The Role of Financial Innovations in the Current Global Financial Crisis

Yoon-Shik Park 서울대학교 경제연구소 2009 Seoul journal of economics Vol.22 No.2

Several macroeconomic missteps such as global imbalance have been blamed for causing the current international financial crisis. Others have also blamed the excessive Wall Street greed for the crisis. While the above factors may have played a supporting role in the financial crisis, they were certainly not the primary causes of the crisis. The root cause of the current international financial crisis is the abuse of various innovative financial techniques and new investment instruments that have been developed. In recent decades, the pace of financial innovations has accelerated precipitously, which in turn has driven the explosive growth in both the size of global financial markets and its array of new financial products and techniques. The current crisis is primarily the direct result of the abuse of some of the latest and most innovative financial techniques, most of which are too esoteric and technical to be comprehended correctly by both government regulators and academic economists. Many crises are usually a byproduct of the cycle of financial innovations.

금융위기와 금융구조조정의 국가별 비교ㆍ분석

배영목(Young-Mok Bae) 한국경제발전학회 2007 經濟發展硏究 Vol.13 No.2

  이 논문은 선진 대국 4개국, 선진 소국 북구 3개국, 중남미 신흥시장국 4개국, 동아시아 신흥시장국 4개국과 우리나라를 대상으로, 금융위기, 위기수습정책 및 그 차이를 살펴보고, 금융위기 전후의 금융경제와 실물경제의 변화를 검토하고, 금융위기 이후의 금융구조조정의 방식과 그 차이를 비교하고, 마지막으로 그 결과를 우리나라의 것과 비교하여 우리나라 금융위기의 특징을 파악하고자 한 것이다.<BR>  우리나라의 금융위기에서 신흥시장국과 북구3국과 마찬가지로 은행의 방만한 대출, 경기침체와 통화위기에 따른 자본유출이 문제가 되고 있으나, 선진국과 동아시아 국가와는 달리 거품경제의 붕괴 등의 문제는 없었다. 우리나라는 위기를 수습하기 위해 선진국과 마찬가지로 중앙은행의 긴급대출과 예금지급의 한시적 보장을 사용하되 일부 중남미 국가와 동아시아 국가처럼 예금지급정지나 자본통제 같은 수단을 사용하지는 않았다. 대부분의 나라에서 금융위기의 충격은 금융시장에서 명목대출금리상승, 주가하락, 환율상승은 물론이고 실질금리상승, 신용경색, 자본유출을 통해 실질경제성장률의 하락으로 나타났지만, 일본 중남미 국가를 제외하면 대부분 나라가 원상태로 복귀하였다. 그런데 우리나라는 실질금리의 뚜렷한 하락세를 보이고 다른 나라와 달리 신용경색은 금융위기 직후에도 잘 나타나지 않았고 북구3국, 중남미 및 동아시아 국가와는 달리 곧바로 자본의 순유입으로 돌아섰다. 실질경제성장률은 북구3국, 동아시아 및 중남미 국가와 마찬가지로 마이너스 성장에서 이전으로 회복하고 있지만 위기 이전보다는 낮다. 그리고 금융구조조정의 방법에서 나라마다 큰 차이가 있는 것은 아니었지만, 우리 나라는 공적자금을 조성하여 선진국과 신흥시장국이 이미 사용한 청산, 인수합병, 매각, 자본재구축, 부실채권 정리, 국유화 등 모든 구조조정 방법을 사용하여 금융구조조정을 실시하였다. 우리나라는 생소하였던 금융위기에 가장 늦게 직면하여 위기 후발국으로서 가장 다양한 금융구조조정 방안을 신속하고도 강력하게 시행한 결과, 인도네시아, 태국 다음으로 상대적으로 많은 비용을 감당하게 되었지만 대신에 금융ㆍ실물경제는 매우 빨리 회복되었다.   This paper studies financial crises, changes of financial and real economy before and after the crises, and financial restructuring of 4 developed large countries, 3 developed small countries, 4 Latin emerging market countries, 4 east Asian emerging market countries, and Korea. First, this paper investigates financial crises and policies for stabilization of these countries. Secondly, it studies changes of financial markets and of macro variables--real interest rate, credit to private sector, net inflow of capital, and real economic growth rate before and after the crises. Thirdly, it studies the financial sector restructuring for managing banking crises and currency crises, and the consequences of these policies. Finally, it compares the experiences of Korea with the those of other countries.<BR>  Korea experienced private loan boom, economic stagnation, net outflow of capital just like emerging market countries and 3 Nordic countries, but didn"t experience the bubble economy that most developed countries had before banking crises. Some emerging market countries used capital control and deposit freezes to stabilize the banking system, but Korea didn"t.<BR>  Most countries experienced nominal interest hike, stock price fall, depreciation, real interest hike, credit crash, net outflow of capital, and economic stagnation after financial crises. Although Korea also experienced these impacts of financial crises like other countries, impacts on Korean economy were stronger, the credit crash didn"t appear, and the crisis of Korea lasted shorter than the crises of other countries.<BR>  The main restructuring strategies or policies to restore financial stability were not quite different among countries. Korea used all available policies, for example, public funded recapitalization, merge and acquisition, other restructuring measures and nationalization of commercial banks, all of which emerging market countries as well as developed countries had already used. Korea could restore the confidence of financial system more quickly than any other countries with the help of these policies, but the cost of restructuring were higher than in other countries.

