세조대 모련위 정벌의 의미와 대명인식

이규철(Lee Kyu Chul) 한국사연구회 2012 한국사연구 Vol.158 No.-

It is necessary to examine why Joseon executed Nangbarahan(낭발아한) to understand the cause of Joseon’s conquest of Moryeonwi in King Sejo’s reign. Joseon tried to eliminate strong Jurchen chiefs when they did not remain under its control. By doing so, Joseon sought to eliminate those who could serve as pivotal figures in Jurchen and to expand Joseon’s influence. Joseon’s conquest of Moryeonwi was not in revenge for invasion from Yain. There already was a consensus across Joseon that it should now take on a foreign conquest. A conquest means to exert extreme force on external powers. This requires not only a preparatory period but also careful consideration of aftermaths of the conquest and financial expenses. Particularly, its failure holds the risk of a heavy blow to the authority of Joseon and its king. In light of this, invasions from Abiguh (아비거) and others are seen to have been used as a justification for the conquest, rather than its direct cause. Sejo launched a conquest of Moryeonwi earlier than originally scheduled, and ordered that the envoy to Ming be brought to Pyeongyang, where his arrival was previously forbidden. Sejo also went on a patrol of northern regions. During his patrol. Sejo intended to meet the Ming envoy in Pyeongyang and receive his reports on the success of the conquest of Moryeonwi. Sejo wanted these three rituals to proceed in Pyeongyang simultaneously so as to strengthen his royal authority further. Joseon kept in touch with Yain in the following years. At the same time, its conquest had been more frequently discussed than before. Joseon was not damaged by neighboring forces at the time. It rather tried to control them with its overwhelming military force. Joseon’s conquest of Jurchen was not in response to invasions from Yain. Its purpose was to make Yain surrender to Joseon by exerting military force. Using the outcome of the conquest in his ruling of Joseon, King Sejo sought to expand his political influence and strengthen the royal authority. Since King Taejong came to power, Joseon emphasized obedience and subservience to Ming. Joseon in the 15th century, however, often showed an ambivalent attitude toward Ming. A representative example of this is its relation with Jurchen, specifically its conquest. Obedience held important value for Joseon, but it could be taken advantage of at any time to consolidate the royal authority.

세조대 건주위 정벌과 명의 출병 요청

이규철(Lee, Kyu-chul) 한국역사연구회 2013 역사와 현실 Vol.- No.89

Joseon’s Mo’ryeon-wei conquest agitated the Jurchens significantly. What concerned them most was the possible continuation of Joseon’s conquest. After its conquest of Mo’ryeon-wei, Joseon also tried to approach the Jurchens in a cautious manner, fearing Mo’ryeon-wei and Jian’zou-wei might join forces. After the Mo’ryeon-wei conquest, however, there was a series of discussions inside Joseon on further conquests. Li Manzhu strived to improve relations with Joseon, providing Joseon with critical intelligence upon Wild Jurchens, in an attempt to avoid Joseon’s conquest. Nevertheless, Joseon maintained its plan to gain full control of Li Manzhu of Jian zou-wei, that had been in existence since King Sejong’s reign, with its diplomatic and military power. This led Li Manzhu to finally send an envoy to Ming to ask protection of Jian’zou-wei from Joseon’s attack. The Ming Emperor accepted his request and stopped Joseon’s dispatch of its troops. As Joseon assured Li Doori that it had no intention of conquering Jian’zou-wei, and the Ming Dynasty took measures as requested, the Jian’zhou Jurchens concluded that a threat of Joseon’s conquest disappeared. King Sejo later ordered his troops consisting of 15,000 infantry soldiers to conquer Jian’zhou-wei. Joseon’s dispatch of troops at the time seemed as an attack launched in response to a massive invasion from the Wild Jurchens. The fact that Joseon decided to dispatch its troops only three days after it received a report of the Wild Jurchen invasion, however, implies that Joseon’s discussions and preparation for a dispatch had already been well underway. Joseon’s conquest came to a halt, as Lee Se eae led a revolt not long after the decision was made. Meanwhile, expressing its intentions to suppress Jian’zhou-wei, Ming asked Joseon to dispatch its troops. Although the aftermath of the revolt was not completely subdued, King Sejo showed his will to dispatch its troops as requested by Ming. King Sejo used Ming s request for Joseon’s dispatch of troops to conquer Jian’zhou-wei as a chance to achieve Joseon’s diplomatic goals. While seemingly accepting Ming’s request, Joseon rather made use of this opportunity to get rid of Li Manzhu and his son who had served as pivotal figures among the Jian’zhou Jurchens. Joseon eliminated its enemy’s chief, and achieved a critical factor which would determine the success or failure of a conquest. Ming’s dispatch of troops was intended to keep Joseon in check, which was at the time expanding its influence over the Jurchen region by conquering it, and to strengthen Ming’s control over the region. Joseon during King Sejo’s reign successfully maintained its influence over the Jurchen region by accepting Ming’s request and at the same time capturing and eliminating the enemy’s chief, which clearly demonstrated a successful conquest. Joseon at the time maintained its control of the Jurchen region while continuing to demonstrating submission to the Ming.

