기업구조조정 세법의 개선 방안 연구 - 법적 체계와 조문 형식을 중심으로-

정래용 ( Rae-young Chung ),최헌섭 ( Hun-seop Choi ) 홍익대학교 법학연구소 2016 홍익법학 Vol.17 No.4

우리나라의 현행 기업구조조정 지원 세제는 그 내용이 매우 복잡하고 다양할 뿐 아니라 이해하기도 쉽지 않음에도 불구하고 여러 세법에 산재되어 규정하고 있거나 같은 법률 내에서도 규정의 배열에 있어 논리적인 일관성이 부족하여 법적 체계성 문제가 제기되고 있다. 이로 인해 기업이나 과세관청 등에서 동 기업구조조정 지원 세제를 이용하거나 집행하는데 적지 않은 어려움이 초래되고 있으며 이는 결국 기업구조조정을 저해하는 원인이 되고 있다. 본 연구는 위와 같은 문제의식에 기초하여 기업구조조정 세법 체계 및 조문 형식의 개선 방안을 제시하기 위한 것이다. 연구 결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째 합병과 분할 세제는 법인세법에 규정되어 있으나 합병은 우리나라에서 현실적으로 기업구조조정 수단으로 간주되고 있다는 점, 합병 세제는 세수확보 목적보다 적격합병을 유도하여 기업의 연속성 유지를 지원하는 목적이라는 점, 합병은 분할이나 현물출자 등 다른 기업구조조정 지원 세제에 원용되는 규정이 적지 않다는 점 그리고 입법 기술 측면에서 적격합병의 경우 미국은 처음부터 양도손익을 인식하지 않고 과세를 이연하나 우리나라는 합병을 양도로 규정하여 양도손익 인식을 원칙으로 한 다음 적격합병에 따른 과세특례를 적용하여 과세를 이연시키는 방법을 택하고 있으므로 합병과세규정이 조세특례제한법에 규정되어야 할 특례규정 성격이라는 점 등을 고려하여 독일이나 중국처럼 기업구조조정 세제에 포함시켜야 한다. 분할도 원칙이 합병과 동일하다. 둘째, 가업승계와 가업상속 세제는 상속세 과세를 후대로 이연시킨다는 점에서 그 성격이 합병이나 분할과 유사하나 각각 조세특례제한법과 상속세 및 증여세법에 규정하고 있는 것은 불합리하므로 조세특례제한법으로 통일시키는 것이 바람직하다. 셋째, 재무구조개선계획에 따른 구조조정 세제 6개 규정은 조세특례제한법의 기업구조 조정 부문에 산재되어 규정되고 있으나(1개 규정은 법인세법) 별도의 장으로 묶어서 통일적으로 규정하는 것이 바람직하다. 넷째, 기업구조조정 세제의 법적 체계성 구비 방안은 현행 조세특례제한법 제5장의10 사업재편계획을 위한 조세특례를 기업구조조정 세제의 법적 체계성 구비의 표준으로 삼되기업의 연속성 유지 지원을 위한 과세 특례 규정들을 제6장 기업구조조정을 위한 조세특례로 구분하고 재무구조개선계획을 위한 조세지원 6개 규정은 제6장의2 재무구조개선계획을 위한 조세특례로 구분하며 기존 조세특례제한법 제5장의10은 제6장의3으로 구분한다. Current tax codes to support corporate restructuring in Korea are complex and diverse, not yielding to easy understanding. One point of regulation is often spread across various tax codes; even within a single legislation, arrangement of provisions lack logical coherence, raising an issue of legal system. This has led to significant difficulties on the part of firms and tax authorities who seek to benefit from or execute corporate restructuring support tax codes. This in turn has created an obstacle in corporate restructuring. This study recognises such shortcoming and seeks to propose improvements in tax code system and the style of provisions in support of corporate restructuring. The findings are as follows. First, mergers and demerger tax codes are defined in corporate tax law, but in reality, merger is considered a means of corporate restructuring in Korea. The primary purpose of merger tax code is not to raise tax revenue but rather to induce appropriate merger to support corporate sustainability. Much of merger tax codes is invoked in other corporate restructuring tax codes such as demerger or investment in kind. Furthermore, in terms of legislative technicalities, for appropriate mergers, whereas they postpone taxation without recognising transfer profit in the U.S., Korean tax practice sees merger as transfer and in principle recognizes transfer profit before postponing taxation through the application of special tax codes for appropriate merger; this means that merger tax codes are in effect special regulations which should be defined in Tax Reduction and Exemption Control Act and, like in Germany or China, be included in corporate restructuring tax codes. The same principle applies to demerger. Second, in the case of family business succession and corporate inheritance tax codes, although they are similar to the cases of merger or demerger in that they postpone inheritance tax to the next generation, they are each defined in Tax Reduction and Exemption Control Act and in Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act. This is illogical; unification of tax codes under Tax Reduction and Exemption Control Act is recommended. Third, 6 provisions of corporate restructuring tax codes in accordance to financial structure improvement plan are currently stipulated in the corporate restructuring section of Tax Reduction and Exemption Control Act in a sporadic manner (1 code is defined in Corporate Tax Act). These should be defined with coherence in a separate chapter. Fourth, to establish systematic coherence in corporate restructuring tax codes, 10 Article 5 of current Tax Reduction and Exemption Control Act (Tax Reduction for Business Restructuring Plan) should be taken as the basis for establishing a coherent system of corporate restructuring tax codes. Tax reductions in support of corporate sustainability should be separately defined in Article 6, Tax Reduction for Corporate Restructuring. 6 tax benefit provisions for financial structure improvement plan should be defined in Article 6-2Tax Reductions for Financial Structure Improvement Plan. Article 5 -10of the existing Tax Reduction and Exemption Control Act should be organised as Article 6-3.

