당내민주주의의 헌법적 의의와 실현방안

김소연(Kim, So-Yeon) 원광대학교 법학연구소 2013 圓光法學 Vol.29 No.1

In today's mass democracy society, political party takes charge of important role in politics. Without democratization of political party itself, it is impossible to put into action democracy. Political party works very effectively to realize democracy, but it also can be effectual means to destroy democracy. So political party shall call for internal democratization of each political party itself. People's variety opinions are put together and changed the national will by political party. These are political party's key functional roles. To perform this job well, internal democratization of each political party is getting more and more important. As political party exercises political leverage extensively, internal democratization of each political party is not only for political party itself, but also for national order. There are two ways to give shape to internal democratization of each political party. One is to make political party's internal organization democratically and the other is to do political party's activities democratically. Political party's internal organization which is composed democratically is putting emphasis on autonomy of expressing political party members opinion. And the delivery system of their opinions shall be bottom up and not top down. Political party's activities is based on democratic decision-making processes which is existed between political party members. So it is important to secure autonomy of expressing political party members opinion. To build political party's democratical internal organization, the proper legal status for each member of political party shall be guaranteed. Political party constitution and platform shall be enacted and made public. To work political party's activities democratically, political party's public nomination for the public office candidate shall be democratic. But first in importance is that internal democratization of each political party comes true effectively when political party and people work together and make efforts together.

당내민주주의의 헌법적 의의와 실현방안

김소연 원광대학교 법학연구소 2013 法學硏究 Vol.29 No.1

In today's mass democracy society, political party takes charge of important role in politics. Without democratization of political party itself, it is impossible to put into action democracy. Political party works very effectively to realize democracy, but it also can be effectual means to destroy democracy. So political party shall call for internal democratization of each political party itself. People's variety opinions are put together and changed the national will by political party. These are political party's key functional roles. To perform this job well, internal democratization of each political party is getting more and more important. As political party exercises political leverage extensively, internal democratization of each political party is not only for political party itself, but also for national order. There are two ways to give shape to internal democratization of each political party. One is to make political party's internal organization democratically and the other is to do political party's activities democratically. Political party's internal organization which is composed democratically is putting emphasis on autonomy of expressing political party members opinion. And the delivery system of their opinions shall be bottom up and not top down. Political party's activities is based on democratic decision-making processes which is existed between political party members. So it is important to secure autonomy of expressing political party members opinion. To build political party's democratical internal organization, the proper legal status for each member of political party shall be guaranteed. Political party constitution and platform shall be enacted and made public. To work political party's activities democratically, political party's public nomination for the public office candidate shall be democratic. But first in importance is that internal democratization of each political party comes true effectively when political party and people work together and make efforts together.