여말선초 정도전의 建州女眞 인식과 요동정벌계획

서민정(Seo, Min-Jeong) 효원사학회 2019 역사와 세계 Vol.- No.55

본 논문은 정도전의 요동정벌계획이 고구려 故土 수복을 위한 理想이 내재된 북진정책이라는 시각에서 벗어나, 요동지역에 위치한 주변세력의 동향과 연관시켜 세운 것으로 판단하고 기존과는 다른 입장에서 살펴보았다. 14세기 후반 동아시아 정세변화 속에서 요동지역은 고려(조선)와 명에게 있어 동아시아 패권을 결정하는 중요한 사안 중 하나였다. 특히 양국은 요동 지역의 建州女眞세력을 통제·포섭하는 것이 매우 중요하다고 인식하고 있었다. 이들에 대한 통제가 실질적으로 요동의 주도권 확보 및 변방 안정시키는데 연결되어 있기 때문이다. 당시 명은 고려든 조선이든 간에 요동지역의 북방민족과 결속해서 자신의 요동지배권에 방해가 되면 가감하게 고압정책을 실시했다. 물론 동북면지역의 여진부족 대부분은 고려 말부터 이미 이성계 휘하에 내속되어 있는 상황이었다. 명 태조는 요동지역의 건주여진세력마저 조선지배에 들어가게 되면 요동경략이 어려워질 뿐만 아니라 지배권도 빼앗기게 될 것 같아 두려웠다. 따라서 그는 요동정벌계획을 세운 정도전을 제거하려고 표전문제를 빌미로 고압정책을 지속적으로 내세웠다. 정도전은 역성혁명을 통해 새 왕조국가를 세우면서 영토를 보존하고 변경 안정을 해결하기 위해 요동정벌계획을 생각했던 것으로 볼 수 있다. 물론 그는 정통성을 중시하는 성리학자로서 명과의 사대관계를 유지하고자 했다. 하지만 그는 명의 무리한 요구를 무조건 들어주기에는 무리가 있다고 보았다. 그는 명이 더 이상 고압적인 태도를 취하지 못하도록 요동에 대한 지배권을 차지해야 한다고 결론을 내리고 요동정벌계획을 세운 것으로 보인다. 그러나 정도전의 요동정벌계획을 고구려 故土 수복을 위한 원대한 꿈으로 보기에는 현실성이 떨어진다. 실질적으로 그는 조선안위와 변경안정을 위해서 요동정벌을 택한 것이라고 본다. 또한 위협 세력으로 성장할 수 있었던 건주여진 세력통제에 대한 현실적인 해결책으로 계획을 세웠다고 생각한다. 정도전은 지정학적으로 교두보 역할을 하고 있었던 요동지역을 수복함과 동시에 건주여진을 중심으로 그들 세력의 규합을 미리 통제하고자 했다. 또한 그들을 이용해 명의 고압적인 외교정책에 따라 더 이상 조선 입지가 약해지지 않도록 요동정벌계획을 세워 실현하고자 했던 것이다. 따라서 정도전이 막연하게 조선이 중원의 주인공이 되려는 것이 아니라 조선의 안정과 부국강병을 위해서 반드시 필요한 정책으로 개국 전부터 이미 계획을 구상한 것이라고 판단된다. 그는 조선에 위험요소가 될 수도 있는 건주여진의 성장을 사전에 막기 위해서 요동정벌이라는 해결책을 제시하고 실현해서 국가의 기반을 튼튼히 유지하고자 하는 입장이었을 것이다. 정도전의 요동정벌계획은 실현되지 못하고 구상으로 끝나버렸다. 그러나 그는 여말선초 국제정세를 정확히 파악하고 체계적으로 해결책을 강구하려고 노력한 실용주의자인 유학자이면서 정치가임에 틀림없다. 따라서 그가 내세운 요동정벌계획은 이제 막 개창한 조선의 국가기반을 튼튼하게 유지하여 ‘조선의 위상을 강화’시키고, ‘위민을 표방한 부국강병’의 일환으로 이후의 정책에도 영향을 미친 실천적 대안이었다고 생각한다. 그리고 이 연구를 통해 정도전의 요동정벌계획이 북진정책이었다는 기존의 해석에서 벗어나 주변세력과의 관계를 살피고 중요성을 인식한 계획이었다는 또 다른 관점을 제공하게 되었다고 본다. This thesis examined Jeong Do-Jeon(鄭道傳)"s Liaodong Conquest Plan in the viewpoint different from the existing one, by judging it as the plan established in the relation with the trend of surrounding powers located in Liaodong area, instead of the policy of northward advancement for recapturing the native land of Goguryeo. Under the changed situation of East Asia in the late 14th century, Liaodong area was one of the important matters deciding the supremacy of East Asia for Goryeo (Joseon) and Ming. Especially, both countries perceived that controlling/winning over the Jianzhou Jurchens(建州女眞) of Liaodong area would be very important because the control of them was connected to the actual securement of leadership in Liaodong and also to the stabilization of the frontier. The Ming Dynasty of the time resolutely implemented the high-handed policy by uniting with northern races of Liaodong area if anyone obstructed their control over Liaodong, regardless of Goryeo or Joseon. Of course, most of the Jerchen tribes in the north-east area were already under the command of Lee Seong-Gye(李成桂) from the end of the Goryeo Dynasty. Therefore, the