연구개발비지출과 기업가치 관련성에 관한연구- IMF외환위기와 글로벌위기 비교분석

김형주,강호영 한국회계정보학회 2012 회계정보연구 Vol.30 No.3

The subjects of this study are manufacturing industry and service industry. This study empirically analyzed relationship between R&D expenditures and corporate value by dividing the period of 23 years from 1988 to 2010 into IMF financial crisis and global crisis. This study predicted that there would be different influences of R&D expenditures upon corporate value according to period - before and after IMF financial crisis, before and after global crisis. This is because IMF financial crisis and global crisis highly affected corporate management and the difference was clear. The study results in short are as follows. The relationship between R&D expenditures and corporate value in the period of before and after IMF financial crisis was not statistically significant. On the contrary, the relationship between R&D expenditures and corporate value in the period of before and after global crisis showed significance level of 1% and positive(+) correlation. Through the empirical analysis, it is found out that R&D expenditures plan considering corporate value in the various financial environments which can happen in the future would raise head start response. For individual corporate, necessity of R&D expenditures as a tool to respond to future competitiveness in the uncertainty would contribute to as factor providing motive. To do this, influences of two financial crises upon corporate were compared, and relationship between R&D expenditures and corporate value according to changes in financial environment was investigated. This study provided implications that variables such as current ratio, debt ratio, internal cash flow, corporate size etc. used as control variable are major financial and non-financial index of corporate in the situation like financial crisis, especially, soundness of corporate financial structure is main means for overcoming crisis. 본 연구는 제조업과 서비스업을 대상으로 1988년부터 2010년까지 23년간을 IMF외환위기와 글로벌위기로 구분하여 연구개발비지출과 기업가치 관련성을 실증 분석하였다. 본 연구는 IMF외환위기와 글로벌위기가 우리경제에 미친 영향이 지대하였으므로, 기업경영에도 많은 영향을 미쳤을 것으로 보았다. 따라서 기업의 연구개발비지출이 기업 가치에 미친 영향도 IMF외환위기 전․후와 글로벌위기 전․후가 다르게 나타날 것으로 예측하였다. 연구결과를 요약하면, IMF외환위기 전․후에는 연구개발비지출과 기업가치 관련성이 통계적으로 유의하지 않았다. 반면 글로벌위기 전․후에는 연구개발비지출과 기업가치 관련성이 대체로 1% 유의수준에 양(+)의 관련성으로 나타났다. 본 연구는 두 차례 금융위기에 각각의 금융환경 변화에 따른 연구개발비지출과 기업가치 관련성 실증분석에서 나타난 차이점을 통해, 미래 발생가능 한 다양한 금융환경에 선재적인 대응력을 높임과 동시에, 불확실성 속에서 미래경쟁력 향상을 계획하며, 동기부여 요인으로 기여할 것으로 보인다. 본 연구에서 통제변수로 활용한 유동비율, 부채비율, 내부현금흐름, 기업규모 등의 변수는 금융위기와 같은 상황 속에서 주요한 기업의 재무적․비재무적 지표이며, 특히 기업 재무구조의 견실성은 연구개발비투자와 함께 기업가치 인식에 주요 지표임이 시사점으로 나타났다.

