Support for Democracy in Autocratic Natural Resource Exporter

우정무 동국대학교 사회과학연구원 2017 사회과학연구 Vol.24 No.2

Most prior studies have argued that oil hinders regime transition. This is because an oil-funded autocracy can buy off the autocracy’s citizens with social spending or can repress the citizens with coercive apparatuses to reduce domestic democratizing pressures. However, prior studies have not examined how oil reduces domestic democratizing pressures. Thus, this study focuses on individual support for democracy that plays a prominent role in creating domestic democratizing pressures. I argue that the increase in an autocracy’s fiscal reliance on oil revenues makes citizens in the autocracy less likely to support democracy, because the autocracy has better fiscal capabilities to buy off or repress the citizens. I also argue that although citizens who are more interested in politics or are more educated are likely to support democracy, the increase in an autocracy’s fiscal reliance on oil revenues reduces the effects of political interest and education on support for democracy. In order to examine these hypotheses, I employ multilevel analysis that allows us to test the effect of a state-level factor on an individual-level factor and the interaction between the effect of a state-level factor on an individual-level dependent variable and the effect of an individual-level factor on an individual-level dependent variable. Empirical results support the general expectations of this study.

Another Resource curse?: Resources in the Conflict Region and Third-Party Intervention

우정무 동국대학교 사회과학연구원 2017 사회과학연구 Vol.24 No.3

Most prior studies have argued that resources and third-party intervention are important parts to understand civil war. However, prior studies have relatively little focused on the impact of resources on third-party intervention, although many real-world cases reveal that resources affect third parties' decisions to intervene in a civil war. In addition, a few studies on the impact of resources on third-party intervention have focused primarily on the greed theory that only greedy third parties intervene in a civil war to gain access to resources in a conflict region or a greedy governmental actor or a greedy rebel group encourages third parties to intervene in a civil war by selling booty future. However, this argument explains only a part of the impact of resources on third-party intervention. This study suggests another theory to analyze the impact of resources on third-party intervention, called the protection theory, that third parties may intervene in a civil war to protect their rights and properties to exploit resources in a conflict region. Furthermore, in order to suggest more specific theories to explain the impact of resources on third-party intervention, this study classifies types of third-party intervention and types of third parties. Based on the protection theory and the classifications of types of intervention and types of third parties, this study suggests six testable hypotheses to understand the impact of resources on third-party intervention.

The Impact of Oil Market Power on Coup Risk

우정무 고려대학교 평화와 민주주의연구소 2018 평화연구 Vol.26 No.1

Prior studies have argued that because oil increases the value of capturing a state, oil increases coup risk. However, political stabilization in Equatorial Guinea reveals that oil may reduce coup risk by attracting support for the government from oil-importing states. In order to explain the two contrasting effects of oil on coup risk, this study suggests a theory to explain how a state’s oil export reduces coup risk. In the international oil market, although oil is a primary energy source in most states, there are few oil exporters. Thus, if a coup attempt in a state damages the state’s capability to produce and export oil, oil-importing states’ economies would be damaged. Thus, oil-importing states are likely to support oil- exporting states’ governments to reduce coup risk. The possibility of support for an oil-exporting state’s government from oil-importing states reduces coup plotters’ perceived probability of a coup’s success and, thus, coup risk.

The Size of Veto Players in a Sender State and the Duration of Economic Sanctions

우정무 고려대학교 평화와 민주주의연구소 2019 평화연구 Vol.27 No.2

Prior studies have explained how domestic political constraints in either a sender or target state affect the imposition and effectiveness of economic sanctions. However, although the duration of economic sanctions is an important indicator of the sanctions efficiency, they have little explained how domestic political constraints in either a sender or target state affect the duration of economic sanctions. To analyze the impact of domestic political constraints in a sender state on the duration of economic sanctions, this study employs the concept of veto players. This study suggests a testable hypothesis that an increase in the size of veto players in a sender state reduces the duration of an economic sanctions episode. This is because a larger size of veto players allows some domestic actors in a sender state, who should bear economic losses incurred by economic sanctions, to have more opportunities to persuade a veto player to terminate the imposition of economic sanctions. Empirical results support this hypothesis.