first king of the Ming Dynasty was afraid of Joseon"s domination over Jianzhou Jurchens of Liaodong area as it would be tough for them to govern Liaodong and the control over it could be taken by Joseon. Thus, in order to remove Jeong Do-Jeon who originally set the Liaodong Conquest Plan, he continued the absurd high-handed policy with an excuse of royal family"s letter to the emperor. Jeong Do-Jeon might conceive the Liaodong Conquest Plan in order to solve the instable frontier problem when founding the new dynasty through a dynastic revolution. Of course, as a Neo-Confucian scholar emphasizing the legitimacy, he aimed to maintain the toadying relationship with the Ming Dynasty. However, he thought that it would be difficult to accept all the impractical demands of the Ming Dynasty. He probably set the Liaodong Conquest Plan after concluding that the control over Liaodong should be taken, so that the Ming Dynasty could not maintain the high-handed attitude. Here, the Liaodong Conquest in his plan was not the policy of northward advancement for recapturing the native land of Goguryeo. He might choose the Liaodong Conquest for correcting the instable frontier problem and the national security. Thus, he established the plan as a solution of Jianzhou Jurchens that could grow into a threatening force. On top of recapturing Liaodong area geopolitically playing the role of bridgehead, Jeong Do-Jeon aimed to control the unity of these forces focusing on Jianzhou Jurchens in advance. Also, he used them for the realization of Liaodong Conquest Plan, so that the position of Joseon would not be weakened any more by the high-handed diplomatic policy of the Ming Dynasty. Therefore, Jeong Do-Jeon probably conceived the plan as an essential policy for the stability, national prosperity, and military power of Joseon instead of vaguely becoming the hero in the central districts, even before founding the country. And, in order to prevent the growth of Jianzhou Jurchens that could become a risk factor to Joseon, he probably aimed to solidly maintain the basis of the country by suggesting/realizing the insight of Liaodong Conquest. Jeong Do-Jeon"s Liaodong Conquest Plan was not realized. However, he was certainly a pragmatistic Confucian and politician who tried hard to systematically seek for the solution by accurately understanding the international situation in the end of the Goryeo Dynasty and the early Joseon Dynasty. Thus, his Liaodong Conquest Plan would be the practical insight having influences on the policies afterwards, as a part of the "reinforcement of the status of Joseon" and the "national prosperity and military power for the people", by solidly maintaining the basis of the Joseon Dynasty that was just founded. And this study provided another viewpoint that Jeong Do-Jeon"s Liaodong Conquest