정당해산의 실체적 요건의 규범적합적 해석

김선택(Kim, Seon-Taek) 헌법이론실무학회 2014 헌법연구 Vol.1 No.1

This article deals with a few core issues on the substantial requirements of the dissolution of political parties. On 5 th November, 2013, Korean government requested the Constitutional Court to decide on the unconstitutionality of the United Progressive Party and dissolve the party. The Basic Law(Grundgesetz) of Germany is the example of the clause of dissolution of political parties, i.e. Article 8 of Korean Constitution. But the intention of constitution-makers in two countries was fundamentally different. Whereas german parliamentary council for making Basic Law intended to prevent the appearance and growth of anti-democratic parties such as Nazis party, korean national assembly wanted to block arbitrary dissolving political parties by the government. “Grundgesetz” decided german democracy as so-called “streitbare oder wehrhafte Demokratie (defensive democracy)”, which is supported by many ofinstitutions prescribed in Art. 9 Para 2, Art. 18, Art. 21 Para. 2 GG. In Korean Constitution, there’s only one institution, that is, dissolution of political parties, which focuses primarily on the protection of political parties. Therefore, korean democracy can’t be classified as a kind of german-style defensive democracy. “Democratic basic order” in the party-clause of Korean Constitution and “free democratic basic order” in the preamble and unification-clause(Article 4) of Korean Constitution are different each other. The former refers to essential principles of democracy in Korean Constitution. The latter means state’s system as such of Korea, which has been fighting against so-called ‘people’s democracy’ of North Korea since 1948. The scope of the latter is wider then that of the former. Because Art. 8 Para. 4 of Korean Constitution is an exceptional clause, its contents must be strictly interpreted. The aim of political parties must be grasped on the ground of official papers such as political program. The activities of political parties linked with such aim provide the Court with materials for decision. Whether an activity of any part organizations or party members or supporters of political parties can fall under the boundary of the activities of political party, must be decided from the perspective of the party as a whole. Only when the danger caused by the activities linked the aim of political parties is present, concrete and serious, the concerned party is in collision with “democratic basic order”. But in the light of the character of dissolution of political parties as a preventive measure, it is not required for the party to have a (high-) probability of realization of its aim. Taking the severe impact of dissolution of political parties on the liberty of the parties and party members in consideration, this measure must be proportional. Korean Constitution does not stipulate‘existence of state’ as a cause of dissolution of political parties. Therefore the activity against the existence of state by party members and supporters, forexample, the crime such as high treason, could be coped with not by the measure of dissolution of political parties but by the criminal law. 이 글에서는 2013년 11월 5일 정부의 통합진보당에 대한 해산심판청구를 계기로 촉발된 학계의 정당해산논의를 통하여서도 충분히 해명되지 않은 정당해산의 실체적요건에 관련된 핵심쟁점 몇 가지를 우리 헌법조문에 근거하여 살펴보았다. 우리 헌법의 정당해산조항은 독일 기본법을 모델로 한 것이긴 하지만, 나치당과 같은 불법 정당을 방지하고자 한 독일과 정부에 의한 자의적 정당해산을 방지하고자 한한국은 입법배경이 다르다. 또한 기본법에 산재한 각종의 제도들로 자신들이 결단한방어적 민주주의를 뒷받침하고 있는 독일과 달리 우리 헌법은 정당해산제도를 두고있을 뿐이고, 그것도 일차적으로는 정당보호에 초점이 있기 때문에 우리 헌법이 독일식의 좁은 의미의 방어적 민주주의로 원칙적인 헌법적 결단을 내렸다고 할 수 없다. 정당해산의 보호법익으로 규정된 ‘민주적 기본질서’와 전문과 통일조항에 규정된‘자유민주적 기본질서’라는 개념은 각자의 입법목적과 체계에 맞게 해석되어야 한다. 전자는 우리 헌법상의 민주주의의 핵심요소들을 내용으로 하는 체제내적 개념이며,후자는 북한의 인민민주주의체제와 대립하고 있는 우리 대한민국의 국가체제를 가리키는 체제대결적 개념인데, 외연으로 보면 후자가 전자보다 넓은 것으로 파악된다. 헌법 제8조의 체계상 제4항의 제한적ㆍ예외적 성격 때문에 동 조항에 규정된 가중적 요건은 엄격하게 해석되어야 한다. 정당의 목적은 정당의 공식문건에 의해 파악해야 하고, 정당이 진정한 목적을 은폐하는 경우 입증이 어려울 뿐만 아니라 드러나지도 않은 주관적 의도를 이유로 심대한 불이익을 가하는 것은 부당하며, 그러한 정당의 성장에는 한계가 있어 해산의 실익도 없어 보인다. 또한 목적만으로는 충분치 않고 목적 달성을 위한 활동으로 나아간 정당만이 해산대상이 될 수 있고, 정당의 부분 조직이나 당원 일부 내지 지지자들의 행동은 전체 정당의 견지에서 평가하여 정당귀속 여부를 가려야 한다. 정당의 목적과 결합한 활동이 민주적 기본질서에 위배되려면용납할 수 없는 정도로 상충되어야 하고, 그로부터 발생하는 위험은 현재적, 구체적이고 진지한 정도에 이르러야 하지만, 정당해산의 예방조치적 성격에 비추어 목적이 현실적으로 실현될 가능성이 있어야 하는 것은 아니다. 정당해산이 당사자에게 미치는효과의 심각성을 고려할 때 비례성심사를 배제할 수 없다. 헌법은 국가의 존립을 정당해산의 보호법익으로 규정하고 있지 않으므로 일부 당원들의 국가존립에 대한 위해행위, 예컨대 내란범죄행위는 정당해산이라는 헌법적 수단이 아니라 형법적 수단으로 진압되어야 한다.

Democratization and Politics of Trasformismo: Explaining the 1990 Three-Party Merger in South Korea