기업활력제고를 위한 특별법의 문제점과 개선방안

권종호 법무부 2018 선진상사법률연구 Vol.- No.81

It has been a year since the “SPECIAL ACT ON THE CORPORATE REVITALIZATION” was enacted. 46 companies have been approved, SPECIAL ACT is settling down successfully during this period. In spite of these evaluations, however, It is pointed out that the SPECIAL ACT requires legislative improvements to fulfill its functions as a law supporting preemptive corporate restructuring. For this reason, this paper reviews from the perspective of interpretation and legislative on the subject of Problems and Improvement of the SPECIAL ACT. It is necessary to support the preemptive corporate restructuring of the normal company, in Korea. In order to do so, the following amendments are required : First, the SPECIAL ACT will apply to Korean companies which perform corporate restructuring to address oversupply. However, the scope of application should extend to all companies. Second, There is that conducting corporate restructuring jointly. In this case, it is necessary to induce corporate restructuring of the oversupply sector by providing incentives in the application of the SPECIAL ACT and support. Third, if a corporate restructuring approved company joins the new business sector, it is necessary to make a legal supplement to ensure fair competition with existing firms in the field of business. Fourth, Measures should be taken to prevent misuse of the disclosure system of approval facts. Fifth, the corporate restructuring PEF shall be established for the purposes of introducing private capital to the corporate restructuring. Sixth, it will be necessary to prepare guidelines for interpreting legislative purposes to avoid confusion in the deliberation of the Corporate Restructuring Plan Review Committee. 기업활력제고를 위한 특별법이 시행된 지 1년 4개월이 지난 시점에서 67개 기업이 승인을 받았을 만큼 순조롭게 안착하고 있다. 그러나 기활법이 선제적 사업재편을 지원하는 법률로서 제 기능을 다하기 위해서는 입법적인 개선이 필요하다는 지적이 적지 않다. 이에 본고는 기활법의 문제점과 개선방안에 관해 해석론과 입법론적 관점에서 검토한 것이다. 검토한 내용을 정리하면, 정상적인 기업의 선제적 사업재편을 지원하는 법률로서 기활법이 제 역할을 다하려면 다음과 같은 입법조치가 필요하다. 첫째, 현재 과잉공급업종의 기업으로 국한되고 있는 적용범위를 과잉공급업종유무에 관계없이 구조변경이나 사업혁신을 통해 생산성을 향상할 수 있는 기업이면 모두 적용대상으로 하여야 한다. 둘째 과잉공급업종의 둘 이상의 기업이 공동으로 사업재편을 하는 경우에는 기활법의 적용이나 각종 지원에 있어서 편익을 제공함으로써 과잉공급업종 전체의 사업재편을 유도할 필요가 있고, 셋째 기활법상의 각종 지원을 받은 사업재편승인기업이 신사업 분야에 진출하는 경우 그 분야의 기존기업과 공정한 경쟁이 이루어질 수 있도록 필요한 조치를 강구하여야 한다. 넷째 그 외에도 ①승인사실에 관한 공시제도의 악용방지를 위하여 승인된 것은 사업재편에 관한 ‘계획’임을 명확히 하는 방향으로 공시제도를 개선하고, ②규제차익 해소를 위하여 소규모분할제도와 소규모합병제도의 부정합을 해소하며, ③사업재편에 민간자본의 유입을 위하여 사업재편에 특화된 가칭 “사업재편 PEF”를 신설하여야 할 것이다. 그리고 신청기업과의 상담과정이나 사업재편심의위원회 심의과정에서 해석상의 혼란을 피하기 위해서는 입법취지를 살린 해석지침을 마련하는 것도 적극적으로 검토할 필요가 있다.