고려 말 조선 초 전쟁과 지도 만들기

이규철(Lee Kyu Chul) 역사비평사 2018 역사비평 Vol.- No.124

Goryeo & Chosun Dynasty in the 15th century maintained their balance of diplomatic policy through ‘Foreign Conquest’. We have diculty in nding the case that the Korean Dynasty Country since the Middle Ages had militarily suppressed the peripheral powers like the 15th century. In particular, Chosun Dynasty always tried to nd its conduct cause of military expedition externally when enforcing ‘Foreign Conquest’. However, basically the conquest meant a military conduct for suppressing the external powers. In order to begin the ‘Foreign Conquest’, they had to plan taking various factors such as troops & supplies into consideration. e Conquest was very highly risky of facing with it when it proved to be a failure unlike other foreign policies. What’s more, the military movement toward the specic powers had the great possibility of causing the peripheral resistance. erefore, the ‘Foreign Conquest’ was not a policy to progress through short discussion & preparation at all. Chosun Dynasty’s foreign conquest during the 15th century was a policy which was greatly influenced by Goryeo Dynasty. The time when the foreign conquest policy used to reveal its true feature was from the era of King GongMin at the end of Goryeo Dynasty. erefore, it can be explained that the foreign conquest of Chosun Dynasty was the representative foreign policy in the 15th century and was evidently inuenced by that of the end of Goryeo Dynasty. Of course, the wars fought by Goryeo & Chosun Dynasty were aiming for its own benets. At that time, ‘its own benets’ which Goryeo & Chosun Dynasty tried to obtained, were essentially related to the problems of area & territory. e conquest of Goryeo & Chosun Dynasty shared with the goal for the purpose of extending the external inuence abilities & securing a new area & territory.

공민왕대 대외정벌 정책의 추진과 시행

이규철(Lee, Kyu-chul) 역사실학회 2016 역사와실학 Vol.59 No.-

고려는 공민왕의 재위기 부터 대외정벌을 준비해 본격적으로 추진하고 시행했다. 원의 간섭 체제 아래 있었던 고려는 공민왕을 중심으로 기존의 지배질서를 타파하려는 적극적 움직임을 보였다. 공민왕은 여말선초 시기 대외정벌 정책에서 가장 상징적 인물이라 설명할 수 있다. 그는 대외정벌 정책을 적극적으로 활용해서 고려가 원의 영향력에서 벗어날 수 있도록 하는 계기를 만들었고, 고려의 영역을 회복했다. 공민왕이 적극적으로 대외정벌을 시행하면서 국정을 이끌어 가던 통치 방식은 후계자가 되는 우왕은 물론 조선초기의 국왕들에게도 지대한 영향을 미쳤다. 당시 고려는 중원의 새로운 강자로 등장한 명과의 관계 개선에 힘쓰고 있는 상황이었다. 아울러 홍건적과 왜구 세력에게 커다란 피해를 입었다. 이러한 상황에서도 고려는 지속적으로 대외정벌을 준비해 시행했다. 더욱이 정벌 대상이 고려에게 피해를 주었던 왜구나 홍건적 등이 아니라 요양과 여진, 제주 지역이었다는 점은 당시 대외정벌이 외부세력의 압박에 대한 반발이라기보다는 계획된 정책의 일환이었다는 점을 보여준다. Goryeo prepared foreign conquest and develop and enforced foreign conquest policy in a full scale during King Gongmin"s regime. Goryeo, which was under the control of Yuan Dynasty, made active attempts along with King Gongmin to break down the existing ruling order. King Gongmin is the most symbolic figure in the foreign conquest policy during the period between the end of Goryeo and the beginning of Joseon Dynasty. He utilized the foreign conquest policy actively to make an opportunity for Goryeo to get free from the influence of Yuan Dynastry and to recover the territory of Goryeo. As King Gongmin enforces the foreign conquest actively, his ruling method had great impacts on the kings in the early Josean Dynasty period as well as on his successor King Woo. Goryeo at that time was trying to improve the relationship with Ming Dynasty which emerged as a new power in China. In addition, Goryeo suffered from considerable damage by Red Turban Badits and Japanese invaders. Under this situation, Goryeo consistently prepared and enforced foreign conquests. Moreover, the target for conquest was not basis for Japanese invaders or Red Turban Bandits but Yoyang, Yeojin and Tamra regions, which demonstrates that the foreign conquest at that time was not the opposition against the pressure from outside powers but a part of planned policy.

