1693년 조선인의 돗토리번(鳥取藩) 연행 사건과 쓰시마번(對馬藩)

윤유숙(Yusook Yoon) 동양사학회 2013 東洋史學硏究 Vol.123 No.-

This paper examines a set of diplomatic measures taken by Tsushima Domain(對馬藩) regarding relations between Joseon(朝鮮) and Japan, and focuses on the Koreans who were captured and taken to Tottori Domain(鳥取藩) in 1693. This paper seeks to identify the intention and the diplomatic position of Tsushima Domain, which was deeply involved in the repatriation of these Koreans. In 1407, the governor of Tsushima, S? Sadashige(宗貞茂), expressed to Joseon that he wanted to move to Ulleungdo(鬱陵島). Further, Tsushima several times gained the repatriation of Japanese fishermen who had sailed to Ulleungdo and reached the eastern coast of Joseon. Through such experiences, Tsushima Domain learned that fishermen from Tottori Domain had been sailing to Ulleungdo. However, there is no record that Tottori Domain ever informed the Joseon government of this fact. The Edo government(江戶幕府) ordered Tsushima Domain to repatriate the Koreans taken to Japan by Tottori Domain fishermen in 1693. Tsushima Domain independently investigated Ulleungdo and reaffirmed that Takeshima(竹嶋) is Ulleungdo. Tsushima Domain, however, negotiated with Joseon without reporting the results of this investigation to the Edo government. Further, Tsushima Domain sent Joseon a diplomatic document in which was written “Japan’s Takeshima,” while the original order from the Edo government was to “request the Joseon government to prohibit its people from sailing to Takeshima,” that is Ulleungdo. Joseon and Japan argued over expressions included in the Joseon government’s reply from the eleventh month of 1693 to mid-1695. During this period, Tsushima Domain continuously attempted to include Takeshima into Japanese territory. Such attempts could stem from Tsushima Domain’s territorial ambitions over Ulleungdo. However, Tsushima Domain was not able to achieve its goal as the Joseon government started to adopt hard-line policies to address this issue in the late stages of its diplomatic negotiations with Japan. In the end, the Edo government confirmed the facts about the ownership of Ulleungdo and provided Joseon with a reply that it will ban Japanese from sailing to Ulleungdo.