회계정보의 질과 선제적 구조조정

임주현 한국무역연구원 2019 무역연구 Vol.15 No.4

Purpose - The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of financial reporting quality on firm performance in preemptive corporate restructuring deals in Korea. Design/methodology/approach - The 347 corporate restructuring deals examined in this study was extracted from the S&P Capital IQ database. Multiple regression analysis was performed. Findings - High-quality financial reporting of preemptive corporate restructuring firms is associated with more profitable corporate restructuring, as measured by announced returns. High quality accounting information transparently reflects the past and present financial position and performance, thereby these enhance the estimation of future cash flows of the corporate restructuring firms, and thus this reduces uncertainty about the firms. Therefore, the agreed-upon price about the assets to be sold between the corporate restructuring firm and acquirer is higher and this leads to positive corporate restructuring performance. In addition, the importance of financial reporting quality increases when corporate restructuring firms have high debt ratios. Research Implications or Originality - The quality of accounting information is an important success factor in corporate restructuring.

중국의 기업구조조정세제에 관한 비교법적 연구

윤현석 梨花女子大學校 法學硏究所 2012 法學論集 Vol.17 No.1

China’s corporate restructuring tax system classified the restructuring types of the target with reference to the concept of international tax, and the tax treatment methods are separated into general restructuring and special restructuring in accordance with the terms of the restructuring. Special restructuring tax treatment applies a point ahead of the recognized tax income or loss that may arise in the course of restructuring the tax deferral. From this perspective, China’s corporate restructuring were compared with the Korea’s tax system. China, Korea and Like the company’s restructuring that occurs in the process in order to support taxation issues are resolved. In particular, in order to be exempt from tax the process of corporate restructuring shall conform certain requirements, the requirements of some of our country and China is different. China, unlike Korea, is to prove to the Taxpayer business objectives and no tax avoidance purpose in rational business purpose requirement. Therefore, if not proven to meet the requirements of its reasonable business purpose regardless of whether the other eligibility requirements, the tax burden will occur. Therefore when compared to Korea and China, Korea requires the formal requirements, while China requires substantial requirements. Progress, even if the case of Korea, the restructuring of domestic companies by foreign firms to corporate mergers and acquisitions, domestic and foreign companies, without tax discrimination. However, a 100% stake in enterprises between parties for a non-resident company fully hat on crossing the border corporate restructuring that allowed for the case of China, is extremely limited. Korean companies in China who wish to advance are different between China’s Corporate Restructuring Tax System and Korea’s Corporate Restructuring Tax System, they are the need to recognize that different Systems. That is because damage can occur due to taxation issues, the mergers and acquisitions of Chinese enterprises, or in the process of restructuring among enterprises in China. It is difficult to expand their business in China, and the tax authorities, particularly in China, to demonstrate reasonable business purpose requirement for properly if you do not, the business activities in China will be forced to shrink. 중국의 기업구조조정세제는 국제조세의 개념을 참고로 하여 대상이 되는 구조조정 유형을 분류하고 그 세무처리방법을 일반구조조정과 특별구조조정으로 구분하였다. 특별구조조정의 세무처리를 선택하는 경우에는 구조조정과정에서 발생하는 세무상 소득 또는 손실의 인식시점을 앞당겨 과세이연을 할 수 있도록 함으로써 세부담을 완화 하였다. 이 관점에서 중국의 기업구조조정세제와 우리나라의 세제를 비교 검토하였다. 