쓰다 소키치는 고대 일본의 한반도 정벌을 통해 어떠한 歷史像을 그려냈는가

김성현,정상우 한국사학회 2022 史學硏究 Vol.- No.145

Tsuda Sokichi(津田左右吉) is a remarkable historian given the ambivalence of historiography of colonialism, which not only historically defended invasion and colonization, but also tried to reorganize East Asian history centered on Japan. Having had an idea of contempt for China and Korea, he talked about the purity of the Japanese imperial family and the uniqueness and excellence of the Japanese people and culture based on it. In this process, like other Japanese historians, he affirmed Japan’s conquest and domination of Korea in ancient times. As is well known, Tsuda viewed Kojiki(古事記) and Nihonshoki(日本書紀) as the same as a literary work. Therefore, he didn’t believe the Empress Jingu(神功皇后)’s conquest of Silla, which was recorded in Nihonshoki. However, what he denied was Empress Jingu, not the Silla conquest. In other words, the conquest of Silla by the Yamato sovereignty is a historical fact, but it was not Empress Jingu who conquered Silla. He argued that it was in the late 4th century that the Yamato sovereignty’s conquest of Silla based on the Gwanggaeto monument. However, in order to talk about the conquest of Silla by the Yamato sovereignty in the late 4th century, it was necessary to explain the growth of the Yamato sovereignty. This is because achieving overseas conquest and domination means that political power emerged and developed early in Japan, and culture blossomed for it. Tsuda found the main cause of the emergence and development of political power in ancient Japan before the 8∼10th centuries when Japanese culture reached the level of confrontation with Chinese culture, from the influx of Chinese culture into Japan. Lelang Commandery(樂浪郡) and Daifang Commandery(帶方郡), which were established in the northwest of the Korean Peninsula in the 1st century B.C. and existed until the early 4th century, were the starting points to explain this. The small powers of the Tsukushi(筑紫) region, which is advantageous for transportation to the Korean Peninsula, accepted Chinese culture from Lelang Commandery and spread it to the Kinki(近畿) region, and by the second century, Yamato Rowing also grew into a significant power and subsequently conquered surrounding powers. In the 4th century, the weakening of the Chinese dynasty caused by the Xianbei(鮮卑)’s activities led to the disappearance of the Lelang and Daifang Commanderies, the supporters of the Tsukushi region. And this