1704년 問慰行에 대한 對馬藩의 權現堂 供物 지급 요청

이해진(Lee Hae-Jin) 한일관계사학회 2018 한일관계사연구 Vol.61 No.-

본고에서는 1704년에 쓰시마번이 권현당(權現堂)에 대한 공물(供物)을 조선으로부터 지급받고자 한 사실을 검토하였다. 권현당이란 쓰시마번 내에 건립된 도쇼구, 즉 에도막부의 초대 쇼군 도쿠가와 이에야스의 사당을 가리킨다. 17세기 후반에도 쓰시마번은 도쇼다이곤겐에 대한 조선으로부터의 공양자금 제공을 명분으로 하는 외교・무역선인 권현당송사의 신설을 조선 측에 요청하였다. 쓰시마번은 줄곧 조선과의 관계 속에서 권현당을 활용해 번의 이익을 도모하고 있었던 것이다. 본고에서 주목한 1704년의 교섭도 그 연장선상에 해당한다. 권현당 공물 지급 요청이 재개된 계기는 1701년에 있었던 권현당의 소실이었다. 당시 은거 중이었던 전 번주 소 요시자네는 권현당이 과거 막부에 청원하여 건립한 것이기 때문에 서둘러 재건해야 한다고 독려하였다. 이후 쓰시마번은 권현당의 소실과 그 재건 계획을 막부에도 보고하였다. 하지만 로주 아베 마사타케는 권현당 건립은 쓰시마번의 소관으로, 막부와는 관련이 없다고 이야기하였다. 이는 요시자네가 주장한 권현당 재건의 당위성과는 모순되는 답변이었다. 더욱이 그 무렵은 쓰시마번의 재정난이 시작된 시기이기도 하였기 때문에 결국 권현당의 재건은 중지되었다. 그 후 사망한 요시자네의 조문을 위해 조선으로부터 도해한 문위행을 상대로 쓰시마번은 권현당 공물 지급 요청을 개시하였다. 이러한 쓰시마번의 움직임은 조선무역의 쇠퇴 등으로 인한 재정난을 타개하고자 한 시도 중 하나였다. 그러나 문위행의 귀국 후 이어진 교섭에서 권현당 공물 문제가 공식석상에 등장하는 일은 없었다. 그 이유는 실현 가능성이 희박한 사안이었기에 아명도서의 신설과 공작미 지급의 연한 연장과 같은 다른 요청사항에 비해 우선순위에서 밀렸기 때문이었다. 게다가 권현당 공물 문제는 도리어 주된 교섭에 지장을 초래할 우려가 있다고 판단되어 유보되었다. 권현당 공물 요청은 막부와 합의하지 않은 채 쓰시마번이 독자적으로 벌인 작업이었다. 그 목적은 막부나 도쇼다이곤겐에 대한 숭경이라기보다도 오히려 번의 경제적 이익을 위해서였다. 나아가 이러한 계획을 위해 막부와 도쇼다이곤겐이라는 존재마저 철저히 활용하였다는 사실은 조일관계 속에서 쓰시마번이 지니고 있던 독자적인 입장을 확인하게끔 해준다. This article examines the unfolding of events when, in 1704, Tsushima Domain planned to request of Joseon the initiation of the Gongendō tribute. The Gongendō was the Tōshōgū, viz., the shrine of the first shogun of the Tokugawa Shogunate (Tōshō Daigongen, Tokugawa Ieyasu) established in Tsushima Domain. Even in the late seventeenth century, Tsushima Domain requested of Joseon the founding of a diplomacy-trade ship for the Gongendō, that is, the Gongendō annual ship. This ship was to raise funds used for procuring the offerings devoted to the Tōshō Daigongen. Hence, even before the eighteenth century, Tsushima Domain was already using the Gongendō to their advantage when engaging in diplomatic negotiations with Joseon. In 1701, the Gongendō was destroyed by fire. Consequently, this prompted Tsushima to resume with the request for tribute. The former daimyō of the domain Sō Yoshizane, who at the time was retired, because the Gongendō had been established on a request to the Shogunate, encouraged that it should be restored as soon as possible. Thereafter, Tsushima Domain planned the restoration of the Gongendō and also reported this to the Shogunate. However, the Rōjū Abe Masatake replied that the restoration of the Gongendō had nothing to do with the Shogunate and that it was completely up to Tsushima Domain. This directly contradicted the legitimacy of the restoration that Yoshizane asserted. Furthermore, at that time Tsushima was starting to suffer from a budgetary crisis. As a result, the restoration project was aborted. After this, Tsushima asked the Munwihaeng who crossed the sea to mourn the deceased Yoshizane to mediate the affairs regarding the Gongendō tribute. This was one of the measures to resolve the budgetary crisis caused by the decrease in trade with Joseon. However, in the talks that took place after the Munwihaeng returned to Joseon, there were no official requests for the Gongendō tribute. This was because that compared to other matters such as the establishment of the Doseo (the bronze seal for the proprietor of the diplomatic right with Joseon) for the Tsushima heir and the extension for the provisions of official trade rice, the Gongendō tribute was of minor importance. Moreover, fearful that it could jeopardize the negotiation per se, Tsushima postponed proposing the Gongendō tribute as an agenda item in the talks that ensued. To summarize, the request for the Gongendō tribute was an autonomous action of Tsushima that was not under the influence of the Shogunate. The request was triggered by the concern to yield economic profits for the domain rather than by the motivation to venerate the Shogunate or the Tōshō Daigongen. Furthermore, Tsushima skillfully used the very existence of the Shogunate and the Tōshō Daigongen to accomplish its goals. This verifies the independence of Tsushima as a major participant in Joseon-Japan relations.