중국도 우리나라와 마찬가지로 기업의 구조조정을 뒷받침하기 위해서 그 과정에서 발생하는 과세문제를 해결하고 있다. 다만 기업구조조정의 과정에서 발생하는 세부담을 없애기 위해서는 일정한 요건을 요구하고 있고, 그 요건 중 일부가 우리나라와 중국이 다르다. 중국은 우리나라와는 달리 합리적 사업목적요건에서 납세의무자에게 사업목적과 조세회피목적이 없음을 입증하도록 요구하고 있다. 그 합리적 사업목적의 요건이 입증되지 아니한 경우에는 다른 적격요건의 충족여부와 상관없이 세부담이 발생하게 된다. 그러므로 우리나라와 비교할 때 우리나라는 형식적 요건을 요구하는 있는 반면, 중국은 실질적 요건을 요구하고 있다. 우리나라의 경우에는 외국 기업이 우리나라 기업을 인수 합병하는 기업구조조정을 진행하더라도 내외국 기업 간의 과세상 차별은 존재하지 않는다. 그러나 중국은 국경을 넘는 기업구조조정에 대해 비거주자기업간의 100% 지분관계인 완전모자회사에 대해서만 비과세를 허용하고 있어 극히 제한적이라고 할 수 있다. 따라서 중국에 진출하였거나 하고자 하는 우리나라 기업의 입장에서는 중국의 기업구조조정세제가 우리나라와 세제와는 다른 점을 인식할 필요성이 있다. 즉 중국 기업을 인수 합병하거나 중국 내 기업 간 구조조정을 진행하는 과정에서 과세문제로 인한 피해가 발생할 수 있기 때문이다. 특히 중국의 과세당국에게 합리적 사업목적 요건에 대한 입증을 제대로 하지 못하는 경우에는 중국에서의 사업 확장 및 철수 등이 어렵게 될 수 있어 중국 내 기업의 활동이 위축될 수밖에 없을 것이다.

기업개선협약에 대한 소고

이승환 ( Seung Hwan Lee ) 연세대학교 법학연구원 글로벌비즈니스와 법센터 2010 연세 글로벌 비즈니스 법학연구 Vol.2 No.2

The recent financial Crisis brought numerous changes to corporate restructuring in Korean market. In order to overcome the challenges caused by the Crisis and normalize the corporate financial market, insolvent obligations owed by the corporations were needed to be determined and regulated. In other words, the restoration of the corporate financial market depended upon the effective liquidation of insolvent enterprises and the systematic corporate reorganization. Before the Crisis, the Korean government played a major role in dealing with the insolvent enterprises. However, once the Emergency Financing Agreements imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were accepted by the Korean government in exchange for major bailout funds, major reforms in the economic system were required. The previous procedure of composition for insolvency and liquidation became impractical due to the complicated procedure and the lack of specific knowledge for restructuring by the public administrative officials. As this procedure was unsuitable for prompt normalization of the financial market during the Crisis, a new solution was needed and the answer was Corporate Workout. Corporate Workout is a process of corporate restructuring that takes place before a court orders a mandatory bankruptcy proceeding when the creditor financial institutions and the debtor corporation mutually negotiate upon more relaxed conditions of repayment in order to revive the corporation. Hence Corporate Workout procedure is not ruled by the strict bankruptcy laws but is a type of private restructuring agreement governed by the corporate reorganization agreement between the creditors and the debtor. Corporate Workout is consisted of three phases: contracting a corporate workout agreement, financial restructuring and business restructuring. When contracting a corporate workout agreement, the creditor institutions select a target corporation and evaluate the corporation`s financial assets and business structure in order to determine the feasibility for Corporate Workout. Once the parties decide on corporate workout, then they readjust the financial restructure plan and business restructure plan. Corporate Workout is thus a process of settlement and discussion in which the creditor financial institutions and the debtor corporation contract a corporate reorganization agreement in order to normalize the corporation by readjusting the repayment plan and restructuring. Corporate Workout is a private agreement that lacks a court`s binding enforcement, but many codes are being revised to incorporate Corporate Workout as a dependable method of corporate restructuring. For Corporate Workout to be successfully implemented, the corporate community first must raise expert arbitrators who can foster understanding and cooperation between the creditors and the corporations. Also, when Corporate Workout cannot be easily implemented on its own, the law should include Corporate Workout in the corporate restructuring system.