was an opportunity for the Yamato sovereignty to occupy this area. On the other hand, in the southern region of the Korean peninsula, which remained at the tribal state under the pressure of the two Chinese commanderies, when the two commanderies disappeared, Silla unified the small country in Jinhan(辰韓) region and put pressure on the Byunhan(弁韓) region. Then, Byunhan’s powers asked Yamato for help, as a result, Yamato sovereignty’s conquest of Silla took place in the late 4th century. This was a historical image, which Tsuda drew through Japan’s conquest of the Korean Peninsula in ancient time. Presenting this historical image, Tsuda cited the existence of the monarch of the Yamato sovereignty, the imperial family of Japan, as one of the reasons for the growth of the Yamato power, in addition to the changes brought about by the influx of Chinese culture through Tsukushi and the activities of Xianbei. In other words, the historical image presented by Tsuda was to explain Japan’s history of the growth and development of the Yamato sovereignty centered on the imperial family with East Asia as the stage. 침략과 식민지배를 역사적으로 옹호할 뿐만 아니라 일본을 중심으로 동아시아의 역사를 재편하려던 식민주의 역사학의 양면성을 고려할 때 쓰다 소키치는 주목할 만한 역사가이다. 이른 시기부터 중국과 한국에 대한 멸시의 관념을 가졌던 쓰다는 일본 황실의 순수성과 이를 기반으로 일본민족과 문화의 독자성 및 우수성을 이야기했다. 이 과정에서 그는 다른 일본인 역사가들과 마찬가지로 고대 일본의 한국 정벌과 지배를 긍정했다. 잘 알려져 있듯이 쓰다는 고사기와 일본서기를 하나의 문학작품과 같은 것이라고 보고, 여기에 실린 진구황후의 신라정벌을 부정했다. 그렇지만 그가 부정했던 것은 진구황후였지 신라정벌은 아니었다. 즉 신라정벌은 역사적 사실이지만 그 주체는 진구황후가 아니었다는 것이다. 그는 이러한 생각으로 시종일관했으며, 광개토대왕비를 근거로 야마토 조정의 신라정벌이 벌어진 것은 4세기 후반으로 보았다. 그런데 4세기 후반 야마토 조정의 신라정벌을 이야기하기 위해서는 야마토 조정의 성장을 설명해야만 했다. 해외를 경략했다는 것은 그 이전에 국가체제를 정비하여 그를 감당할 수 있는 역량을 갖추었음을, 바로 일본에서 이른 시기에 정치 권력이 출현·발달했고, 이를 위한 문화도 꽃피웠음을 의미하는 것이기 때문이다. 쓰다는 일본문화가 중국문화에 대립할 수준에 이른 8∼10세기 이전 고대 일본에서 정치 권력의 등장과 발달의 주요한 계기를 중국문화에서 찾았다. 기원전 1세기에 한반도 서북부에 설치되어 4세기 초까지 존재했던 낙랑군, 그리고 대방군은 이를 설명하는 시작점이었다. 낙랑군으로부터 한반도와 교통에 유리한 쓰쿠시 지방으로 중국의 문화가 유입되어 이 지방에서 정치세력이 발달하는 한편 중국문화가 近畿 지방으로 확산되어, 2세기가 되면 야마토 조정 역시 상당한 권력체로 성장해 이후 주변 세력들을 복멸해 나갔다는 것이다. 4세기, 5호 16국의 혼란, 특히 鮮卑의 활동으로 인한 중국 왕조의 약화로 쓰쿠시 지역 세력들의 후원자였던 낙랑군과 대방군이 사라진 결과 쓰쿠시의 세력들은 약화되어 야마토 조정이 이 지역을 차지하는 계기를 이루었다. 반면 두 군의 압력으로 부락국가 수준에 머물던 한반도 남부 진한 지역에서 신라가 小國을 통합하고 변한 지역을 압박하자 변한의 세력들이 야마토 조정에 도움을 요청한 결과 4세기 후반 야마토 조정의 신라정벌이 단행되었다는 것이 고대 일본의 한반도 정벌을 둘러싸고 쓰다가 그린 역사상이었다. 쓰다는 이러한 역사상을 제시하며 야마토 조정의 성장 원인 하나로 쓰쿠시를 매개로 한 중국문화의 유입이나 鮮卑의 활동이 초래한 변화들 외에 야마토 조정의 군주, 바로 황실의 존재를 꼽았다. 즉 쓰다가 제시한 역사상은 동아시아를 무대로 황실을 중심으로 하는 야마토 조정의 성장과 발전이라는 자신들의 역사를 설명하는 것이었다고 하겠다.

