倭館을 통해서 본 조선후기 對日 求請物品 - 「朝鮮より所望物集書」를 중심으로 -

김강일 일본사학회 2011 일본역사연구 Vol.34 No.-

There were various types of foreign diplomacy relation such as subservience or friendship relation among east Asian countries in the premodern period. While Joseon and Japan had parallel and equal friendship based relation between King of Joseon and general of Japan's feudal government, Joseon had a subservience relation against Tsushima based on tribute and investiture. Japan house was the place to execute such diplomatic negotiation. Though Japan house(浦所倭館) before the Imjin War focused on the function of accommodation(客館), it became to have a character of commercial house(商館) or foreign diplomatic place in the postwar period. There was no division between diplomat and trading in premodern period in Korea and Japan, and various types of goods were exchanged through Choryang Japan house. The types of trading are Jinsang(進上) and Hoisa(回賜) or Gucheong(求請) and Gumu(求貿), which have characteristics of both public trading and private trading. Gucheong was mainly by Japan to Joseon, but there were also many cases that Joseon requested to Japan. It means Gucheong was mutual exchange. Gucheong goods are those used in the royal court of Joseon, and Tsushima procured rapidly as they knew it was for 「Royal Use(御用)」. Japan house is a path of import and export. From the perspective of Joseon, Japan house had an important meaning as a channel of importing goods. Although Joseon and Japan trading via Japan house was mainly official, it also included private trading for goods for royal court or Daimyou(大名) or Garo(家老) in Japan. In this sense, Choryang Japan house, together with Euiju(義州) and Gyeonghueng(慶興) was one of the routes open toward outside in Joseon that maintained seclusion policy.

북일냉전, 1950~1973: 전후처리의 분단구조

박정진 서울대학교 일본연구소 2020 일본비평 Vol.- No.22

Japan-DPRK normalization is discussed as an alternative to overcoming the “1965 regime” between ROK and Japan. To verify this suggestion, this paper reviews the Japan-DPRK relations in light of the postwar process of Japan. The analysis covers two periods. First, the process of the formation of the “1965 regime” between ROK and Japan is reviewed, focusing on North Korean factors. Second, the detente between North Korea and Japan in the 1970s is analyzed based on the impact of the “1965 regime.” The main focus is how the Cold War's influence on Japan-DPRK relations was realized through the division structure of Korea. The purpose of this paper is to find the answer to this question: how did the inter-Korean competition over the sole political legitimacy on the Korean Peninsula affect the postwar process of Japan? The causality between inter-Korean relations and Japan-DPRK relations is also examined. The formation of the “1965 regime” was the result of not only ROK-Japan relations but also Japan-DPRK relations. Therefore, the transformation of the “1965 regime” should be redefined from the perspective of “Korean Peninsula-Japan relations.” Will Japan-DPRK normalization end the controversy over Article II of the 1965 Treaty? The tentative conclusion made in Japan–DPRK Pyongyang Declaration (2002) was “economic cooperation.” When it comes to Japan-DPRK normalization, Article III of the 1965 Treaty will have to be revised between ROK and Japan. This means that the political legitimacy of ROK as the only lawful government on the Korean Peninsula will be denied. Japan-DPRK normalization is essential for peaceful co-existence of the “Two Koreas”; however, this also means the institutionalization of the division of Korea.

