 경쟁분석을 할 경우에 다면적 플랫폼이 점점 더 여러 사업영역에서 다양한 기능과 역할을 복합적으로 수행하게 되면 될수록 경쟁분석의 오류를 초래할 가능성이 높아진다. 이러한 점에서 다면적 플랫폼의 각 면의 경쟁양상이 서로 상이한 경우 각 면의 수요집단별로 대체성을 기준으로 경쟁원천을 파악하는 방법으로 시장획정을 하고 그에 따라 경쟁분석을 하는 것이 오류 가능성을 줄이는 방법이 될 것이다. 이러한 점에서 대법원의 티브로드 강서 판결은 큰 의미가 있다. 대법원은 케이블 TV사업자가 다면적 플랫폼사업자로서 양면시장적 특성을 가지고 있으며, PP측면과 가입자측면의 경쟁양상이 상이하다는 점을 근거로 하여 별도 시장획정을 하고 당해 남용행위가 문제되고 있는 PP측면에서 티브로드 강서방송이 시장지배력을 보유하고 있는지를 분석하고 있다는 점에서 타당한 접근방법이다. 아울러, 대법원은 시장지배력의 전이이론과 관련하여서도 다면적 플랫폼 사업의 경우 각 측면의 수요가 상호의존성을 가지고 있다는 점만을 근거로 하여 당해 사업자가 한 측면에서 시장지배력을 가지고 있다고 하여 다른 측면으로 시장지배력이 전이되는 관계에 있는 것이 아님을 판시하고 있는 바, 이는 다면적 플랫폼 사업자에 대한 시장획정 및 시장지배력 판단의 관점에서도 타당하지만 시장지배력 전이이론의 관점에서도 타당하다. 시장지배력의 전이이론은 사업자가 어떤 시장에서의 시장지배력을 매개로 하여 다른 시장으로 시장지배력을 이전, 확대하기 위하여 끼워팔기와 같은 경쟁배제적 행위를 하는 것을 말하는데 티브로드 강서방송이 우리홈쇼핑에 대하여 방송채널을 하위채널로 변경하는 것이 그러한 전이행위에 해당할 수 없음은 명백하기 때문이다.

Measuring the Impact of Competition on Pricing Behaviors in a Two-Sided Market

Kim, Minkyung,Song, Inseong Korean Marketing Association 2014 ASIA MARKETING JOURNAL Vol.16 No.1

The impact of competition on pricing has been studied in the context of counterfactual merger analyses where expected optimal prices in a hypothetical monopoly are compared with observed prices in an oligopolistic market. Such analyses would typically assume static decision making by consumers and firms and thus have been applied mostly to data obtained from consumer packed goods such as cereal and soft drinks. However such static modeling approach is not suitable when decision makers are forward looking. When it comes to the markets for durable products with indirect network effects, consumer purchase decisions and firm pricing decisions are inherently dynamic as they take into account future states when making purchase and pricing decisions. Researchers need to take into account the dynamic aspects of decision making both in the consumer side and in the supplier side for such markets. Firms in a two-sided market typically subsidize one side of the market to exploit the indirect network effect. Such pricing behaviors would be more prevalent in competitive markets where firms would try to win over the battle for standard. While such qualitative expectation on the relationship between pricing behaviors and competitive structures could be easily formed, little empirical studies have measured the extent to which the distinct pricing structure in two-sided markets depends on the competitive structure of the market. This paper develops an empirical model to measure the impact of competition on optimal pricing of durable products under indirect network effects. In order to measure the impact of exogenously determined competition among firms on pricing, we compare the equilibrium prices in the observed oligopoly market to those in a hypothetical monopoly market. In computing the equilibrium prices, we account for the forward looking behaviors of consumers and supplier. We first estimate a demand function that accounts for consumers' forward-looking behaviors and indirect network effects. And then, for the supply side, the pricing equation is obtained as an outcome of the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in pricing. In doing so, we utilize numerical dynamic programming techniques. We apply our model to a data set obtained from the U.S. video game console market. The video game console market is considered a prototypical case of two-sided markets in which the platform typically subsidizes one side of market to expand the installed base anticipating larger revenues in the other side of market resulting from the expanded installed base. The data consist of monthly observations of price, hardware unit sales and the number of compatible software titles for Sony PlayStation and Nintendo 64 from September 1996 to August 2002. Sony PlayStation was released to the market a year before Nintendo 64 was launched. We compute the expected equilibrium price path for Nintendo 64 and Playstation for both oligopoly and for monopoly. Our analysis reveals that the price level differs significantly between two competition structures. The merged monopoly is expected to set prices higher by 14.8% for Sony PlayStation and 21.8% for Nintendo 64 on average than the independent firms in an oligopoly would do. And such removal of competition would result in a reduction in consumer value by 43.1%. Higher prices are expected for the hypothetical monopoly because the merged firm does not need to engage in the battle for industry standard. This result is attributed to the distinct property of a two-sided market that competing firms tend to set low prices particularly at the initial period to attract consumers at the introductory stage and to reinforce their own networks and eventually finally to dominate the market.

온라인 양면 거래 플랫폼의 시장획정 및 시장지배력 판단

변정욱 ( Jeong Wook Byun ),김정현 ( Jeonghyun Kim ) 한국경쟁법학회 2018 競爭法硏究 Vol.37 No.-

Since the competitive pressure on two-sided O2O platform markets is increasing, new types of competition issues are expected to be raised actively. Due to the indirect network externality, the traditional SSNIP test cannot be directly applied to define the two-sided markets. Therefore, it is necessary to revise the method of market definition by considering the main features of two-sided markets. This paper reviews the existing literature on two-sided market definition and suggests in detail the modified way of market definition for the on-line two-sided transaction platforms with two-part tariff structures. We also discuss the recent issues of market dominance of the on-line two-sided transaction platforms and the operation of competition law in EU, so as to derive implications for enforcement of competition law by the competition authority.