Democracy Incongruence and Protest

우정무,이재철 서울대학교 국제학연구소 2020 Journal of International and Area Studies Vol.27 No.2

The literature on protest argues that economic grievances against the government increase the likelihood of a protest. However, the literature offers little explanation for why some states with good economic performance, such as South Korea and China in the 1980s, experienced severe protests. This study suggests that even though a state has a high income level, if its political institutions do not satisfy citizens’ demands for democracy caused by economic development, citizens would have political grievances against their government. If citizens share such political grievances, their civil society would have the group-level perception of discrepancy between their demand for democracy and their government’s institutional supply of political rights, called democracy incongruence. As the level of democracy incongruence in a state increases, the citizens are willing to participate in protest to express political grievances against the government. Empirical results support this argument.

Security Policy Similarity and Sanction Treat and Imposition

우정무 동국대학교 사회과학연구원 2019 사회과학연구 Vol.26 No.4

Prior studies have explained how dyad-level factors affect a sender state’s sanction threat and imposition decision. However, although security is one of states’ important goals, prior studies have little explained how security issues at the dyad level affect the likelihood of sanction threat and imposition. Thus, this study analyzes how two states’ security policy similarity based on their alliance portfolios affects sanction threat and imposition. This study suggests a testable hypothesis that an increase in two states’ security policy similarity increases the likelihood of sanction threat by increasing the likelihood of an interest conflict. However, two states’ security policy similarity does not affect the likelihood of sanction imposition due to high expected costs of sanction imposition and more complete information situations. Empirical results in this study support this argument.