조선 태종대 대명의식과 여진 정벌(征伐)

이규철 만주학회 2014 만주연구 Vol.- No.17

In the early days of Chosun Dynasty, animated activities of outside conquest were extraordinarily done. The conquest of Yeojin which occupied the mainstream of outside conquest, made it unavoidable to collide against the interest with Ming Dynasty which had been nominally ruling this area. To think of this fact, it is comprehended that the submission to the stronger which Chosun Dynasty put up with founding its nation, had a considerable limit. In conclusion, Chosun Dynasty not so much recognized submission to the stronger as value to be necessarily kept as exploited it to give some justification to their own political deeds. Without doubt, Chosun Dynasty preferred attaining the current government when the two principles conflicted with each other. In case that following the stronger was judged to be against a nation’s interests, they did not obstinately follow it. This means that submission to the stronger had not choice but to be attached to the absolute value of a nation’s protection. At the same time, it is shown that the submission to the stronger in Chosun Dynasty did not mean the national interests. The Conquest of Moryun-wee made in 1410 (10th Period of Taejong Epoch) was taken as a military action which the intention for obtaining the initiative of Chosun for the area of the Yeojin was strongly reflected. The conquest of Yeojin during Taejong Epoch was shown differently from that of the post, which means collateral evidence that it made a surprise attack on the enemy by mobilizing the minority of elite troops rather than overwhelmed the opponents by raising a large force in Chosun at that time. In spite of it, since the Chosun Army succeeded in carrying out the raid operations, they were able to win the great wartime accomplishments despite having mobilized the comparatively small troops. Chosun insisted the fake logic that they had not known that the chiefs of Yeojin were not given public posts of Ming Dynasty with informing Ming of the result of conquest. Together, they also tried to explain that The Conquest of Moryun-wee was not regarded as the decision from the national level but as the response to the change of location against the invasion of foreign enemies. This is also, I’d say, the situation showing the limit of awareness against Ming Dynasty which Chosun Dynasty had. 조선초기에는 유독 활발한 대외정벌(對外征伐) 활동이 이루어졌다. 대외정벌의 주류를 점했던 여진(女眞) 정벌은 명목상 이 지역을 지배하고 있던 명과의 이해관계와 충돌이 불가피했다. 이러한 사실을 생각해 본다면 조선이 건국과 함께 내세웠던 사대는 상당한 한계가 있었다는 점을 파악할 수 있다. 결국 조선은 사대를 반드시 지켜야 하는 가치로 인식했다기보다는 정국을 장악하고 자신들의 정치 행위에 정당성을 부여하기 위해 활용했다. 조선은 두 원칙이 충돌할 때 당연히 국정목표의 달성을 우선시했다. 사대명분을 따르는 것이 국가의 이익에 반한다고 판단할 경우 이를 굳이 따르지 않았다. 이는 사대가 국가의 보전이라는 절대적 가치에 부속될 수밖에 없었다는 점을 의미한다. 동시에 아직 조선에서의 사대가 곧 국익을 의미하지 않았음도 보여준다. 1410년(태종 10) 단행되었던 모련위 정벌은 여진 지역에 대한 조선의 주도권을 확보하기 위한 의도가 강하게 반영된 군사 행동이었다. 태종대의 여진 정벌은 이후의 정벌과 다른 양상을 보이는데, 당시 조선에서 대군을 동원해 상대를 압도하기보다는 소수의 정예 병력을 동원해 적을 기습했다는 점을 방증한다. 하지만 조선군의 기습작전이 성공했기 때문에 비교적 적은 병력을 동원했음에도 큰 전과를 얻을 수 있었다. 조선은 정벌의 결과를 명에 알리면서 여진 추장들이 명(明)의 관직을 받았다는 알지 못했다는 거짓 논리를 주장했다. 아울러 모련위 정벌을 국가 차원의 결정이 아니라 외적의 침입에 대한 변경 장수의 대응으로 설명했다. 이 역시 조선이 가지고 있던 대명의식의 한계를 보여주는 상황이라 하겠다.