일본의 군사협력관계 구축 전략 - 동맹확대 정책의 배경과 전망

김두승 한국국방연구원 2009 국방정책연구 Vol.25 No.1

The U.S.-Japan discussion for the realignment of their alliance that had started in the mid-1990s emerged as a critical diplomatic and defense issue to be resolved for two countries in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist incidents, which highlighted unconventional security threats. And this change with a very strong impact on Japan’s security policy drove Japan into an even more extended alliance policy toward the U.S. and security cooperation with other regional players. This article examines backgrounds for Japan’s strategy to build up its security cooperation with other countries to enhance its own national security. First, the article examines the backgrounds for the Japan’s effort to build up its security cooperation with regional powers from the perspectives of the U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan’s so cold value diplomacy, and the Chinese threat theory. Second, it tries to predict the course of Japan’s future security cooperation policy based on the above examination. Finally, it briefly describes the ROK’s policy toward Japan taking Japan’s shifting security strategy into consideration. 냉전 종결 이후 1990년대 중반에 제기된 미일동맹 재편 논의는 9.11 테러 발생을 계기로 해결해야 할 한층 더 시급한 외교안보 현안으로 부각되었다. 그리고 이러한 안보위협 요인의 변화는 일본의 동맹확대 정책의 중요한 추진 배경으로 작용했다. 본고는 이러한 상황하 일본이 자국의 안전을 확보하기 위해 추진한 안보협력관계 구축 전략의 배경에 대해 고찰하였다. 첫째, 미일동맹과 가치외교의 관점 및 중국 위협론의 관점에서 동 안보협력관계 구축 배경에 대해 고찰하였다. 둘째, 이를 토대로 향후 일본의 동맹확대 정책의 추진 방향에 대해 전망하고, 마지막으로 이러한 일본의 전략에 대한 한국의 대일정책 방향에 대해 간단히 언급하였다.

戰後 韓日관계와 샌프란시스코 平和條約

박진희(Park Jin-Hee) 한국사연구회 2005 한국사연구 Vol.131 No.-

Korea's attitude towards Japan in the immediate post-liberation era was one that was based on the desire to clear up their mutual history by first pressuring Tokyo to thoroughly assume responsibility for its wrongdoings, and then reaching an agreement on reparations for these crimes. The securing of reparations from Japan being the main objective. Korea focused most of its energy on the forging and implementation of its reparations policy towards Tokyo. The Treaty of San Francisco signed by the Allied Powers and Japan. which officially brought the Pacific War to an end, greatly influenced Koreans perception of Japan and its relevant policies. Korea first recognized the need to improve Korea-Japan ties during the process which led up to the signing of the Treaty of San Francisco. Although Korea was not a direct party to the negotiations, it was nevertheless recognized as a concerned third party. Core issues such as that of reparations and compensation. Japans need to clear up the past and engage in introspection, the legal status of Korean residents in Japan, and the Tokdo issue, all of which were considered to be crucial issues in terms of Korea-Japan relations, were included in the treaty. Nevertheless, as Korea was not privy to the treaty as a direct participant, additional negotiations with Japan were required in order to conclude a bilateral treaty. Korea-Japan talks were thus born out of this necessity. However, the Japan-centered Northeast Asian policy adopted by the U.S. had the effect of limiting the degree to which past history could be dealt with during Korea-Japan talks and bilateral negotiations as a whole. Furthermore, the fact that Korea. then a newborn nation-state which had just removed the yoke of colonialism and was now in the midst of its own civil war, had only limited diplomatic experience. resources. and avenues open to it, negatively affected its ability to secure its objectives vis-e-vis Japan. The Korea-Japan talks held during the 1950s, which dealt with bilateral issues between the two countries, were greatly influenced by U.S. power in Northeast Asia, and its ability to control conditions.

일본의 우주안보정책과 미일협력

이정환 ( Junghwan Lee ) 국방대학교 안보문제연구소 2024 국방연구 Vol.67 No.2

일본의 우주안보정책에서는 증가한 안보위협에 대해 미일협력 강화로 대응하는 성격이 두드러진다. 우주안보정책의 미일협력 중심성은 그 방법이 가지는 높은 효과성에 대한 전략 판단에 기반한다. 하지만, 일본의 우주안보정책에는 자주적 성격도 존재한다. 독자적 위성감시능력 구축을 위한 위성콘스텔레이션에 대한 투자가 대표적 예이다. 우주안보정책에서 발견되는 일본의 ‘전략적 자율성’ 추구는 우주 분야에서 그동안 축적한 일본의 국가기술경쟁력을 활용한 위치권력 상승 전략 차원에서 이해된다. 미일협력은 필연적이지만, 그 미일협력의 결과가 일본에 보다 긍정적인 것이 되도록 하기 위해서 자주적 국가 능력 향상 노력을 중시하는 일본 정책관여자들의 전략 사고가 엿보이는 대목이다. Japan's space security policy is characterized by strengthening U.S.-Japan cooperation in response to the increasing security threats since the 1990s. The centrality of U.S.-Japan cooperation in Japan's space security policy is based on a strategic assessment of its effectiveness. However, Japan's space security policy also has the characteristics of pursuing autonomous space capabilities. A prime example is the investment in satellite constellation to build indigenous satellite surveillance capabilities. Japan's pursuit of strategic autonomy in its space security policy can be understood as a strategy for upgrading its own position in US-Japan cooperation. While U.S.-Japan cooperation is inevitable, Japanese policymakers consider autonomous national capability as a prerequisite for ensuring that the outcomes of U.S.-Japan cooperation are more positive for Japan.