금융위기 극복을 위한 우리나라의 법적 대응 - 1997년 금융·외환위기 및 최근의 글로벌 금융위기를 중심으로 -

노철우 한국경영법률학회 2013 經營法律 Vol.23 No.3

The main purpose of this study to review the legal responses to the financial and currency crisis in 1997 and the recent global financial crisis for overcoming the crises in Korea. The Korean Government has tried to enact and amend financial laws in order to promote the financial sector restructuring in Korea and propose reform measures on them. The first chapter deals with the purpose, scope, and method of this study. The second chapter studies the definition of financial and currency crisis, and the relationship between economic crisis and financial and currency crisis. In the third chapter, I review the occurrence of the financial and currency crisis in 1997 and the legal responses to the crisis. I analyze the enactments and amendments of financial laws whose main purposes were to promote the financial sector restructuring in Korea which could be divided into 3-stages. In the fourth chapter, I review the occurrence, causes of the recent global financial crisis and the legal responses in Korea to the crisis. I analyze the enactments and amendments of financial laws whose main purposes were to get over the crisis. In the fifth chapter, I suggest the estimation and problems of the legal responses in Korea to the financial and currency crisis in 1997 and the recent global financial crisis. The financial laws of the United States of America and the other financially well-developed countries influenced the enactments and amendments of the Korean financial laws, which resulted in measure- ments in overcoming the crises, made the Korean financial laws advanced to the level of well-developed countries, helped the competi- tiveness of Korean financial industry to be raised, and provided a momentum for researching the Korean financial laws in detail. We should research hard the financial laws of financially well- developed countries to introduce good legal systems from them for our country. When enacting and amending the financial laws in the future, the Government should do in a timely manner and with adequate discussions on them. We also should carry out the reorganization of financial supervisory system and central banking system in Korea in the near future following the examples of the U.S.A. and the United Kingdom.

Getting Global Financial Stability Through Precautionary Principle

Jin Yul Ju 서울국제법연구원 2012 서울국제법연구 Vol.19 No.2

1976년 브레튼우즈 체제 붕괴 이후부터 2012년 오늘날까지 국제사회는 거의 10년을 주기로 심각한 국제금융위기를 겪어 왔지만 국제금융시장의 안정화를 위한 국제법제도를 마련하지 못하고 있다. 1930년대 대공황 이후 세계경제에 가장 큰 악영향을 미친 금융위기로 평가되는 2008년 위기의 주범으로 샤도우뱅킹과 장외파생상품과 같이 그 파급효과를 전혀 예측할 수 없는 대단히 복잡하고 불확실한 투기적 금융관행이 지목되고 있음에도 불구하고, 미국을 비롯한 주요 금융선진국은 이러한 투기적 관행을 금지시키지 않고 있다. 현재 주요 금융 선진국이나 국제금융기구는 기존의 수리통계학적 리스크분석방식에 기초한 금융리스크관리법으로 글로벌금융시장의 안정화를 추구하고 있지만, 이러한 방식으로는 복잡한 투기적 금융관행으로 인한 글로벌금융위기의 재발을 사전에 방지할 수가 없다. 글로벌금융시장의 안정화를 위해서는 사전주의적 차원에서 그 파급효과의 예측이 불가능한 투기적 금융관행을 국내입법과 국제조약을 통해 전면 금지해야 할 필요가 있다. 그런데 투기적 금융관행일 수록 금융계의 큰 수입원이 되고, 글로벌금융시장을 사실상 지배하고 있는 소수 국가들의 정부와 국제금융기구가 금융업계의 로비에 포획되어 있기 때문에, 투기적 금융관행에 대한 사전주의적 금지입법이 쉽지는 않을 것으로 보인다. Today international society faces a challenge in addressing the global financial crises. Despites never-ending debating on the key causes of financial crises, it seems quite certain that there do exist a great deal of "uncertainty" in global financial market. Unlike risk, uncertainty cannot be forecasted by statistical inference. For instance, over-the-count derivatives are too complex to predict whether they can cause financial crisis or not. While some says that derivatives enhance economic efficiency, others criticize that derivatives are "financial weapons of mass destruction." At any rate, the recent global financial crisis well shows that any scientific risk assessment of too-complex-to-predict (TCTP) financial practices can never forecast future crisis. If it is true that financial industry did not intend to cause the 2007-8 financial turmoil and the governments were not aware of a possibility of crisis, it can be assumed that TCTP practices have unintended economic consequences which makes the lives of ordinary people worse. This paper argues that TCTP financial practice should be considered as "potentially dangerous" for the purpose of global financial stability. Of course there is an uncertainty whether a particular TCTP practice would really cause financial crisis. In regard to this, this paper finds that global financial system can be analogized to complex ecosystem where the consequences of human actions are not predictable and the Precautionary Principle (PP) says that uncertainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prohibit TCTP human behaviors. In this context, this article suggests that the PP should be introduced to deal with TCTP financial practices. Of course there are critiques of the PP. It is true that the PP can be misused in some circumstances where unreasonable and speculative fears of future harms are exaggerated. But when considering already-happened catastrophic financial crises, fears of next crises can never be considered as unreasonable and speculative. Moreover, when considering a possibility that large fiscal expansion to mitigate private financial sectors crisis causes another sovereign debt crisis, it is highly needed to introduce the PP in dealing with TCTP practices. As the PP may have various forms in different contexts, the argument for it is just a starting point. To have a real meaning in the real world, the PP is required to be more specified. This article argues that the strongest form of the PP should be introduced. It must be financial firms, rather than the government or the public, who bear the burden of proof that TCTE practices would not cause financial crisis. As far as potentially dangerous practices give financial firms a chance of astronomical amount of money, TCTP practices will be nothing more than rational choice for them. If financial industry fails to prove it, the governments should prohibit a TCTE practice in question to protect the lives of ordinary people which are particularly vulnerable to financial crisis.