16세기 초 에스파냐인들의 아스테카 정복의 역사 다시 쓰기

박구병 한국서양사학회 2022 西洋史論 Vol.- No.153

This article attempts to examine the repeated themes and issues in traditional narrative of the Spanish Conquest in the early 16th century, the revisionist criticism of the traditional perception, and diversified research examples by way of new approach. The traditional triumphalist narrative of the Spanish Conquest have focused mainly on the activities of conquistadors in Mexico, and emphasized the inevitability and rapidity of military victory and religious conversion. It also tended to maximize differences between the civilizations particularly based on metonymic contrasts between Cortés and Montezuma. Its polished success stories have been accepted as a historical reality and thus prolonging “mythistory” for centuries. In contrast, the revisionist New Conquest History, which emerged from a renewed emphasis on paleographic toil and philological analyses on primary sources in Nahuatl(Nahuan languages), has underscored localized accounts and the roles of the indigenous that the mythistory of the Conquest tended to neglect. As a revisionist example, Matthew Restall raises a challenging question of whether Cortés could exert a strong influence on development of the events, and urges to reappraise the deep-rooted and complex territorial conflict related to the Tlaxcaltecas’ fierce rivalry against the Aztecas. The Spanish conquistadors were heavily outnumbered by all of the undisclosed indigenous forces with altepetl(community)-based identities. Although the crucial factors such as disease, native disunity, and Spanish military technology represented by steel have explained the conquest’s outcome, it is indispensable to pay closer attention to the neglected and unnoticed role of other Nahuatl-speaking tribes in the conquest of the Aztecas. 이 글은 16세기 초 에스파냐인들의 아스테카 정복에 대한 전통적인 서사를 신화와 뒤섞인 역사로 평가하는 ‘새로운 정복사’ 또는 수정주의적 연구의 몇 가지 주요 논점을 정리하고, 정복 과정을 둘러싼 관심사의 확대 사례에 주목한다. 수정주의적 연구가 재탐색하려는 세 가지 핵심 쟁점은 첫째, 1519년 11월 코르테스와 목테수마 사이의 회합의 성격, 둘째, 목테수마의 수동성을 비난하는 근거로 제시된예언의 역할과 그것이 아스테카의 패배에 끼친 영향에 대한 신빙성 여부, 셋째, 누가 전쟁의 주도권을 쥐고 있었는지 등이다. 수정주의적 연구의 사례들은 코르테스에 초점을 맞추는 전통적인 서사에서 벗어나 정복자들과 동맹을 맺은 틀락스칼테카인들의 역할, 그리고 16세기 초 이전부터 존재해 온 나우아인들의 뿌리 깊고 복잡한 영토 전쟁에 더 주목하도록 촉구한다. 그런 관점에서 에스파냐인들의 정복에 대한 신화적 역사를 중부 멕시코의 나우아인 사이의 대립에 에스파냐인들이새롭게 개입한 사건으로 재정립하는 시도가 요구된다.

征東行省의 置廢경위와 성격변화 再考

고명수 한국중세사학회 2015 한국중세사연구 Vol.0 No.43

Cheng-tung Hsing-sheng(征東行省) was established for the first time in Goryeo and southern China right before the second conquest of Japan by Mongol in 1281, and then both were abolished after the failure of the conquest. Later, as Mongol resumed the preparations for the war, it was set up again in two places in 1283, and while the Hsing-sheng in the southern China was exclusively responsible for the actual preparations for the war, that in Goryeo was exempted from the burden. Then, as the conquest plan was canceled, the Hsing-sheng in the southern China was closed in May, 1284, but the one in Goryeo was maintained. It’s because the Hsing-sheng in Goryeo controled Jinbyeonmanhobu(鎭邊萬戶府), which had been established right after the failure of the second conquest, rather than participated in the actual preparations for the war, and took on the new mission to defend the southeast coast from Japan’s counterattack. Later, as the preparations for the war were resumed in 1285, it was given the role again to procure soldiers, vessels and weapons with the Hsing-sheng in the southern China, and was still maintained even after the Hsing-sheng in the southern China was discontinued. Therefore, it’s difficult to accept the general opinion that when King Chungryeol was appointed as the Haengsangseoseong(行尙書省) Pyeongjangjeongsa(平章政事) in May, 1287, Cheng-tung Hsing-sheng appeared in Goryeo with new features not related to the conquest of Japan. Hsing-sheng already existed at that time, so it's just the result of the change in the name and the position of its minister due to the reform of Mongol government organization enforced just in time. Later, Cheng-tung Hsing-sheng once concentrated on the suppression of the Nayan and Qaidu rebelling forces, but didn’t abandon its role by actively cooperating the preparations for the conquest of Japan that began again in 1293. When the successive regime following that of Khubilai withdrew the plan for the conquest over Japan totally in January, 1294, with his death, it was exempted from the duty of the conquest of Japan, so its character came to be changed at last.

패자가 쓴 역사: 7세기 ‘아랍 무슬림’의 정복에 대한 동시대 기독교도와 유대인의 시각

황의현 한국중동학회 2023 韓國 中東 學會 論叢 Vol.43 No.3

In the 7th century, the followers of Muhammad came from the Arabian Peninsula and conquered the Middle East. As most of the Muslim sources on the conquest were composed in the later periods, the conquered people of the Middle East provide us with valuable resources on the identity of the conquerors and how the conquest was perceived by the contemporaries. The 7th century conquest is known as the peaceful one, however, this research finds that the contemporary sources show the opposite image on the conquest. Some Christians expressed shock and fear, and tried to understand the conquest through the eschatological world view, while others gave a positive interpretations of the event. The research criticizes dichotomous views on the conquest, suggesting that it should be understood as a complex phenomenon.