중국의 구조조정세제에 관한 연구

유호림 한국세무학회 2010 세무와 회계저널 Vol.11 No.3

중국의 구조조정세제는 1990년대 후반 외자기업의 조세회피를 규제하고 내자기업의 원활한 구조조정을 지원하여 자국 기업의 국제경쟁력을 제고하기 위한 수단으로 도입되었다. 그러나, 2008년 세제개혁을 통해 내자기업소득세법과 외자기업소득세법이 통합되었음에 불구하고 구조조정세제에 대하여는 적절한 개정이 이루어지지 아니하였다. 그 결과 구조조정세제의 법적 근거가 모호해지고, 내자기업과 외자기업의 구조조정에 대하여 세법상 차별적인 규정을 그대로 적용하고 있어,구조조정세제가 오히려 기업의 합리적인 구조조정을 저해하고 조세공평을 저해한다는 비판을 받게되었다. 이에, 중국 과세당국은 2009년과 2010년에 선진국의 구조조정세제를 참조하여 새로운 구조조정세제를 시행하고 있는바, 개편된 중국의 구조조정세제는 주로 다음과 같은 특징을 보인다. 첫째,기업구조조정의 유형을 기업법률형태의 전환․채무조정․합병(분할)․자산인수․지분인수 등으로세분하고 각 유형별 과세규정을 보완․신설하였다. 둘째, 내외자기업의 차별규정을 철폐하고 역외구조조정에 관한 규정을 신설하는 등 구조조정세제를 선진화․국제화 하였다. 셋째, 일정 요건을만족하는 구조조정에 대하여는 과세소득을 이연하거나 면제할 수 있는 면세구조조정 개념을 도입하였다. 넷째, 구조조정거래의 판정에 있어서 실질과세의 원칙을 명문화하고 사후관리를 강화하는등 조세회피목적의 구조조정에 대한 제한규정을 강화하였다. 그러나, 중국의 현행 구조조정세제는 사회주의 시장경제체제가 가지는 한계점 및 이에 기인한 관련 법률의 미비로 인해 다음과 같은 한계점을 드러내고 있다. 첫째, 현행 중국의 구조조정세제에서는 삼각합병․역합병 등 새로운 합병형태에 관한 규정이 미비되어 있을 뿐 아니라, 분할의 경우에도 물적분할과 인적분할 등에 관하여도 세법상 명확한 규정을 두고 있지 않아 이에 대한 보완이필요하다. 둘째, 면세구조조정의 주요 요건인 지분(주식)의 계산에 있어서 지분(주식)의 종류를 명확히 하고 있지 않다는 문제점이 제기되고 있으며, 조세회피목적의 판단 기준이 되는 실질과세의원칙이 포괄적으로 규정되어 있어 과세관청의 자의적인 판단이 개입할 여지가 매우 크다. 셋째, 현행 중국의 구조조정세제에서는 납세의무자의 구조조정거래가 면세구조조정의 요건을 만족하는지의 여부에 대하여 납세의무자인 기업에게 과도한 입증책임 및 자료제출의무를 부담지우고 있는바,합리적인 기업구조조정에 대한 세제지원을 위하여는 개선이 필요한 부분이라 할 것이다. 한편, 중국은 2008년부터 기업소득세법을 통합하여 내자기업과 외자기업에 공히 적용하고 있으므로, 새로이 시행되고 있는 구조조정세제 또한 내자기업과 외자기업에 대하여 동일하게 적용된다. 따라서, 중국에 투자한 우리나라 기업이 중국의 구조조정세제를 합리적으로 활용하는 경우, 중국내투자기업의 구조조정과정에서 발생하는 조세부담을 경감할 수 있을 뿐 아니라, 기업의 가치와 경쟁력을 강화하는데 크게 기여할 수 있을 것으로 생각된다. The Chinese taxation system for restructuring was introduced in the latter period of the 1990s as a means of promoting the national competitiveness of domestic enterprises by restricting the tax evasion of the enterprises on foreign capital and supporting a smooth restructuring process of the enterprises on domestic capital. However, despite the fact that income tax law for the enterprises on domestic capital & foreign capital were integrated through the tax reform in 2008, there was a proper revision of the taxation system for restructuring. As a result, the legal basis of taxation system for restructuring became ambiguous and applied discriminate regulations to the restructuring of the enterprises on domestic capital & foreign capital in the same way as before, thus coming under criticism that the tax system for restructuring contrarily hindered a reasonable corporate restructuring and also impeded tax equity. Thus, the Chinese tax authorities have been enforcing a new tax system for