미국의 서브프라임 금융위기와 헤지펀드 규제 동향

윤성승 국제거래법학회 2008 國際去來法硏究 Vol.17 No.2

Hedge funds are a type of private equity funds. During the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis, big hedge funds with huge loss from the investment to collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) based on residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs) were collapsed. Since hedge funds are located in the center of the crisis, there are still debates whether hedge funds were the cause of financial crisis or hedge funds just increased the effects of the subprime financial crisis. The subprime financial crisis was caused by the melting down of the value of subprime mortgage loans and assets. It was triggered by the decreased residential housing value and the increased default rates of loan payments. The collapse of some hedge funds is the result of such changes of housing market. Thus hedge funds are one of the victims of the subprime crisis. After some huge hedge funds were bankrupted or suspended redemption, the market for transactions of RMBSs or CDOs based on RMBSs was almost stopped. This made impossible for the financial institutions heavily engaged in subprime mortgage loans to meet the depositors’ demand when the deposit run happened because they could not sell their loans using RMBSs to make liquidity. Even though hedge funds are not the cause of the crisis, the impact of super huge hedge funds’ collapse was very strong to other financial institutions such as banks. Thus the issue of hedge fund regulation attracted attentions from many commentators after the subprime mortgage crisis. However, there are still pros and cons about the hedge fund regulation. Major issues related to the hedge fund regulation are leverage level, transparency, and fraud by hedge fund. Highly leveraged hedge funds increase the risks as well as the potential of high return. Since hedge funds are investing to the assets with high risk to get high absolute returns, the fund managers must provide to the investors the information regarding the changes of the strategies, valuation, and composition of their portfolio assets with timely basis. If hedge funds’ managers do not provide material information or provide untrue information to the investors about the hedge funds, the investors will receive loss by the fraudulent act. Even though several years before the subprime crisis, there were recommendations by the U.S. President’s Working Group and by the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), respectively, after the Long-Term Capital Management’s collapse, both reports did not recommend direct regulation on hedge funds. Instead they recommended increasing transparency and enforcing counterparties risk management. After the subprime financial crisis, FSF still recommended indirect regulation of the hedge funds even though it added some additional items such as changes in role and uses of credit rating agencies regarding structured products. Recently, the International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) made recommendations regarding possible future IOSCO works in the report on the subprime crisis. It recommended indirect regulations such as increase of transparency in structured finance transactions, improvement of risk management practices and valuation of structured finance products, and increase of quality and integrity of the rating process on structured products by credit rating agencies. Before the subprime crisis, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) tried to regulate hedge funds by requiring registration using Rule 203(b)(3)-2(Hedge Fund Rule) under Investment Advisors Act of 1940. However, such rule was invalidated by the court decision because it is against the purpose of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940. Nevertheless, SEC introduced alternatively new Rule 207(4)-8 (Anti-fraud Rule) to regulate hedge fund fraud by the investment advisor of the fund. This year SEC filed a civil suit against the managers of two hedge funds operated by Bear Stearns Asset Management, when they was collapsed and incurred huge loss to the inve... Hedge funds are a type of private equity funds. During the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis, big hedge funds with huge loss from the investment to collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) based on residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs) were collapsed. Since hedge funds are located in the center of the crisis, there are still debates whether hedge funds were the cause of financial crisis or hedge funds just increased the effects of the subprime financial crisis. The subprime financial crisis was caused by the melting down of the value of subprime mortgage loans and assets. It was triggered by the decreased residential housing value and the increased default rates of loan payments. The collapse of some hedge funds is the result of such changes of housing market. Thus hedge funds are one of the victims of the subprime crisis. After some huge hedge funds were bankrupted or suspended redemption, the market for transactions of RMBSs or CDOs based on RMBSs was almost stopped. This made impossible for the financial institutions heavily engaged in subprime mortgage loans to meet the depositors’ demand when the deposit run happened because they could not sell their loans using RMBSs to make liquidity. Even though hedge funds are not the cause of the crisis, the impact of super huge hedge funds’ collapse was very strong to other financial institutions such as banks. Thus the issue of hedge fund regulation attracted attentions from many commentators after the subprime mortgage crisis. However, there are still pros and cons about the hedge fund regulation. Major issues related to the hedge fund regulation are leverage level, transparency, and fraud by hedge fund. Highly leveraged hedge funds increase the risks as well as the potential of high return. Since hedge funds are investing to the assets with high risk to get high absolute returns, the fund managers must provide to the investors the information regarding the changes of the strategies, valuation, and composition of their portfolio assets with timely basis. If hedge funds’ managers do not provide material information or provide untrue information to the investors about the hedge funds, the investors will receive loss by the fraudulent act. Even though several years before the subprime crisis, there were recommendations by the U.S. President’s Working Group and by the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), respectively, after the Long-Term Capital Management’s collapse, both reports did not recommend direct regulation on hedge funds. Instead they recommended increasing transparency and enforcing counterparties risk management. After the subprime financial crisis, FSF still recommended indirect regulation of the hedge funds even though it added some additional items such as changes in role and uses of credit rating agencies regarding structured products. Recently, the International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) made recommendations regarding possible future IOSCO works in the report on the subprime crisis. It recommended indirect regulations such as increase of transparency in structured finance transactions, improvement of risk management practices and valuation of structured finance products, and increase of quality and integrity of the rating process on structured products by credit rating agencies. Before the subprime crisis, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) tried to regulate hedge funds by requiring registration using Rule 203(b)(3)-2(Hedge Fund Rule) under Investment Advisors Act of 1940. However, such rule was invalidated by the court decision because it is against the purpose of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940. Nevertheless, SEC introduced alternatively new Rule 207(4)-8 (Anti-fraud Rule) to regulate hedge fund fraud by the investment advisor of the fund. This year SEC filed a civil suit against the managers of two hedge funds operated by Bear Stearns Asset Management, when they was collapsed and incurred huge loss to the investo...