Pricing Strategies of Social Commerce Platform under Network Externalities

Wei Zhang,Wei Ma,Zhonghua Li,Naixue Xiong 보안공학연구지원센터 2015 International Journal of Hybrid Information Techno Vol.8 No.12

Although the theory of two-sided markets is popular nowadays, little attention was paid on self-network externalities and UGC (User Generated Content) produced by buyers which are the major features of social commerce two-sided markets. This article studies percentages of buyers who generated UGC, self-network externalities of buyers and cross-group externalities between two groups. The three factors influence the pricing strategy of social commerce platforms based on two-sided markets. With analyzing the special characteristics of social commerce, the study unveils that the optimal price of buyers charged by social commerce platform shows a negative correlation with self-network externalities and it also shows a negative correlation with the probability of UGC generated by buyers. The study also shows that the equilibrium price of buyers declines with the augment of cross-group externalities of buyers to sellers, and the equilibrium price of sellers declines with the augment of cross-group work externalities of sellers to buyers. The social commerce platforms on the basis of interest graph, lower UGC threshold and more interactive among customers gain the competitive advantages. Compared to other platforms, the two-sided social commerce platforms give consumers and retailers more subsidies.

모바일서비스 플랫폼의 양면시장 형성단계에 관한 연구

김진영(Jin Young Kim),김민용(Min Yong Kim) 한국인터넷전자상거래학회 2013 인터넷전자상거래연구 Vol.13 No.4

Kakaotalk which is top level of mobile instant messenger in Korea has evolved from one-sided market to two-sided market as a biggest mobile service platform. The minimum necessary condition of two sided market is to have cross network externality in the platform. The platform provider commonly uses instruments of cross-subsidization to strengthen the cross network externality. Kakaotalk is the first mobile service platform progressed to two-sided market because it has not only secured cross network externality but also made full use of instruments of cross subsidization effectively. This is a exploratory case study focusing on Kakaotalk that has been evolved to two-sided market with cross network externality. This study verified the following research thesis. First, it verified a mobile service requires constant growth stage when it develops two-sided market as platform. Second, it verified if a mobile service utilizes instruments of cross-subsidization in order to enforce cross network externality which is necessary condition of the two-sided market through exploratory case study on detailed event analysis of Kakaotalk. The study on two-sided market of mobile service platform focusing on the Kakaotalk case proposes what a mobile service is to be required to evolve from one-sided market to two-sided market as constant platform. In particular, this study investigated strategic usage of instruments of cross-subsidization for securing cross network externality and how the instruments of cross-subsidization can intensify the cross network externality.

경쟁법 적용을 위한 보완재 상품군의 시장획정

이상규 ( Sang Kyu Rhee ) 한국경제학회 2013 經濟學硏究 Vol.61 No.3

관련 상품시장의 획정이란 상호간에 실질적 경쟁관계에 있는 상품의 집합을 결정하는 일련의 과정을 일컫는다. 여기서 실질적 경쟁관계 여부는 상품간의 교체 또는 대체가능성으로 판단되어진다. 하지만 경쟁법 적용 사례에서 때로는 대체관계가 성립하지 않는 상품군들을 다루는 경우도 종종 발생한다. 후속시장, 양면시장, 군집시장 등이 이에 해당하는 대표적 예이다. 이들 예는 상품군을 구성하는 상품들 간에 대체성이 성립하지 않기 때문에 이를 고려하지 않고 SSNIP test를 기계적으로 적용할 경우 시장획정에서 오류를 범할 가능성이 있다. 이에 따라 본 논문에서는 보완재 상품군의 시장획정 시 고려해야할 몇 가지 요인들을 살펴본다. 후속시장 획정 시에는 전환비용, 정보의 비대칭성 정도, 거래관행 등을 고려하여 주시장과 후속시장을 동일시장이나 별도의 시장으로 획정할지를 결정하여야 한다. 양면시장에서는 교차 네트워크 외부성으로 서로 다른 측면의 이용자 그룹이 서로 보완재의 역할을 한다는 사실을 염두에 두고 시장획정을 하여야 하며, 군집시장의 경우에는 거래적 보완성, 범위의 경제 및 군집상품의 가격할인율, 분리비용, 기술적 통합정도, 수요행태 및 거래관행 등을 고려하여 군집의 범위를 결정하고 시장획정을 하여야 한다. Market definition refers to the process of determining the set of products those are substitutable or interchangeable to the reference good for the purpose of analyzing the antitrust issues at hand. However there are lots of competition law cases in which the reference good consists of complementary goods, and/or relevant goods are not substitutable but complementary each others. Aftermarkets, two-sided markets, and cluster markets are the typical examples. Since goods are not substitutable in those examples, the mechanical application of SSNIP test or critical loss analysis to define relevant good market could make serious mistakes. The most possible mistake will be to define relevant market narrower than actual market since SSNIP test does not consider the complementarity among goods. Therefore this article try to verify the most important factors which should be considers when aftermarkets, two-sided markets, and cluster markets are defined. In case of aftermarket, the extent of switching cost, and information asymmetry between consumers and firms, trade practice should be considered to decide whether equipment and aftermarket service are defined as the same market or not. In case of two-sided market, the most important factor that makes difference from single-sided market is cross-network externality. Two distinct groups of users in the two-sided platform become complementary goods to each other through cross-network externality. Thus the feedback effect of the action which take place in one side should be considered during market definition procedure. In case of cluster market, transactional complementarity, economies of scope and discount rate of cluster price, unbundling cost, extent of technological integration, demand and trade practice should be considered to define the scop of clustering.