코로나 19의 지역 전파양상 - 인천과 서울 간 관계적 특성을 중심으로 -

우정무(Woo Jungmoo),박요한(Park Johann) 인천대학교 인천학연구원 2021 인천학연구 Vol.35 No.-

서울과 인천은 오랜 역사 속에서 긴밀한 관계를 유지하고 있다. 서울과 인천의 서로 다른 산업구조와 더 나은 주거환경을 위해 서울에서 인천으로 주거이동하는 인구의 증가는 인천에서 서울로 통근하는 유동인구의 비율을 높였다. 서울의 경우 대한민국의 수도로서 기능한다는 점과 거주인구가 많다는 점을 바탕으로 산업 활동에 있어 다른 지역에서 생산되는 원자재나 중간재가 필요하지 않은 서비스업이 발달해 서울 내의 자원을 통해 최종 서비스 산출물을 생산할 수 있으며, 서비스업 이외 분야 산출물의 경우 다른 지역에서 생산된 최종 산출물에 의존하고 있다. 이런 특징들은 서울의 경제활동이 주로 서울 내에서 이루어지며, 원자재나 중간재를 구하기 위해 서울에서 다른 지역으로 인구가 이동하는 경우가 다른 지역에 비해 상대적으로 낮음을 의미한다. 반면, 인천은 조선 시대부터 서울의 관문으로 역할을 하면서 자연스럽게 발달한 항공운송서비스업과 수입원자재를 기반으로 한 제조업이 발달했다. 이로 인해 인천에서 생산된 산출물들은 경기, 서울 등 수요가 많이 존재하는 곳으로 이출 되면서 인천 내 인구가 경제활동을 하는 과정에서 서울로 이동하는 경우가 많이 발생한다. 또한, 서울의 과밀화 문제를 해소하기 위해 인천이 베드타운 기능하기 시작하면서 인천에서 거주하면서 경제활동 등으로 서울로 통근 또는 통학을 하는 순환적인 인적 흐름이 점점 강화되고 있음을 의미한다. 이런 특성은 서울에서 발생한 코로나 19가 유동인구를 통해 인천에 전파될 확률이 높은 반면, 인천에서 서울로 코로나 19가 전파될 확률은 높지 않음을 의미한다. 이 가설을 검증하기 위해 본 연구는 사례분석과 시계열 데이터 분석을 동시에 진행했다. 사례분석 결과 서울의 정치·경제·문화적 가치 및 시설을 활용하려는 인천거주 유동인구가 서울에서 코로나 19에 감염된 후 인천 내 코로나 19를 확산시킨 사례들이 다수 존재했다. 그랜저 인과성을 통한 시계열 데이터 분석 역시 인천의 코로나 19 일일 신규 확진자 수는 서울에서 이전 3일 간 발생한 코로나 19 일일 확진자 수에 의해 통계적으로 유의미하게 영향을 받았다. 따라서 코로나 19는 서울에서 인천으로 확산된다고 할 수 있다. Incheon and Seoul have maintained a historically close relationship. Because Incheon and Seoul have different types of industries and many people have moved from Seoul to Incheon to enjoy better housing conditions, many people who live in Incheon work in Seoul now. Seoul relies on service industries that can provide final productions without raw materials and intermediate goods and import non-service goods from other regions, because Seoul is the capital city of South Korea and many populations live in Seoul. This characteristics means that economic activities in Seoul do not depend on other regions and people in Seoul do not have to move to other regions to obtain raw materials or intermediate goods. However, because Incheon has functioned as the gateway to Seoul that facilitates the development of air transportation service industries and manufacturing industries depending on imported raw materials, which rely on other regions where many consumers live. This economic characteristic of Incheon implies that many people in Incheon should frequently commute to Seoul. Also, to relieve overpopulation problems in Seoul, Incheon has functioned as an important bed town of Seoul. This implies that many people who moved from Seoul to Incheon are likely to commute from Incheon to Seoul. These characteristics of the relationship between Incheon and Seoul implies that Covid-19 more easily spread from Seoul to Incheon while Covid-19 rarely spread from Incheon to Seoul. We test this hypothesis by conducting a illustrative case study and a time-series statistical analysis. Our study period spans from February, 2020 to February to 2021 including the three big waves of the pandemic. Our case examination shows that Covid-19 has spread from Seoul to Incheon by those who live in Incheon but work in Seoul. Our Granger causality test based on Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR) finds that Incheon’s daily confirmed cases have been significantly affected by Seoul’s daily confirmed cases occurring on previous three consecutive days. Thus, we can conclude that Seoul affects Incheon in the spread of Covid-19.

EU와 러시아의 천연가스 관계

우정무(Jungmoo Woo),이재철(Lee Jae chul) 21세기정치학회 2010 21세기 정치학회보 Vol.20 No.2

Recognizing the importance of energy security, Russia tries to take the initiative in diplomacy while European Union (hereafter, EU) seeks to dissipate the energy conflict through the network of its member countries. The recent strategy demonstrated by the EU and Russia suggests new approach or framework for the study of energy. In fact, previous studies on the EU and Russia energy relations have dealt mostly with policy. As a result, little is known about the dynamic behaviors of the actors. Utilizing the concept of centrality and sociogram in network analysis, this study examines relations between the EU and Russia concerning natural gas. This study reveals that the network can be categorized as decentralized in explaining the natural gas relations between the EU and Russia. It also finds that Russia has maintained the highest score in three types of centralities, such as degree, closeness, and between, which means Russia is the most influential country with the potential to change the network structure of natural gas relations in Europe. Finally, this study argues that the concept of network provides a powerful approach to analyze dynamic changes in energy relations between the EU and Russia.