글로벌 금융위기에 관한 정치경제학적 분석

황준성 ( Jun Seong Hwang ),윤여협 ( Yeo Hyub Yoon ) 한독경상학회 2009 經商論叢 Vol.27 No.3

현 글로벌 금융위기는 신흥시장이 아닌 미국경제에 그 근원이 있고, 그 위기가 현재 세계적위기로 확산되었다는 점에서 가장 큰 특징이 있다. 본 논문에서는 현 미국 금융위기의 주요원인이 세계적 불균형(global imbalance)과 금융기관들의 경기 순응적 레버리지(procyclical leverage) 관리방식에 있고, 위기의 세계적 전염 문제의 중심에 글로벌 금융자본의 자유로운 이동이 존재한다고 분석하였다. 금번 미국 발 글로벌 금융위기를 포함한 최근의 금융위기의 만개는 1980년대 이래 추진된 금융자유화와 금융세계화의 진전에 따라 발생한 것이다. 그리고 분명한 것은 위기의 중심에서 글로벌 금융자본이 주요한 역할을 하고 있다는 점이다. 따라서 위기와 심화와 재발을 막기 위해서는 국내 신용 시스템과 글로벌 금융자본에 대한 보다 단호한 규제와 감독 시스템을 포함한 통제방안이 필요하고, 금융위기의 전염을 막는 공적, 집단적, 국제적인 금융질서의 개혁논의가 더욱 활성화되어야 한다. The global financial crisis of 2008~2009 began in July 2007 when a loss of confidence by investors in the value of securitized mortgages in the U.S. resulted in a liquidity crisis that prompted a substantial injection of capital into financial markets by the U.S.Federal Reserve, Bank of England and the European Central Bank. The TED spread, an indicator of perceived credit risk in the general economy, spiked up in July 2007, remained volatile for a year, then spiked even higher in September 2008, reaching a record 4.65% on October 2008. In September 2008, the crisis deepened, as stock markets worldwide crashed and entered a period of high volatility, and a considerable number of banks, mortgage lenders and insurance companies failed. The financial crisis is remarkable in several ways; being now very much a global affair, even though the crisis started in the U.S. housing market; the roots of the crisis lie not in the emerging markets but in the U.S. market which is the center of global financial market. This paper analyzes the fragility of global imbalance and pro-cyclical leverage actions of the U.S financial institutions as the main factors that have contributed to current financial crises. The authors also examine that international financial flows are the propagation mechanism for contaminating financial instability across borders. The recent wave of financial crises has followed the surge in global financial flows since 1980s. It became clear that leveraged global financial intermediaries-commercial banks, hedge funds, mutual funds-have played major roles at the heart of financial market melt-down. Under these circumstances, in order to curb the recurrence of financial crises, the policies are required to manage domestic credit systems as well as the international flows. They, specifically, include increased government controls on the global financial capital, strong surveillance of private and international capital market, and a reform of the international monetary and financial system which provides all countries with well-functioning collective insurance against financial crises and protect them from the contamination of financial crises.