조선후기 對馬藩의 조선 교섭과 1693년 울릉도 영속시비

장순순 동북아역사재단 2012 東北亞歷史論叢 Vol.- No.37

This paper focuses on the territory dispute over Ulleungdo between Joseon and Japan in 1693 and the attitude of Tsushima Domain toward diplomatic negotiations with Joseon. In the third month of 1693, Ahn Yongbok (安龍福) and Pak Eodun (朴於屯), who had sailed near Ulleungdo (Takeshima, 竹島) for fishing were abducted by Japanese fishermen from Oki Province (隱岐州). The Edo Shogunate, which was briefed on the situation through Tottori Domain (鳥取藩) instructed the Edo Hantei (江戶藩邸) on the thirteenth day of the fifth month of that year to negotiate with Joseon for their repatriation to Joseon and for a prohibition on sail to Takeshima. At that time, Tsushima had long recognized that Takeshima belonged to Joseon and that that island was Ulleungdo. What Tottori Domain or the Edo Shogunate wanted to gain through the Tsushima’s negotiations with Joseon was not possession over Takeshima, but fishery rights for Japanese by prohibiting fishing by Koreans at Takeshima. However, Tsushima had indicated its position that Takeshima was the territory of Joseon from before the Imjin War (壬辰倭亂), which started in 1592. But according to the cases in 1637 and 1666, there was no indication of Joseon’s territory so Japan gained that island. Japan thus engaged in the negotiation with Joseon based on the unreasonable preconception that Takeshima is Japanese territory, and put the expression of “our Takeshima” (本國竹島) in the document sent to the Minister of the Board of Rites (禮曹參判) in the Joseon government. The first negotiation over the possession of Ulleungdo between Tsushima and Joseon, which started with the Ahn Yongbok abduction case in 1693, continued from the twelfth month of 1693 to the second month of 1694. The second negotiation was in progress from the intercalary fifth month in 1694 to the fifth month of 1695. Tsushima,which demanded to alter the document from Joseon, and Joseon, which continued to insist that Takeshima was Ulleungdo and Joseon’s territory, were in confrontation and negotiations showed no sign of resolution. Tsushima asked the Edo Shogunate, which began to study the Ulleungdo possession issue. The conclusion was that Takeshima was not Japanese territory, thus Japanese were not permitted to sail to Takeshima. Though Tsushima recognized that Takeshima is Ulleungdo and Joseon’s territory, Tsushima included Takeshima in Japanese territory. In the background to this were the new diplomatic procedures with Tsushima as the leader after the Imjin War. The order from the shogunate about Ahn Yongbok’s repatriation and the prohibition on sail to Takeshima for Joseon were the touchstones of the diplomatic ability of Tsushima with Joseon, thus Tsushima exhibited its loyalty to the shogunate at the negotiations with Joseon. Also in the background was Tsushima’s intent to process Ulleungdo since Japanese fishermen whose ships had drifted to Joseon avoided punishment even though they had stated that they were fishing around Takeshima in 1637 and 1666. A third issue was the diplomatic position of Tsushima toward Joseon after the Imjin War. Tsushima made effective use of Joseon’s defensive situation due to the Manchu wars in 1627 and 1636, and thus gained good benefit from Joseon. Tsushima tried to gain diplomatic benefit from Joseon and used illusory pressure called “the shogunate’s military prestige.” With the position of Tsushima, they thought they had to carry their point even with force and threat. And a fourth was that the negotiation was being conducted under Sō Yoshizane, the daimyo of Tsushima. At the time of the negotiations over possession of Ulleungdo with Japan (Tsushima), Joseon took a firm and active attitude, yet Tsushima maintained its earlier position. Therefore, the possession issue regarding Ulleungdo that started in 1693 was settled not as Tsushima Domain had hoped.

18세기 후반 쓰시마 간사재판(幹事裁判)의 교섭 검토

윤유숙 한일관계사학회 2019 한일관계사연구 Vol.66 No.-

The purpose of this study is to reveal the details of negotiations the Gansa jaepans from Tsushima Domain engaged in at Joseon during the late eighteenth century. Gansa jaepan (幹事裁判) has been loosely defined as officials who travel overseas to handle negotiations on issues apart from extending the period of trading Gongjakmi (公作米), the Joseon rice traded for Japanese cotton, or escorting diplomatic missions from Joseon such as Tongshinsa(通信使) and Munwihaeng(問慰行). As such, what sort of negotiations each Gansa jaepan was exactly involved in has not yet been sufficiently studied. This study therefore focuses on three figures known to have served as a Gansa jaepan: Matsuura Sanji (松浦賛治), Shimao Tadaemon (嶋雄只右衛門), and Toda Sanzaemon(戸田三左衛門). By investigating why they traveled to Joseon, what their negotiations specifically involved, and how those negotiations ended should be able to offer clues as to what surfaced as issues in the Joseon-Japan relations during the late eighteenth century and how those issues unfolded. Matsuura Sanji came to Joseon in 1754 to ask for an extension to the period of ginseng and Gongjakmi trade. However, he returned to Tsushima Domain only after staying about a month at the Japanese guest house called waegwan and failed to finalize the negotiation. This abrupt end to his visit to Joseon as a jaepan was caused by unexpected developments that occurred in the early 1750s. Because Tsushima Domain repeatedly refused to accept Yedansam (禮單蔘), the ginseng the Joseon government gifted to Japanese envoys, and asked for it to be replaced with a different item, Joseon banned ginseng trade with the domain. This in turn made it highly uncertain as to whether an extension would be granted for the trade of Gongjakmi. In the case of Shimao Tadaemon, he was dispatched to Joseon in 1765 to convey the news that the Edo bakufu granted permission for Joseon to send a Munwihaeng mission the following year. As for Toda Sanzaemon, his visit to Joseon in 1771 was related to the Edo bakufu's financial aid that emerged as a major issue for Tsushima Domain in the 1760s. In 1770, the Edo bakufu provided financial aid to the domain to encourage its efforts in restoring the severed trade relations with Joseon. The domain thereby dispatched Toda under the pretext of reviving trade with Joseon as per the bakufu's orders. However, the Tsushima Domain's claim that its officially authorized trade with Joseon had been discontinued was a deception to elicit intermittent financial aid from the Edo bakufu. In actuality, such trade continued up until the nineteenth century albeit in smaller volumes. The Tsushima Domain's scheme to obtain a letter from Joseon confirming it will be impossible to revive official trade and present that letter as proof of discontinued trade was already set in motion by the time Toda was sent to Joseon. 본고의 목적은 18세기 후반 조선에 파견된 쓰시마의 간사재판이 어떠한 교섭을 했는지 규명하는 것이다. 이에 본고에서는 종래 간사재판으로 분류된 마쓰우라 산지(1754), 시마오 다다에몬(1765), 도다 산자에몬(1771)에 주목하여 그들이 조선에 건너온 이유, 조선과 협상한 내용과 협상의 결말을 상세히 고찰하였다. 18세기 후반 간사재판의 사례 연구는 동시기 조일통교에서 쟁점이 되었던 사안이 무엇인지, 그것의 전개 양상은 어떠했는지를 규명할 수 있는 단서가 되기 때문이다. 마쓰우라 산지는 인삼구무(求貿) 매매(賣買)와 공작미 연장을 조선에 요구하기는 했으나 왜관에 온지 1개월여 만에 귀국하여 교섭을 마무리 짓지 못했다. 그의 재판사행이 이런 식으로 끝난 데에는 1750년대 초반, 쓰시마의 거듭된 예단삼 점퇴와 교체요구로 인해 조선의 반발이 고조되어 인삼매매가 금지되고 공작미 연장마저 불투명해지는 이례적인 상황이 이어졌기 때문이다. 시마오 다다에몬은 1766년 문위행과 관련하여, 그 사행을 막부가 수락했다는 사실을 조선에 전달한다는 명목으로 파견되었다. 도다 산자에몬은 1760년대 쓰시마에게 중대 과제로 부상한 막부의 영속지원금 실현과 관련되어 있었다. 막부는 1770년, 조선과의 교역이 단절되었다는 점을 이유로 지원금을 하사하면서 교역 재흥에 힘쓸 것을 지시하자, 쓰시마는 ‘막부의 명령으로 교역재흥을 요청한다’는 명목으로 다다를 조선에 파견했다. 그러나 조선과의 사무역(개시무역)이 단절되었다는 주장은 영속지원금을 받아내기 위해 쓰시마가 막부를 기만한 것으로, 사무역은 19세기까지도 소규모로 계속되고 있었다. 쓰시마는 도다로 하여금 사무역 재흥이 어렵다는 조선 역관의 진문(眞文)를 받게 했고, 막부를 상대로 이것을 사무역이 단절된 증거로 활용했다.