권혁용 사단법인 코리아컨센서스연구원 2017 분석과 대안 Vol.1 No.2

Research on democratic transitions has relatively ignored the question of why some countries experience a regressive form of political pacts, while others do not. This paper develops a simple game-theoretic model to explain the phenomenon of collusive pacts in the process of democratization. Trasformismo is a term that refers to a system of political exchange based on informal clientelistic politics. The existing studies of the politics of trasformismo have emphasized the timing of industrialization and the tradition of strong state as conditions of the politics of trasformismo. However, not every late industrializers and not every strong states experienced some variants of collusive political pacts in their trajectories of democratization. In this paper, I contend that the politics of trasformismo is rather a generalizable pattern of political elites’ behavior under particular circumstances. By developing a simple game theoretic model, this paper suggests the conditions under which political actors are likely to collude to a regressive form of political pacts. The model shows that the likelihood of collusion to a regressive form of political pacts is a function of a set of parameters. First, a higher level of incumbency advantage in electoral competition is likely to be associated with a higher probability of collusive political pacts. Second, a higher degree of the monopoly of political representation of political parties without a close link with a variety of societal forces is likely to induce collusive behavior among politicians. Third, the ruling party leader’s expectations about the likelihood of a safe extrication are related to collusive political pacts. This paper then engages in a case study of the 1990 three-party merger in South Korea. The 1990 Korean case is interesting in that the ruling party created a new party after having merged with two opposition parties. This case can be considered a result of political maneuver in a context of democratization. The case study suggests the empirical relevance of the game-theoretic model. As the game of trasformismo and the case study of the 1990 three-party merger in South Korea have shown, the collusive political pact was neither determined by a certain stage of economic development nor by a particular cultural systems. Rather, it was a product of the art of trasformismo based on party leaders’ rational calculations of the expected likelihood of taking governing power. Research on democratic transitions has relatively ignored the question of why some countries experience a regressive form of political pacts, while others do not. This paper develops a simple game-theoretic model to explain the phenomenon of collusive pacts in the process of democratization. Trasformismo is a term that refers to a system of political exchange based on informal clientelistic politics. The existing studies of the politics of trasformismo have emphasized the timing of industrialization and the tradition of strong state as conditions of the politics of trasformismo. However, not every late industrializers and not every strong states experienced some variants of collusive political pacts in their trajectories of democratization. In this paper, I contend that the politics of trasformismo is rather a generalizable pattern of political elites’ behavior under particular circumstances. By developing a simple game theoretic model, this paper suggests the conditions under which political actors are likely to collude to a regressive form of political pacts. The model shows that the likelihood of collusion to a regressive form of political pacts is a function of a set of parameters. First, a higher level of incumbency advantage in electoral competition is likely to be associated with a higher probability of collusive political pacts. Second, a higher degree of the monopoly of political representation of political parties without a close link with a variety of societal forces is likely to induce collusive behavior among politicians. Third, the ruling party leader’s expectations about the likelihood of a safe extrication are related to collusive political pacts. This paper then engages in a case study of the 1990 three-party merger in South Korea. The 1990 Korean case is interesting in that the ruling party created a new party after having merged with two opposition parties. This case can be considered a result of political maneuver in a context of democratization. The case study suggests the empirical relevance of the game-theoretic model. As the game of trasformismo and the case study of the 1990 three-party merger in South Korea have shown, the collusive political pact was neither determined by a certain stage of economic development nor by a particular cultural systems. Rather, it was a product of the art of trasformismo based on party leaders’ rational calculations of the expected likelihood of taking governing power.

정치교육적 관점에서 본 제도변화의 정치와 정당민주화

유경화(Kyungha Yu) 한국열린교육학회 2023 열린교육연구 Vol.31 No.2

이 글은 민주화 이후 한국 정치개혁의 여러 이슈들 가운데 갈등과 경쟁의 구도측면에서 정당 및 선거 영역에서의 제도변화, 보다 구체적으로는 2002년 국민참여경선제 도입 이후 대통령후보선출제도에 있어서 변화의 원인과 과정, 정치적결과를 살펴보는데 그 목적이 있다. 이와 같은 흐름에 주목한 이유는 정당의 제도변화가 정당 민주화 요구에 어느 정도 부응하고 있는지에 대한 검토 및 평가를 위한 기반을 마련하기 위함이다. 그렇다면, 한국 정당에서 국민참여경선제도의 도입은 제도 도입이전과 비교하여 정당 민주화차원에서 만족할 만한 정도의 수준에 도달하였는가?‘국민참여경선제’란 이름의 개방형 후보선출제도를 도입한 제도변화로 정치적 결과의 민주화를 가져오게 되었는가? 이와 같은 문제의식을 토대로 분석한 결과, 특히 대표성의 측면에서 각 정당이 의도하는 바를 달성했다고 평가 할 수 있었다. 하지만, 참여성과 반응성 측면에서는 한국의 정당들이 국민경선제의 도입 당시 기대했던 의도와는 부응하지 않은 방향으로 결과가 도출되었음을 확인해 주고 있다. 참여성의 경우, 경선에서의 실제 투표율의 저조에서 그와 같은 결과를 뒷받침해 주었고, 반응성에서는 경선 참여 이후 후보자들의 정당에 대한 일체감의 약화 및 관심의 철회 등과 같은 현상을 통해 또한 의도하지 않은 결과를 뒷받침해주고 있다. 주목해야 할 점은 참여성과 반응성의 두 가지 측면은 공통적으로 한국 정치과정에서의 새로운 환경의 변화와 밀접한 관련이 있다는 점에 유의할 필요가 있음을 지적했다. 결론에서는 정당의 민주화 관점에서 제시할 수 있는 과제는 무엇인지에 대해 논의하였고, 또한 정치제도의 변화를 통한 한국의 정치발전이 정치교육에 어떠한 영향을 미치는지에 대해 고찰하였다. This paper examines changes in the political parties and elections in terms of conflict and competition among various issues of political reform in Korea after democratization. The purpose is to examine the processes and political results. The reason for paying attention to these trends is to prepare a basis for review and evaluation of the extent to which political party institutional changes are responding to party democratization demands. If so, has the introduction of the national participation contest system reached a satisfactory level in terms of party democratization compared to before the introduction of the system? Did these institutional changs, which introduced an open candidate selection system called the ‘People’s Participation Competition’, bring about the democratization of political results? As a result of the analysis based on this awareness of the problem, it could be evaluated that each party achieved what they intended, especially in terms of representativeness. However, in terms of participation and responsiveness, it is confirmed that the results did not meet the expectations of the Korean political parties at the time of the introduction of the national primary system. In the case of participation, such a result was supported by low turnouts in the primaries, and in the case of responsiveness, unintended results were also supported through phenomena such as the weakening of the party's unity and the withdrawal of interest among candidates after participating in the primary. What should be noted is that the two aspects of participation and responsiveness are closely related to changes in the new environment in the Korean political process. In conclusion, we discussed what tasks can be presented from the perspective of democratization of political parties, and also considered how the political development of Korea through changes in the political system affects political education.