대일평화조약 이후 일본의 독도에 대한 대응조치

최장근 한일군사문화학회 2021 한일군사문화연구 Vol.31 No.-

Japan lost World War II in 1945 and the Treaty of Peace with Japan was signed in September 1951. Dokdo as Japan`s territory in the Treaty of Peace with Japan. Japan wanted to be determined. But the Dokdo as Japanese territory to be decided. Didn’t determined the status of Dokdo in a peace treaty with Japan. Korea in January 1946, is already scapin as measured at 677 in rule had jurisdiction over the Dokdo. Treaty of Peace with Japan South Korea’s Dokdo as Korean territory in the U.S. ambassador who did not get the Japanese viewpoint of William J. Sebald. Japan’s claim is guilty of faking the fact that Dokdo is Japanese territory. In January 1952, Korea declared a peace line. So, after a peace treaty with Japan became effectively ruled by a Dokdo. Japan did not give up its sovereignty over Dokdo. South Korea’s action in the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Japan against the Peace Line. that Dokdo as Japan`s territory, determined a hoax. Dokdo is Japan, the U.S. Air Force were designated as the bombing practice. Japan is the designated as the bombing of the Dokdo as an administrative agreement and claimed that Dokdo is Japanese territory because the evidence. Also, Dokdo is Japan made false allegations that to a peaceful settlement in the case to the International Court of Justice. In relation to Dokdo is Japanese and Dokdo as Japanese territory, except in its territory in several laws didn’t handle. The Japanese government is well aware that it is using the United States. Nevertheless, Japan, Dokdo, Dokdo is Korean but a peaceful resolution of the problem is their illegal occupation by force the fact that a hoax. Japan also fabricated the following facts. Japan is a Dokdo to Korea to the International Court of Justice on consignment to solving issues proposed. South Korea has rejected it three times. Dokdo is Korean territory and not the invaded territory. 1945년 제2차 세계대전에서 일본이 패하고 1951년 9월 대일평화조약이 체결되었다. 일본은 대일평화조약에서 독도가 일본영토로서 결정되기를 원했다. 그러나 독도는 일본영토로 결정되지 않았다. 대일평화조약에서 독도의 지위가 결정되지 못했다. 이미 1946년 1월부터 한국은 SCAPIN 677호로 독도를 관할 통치하고 있었다. 대일평화조약에서 한국이 독도를 한국영토로 인정받지 못했던 이유는 주일미국대사 윌리엄 시볼드가 일본의 입장을 지지했기 때문이다. 일본의 주장은 독도가 일본영토라고 사실을 날조한 것이다. 1952년 1월 한국은 평화선을 선언하였다. 그래서 한국은 대일평화조약 이후에도 독도를 실효적으로 지배하게 되었다. 일본은 독도의 영유권을 포기하지 않았다. 한국의 평화선 조치에 대항하여 일본은 대일평화조약에서 독도가 일본영토로서 결정되었다고 날조했다. 주일 미공군이 독도를 폭격연습장으로 지정하였다. 일본은 미일행정협정으로 독도를 폭격연습장으로 지정하였기 때문에 독도가 일본영토라는 증거라고 주장했다. 또한 일본은 독도문제를 국제사법재판소에서 평화적으로 해결하자고 거짓 주장을 했다. 전후 일본은 독도와 관련되는 여러 법령에서 독도를 일본영토에서 제외하고, 일본영토로서 취급하지 않았다. 일본은 미일행정협정을 체결하여 주일미군에 대해 독도를 공군훈련연습장으로 지정할 것을 권하였다. 왜냐하면 독도가 일본영토라는 증거로 삼기 위해서였다. 또한 독도는 한국의 고유영토이다. 그런데 일본이 일방적으로 독도를 분쟁지역이라고 주장한다. 하지만 국제사법재판소는 당사지가 합의한 분쟁지역이 아니면 재판을 주관하지 않는다. 그리고 한국은 국제사법재판소의 강제관할권에 가입하지 않았기 때문에 일본이 아무리 소송을 제기한다고 하더라도 국제사법재판소가 독도의 영유권 재판을 강제할 수 없다. 일본정부는 이러한 사실을 잘 알고 있음에도 불구하고, 일본은 독도문제를 평화적 해결을 원하지만, 한국이 독도를 무력으로 불법 점령하고 있다고 사실을 날조하고 있다. 또한 일본은 독도문제를 평화적으로 해결하기 위해 국제사법재판소에서 해자고 한국에 제안했지만, 한국은 그것을 거부하고 무력으로 독도를 점령하고 있다고 사실을 날조하여 국제사회를 선동하고 있다.