장부가치와 순이익의 상대적인 가치관련성 : 1997년 경제위기의 영향을 중심으로

김정옥,배길수 韓國公認會計士會 2009 회계·세무와 감사 연구 Vol.50 No.-

본 연구는 장부가치와 순이익의 상대적 가치관련성이 외환위기 전과, 외환위기 중, 그리고 외환위기 후에 어떻게 달라지는지를 조사한다. 우리나라는 1997년 외환위기를 겪었고, 이로 인해 수많은 기업이 도산을 하였으며, 도산을 하지 않은 기업에게도 도산이 현실적인 위협으로 존재하였다. 이 같은 경제환경하에서는 기업의 가치평가에 계속기업 가정하에서 의미가 큰 순이익의 중요성은 상대적으로 감소하고 대신 장부가치는 그 비중이 증가할 것이라는 것을 예측할 수 있다. 이에 본 연구는 외환위기가 기업가치 평가에 직접적인 영향을 주었는지를 실증분석하고자 한다. 이를 위해 본 연구는 표본기간을 외환위기기간과 비외환위기기간으로 나누어 사용하며, 더 나아가 비외환위기기간은 외환위기 전과 외환위기 후로 기간을 나누어 분석한다. 또한 도산가능성과 토빈의 Q를 사용하여 이들이 본 연구의 가설에 추가적으로 미치는 영향을 분석한다. 연구결과 외환위기 기간에는 장부가치의 주가설명력이 외환위기 전과 후에 비해 높아지는 반면 순이익의 주가설명력은 낮아졌다. 이는 도산가능성이 높은 기업에서 더욱 높았다. 또한 외환위기 기간에는 토빈의 Q가 1보다 큰 기업에서 장부가치의 상대적 가치관련성이 순이익에 비해 높았다. 한편 비외환위기 기간을 외환위기전과 후로 나누어 분석한 결과 외환위기 기간과 외환위기 후는 모두 외환위기전 기간에 비해 장부가치의 주가관련성이 유사하게 낮았다. 그러나 외환위기후에는 순이익의 가치관련성이 외환위기기간에 갖는 낮은 값에서 외환위기전으로 회귀하는 데 그치지 않고 더 나아가 가치관련성이 증가하였다. We investigate whether the financial crisis influence on the value relevance of accounting figures (between net book value and net income). Specifically, we examine the differences in the value relevance of accounting figures before, during, and after the 1997 financial crisis. To support our hypothesis, additionally we analysis our main hypothesis using the probability of bankruptcy and tobin's Q. Many investors mainly use the income statement(especially net income) to evaluate the potential growth and the future cash flow of firm. However, the book value play a important role to estimate the liquidation value of firm when the firm confront the risk of bankruptcy. If we view in that kind of point, the financial crisis in Korea provide the important chance to evaluate the value relevance change. Because several firms went bankrupt or confronted the risk of bankruptcy during the financial crisis period, we can examine the difference in value relevance of accounting figures between the financial crisis period and the non-financial crisis period. Therefore this paper investigate whether the difference of relative portion in accounting figures will be affected by the economic condition. Our hypothesis are as follow; First, we expect that the value relevance of net book value will be higher than the net income during the financial crisis period relative to non-financial crisis period. The risk of bankruptcy will be higher during crisis rather than non-financial crisis period. Therefore investors focus on the net book value in financial crisis period, whereas in non-financial crisis period investor place the relative importance on the net income. Because the book value indicates the liquidation value of firm, investor focus on the book value during the crisis. Second, the differences in value relevance of accounting figures during financial crisis will be affected on the probability of bankruptcy. We use Altman et al.(1995)'s measure as the proxy of the probability of bankruptcy. Third, we posit that the value relevance of accounting figures will differ between before and after the financial crisis. Because the regulations and rules related to accounting information were changed due to financial crisis. Therefore we expect that the quality of accounting information increased after financial crisis. If that is correct, the relative value relevance of net income will be increased. But we cannot expect whether the increased quality of financial information positively relate with the increasing value relevance of net income or book value. Finally, the differences in value relevance between before and after the financial