현행 정당공천제도의 헌법적 문제점

최병훈 ( Byung Hoon Choi ) 안암법학회 2010 안암 법학 Vol.0 No.32

The main political parties have adopted the intraparty competing nomination-the direct primary election system-in the 16th and 17th presidential election to enable electorates to select the party`s nominees. And for the 5th Nationwide Local Elections on June 2nd, 2010, political parties amended the party rules toward enlarging the participation of the non-members(unaffifiated voters). This direct primary election system was modeled upon that of the United States. It was one of various efforts to reform political parties and politics in Korea. It purports to take root of upward nomination within the party, which helps to fasten the internal party democracy in Korea. The Korean primary election system is still fledgling in light of its short history especially in the legal perspective as well as the practical perspective. In addition, Korean political parties permit unaffiliated voter to vote in the nomination of candidates and it makes use of surveys of public opinions of the candidates in high proportion in evaluation. It casts serious doubts on the possible injury to the party`s ideology and representation. That becomes, in turn, the unconstitutional burden to the party`s rights of association. In the Jones case, the U.S. Supreme Court held unconstitutional that the state`s election law ordered the blanket primary election in lieu of the closed primary election since it violated the political parties` First Amendment rights of association. On the other hand, as mentioned before, Korea has recently adopted the direct primary election system similar to that of the U.S. To study these matters, this paper applies "the Tripartite Model of Political Parties"-the new definition for constitutional muster of the U.S. Supreme Court-to the intraparty competing nomination of the direct primary election system in Korea. In summary, the direct primary election system is founded upon the principle of the political party democracy and party autonomy embodying rights of association and it necessitates the structural compliance with the Korean Constitution. However, the current Public Office Election Act and the political party`s charters and bylaws have some unconstitutional provisions. Some of these include the qualification and selection clauses of voters as well as application of surveys of public opinions of the candidates in the process of nomination to represent the political party. These could inflict material injury to the structural compliance with the Korean Constitution. Finally, it should be noted that the open intraparty competing nomination needs to comply firmly with the triangular structure of political party democracy, political party autonomy, and national election for passing constitutional muster.