restructuring by referring to the tax system for restructuring of industrialized countries in 2009 and 2010. The revised tax system for restructuring in China is showing some characteristics as follows:First, the new tax system subdivided the patterns of corporate restructuring into conversion of corporate legal form, adjustment of liabilities, merger[split-off], asset acquisition, and equity stake acquisition, etc. and supplemented and newly established the tax regulations by each pattern. Second, China made the tax system for restructuring advanced and internationalized by newly establishing the regulations about offshore restructuring while abolishing discriminate regulations for the enterprises on domestic capital. Third, they introduced the concept of tax-free restructuring in which taxable income is postponed or exempted for restructuring that meets certain requirements. Fourth, as for the decision on restructuring transactions, they intensified the restrictions on the restructuring aiming for tax evasion by stipulating the principle of real taxation and intensifying the restrictions on corporate restructuring aiming for tax evasion. However, due to the uppermost limit of socialist market economy and insufficiency in its causal related laws in the existing restructuring tax system in China, there are exposed the uppermost limits as follows:First, the current restructuring tax system in China is not only insufficient in regulations about new forms of merger, such as triple mergers, and reverse mergers but it also lacks precise regulations about physical division and personal division based on tax law, so there needs to be supplementary measures for this. Second, a problem is posed that the sorts of equity stakes[shares] are not clarified in calculation of equity stake which is a major requirement of tax-free restructuring, and their restructuring tax system so inclusively stipulates the principle of real taxation that is a yardstick for judgment of the purpose of tax evasion that there is too much room for an arbitrary decision of the tax office to be intervened. Third, as to whether a tax-paying debtor's restructuring transactions meet the requirement of tax-free restructuring in currently going-on tax system on restructuring in China, tax obligator,or a corporation is imposed an excessive proof responsibility and obligation to submit supporting evidence in reality;thus, there needs to be an improvement for tax system support for rational corporate restructuring.