민주주의 수준에 대한 정치문화의 영향력: 정치체제, 사회자본, 인류발전 접근 분석

우정무 ( Jung Moo Woo ),이재철 ( Jae Chul Lee ) 경남대학교 극동문제연구소 2013 한국과 국제정치 Vol.29 No.2

본 논문은 세계가치조사 자료, 프리덤하우스 지표, 세계거버넌스 지표를 사용하여, 정치문화의 정치체제 접근, 사회자본 접근, 인류발전 접근과 민주주의의 관계를 분석했다. 분석결과는 다음과 같이 요약할 수 있다. 첫째, 정치체제 접근은 민주주의 수준을 설명하는 데 한계를 나타냈다. 정치문화의 다른 변수들을 포함하여 분석한 경우 국가제도에 대한 신뢰와 민주주의 지지는 모두 통계적으로 의미가 없었다. 둘째, 사회자본 접근도 민주주의를 설명하는 데 충분하지 않았다. 단체가“민주주의의 학교”가 아닐 가능성이 있고, 규범을 준수하는 것도 민주주의에 영향을 미치지 못했다. 대인신뢰의 경우 민주주의와 역방향의 관계가 발견되기도 했다. 셋째, 인류발전 접근은 민주주의를 가장 포괄적으로 설명했다. 다른 변수들을 통제하는 경우에도 인류발전 접근의 영향력은 감소하지 않았기 때문이다. Utilizing the World Values Surveys, Freedom House Index, Worldwide Governance Indicators, this study examines the relationship between the level of democracy and three approaches in political culture-political system, social capital, and human development approach. This study finds the following three major results. First, it reveals that political system approach little explains the influences of political culture on the level of democracy. Two variables of this approach, trust in state institution and popular support for democracy are not statistically significant on the level of democracy. Second, social capital approach has also little impacts on democracy. In particular, participation in organizations does not significantly improve the level of democracy. Moreover, interpersonal trust is likely to reduce the degree of democracy. Third, human development approach more significantly explains the influences of political culture on the degree of democracy. These results may imply that democratic consolidation requires the changes in political culture accompanied by economic development.

The Impact of Oil Market Power on Coup Risk

Jungmoo Woo(우정무) 고려대학교 평화와민주주의연구소 2018 평화연구 Vol.26 No.1

기존 연구들은 석유가 정권획득의 가치를 증가시키기 때문에 쿠데타위험을 증가시킨다고 주장했다. 그러나, 적도기니의 정치 안정화 사례는 석유수출이 석유수출국 정부에 대한 석유수입국의 지지를 이끌어 내기 때문에 쿠데타위험이 감소할 수 있음을 보여준다. 석유의 쿠데타 위험에 대한 이 두 가지 대조적인 영향력을 분석하기 위해, 본 연구는 어떻게 석유수출이 쿠데타위험을 줄이는지에 대한 이론을 국제석유시장의 특성을 통해 제시한다. 국제석유시장에서 대부분의 국가는 석유를 핵심 에너지 자원으로서 필요로 하지만 매우 적은 수의 국가만 석유수출을 하고 있다. 이는 만약 석유 생산 및 수출 시설을 파괴할 수 있는 쿠데타가 석유수출국에서 발발하게 되면, 석유수입국의 경제에 악영향을 미칠 수 있음을 의미한다. 따라서 석유수입국은 석유수출국에서의 쿠데타위험을 줄이기 위해 석유수출국 정부를 지지하는 경향이 있으며, 이는 쿠데타를 계획하려는 행위자의 쿠데타 성공 기대확률을 낮춰 쿠데타 발발확률을 감소시킨다. Prior studies have argued that because oil increases the value of capturing a state, oil increases coup risk. However, political stabilization in Equatorial Guinea reveals that oil may reduce coup risk by attracting support for the government from oil-importing states. In order to explain the two contrasting effects of oil on coup risk, this study suggests a theory to explain how a state’s oil export reduces coup risk. In the international oil market, although oil is a primary energy source in most states, there are few oil exporters. Thus, if a coup attempt in a state damages the state’s capability to produce and export oil, oil-importing states’ economies would be damaged. Thus, oil-importing states are likely to support oilexporting states’ governments to reduce coup risk. The possibility of support for an oil-exporting state’s government from oil-importing states reduces coup plotters’ perceived probability of a coup’s success and, thus, coup risk.