전근대시기 한국과 일본의 대마도 인식

하우봉 동북아역사재단 2013 東北亞歷史論叢 Vol.- No.41

This article examines the concepts of boundary and border between Japan and Korea in the pre-modern period. The pre-modern views on Tsushima between Joseon and Japan should differ from a modern concept of territory in a nation-state because the nation-state is a “modern” phenomenon. The concept of “territory” in the pre-modern period was not clearly established, thus the boundary of territory demanded an intermediary that connected the interior and the exterior of the territory. Tsushima was exemplary in terms of the intermediary role. Tsushima was located in a borderland between Joseon and Japan,and held a quasi-independent status from the Japanese central authority. However, Tsushima’s status went through changes. Whereas Tsushima held a quasi-independent status in the Muromachi period, its status of independence diminished in the Tokugawa period. In other words, Tsushima also became part of the system of the bakufu (shogunate) and domains (J. bakuhanseido ) in the Tokugawa period. In other words, the status of Tsushima in Japan changed, and,accordingly, the view of the Joseon court toward Tsushima also changed. In this paper, as I examine perceptions of Tsushima between Joseon and Japan, I systematically categorize the development of perception on Tsushima from time to time in the historical context. Also, by examining the theories of scholars in the field of Korean-Japanese relations in both the Republic of Korea and Japan I investigate the main causes of the shifting views on Tsushima, that is, a policy of vassalage and a policy of making an intermediary role between Joseon and Japan. For a better understanding, I deconstruct the perceptions of Koreans toward Tsushima in the Joseon period into three patterns: the perception of Tsushima as a homeland; the perception of defending Tsushima domain; and the perception of distinguishing Tsushima as a separate entity from Japan. Also I attempt to prove that although three different perceptions of Tsushima were systemized in the Joseon period,those perceptions derived from ancient history and the island’s relations with Korea. In particular, Joseon’s perception of Tsushima was systemized based upon two important facts: that Tsushima became a vassal of Gyeongsang Province after the subjugation of Tsushima in the early Joseon period and that Tsushima became Joseon’s vassal for friendly relations between Joseon and Japan in the context of the Chinese world order. As a result, the Joseon court considered Tsushima as Japan’s territory, but as a vassal of Joseon.