위헌정당해산제도에 관한 소고

이한태(Han-Tae Lee) 충남대학교 법학연구소 2014 法學硏究 Vol.25 No.2

우리헌법 제8조 제4항은 “정당의 목적이나 활동이 민주적 기본질서에 위배될 때에는 정부는 헌법재판소에 그 해산을 제소할 수 있고, 정당은 헌법재판소의 심판에 의하여 해산된다.”고 명시함에 따라 위헌정당해산제도를 인정하고 있다. 이에 통합진보당의 강령 등이 북한의 정책과 유사하다는 주장과 국회의원 당선자의 과거전력 등으로 인하여 통합진보당이 과연 정당의 목적이나 활동이 민주적 기본질서에 위배되지 않았는가의 문제가 제기됨에 따라, 정부는 한국헌정사상 최초로 2013. 11. 5. 통합진보당에 대해 헌법상 민주적 기본질서에 위배되는 위헌정당으로 판단하여 헌법재판소에 정당해산심판을 청구하였다. 위헌정당해산제도는 방어적 민주주의와 정당의 보호라는 두 가지 중요한 의미를 지니고 있는 바, 독일의 경우는 나치정당에 따른 민주주의의 몰락이라는 역사적 배경을 바탕으로 함에 따라 방어적 민주주의에 초점을 두고 있고, 우리나라의 경우에는 정부에 의한 부당한 야당 탄압이라는 왜곡된 헌정사적 경험이 주된 배경을 이룸에 따라 정당의 보호에 주안점을 두고 있다고 보아야 한다. 또한 위헌정당해산제도는 집권세력이 정적을 제거하기 위한 방편으로 악용될 가능성을 내포하고 있기 때문에 현재 통합진보당 사건과 관련하여 해산의 요건인 실체적 판단기준을 엄격하게 따져보아야 할 것이다. 최근 유럽에서 베니스위원회가 제시한 정당해산심판에 관한 엄격한 기준을 적극 검토할 필요가 있다. 따라서 정당해산의 실체적 판단 기준인 정당의 목적이나 활동이 민주적 기본질서에 위배 여부에 관하여, 위헌적 강령의 존재만이 정당해산의 근거가 될 수 없으며, 실제로 당원들이 강령에 얼마나 충실하고 있는 지의 여부와 실질적 위험성까지 엄격하게 파악하고, 활동주체의 범주를 정당의 모든 구성원으로 파악해야 한다. 또한 사회민주적 기본질서가 현대사회에서 헌법이 보호하는 자유와 평등에 관련한 민주주의적 원칙을 전면 수용함과 더불어 자유민주적 기본질서가 지니는 단점을 보완하여 국민의 진정한 자유와 평등을 보장하려 한다는 의미를 지니고 있기 때문에 헌법 제8조 제4항의 민주적 기본질서의 의미는 자유민주적 기본질서에 사회민주적 기본질서가 포함하는 개념으로 보아야 할 것이다. 해산된 정당의 소속 국회의원 자격 유지여부에 대하여 학설이 갈리나, 국회의원 각자가 갖는 민주적 정당성과 의원의 제명을 통치행위의 일유형으로 보고 사법적 판단을 자제하는 헌법 제64조 제4항의 의도를 놓고 보았을 때 국민에 의해 선출된 국회의원을 헌법재판소의 판단에 의하여 전적으로 의원직을 상실시키는 것은 바람직하지 않다. 다만 비례대표제의원의 경우 정당의 대표성 역시 동시에 지니고 있다고 보아야 할 것인바, 비례대표제의원에 대한 지지는 곳 정당에 대한 지지이고 그러한 정당이 위헌정당해산심판을 받았다면 그들의 민주적 정당성은 상실되었으므로 그들에 대한 자유위임관계보다는 헌법보호가 우선됨에 따라 비례대표의원들은 그 대표성이 박탈되어 의원직을 상실해야 한다고 볼 것이다. It is provided that if the purposes or activities of a political party are contrary to the fundamental democratic order, the Government may bring an action against it in the Constitutional Court for its dissolution, and the political party shall be dissolved in accordance with the decision of the Constitutional Court in Article 1 section, 4 of the Constitution. The administration of Korea sued for adjudication on dissolution of a political party to the Constitutional Court of Korea on November 5th, 2013 because the Unified Progressive Party violated the democratic basic order in the Constitution Article 1 section, 4. It is the first case of this type in the Constitutional history of Korea. The adjudication on dissolution of a political party plays an important role in defensive democracy and protection of political party. In Germany, the historical background of the adjudication on dissolution of a political party is downfall of democracy caused by the Weimar Republic and the Nazis. but In Korea, constitutional history, unjust suppression of opposition party caused by government forms a background to the adjudication on dissolution of a political party. Besides, the adjudication on dissolution of a political party can be wrongfully used as means to eliminate a political opponent. Consequently, with reference to the case of the united progressive party of Korea, the Constitutional Court must examine severely substantive standard for determining of dissolution of a political party. And also, in order to decide the violation of the democratic basic order, it is necessary to examine the guidelines on prohibition and dissolution of political parties and analogous measures suggested by the Venice Commission. When the Constitutional Court adjudicates dissolution of political party, for want of specific articles about whether to disqualify legislatorship of disbanded party, various theories are expressed on disqualification or maintenance of legislatorship. In consideration of democratic legitimacy and constitutional principles of Article 64 section, 4 of the Constitution, it is that undesirable membership of the National Assembly is completely disqualified by decision of the Constitutional Court. But proportional representative Congressmen must be disqualified from legislatorship because they are elected to the National Assembly by support for the party, and therefore lose democratic legitimacy. The constitution protection take priority over free mandate to proportional representative Congressmen.