crisis will be affected on the probability of bankruptcy. And also, we reexamine the hypothesis including the tobin's Q. We find that the value relevance net book value (net income) increased (decreased) during the financial crisis period. This is more pronounced in the case of the firms that have higher probability of bankruptcy. In addition, value relevance of net book value is higher in firms with tobin's Q greater than 1. When the sample is further divided into before, during, and after the crisis, value relevance of net book value both before and during the financial crisis is higher relative to that after the financial crisis. Net income after the crisis, however, did not simply recover relevance it lost during the crisis, but has greater relevance relative to that before the crisis.

글로벌 금융위기의 원인과 국제적인 금융개혁의 동향

김용재 ( Yong Jae Kim ) 고려대학교 법학연구원 2011 고려법학 Vol.0 No.60

At present, worldwide financial reform is underway. For instance, on July 21, 2010, the U.S. President signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (hereinafter the Dodd-Frank Act), which would clear away greed and abuses prevalent in the U.S. financial system before. Regulatory reform in one country is not sufficient to put the global crisis out. Rather, simultaneous reforms all around the world are certainly desirable to get rid of most problems arising from the global financial crisis. This paper will see a broader picture of the global financial crisis, and provide a deep understanding of the crisis, its causes and effects, and the international effort to restore global financial stability. Then, this paper will analyze the Dodd-Frank Act in detail based on the picture and understandings of the global financial crisis. Thus, this paper is quite different from other published papers just focusing on the Dodd-Frank Act per se. The global financial crisis has shown how all nations and peoples are closely interconnected to. A remarkable fact about the crisis is the international cooperation such as G-20 and international reforms it has evoked. This international cooperation is the most important reason why the world has escaped economic collapse so fast and easily. The global economic crisis having occurred since the summer of 2007 is a surprising event without an equivalent case in modern economic history. The world had experienced many economic downturns in the business cycle before, but has never experienced the current Great Recession triggered by near-collapse of the global financial system. The present crisis is also unique because its origin comes from the United States, which has been a strong source of world economy since the second World War. In addition, the crisis exposed the weaknesses of global economic and financial institutions including the IMF and the World Bank since they were completely powerless to remedy the crisis. Stagflation could be avoided only by coordinations by national governments taking active steps rewarding the very people who were responsible for the crisis. The United States which are the cornerstone of the global financial crisis has enacted comprehensive and remarkable reforms which would made fundamental changes to the post Great Fall financial systems established in 1930s. At this time, therefore, it is appropriate to examine the crisis, to determine what happened and why in the past, to analyze current financial regulatory reforms and to suggest future necessary steps to overcome the crisis completely. All these issues will be dealt from Chapter Ⅱ.