조선후기 대일 도자교역 실태와 그 의미

이승민 조선시대사학회 2017 朝鮮時代史學報 Vol.- No.81

The purpose of this study is to examine the characteristics of diplomacy as well as bilateral trade by explaining the reality of ceramics trade with Japan through the Gumu(求貿) of the later Joseon Dynasty. In the later Joseon Dynasty, the ceramics were only traded through the Gumu. Japan traded the ceramics of the Joseon Dynasty through the Tsushima domain(對馬島/對馬藩), or requested various items such as potter's clay(陶土) and firewood, potter, and made ceramics directly from the Waegwan kiln(倭館窯). The Tsushima domain, which was entrusted with the diplomatic and trade authority for the Joseon by the Bakufu(幕府), was the only one capable of trading Joseon's ceramics. Tsushima domain has requested the ceramics trade for the purpose of dedicating it to the Bakufu or separately receive request by the Bakufu. The Joseon government also knew that final consumer of ceramics was the Bakufu. For the reason, most of the trade was allowed, and required potter's clay and firewood are supplied to the Waegwan. In other words, in the trade with Japan, the ceramics had political meanings as well as economic meanings, such as ordering and necessity of the Bakufu, or purpose of Tsushima domain to dedicate to the Bakufu. However, as time goes by, Tsushima domain requested too much trade, and in the process various kinds of clashes such as seogye(書契) issue were created, which caused the Joseon government to refuse or delay the requests of Tsushima domain. The fact that ceramics are traded through the Waegwan or the Waegwan kilns were used to produce ceramics directly from the Joseon Dynasty show different characteristics from those of other Japanese trading vessels at the same time. In general, the goods of Joseon that the Tsushima domain wanted were either produced in Joseon or made in Joseon and had a complete form. On the other hand, the ceramics had an unusual form that rarely finds cases, as Tsushima domain brought the samples and made them in the way they wanted by using the materials and manpower of the Joseon potter's clay and firewood needed for production. 본 연구는 조선후기 求貿를 통한 대일 도자교역의 실태를 밝힘으로써 양국 교역 뿐 아니라 나아가 외교의 특징을 새롭게 고찰하는 데 목적이 있다. 조선후기 대일무역에서 도자류는 오직 구무를 통해서만 거래되고 있었는데, 일본에서는 대마도를 통해 조선의 도자를 교역해가거나 혹은 흙과 땔감을 비롯한 각종 물품 및 陶工 등을 요청해 직접 倭館窯에서 자신들이 원하는 도자를 제작해가기도 했다. 막부로부터 조선에 대한 외교와 무역의 권한을 위임받은 대마도는 조선의 도자를 교역할 수 있는 유일한 존재였는데, 대마도에서는 막부 유력층에 진상하기 위한 용도로 혹은 參勤交代 때나 별도로 막부 측의 지시를 받아 조선에 사기번조를 요청해왔다. 조선정부에서도 도자의 최종 소비자가 막부 측이라는 것을 알고 있었기 때문에 대부분의 경우 교역을 허락하고 해당 물품을 왜관으로 공급해서 도자가 제작할 수 있도록 했다. 즉 대일교역에서 도자는 막부 측의 지시와 필요에 의하거나 대마도가 막부에 진상하기 위해서 사용되는 등, 경제적 의미 뿐 아니라 정치적 의미도 가지고 있었던 것이다. 그러나 시간이 지날수록 빈번한 사기번조 및 과도한 물품의 요청, 그리고 書契 문제 등 그 과정에서 발생한 각종 폐단 등으로 인해 조선에서는 대마도의 요청을 거부하거나 지연시키는 일이 늘어났고, 결국 1717년을 마지막으로 대일 도자교역은 막을 내리게 되었다. 왜관을 통해서 도자가 교역되거나 왜관요를 만들어 조선에서 직접 도자를 제작해 갔다는 사실은 동시기 다른 대일교역품과는 다른 특징을 보여준다. 일반적으로 대마도에서 원하는 조선의 물품은 조선에서 생산되거나 혹은 조선에서 만들어져 완전한 형태를 지닌 것이었다. 그에 비해 도자의 경우에는 대마도에서 견본을 직접 가져와 제작에 필요한 조선의 흙 등과 땔감의 물품 및 인력 등을 이용해 자신들이 원하는 방식대로 만들어서 가져가는 등, 대일교역에서 좀처럼 사례를 찾아보기 힘든 특이한 형태를 띠고 있었다.