정당해산심판의 헌법적 쟁점 ― 정당해산심판의 요건과 효과를 중심으로 ―

정만희 한국공법학회 2014 공법연구 Vol.42 No.3

정부는 한국헌정사상 최초로 2013. 11. 5. 국회 원내 제2야당인 통합진보당에 대해 헌법상 민주적 기본질서에 위배되는 위헌정당으로 판단하여 헌법재판소에 정당해산심판을 청구하였다. 이번의 정당해산심판사건에 있어서 핵심적 쟁점은 크게 두 가지로 볼 수 있다. 하나는 통진당 당원들의 그 동안의 활동이나 당헌ㆍ당규 또는 강령 등에 나타난 통진당의 목적과 활동이 과연 위헌정당해산의 실질적 요건인 헌법 제8조 제4항의 “민주적 기본질서에 위배될 때”에 해당하는가의 문제이며, 또 하나는 헌법재판소에 의한 정당해산결정이 내려지는 경우 통진당 소속 국회의원의 의원직 상실여부에 관한 문제이다. 본고에서는 먼저 통진당 해산심판사건을 계기로 정당해산제도의 헌법적 의의와 본질을 재검토하고 위의 두 가지 쟁점에 대한 학계의 논의를 정리하고 필자의 견해를 제시한다. 정당해산의 실질적 요건에 관하여 먼저 헌법 제8조 제4항의 ‘민주적 기본질서’의 개념은 헌법의 핵심적 근본질서로서 ‘자유민주적 기본질서’로 이해하는 것이 타당하다. 그리고 ‘민주적 기본질서의 위배’ 여부에 관한 판단에 있어서는 종래 학계의 입장에 따라 과거의 독일 판례나 이론에 전적으로 의존하는 것은 문제가 있으며, 최근 유럽에서 베니스위원회가 제시한 정당해산심판에 관한 엄격한 기준을 적극 검토할 필요가 있다. 정당해산의 실질적 요건에 대한 심판기준은 정당해산제도의 본질적 기능을 어떻게 이해하느냐에 따라 달라질 수 있지만, 정당해산제도의 2중적 기능으로서 헌법의 예방적 수호와 정당보호의 기능 중에서 전자의 기능을 우선하기보다는 양자의 조화적 실현을 위한 균형있는 판단이 요구되며, 오히려 정당의 자유보호에 초점을 맞추는 것이 바람직하다. 특히 민주적 기본질서 위배의 정도에 관한 판단기준으로는 비례의 원칙이 적용되어야 할 것이며, 정당이 헌법의 민주적 기본질서에 위배되는 위헌정당인가의 여부는 한마디로 자유민주적 기본질서를 위태롭게 하는 ‘구체적 위험’의 존재를 인정할 수 있는가의 여부에 달려있다고 할 수 있다. 정당해산결정의 효과로서 의원직 상실여부에 관하여 국내의 다수적 견해와 같이 정당이 해산되는 경우 정당소속 의원의 의원직상실이라는 결론을 내리는 것은 곤란하며, 앞으로의 이 문제에 관한 입법에 있어서도 소속의원 전원에 대한 의원직상실을 규정하기는 어렵다고 본다. 이 문제에 대한 학설의 대립은 기본적으로 방어적 민주주의에 기초한 헌법수호의 실효성확보라는 법익과 국회의원의 국민대표성과 자유위임의 원칙이라는 법익의 충돌을 의미하며 이 경우에 어느 법익과 헌법적 가치를 우선할 것인가의 문제인 것이다. 이 점에 관하여 필자의 기본적 견해는 대립하는 양 법익을 조화롭게 실현하는 방안을 찾아야 한다는 것이다. 따라서 원칙적으로는 정당해산의 결과로서 소속의원의 의원직을 상실시키도록 하고, 예외적으로 의원 개개인의 활동이 정당의 목적이나 활동과 객관적 연관성을 가지지 않는 경우에는 의원직을 유지시키도록 하는 방안을 생각할 수 있다. 이번의 통진당사건의 경우에 정당법이나 헌법재판소법 등에 의원직상실여부에 관한 명문규정이 없음에도 불구하고 헌법재판소가 정당해산결정과 함께 의원직상실을 명하는 결정을 내릴 수 있는지의 문제는 간단히 판단하기 어렵다. 헌법재판소는 헌법상의... The Executive of Korea filed for adjudication on dissolution of a political party to the Constitutional Court of Korea on November 5th, 2013 because the Unified Progressive Party, which was the second opposition party in the National Assembly, violated the democratic basic order in the Constitution. It is the first case of this type in the Constitutional history of Korea. There are two key issues in this case. The first is whether activities of members of the party—as well as the party itself under the party constitution, regulation, and platform—violate “the democratic basic order” under the Constitution as a substantial requisite for dissolution of the political party. The second is whether members of the National Assembly belonging to the party will be disqualified if the Court decides on dissolution of the party. This article reviews the constitutional meaning of adjudication on dissolution of a political party and discusses the above issues in academia, then provides the author’s opinions. The democratic basic order, which is a substantial requisite for dissolution of a party, should be understood as the “liberal democratic basic order.” And also, in order to decide the violation of the democratic basic order, it is necessary to examine the guidelines on prohibition and dissolution of political parties and analogous measures suggested by the Venice Commission rather than fully relying on past German cases and theories. The adjudication on dissolution of a political party has dual functions that provide preventive protection of the Constitution and of political parties, and they should be considered together with harmonic understanding, or the latter should be emphasized more if needed. Moreover, it should be clear that violating the democratic basic order presents ‘an actual threat’ to the Constitution in order to decide that a political party is unconstitutional under the principle of proportionality. Relating to the effects of the adjudication, majority in academia argue that all members of the political party must be disqualified for membership in the National Assembly when the Court decides that the party violates Constitution. However, the author argues that all members of the violating political party should be denied membership of the National Assembly at first, but if a member’s activities are not fully related to the political party, his or her membership in the National Assembly may continue as an exception because the purpose of dissolving a political party is to respect the free representative principle in relation to members of the National Assembly. In this case, the Court struggles to decide whether to dissolve the party and disqualify its members from membership of the National Assembly because even though the Court has jurisdiction on the dissolution of a political party, the Court cannot decide whether to disqualify the members of the National Assembly because they are representatives of the people under the separation of powers principle. Without specific articles about this issue, it is better left to the National Assembly itself. Its examination of qualification procedure or disciplinary procedure of the National Assembly could adequately decide which members should and should not be disqualified. With this Unified Progressive Party case, academia should research and study adjudication on dissolution of a political party in order to supplement legislative gaps and deficiences regarding this issue.