통합도산법의 기존 관리인 유지제도가 구조조정 기업의 경영성과에 미치는 영향

김혜리,김정교 대한경영학회 2018 大韓經營學會誌 Vol.31 No.12

In this paper, the purpose is to analyze the effect of the Debtor in Possession(DIP) system of The Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act(Unified Insolvency Law) which was enforced in April 2006 adopts applied to external audit companies from 1990 to 2016 on the management performance of restructuring firms. Specifically, this study examines the relationship between financial performance(quantitative management performance) and qualitative management performance, which are caused by the effects of restructuring, on sales, gross profit, operating income, net income. This study uses the substitution variable of discretionary accruals and real earnings management to analyze the effect of the DIP of the unified insolvency law on the management performance of the restructuring company. In addition, to examine the effect of the DIP, the results of the post-restructuring period between the period of applying the unified insolvency law and the period of the previous corporate restructuring law are examined by difference-in-difference analysis. The main results are as follows. Overall, the application of the DIP significantly increased the net income of quantitative management performance and discretionary accrual which is qualitative management performance as compared to the managerial appointment of the third - party manager. This implies that the improvement in financial performance due to the restructuring is derived from the net income attributable to the accruals rather than the increase in sales and operating profit. Second, restructuring of DIP reduces qualitative management performance through real earnings management. A company of the DIP can report an improvement in its financial performance, but it has been found that the risk of facing corporate bankruptcy is higher after restructuring because qualitative management performance of managers with private incentives is lowered. Third, the existing managerial maintenance system has lowered the qualitative management performance in the unlisted company as opposed to the listed company. This suggests that if an existing manager is elected as a manager, the existing management can abuse it for private gain in the process of liquidation of the company rather than the corporate recovery due to the nature of the privately held company. This study has the following implications and limitations. First, this study empirically analyzed the problems of the DIP which has been continuously pointed out by the precedent study related to the law. As a result, it can serve as evidence for the amendment of the legal provisions for the appointment of managers in the unified insolvency law. Second, the previous studies on restructuring of existing accounting studies were conducted only on listed companies, but this study included all firms subject to external audit. At present, the improvement of corporate governance in listed companies in Korea is much improved compared to the situation in the previous financial crisis. However, since companies such as external audit companies are small size and managed by founders, they are not operating as professional managers. For small businesses, strict legal application is also needed for the appointment of managers at the time of restructuring court restructuring for corporate restructuring. Therefore, we expect that the results of this study will help the recovery of SMEs such as listed companies as well as external audit companies. On the other hand, this study can not be applied to the analysis because of the constraints on the sample because most of the companies except the small number of companies adopting the unified insolvency law appoint the manager as the existing management, also it is difficult to distinguish between the third - party manager and an existing manager. 본 연구의 목적은 1990년부터 2016년까지 외부감사대상 기업을 대상으로 2006년 이후 적용된 통합도산법의기존 관리인 유지제도가 구조조정 기업의 경영성과에 미치는 영향을 실증분석하는 것이다. 구체적으로, 본연구는 구조조정과 관련한 영향으로 인한 양적 성과(Quantitative Management Performance)인 재무성과와경영자의 질적인 경영성과(Qualitative Management Performance)를 매출액, 매출총이익, 영업이익 및 당기순이익과 발생액 이익조정 및 실물 이익조정의 대용변수를 사용하여 통합도산법의 기존 관리인 유지제도가구조조정 기업의 경영성과에 미치는 영향을 실증분석한다. 또한, 기존 관리인 유지제도의 효과를 살펴보기위하여 통합도산법 적용 기간과 구 회사정리법 기간 간 구조조정 전 대비 이후의 성과를 이중차이분석(difference-in-difference analysis)으로 검토한다. 본 연구의 주요 분석결과는 다음과 같다. 먼저, 구조조정 전 대비 이후에 기존 관리인 유지제도 적용은제3자 관리인 선임에 비해 양적 경영성과인 당기순이익과 질적 경영성과인 재량적발생액을 유의하게 증가시키는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 구조조정 실시로 인해 나타난 재무성과의 개선은 매출액 및 영업이익의 향상 보다발생액에 기인한 당기순이익에 의한 것임을 확인할 수 있다. 둘째, 기존 관리인 유지제도를 적용하는 구조조정은 실물이익조정을 통해 질적 경영성과를 낮추는 것으로 나타났다. 이를 통해 기존 경영자를 관리인으로 유지한기업은 관리인을 교체한 기업과 같이 양적 경영성과인 재무성과의 향상을 보고할 수는 있으나 사적이익 추구의유인에 따라 경영자의 질적 경영성과는 낮아짐으로써 이후 기업 도산의 위험에 직면할 위험이 더욱 높은것으로 확인되었다. 셋째, 기존 관리인 유지제도는 상장기업과는 반대로 비상장기업에서 질적 경영성과를낮추는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 소유경영자가 대부분 경영을 지배하고 있는 비상장기업의 특성상 기존 경영자가관리인으로 선임될 경우 기업회생 보다는 기업 청산과정에서 기존 경영진이 사적 이득을 취할 목적으로 악용할수 있음을 시사한다. 본 연구는 법학계에서 꾸준하게 지적되어 온 기존 관리인 유지제도의 문제를 과거 회사정리법의 제3자 관리인 선임과의 비교를 통해 실증적인 결과를 제시하였다는 점에서 학제 간 연구에 공헌한다. 또한, 기존 회계학의 구조조정 선행연구가 상장기업만을 대상으로 연구하였으나 본 연구는 외부감사대상기업을 모두 포함하였다는 점에서 기존 구조조정 선행연구에 추가적인 증거를 제시한다.