近世朝鮮通信使の礼物の鷹と馬の移送について -対馬藩の役割を中心に-

吉田智史 조선통신사학회 2023 조선통신사연구 Vol.36 No.-

조선후기 통신사는 조선 국왕이 도쿠가와[徳川] 쇼군[将軍] 앞 으로 보낸 국서에 쇼군, 후계자, 은퇴한 쇼군에게 보내는 예물 목 록인 예단을 별폭(別幅)으로 첨부해, 백저포(白苧布)ㆍ인삼ㆍ호피ㆍ매ㆍ말 등을 지참했다. 이 중 매와 말은 권위의 상징이었고, 쇼군의 기호에도 맞아 예물이 되었다고 할 수 있다. 그래서 쓰시 마번의 매와 말에 관한 교섭은 쇼군 권위에 관련된 문제이자 조일 외교 업무가 주업이었던 쓰시마 번의 위신에 관련한 문제로서 고 찰할 필요가 있다. 또한 쓰시마번의 이송체제, 해로ㆍ육로 의전 담 당의 이송지원체제, 쓰시마번과 의전 담당의 연계를 명확히 밝히 는 것은 매와 말 이송의 전체 양상 해명에 있어서 의미가 깊다. 이와 같은 시점의 선행 연구를 보면 『우시마도 초시[牛窓町史] 통사편(通史編)』의 해로 이송의 검증, 나카오 히로시[仲尾宏]의 육 로 매 이송에 관한 인원 구성 분석 등 부분적인 해명으로 국한되 어 있다. 그래서 본고에서는 1711년의 통신사 사례를 중심으로 쓰시마번의 매와 말의 교섭, 부산에서 에도[江戸]까지의 이송에 관한 쓰시마번과 의전담당의 동향을 검증했다. 검증의 결과, 매와 말의 교섭은 선례와 막부(幕府)의 의향에 입각해서 쓰시마번의 요청을 조선이 받아들인 것, 조선에서 보내 온 매와 말을 쓰시마번이 선별해서 이송한 것이 밝혀졌다. 그리고 해로․육로 양쪽 다 매와 말은 통신사와 같은 경로를 이동했고, 통 신사 의전담당과 같은 번이 이송을 담당한 것을 확인할 수 있었 다. 더욱이 에도에 옮겨진 매는 막부의 관리가 선별해서 쇼군의 예물로 정했다는 것도 밝혀졌다. 이러한 쓰시마번과 의전담당의 동향이 막부 권위를 지켰고 조일관계의 안정으로 이어졌다. The Joseontonsinsa in the late Joseon period brought a letter of state from the King of Joseon to the Tokugawa Shogun, along with an annex containing a list of courtesies to the Shogun, his successor, and Ogosyo (Retired Shogun), including ramie cloth, ginseng, tiger skin, hawks, and horses. Of these, the hawk and horse were considered symbols of authority, and it is thought that they became courtesies in combination with the Shogun's preferences. Therefore, it can be assumed that the negotiation of the hawk and horse by the Tsushima domain is a matter related to the Shogun's authority, and must be considered as a matter related to the prestige of the Tsushima domain, whose family role is diplomatic service between Japan and the Joseon. In addition, it is significant to clarify the transportation system of the Tsushima domain, the support system for the transportation by the feudal lords by sea and land, and the cooperation between the Tsushima domain and the feudal lords to clarify the whole picture of the transportation of the hawks and horses. From this perspective, previous studies have only partially clarified the details, such as the verification of the transportation by sea in “Ushimado Town History” and the analysis of the personnel composition related to transporting hawks by land by Hiroshi Nakao. This article focuses on Tsushima’s negotiations regarding hawks and horses, as well as the movements of the Tsushima domain and its officials in transporting hawks from Busan to Edo, centering on the Joseontonsinsa of 1711. As a result, it was revealed that the negotiation between hawks and horses was made upon the request of Tsushima Domain based on precedent and shogunate’s intention. It was also confirmed that the support system for the transportation was prepared based on the information provided by the Tsushima domain, and that the hawks and horses traveled along the same route as the Joseontonsinsa both by sea and land. In addition, the sea route and the land route traveled the same route as the carrier of the Joseontonsinsa, who was in charge of the transfer. Moreover, it was also revealed that the hawks transferred to Edo were selected by the shogunate officials as gifts to the shogunate. This trend, where the Tsushima Domain and its officers supported the shogunate authority, significantly contributed to the stability of the Japanese-Joseon relationship.