중국 참정당에 대한 인식변화 및 정치적 영향력 확대방안

박재수 중국지역학회 2016 중국지역연구 Vol.3 No.1

The purpose of this paper is to explore the development process and the change for the participating parties from the leader of the first generation up to the fifth generation and to research political influence expansion strategy of the participating party of China under the Chinese Communist Party system since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. The participating party of China that was created as of 1930 could be analyzed to provide the basis of development of political parties of China by the roles, emergence process of the parties as a variety of forms and the relationship setup with the Communist party in process of the establishment of minor parties as political parties except only the governing party, the Communist Party, in China through factor analyzing method and correlation analysis. Also, since the death of Mao Zedong and the reform and opening up of Chinese economy by Deng Xiaoping in 1976, the participating party was figured out that it has typified on the role of the responsible political parties. Currently, to outward appearances, eight minor parties keep remarkably showing more and more roles as the political party etc working in the various fields of the political system in China. In this situation, participating parties in China have made many changes according to China’s leaders and their cognizance change. Especially participating parties’ role has undergone many changes depending on the variation of the leadership of the ruling party from Mao Zhedong up to the Xi Jinping respectively and it also has been demonstrated the political influence as various forms of the political party. In the future, China’s minor political parties have been analyzed that they could be extinguished, absorbed and integrated by changes of the Chinese ruling party, the Communist Party’s policy moto by realistic policy than any ideology. Under the special political system and party political situation of China, it presented ways that can be extended to their political influence for the minor parties somewhat limited in political participation in the political arena reflecting various activators such as the strengthening of supervisory authorities, the legal requirements of the Parties’ role, training of specialized human resource etc. 본고의 목적은 1949년 중화인민공화국의 설립이후 태동한 중국내 참정당 즉민주당파의 정당의 변화와 발전과정 그리고 제1세대에서부터 제5세대에 이르기까지 중국공산당 지도체제에서의 참정당의 민주적 정착과정속의 인식변화추이를 살펴보고 중국내의 참정당의 정치적 영향력 확대방안에 대하여 다각적인 방향으로 살펴보고자 하는 데 있다. 1930년 기점으로 태동한 참정당은 중국의 유일한 집정당인 공산당이외 기타 정당들로써 참정당의 역할, 다양한 형태의 정당의 출현 과정 그리고 공산당과의 관계설정이 중국 정당정치 발전의 기초를제공하였던 점을 요인 및 상관분석을 통해 알 수 있으며, 1976년 마오쩌둥(毛 泽东) 사망 그리고 덩샤오핑(邓小平)의 개혁개방기치를 내세운 이후 참정당은책임있는 정책적 정당으로의 역할상이 유형화되어 가고 있는 점을 파악할 수있었으며, 현재 8개 참정당은 정치적 참여 역할 등이 외형적이나마 점점 두드려 지게 나타내고 있는 추세를 살펴볼 수 가 있다. 또한 마오쩌둥(毛泽东)으로부터 시진핑(习近平)에 이르기까지 집권여당의 지도층의 변동 즉, 중국 지도층의 세대별 인식변화에 따라 발전되어온 참정당은 그 역할에 있어 많은 변화과정을 거쳤으며, 그 정당의 정치적 영향력 또한 다양한 형태로 발휘되어왔다. 현실적 중국의 정치체제를 고려해 볼 때, 정당 자체의 이데올로기보다 현실적 정책에 의한 집권당인 중국공산당의 정책 기조의 변화에 따라 그들의 정당형태또한 소멸, 흡수 그리고 통합 등의 방향으로 정리되어 갈 것으로 분석할 수 있다. 이러한 중국의 특수한 정치적 체제 및 정당정치 여건 속에 참정당의 감독권한 강화, 당의 역할에 대한 법적요건강화 및 전문화된 인재양성 등 정치권내의 현재의 정치 참여가 다소 제한되어 있는 참정당에 다양한 활성화 요인들을적용 정치적 영향력 확대할 수 있는 방안을 모색하였다.