한국 금융기관의 위기대응력에 대한 연구

김동옥,양철원 한국기업경영학회 2013 기업경영연구 Vol.20 No.6

This paper analyzes whether Korean financial institutions raised the confrontational ability to crisis or maintained their risk culture (or business model) after experiencing crisis. We investigate which is the more relevant for Korean financial institutions between risk culture hypothesis versus learning hypothesis. Analyses in this paper are related to those presented in Fahlenbrach et al. (Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz, 2012, hereafter FPS). We set the 1997 crisis as a preceding crisis and the 2008 crisis as a posterior crisis. Firstly, 2008 crisis return (holding period return of financial institutions’ common stock) is negatively associated with 1997 crisis return. This negative association is outstanding among financial institutions excluding 6 firms in the category of ‘other financial industry’ which is far from the nature of financial business. This is the evidence supporting the learning hypothesis. Korean financial institutions had not maintained their unique risk culture or business model. Secondly, we examine the financial ratios to check how Korean financial institutions changed. Generally activity, profitability, and stability were improved. The results show that financial institutions with decreased borrowing to asset ratio had improved return performance during the 2008 crisis. We also find the decreasing pattern of this ratio just before the 2008 crisis for financial institutions who worse performed in 1997 and the increasing pattern for those who better performed during the preceding crisis. This finding leads us to conclude that relatively bad performers during the preceding crisis, through learning effect, tried to decrease borrowing to asset ratio to raise the confrontational ability to crisis. The results in this paper indicate that Korean financial institutions learned from the preceding crisis (1997 crisis) experience and then tried to minimize the effects from coming negative shocks (2008 crisis). The learning hypothesis is more appropriate than the risk culture hypothesis for Korean case. We guess the reasons of the different result from that of FPS which supports risk culture hypothesis are as follows: (1) weak Korean financial institutions’ risk culture from short history compared to that of US financial institutions; (2) different strength of financial regulation: strong financial regulation in Korea after the preceding crisis but financial deregulation in US; and (3) different strength of the crises: relatively weak shock after greater shock in Korea but greater shock after relatively weak shock in US. Ignorance of effective controlling for survivorship bias, even though it seems not to be serious, is the limitation of this study and remains as a future assignment. We expect that practical guidelines for build-up of confrontational ability to crisis are provided by the more detailed research on learning contents of Korean financial institutions from the crisis experience. 본 연구는 한국 금융기관들이 위기경험 후 학습을 통하여 위기대응력을 제고시켰는지 또는 위기 경험에도 불구하고 위험문화(또는 사업모델)를 유지하였는지에 대하여 살펴보았다. 1997년과 2008년의 금융 위기를 각각 선행위기와 후행위기로 하여 Fahlenbrach et al.(2012)이 제시한 학습효과가설(learning hypothesis)과 위험문화가설(risk culture hypothesis)을 중심으로 검증하였다. 첫째, 후행위기인 2008년 금융위기 기간의 금융기관 주식수익률을 선행위기인 1997년 금융위기의 주식수익률로 회귀분석을 시행하였다. 그 결과 2008년 위기기간 금융기관 주식수익률은 1997년 위기기간 금융기관 주식수익률과 음(-)의 상관관계를 보였으며, 이는 한국 금융기관들이 자신만의 독특한 위험문화를 유지하기 보다는 차기 금융위기에 대응할 수 있도록 학습하였음을 의미한다. 둘째, 개별 재무비율 변화가 수익률 개선에 어떠한 영향을 미쳤는지 살펴보기 위하여 재무비율 변화(2008~1997)를 설명변수로 위기수익률 차이(2008~1997)를 종속변수로 하여 회귀분석을 실시한 한 결과, 차입금의존도가 하락한 금융기관들의 실적이 유의적으로 개선되었음을 확인하였다. 또한, 선행위기 시에 상대적으로 수익률이 양호했던 금융기관들의 차입금의존도는 후행위기 직전 상승하는 양상을 보이고 있으나 선행위기 시에 상대적으로 수익률이 저조했던 금융기관들의 차입금의존도는 하락하는 양상을 보이고 있어, 선행위기 시 실적이 저조했던 금융기관들이, 학습효과로 인하여, 위기대응 목적으로 차입금의존도 하락을 위해 노력했음을 확인할 수 있다.