조선후기 조선・일본의 동남아시아 산물 교역

윤유숙(Yusook Yoon) 한일관계사학회 2020 한일관계사연구 Vol.70 No.-

본고는 동남아시아-일본-조선-중국을 포괄하는 교역 네트워크를 배경으로 하여, 조선후기 조일 관계에서 동남아시아 산물의 교역 실태를 검토한 것이다. 17세기의 동남아시아 산물 교역 상황을 개관하고, 18・19세기의 교역에서는 수우각 무역의 추이를 중점적으로 검토했다. 조선시대에 수입되던 대표적인 동남아시아 산물은 수우각, 후추, 소목, 명반이다. 수우각은 공예품과 활의 재료로, 후추는 조미료나 약용으로, 소목과 명반은 각각 붉은 염료의 재료와 매염제로 사용되었다. 쓰시마는 나가사키에 내항하는 중국선과 네덜란드 선박으로부터 동남아시아산 물품을 구입하여 왜관으로 가져갔다. 또한 조선이 수입한 수우각・후추・소목은 17세기 초부터 18세기 초까지 약 1세기 동안 ‘세폐의 명목으로’ 중국으로도 유입되었다(동남아시아→나가사키→쓰시마→조선 왜관→중국 북경을 연결하는 물품의 이동로). 조선후기 조일무역에서 동남아시아 산물의 무역량이 최고를 기록한 시기는 17세기 말이다. 그러나 일본 국내의 산물이 아닌 만큼 쓰시마가 왜관무역에서 판매할 수 있는 수량은 나가사키 무역의 호황 정도에 따라 증감의 폭이 컸고, 품목에 따라서는 한 해의 교역량이 제로인 경우도 발생했다. 특히 군수물자였던 수우각은 조선에게는 매우 귀중한 수입품이었으나 이미 18세기 전반에 나가사키로 반입되는 양이 매우 불안정했다. 본고는 나가사키키키야쿠(長崎聞役)로 근무했던 마쓰우라 산지(松浦賛治)의 기록 등을 검토하여 해당 시기 나가사키에서 쓰시마가 수우각을 입수한 구체적인 정황을 소개했다. 1776년, 쓰시마와 조선 간의 개시무역이 단절되었다고 판단한 막부는 매년 금 12,000냥의 지원금을 쓰시마에게 하사하기로 결정했다. 또한 막부는 쓰시마가 향후 나가사키에서 개시무역용 무역품을 조달하는 것을 금지하고 관영무역에 필요한 물품의 수량을 보고하도록 했다. 이에 쓰시마는 관영무역에 필요한 동남아시아산 4대 산물의 물량을 필요 액수보다 훨씬 많은 ‘허위’의 액수로 막부에 신고했고, 막부는 이 액수를 인정했다. 18세기에 전개된 막부의 나가사키 무역 축소정책, 동남아시아 현지의 상황, 1799년 네덜란드 동인도회사의 해산 등으로 인해 18세기 이후 4대 산물의 나가사키 반입량은 현저하게 감소해 갔다. 후추, 소목, 명반의 경우 막말까지 관영무역의 정액만큼 조선에 수출되었으나, 수우각은 조일 간의 교섭을 거쳐 1832년부터 조선에 동(銅) 3,000근으로 대납하게 되었다. This study reviews the trade and consumption of commodities in late Joseon that were imported from Southeast Asia via Japan based on a trade network encompassing Southeast Asia, Japan, Joseon, and China. The items Joseon commonly imported from Southeast Asia were water buffalo horn, pepper, sappanwood, and alum. Water buffalo horn was used to make handicraft and bows, while pepper was used for cooking or medicinal purposes. Sappanwood was used to extract dye and alum was a mordant. These items were imported via the Ryuku Kingdom and Japan during the first half of the Joseon Dynasty, but during the second half, they were only imported through the Tsushima Domain. The Tsushima Domain would acquire such items from Chinese or Dutch ships that visited Nagasaki, then bring them over to the Japanese guest house in Joseon called waegwan. The volume of Southeast Asian commodities traded between late Joseon and Japan peaked at the end of the seventeenth century. However, because the commodities weren’t produced in Japan, the amount the Tsushima Domain was able to bring to the waegwan in Joseon fluctuated heavily depending on how prosperous trade was at Nagasaki. This caused the trade of particular items to be nonexistent during certain years. In 1776, the Edo bakufu acknowledged the Tsushima Domain’s claim that its private trade with Joseon had become discontinued and decided to support the domain by granting 12,000 ryō in gold coins each year. The Bakufu also prohibited the domain from obtaining commodities at Nagasaki for private trade with Joseon and obligated the domain to report the volume of commodities necessary for public trade with the Joseon government. The Bakufu thereafter approved of the budget the Tsushima Domain submitted, although it was a false estimate that far exceeded the actual cost required to secure the amount of the aforementioned four Southeast Asian items necessary for public trade with the Joseon government. Nonetheless, beyond the eighteenth century, a significant drop occurred in the incoming volume of these four items at Nagasaki due to the Bakufu policy to downscale trade at the port as well as the Dutch East India Company’s dissolution in 1799. Until the first half of the nineteenth century, the Tsushima Domain was able to deliver the amount of pepper, sappanwood, and alum it promised to procure for Joseon. However, it failed to do so with water buffalo horn because of a sharp drop in its supply through Nagasaki so that in 1832, the domain paid Joseon 3,968 pounds (3,000 geun) of copper instead.