북유럽 포퓰리스트 우파정당의 성장과 정당체제 변화

장선화(Seonhwa Jang) 한국정치학회 2017 한국정치학회보 Vol.51 No.4

이 글은 북유럽 포퓰리스트 우파정당의 정치적 성장 요인을 분석하고 원내 정당으로서의 지속가능성 및 정당체제 변화가능성에 필요한 조건을 규명한다. 특히 2010년 이후 급성장한 스웨덴민주당과 핀란드인당 사례는 포퓰리스트 우파정당이 반이민 이슈의 정치적 동원에 성공한 새로운 전형을 제시한다. 최근 선거과정 및 결과와 유럽 정당 엘리트 대상 설문조사(채플힐 전문가 조사) 등을 통해 분석한 결과 양 정당은 실용주의적 리더십 하에 인종주의적 극우 성향을 완화시키고 자국민 복지를 우선하는 포퓰리스트 우파정당으로 전환하면서 기존 정당정치에 대한 유권자들의 회의와 EU 회의주의, 이민 정책에 대한 반대를 독점적으로 이슈화하여 정치적 동원에 성공했다. 이 연구는 스웨덴민주당과 핀란드인당 사례를 통해 포퓰리스트 우파정당의 성장으로 정당체제가 변화하는 데 필요한 두 가지 조건을 제시한다. 첫째, 의회 내 협력가능성이다. 원내 주요 정당들의 보다 극단주의적인 정당에 대한 태도가 개방적 혹은 폐쇄적인지에 따라 협력가능성이 결정된다. 이는 주요 정당들과 포퓰리스트 우파정당 간의 이념적 간극의 크기와 정치적 지지 규모에 따라 결정된다. 이념적 간극이 지나치게 클 경우 기존 정당들의 배타성이 커져 연합이 불가능하며, 정치적 지지가 지나치게 미약한 경우 연합 대상이 되지 못한다. 둘째, 포퓰리스트 우파정당 리더십의 정당 연합에 대한 유연성 여부에 따라 정당으로서의 지속성이 결정될 것으로 예측할 수 있다. This study aims to analyze the causes of political growth of the Nordic populist right parties and identifies the conditions necessary for the sustainability as parliamentary party and the possibility of the party system change. The Sweden Democrats and the Finns Party, which have accomplished rapidly political success since 2010, present a new paradigm for the political mobilization of anti-immigrant issues by populist right parties. As a result of investigating the recent election processes and electoral results and the survey of European party elites(Chapel Hill Expert Survey), both political parties exclusively responded to voters’ negative attitude toward established political party elites, EU skepticism and opposition to generous immigration policy, and became one of major political parties. Finding results of this study suggests two necessary conditions for the party system change due to the growth of populist right party. One is the possibility of coalition with other major parties in the parliament. The possibility of cooperation depends on exclusion/inclusion of major political parties in the cabinet to the more extreme political parties that determined by the size of the ideological gap between major parties and the relatively extreme political parties and the scale of political support. If the ideological gap is too large, the alliance is impossible and the exclusiveness of the major parties becomes greater. but if political support is too weak, alliance will not be able to be accomplished also. It can be predicted that the sustainability of the populist right parties, as the other condition, will be determined by whether the party leadership’s attitude is flexible enough to make coalition with other major parties in the parliament.