기업구조조정

권기한(Kwon Gi Han),조동성(Jo Dong Seong) 한국경영학회 2003 經營學硏究 Vol.32 No.6

With the environmental hyper-turbulence. more strategic importance has been put on corporate restructuring. We make critical assessments about the existing literatures on the topic of corporate restructuring focused upon portfolio and /or organizational restructuring and suggest implications for related further research in this paper. At first, we classify the existing literatures on the topic of corporate restructuring into two main research streams. While the one has made effort to isolate and identify the antecedent conditions that lead to corporate restructuring, the other has focused on the impacts of corporate restructuring upon the performance. And then, we review main arguments, characteristics, and limitations of the two research streams of corporate restructuring. In conclusion, we discuss future research directions and related meaningful issues.

Abolition? or Permanent Legislation? Recent Discussions on the Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act

( Joon-kyu Choi ) 서울대학교 아시아태평양법연구소 2019 Journal of Korean Law Vol.18 No.2

The sixth Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act (CRPA) was re-enacted as a temporary law effective for five years on October 16, 2018. As an out-of-court debt restructuring scheme, CRPA procedure is governed by the principle of majority or super-majority, not unanimity. Thus, under the CRPA, the claims of the dissenting creditors are subject to a restructuring plan when the council of financial creditors adopts one. Dissenting financial creditors who do not wish to be bound by the resolution can demand that their claims should be purchased. If they do not exercise this right of appraisal, they must follow the restructuring plan, according to which they may be forced to extend additional financing to the distressed company. Out-of-court restructuring schemes are still important because they can contribute to the early and preventive corporate restructuring. Furthermore, most distressed companies prefer out-of-court proceeding to a formal insolvency procedure supervised by the courts, because it can have a relatively minimal impact on the credit rating and trading reputation of the distressed company. CRPA procedure can also hinder the opportunistic behavior of creditors, which is the main problem of the workout procedure governed by the unanimity principle. The social harmfulness of the CRPA has not yet been proved. The CRPA increases the restructuring options from which the distressed companies can choose. Therefore the CRPA should be maintained and made as a permanent law instead of being abolished, and some amendments do need to be added. To strengthen the fairness of the procedure and the private autonomy of creditors, a process of confirming restructuring plans governed by the courts should be introduced, and any additional financing should be left to the voluntary wills of the creditors. Finally, to promote new financing in the CRPA procedure, the protection of additional voluntary financiers should be reinforced.

Abolition? or Permanent Legislation? Recent Discussions on the Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act

최준규 서울대학교 아시아태평양법연구소 2019 Journal of Korean Law Vol.18 No.2

The sixth Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act (CRPA) was re-enacted as a temporary law effective for five years on October 16, 2018. As an out-of-court debt restructuring scheme, CRPA procedure is governed by the principle of majority or super-majority, not unanimity. Thus, under the CRPA, the claims of the dissenting creditors are subject to a restructuring plan when the council of financial creditors adopts one. Dissenting financial creditors who do not wish to be bound by the resolution can demand that their claims should be purchased. If they do not exercise this right of appraisal, they must follow the restructuring plan, according to which they may be forced to extend additional financing to the distressed company. Out-of-court restructuring schemes are still important because they can contribute to the early and preventive corporate restructuring. Furthermore, most distressed companies prefer out-of-court proceeding to a formal insolvency procedure supervised by the courts, because it can have a relatively minimal impact on the credit rating and trading reputation of the distressed company. CRPA procedure can also hinder the opportunistic behavior of creditors, which is the main problem of the workout procedure governed by the unanimity principle. The social harmfulness of the CRPA has not yet been proved. The CRPA increases the restructuring options from which the distressed companies can choose. Therefore the CRPA should be maintained and made as a permanent law instead of being abolished, and some amendments do need to be added. To strengthen the fairness of the procedure and the private autonomy of creditors, a process of confirming restructuring plans governed by the courts should be introduced, and any additional financing should be left to the voluntary wills of the creditors. Finally, to promote new financing in the CRPA procedure, the protection of additional voluntary financiers should be reinforced.