文化8年朝鮮通信使応接における上使小笠原忠固と小倉藩

守友隆 조선통신사학회 2019 조선통신사연구 Vol.28 No.-

Joseon Tongsinsa of Bunka Year 8 Sinmi(181 1), exchanged credentials on Tsushima, a border island. Accordingly, the Tongsinsa party just traveled back and forth between Gyeongseong and Tsushima, and the itinerary was greatly reduced. Meanwhile , the Japanese Shogunate’s Envoy Tadataka Ogasawara, the Lord of Kokura Domain producing 150,000 seok of rice, traveled back and forth between Edo and Tsushima. Concerning Tongsinsa in the Bunka Era , it is necessary to investigate the Japanese envoy party. Thus, this study would investigate and verify the movements/roles of Envoy Tadataka Ogasawara and the Kokura Domain party. The roles given by the Shogunate for Envoy Tadataka Ogasawara and Kokura Domain included preparing a ship traveling to Tsushima, leading about 1,500 manservants including crewmen, shuttling between Edo and Tsushima and holding a series of rites thoroughly. Thus , this role was completed by Tadakata and Kokura Domain. This burden was never light and converted at least to 230,000 nyang in money terms. It is assumed that most of the gold and silver reserved by the Kokura Domain were used. And yet, it is assumed that disposition for “Black & White Fuss," a fuss in the family ended up light because of the achievement of playing the big role. By receiving(exchanging diplomatic gifts with) Tongsinsa in the Bunka Era, Shogunate’s burden was reduced. That did not necessarily reduce all the burden of lapan, and in particular, it was a heavy burden for Kokura of which the Lord was Envoy Tadataka Ogasawara. And yet, after completing the envoy’s roles, Kokura Domain suffered financial difficulties, but even the people who actually bore the burden as Tadataka Ogasawara took on the envoy’s roles recognized the envoy’s roles in receiving Tongsinsa as the highest honor. In addition, as a result of an analysis of the concrete examples of the contact between Envoy Tadataka Ogasawara staying on Tsushima and Tongsinsa based on the historical materials of Ogasawara Clan of Kokura, Tadataka received Tongsinsa after meticulous preparatíon. Moreover, Hikotake Ishikawa, a Confucian scholar of Kokura Domain and employer exchanged poems with the Tongsinsa people. ludging from that, a group of Envoy Tadataka Ogasawara arrived after a group of Tongsinsa, and the group of Tongsinsa left Tsushima first before returning home, not to neglect reception/interchange but it was a result of their effort to faithfully perform the roles given from the Shogunate.

1636년 조선통신사의 닛코 참배와 그 기억 ― 근세 일본의 ‘武威’ 외교에 관한 재고 ―

이해진 동양사학회 2023 東洋史學硏究 Vol.163 No.-

This article is a review of the conventional explanation that the Tsushima Domain “forced” the Joseon Tongsingsa to visit Nikkō under the direction of the shogunate in 1636. Through this, this study reconsidered the character of Edo bakufu's diplomacy, which had been said through the expression “Bui”. In addition, this study continued to examine how the historical memory of visit to Nikkō, which was established later, actually affected the diplomacy of early modern Japan. First of all, after reviewing the records of the Tongsinsa and the records of Tsushima in 1636, it can be seen that Tsushima was more willing to persuade the envoys by appealing to the political crisis of the daimyō than the bakufu. In addition, unlike the conventional explanation of “forced”, Nikkō pilgrimage was aimed at emphasizing the “virtue” of the bakufu, so it was advertised as if the Tongsinsa had voluntarily petitioned. Through the above facts, we were able to confirm that the basic policy of the bakufu's diplomacy was to emphasize the practice of “virtue”, not the expression of “Bui”. Next, this article confirmed the history of visit to Nikkō, which was told by records left by Tsushima in future generations, and tracked the process of establishing such historical memories. The records were based on the “word tradition” that appeared when the bakufu and Tsushima discussed the Nikkō pilgrimage of Tongsinsa in 1682. It contained a self-showoff that Tsushima had established Nikkō pilgrimage instructed by the bakufu without giving up threats against envoys. This “word tradition” was also reflected in the historical description of Tsushima, which was established later, and the Nikkō pilgrimage was recorded as if it had been achieved through “forced” against Tongsinsa. However, the memory of “forced” that Tsushima's “word tradition” describes caused the bakufu to resent and eventually led to the complete withdrawal of the Nikkō pilgrimage. Finally, in 1711 during the reform of the Tongsinsa's invitation ceremony, Tsushima advocated the memory of the Nikkō pilgrimage as an example of the service by ancestors to express its willingness to achieve the bakufu's orders. This claim is returned to Tsushima as the bakufu's logic to ensure the practice of faithful service. Since then, Tsushima has persuaded the Tongsinsa to implement the invitation ceremony reform through the “forced” method that was included in their memories, but was forced to face strong opposition from the Tongsinsa. Rather, the direct reason why the Tongsinsa changed their mind was because of the logical persuasion in line with Confucian universalism and the principle of “equal courtesy” based on the presentation of scriptures.