日本の役務賠償による賠償外交とアジア市場への再進出

김웅기 한국일본학회 2010 日本學報 Vol.82 No.-

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze how Japan's Pacific War reparations toward Asian nations, namely Indonesia and Philippines, were implemented and what their influences were like. The reparations were implemented for the purpose of Japan's reentry into the Asian market, which serves Japan as an important provider of business opportunities as well as natural resources. The method of service reparation was introduced by the US in order to minimize Japan's burden of war compensations against Asian victims. By introducing service reparation, Japan could maximize its business opportunities in these nations at the same time. In Japan's service reparation framework, only Japanese companies could participate in business or project opportunities held in respective Asian nations; furthermore, payments were guaranteed and implemented directly by Japanese government. These meant that the size of Japan's war reparations was equal to the revenue of Japanese companies working in Asia. In short, Japan itself became the largest beneficiary of the reparations. This framework was quite similar to the Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere, in which each Asian nation play a role of natural resources provider and subordinated market. Japan did not rule the nations after the Pacific War; however, mutual economic relations between Japan and respective Asian nations virtually did not change. This can be understood as one of the side effects of Japan's service reparations. Another side effect was that many of reparation business opportunities became media of bribery between political leaders of Asian nations and Japanese businesses. As a result, it became difficult to say that Japan's war reparation certainly contributed to nation buildings of respective Asian nations.

만주사변 후의 동아시아 국제관계와 일소불가침조약 체결 문제

김영숙 일본사학회 2007 일본역사연구 Vol.26 No.-

After the Manchurian Incident, the newly built Manchurian nation, the puppet state of Japan, needed to be approved as a country by other neighboring nations in East Asia. During that time, East Asia was in a very complex relationship with various conflicting interests of each nation. Manchurian nation was striving for international recognition of its existence, China was trying to stop such process as much as possible, the USSR was just starting out the second 5‐year development program, trying to avoid unnecessary military encounter in order to focus on domestic reform, and finally Japan was trying to put an end to the Manchurian incident with diplomatic consent. Since the USSR was acting independently of other countries in terms of diplomacy and also because it was important for the USSR to make a quick transition from its former superficial treaties of nonaggression to actual prevention of military encounter with Japan, there was a possibility for the USSR to approve of the establishment of the Manchurian nation. China did its best to stop the establishment of the Manchurian nation by contacting numerous figures of Japan. Simultaneously, China hesitated to restore its interchange with the USSR and wished to promote the nonaggression treaty first. On the other hand, the Manchurian nation was planning to bring together approvals of many countries on the basis of former consent by the three countries, Japan, the USSR, and France. They had started persuading especially the USSR way before any other countries. However, in September of 1932, the relationship between China and Japan greatly aggravated after Japan’s official approval of the Manchurian nation. China pursued its efforts to persuade the USSR in disapproving of the Manchurian nation. On the other hand, Japanese representative in the League of Nations visited the diplomatic official of the USSR several times to ask for cooperation in the Manchurian nation issue before attending the general meeting of the League of Nations. In fact, Japan was very close to securing an agreement. However, not only the USSR’s approval of the Manchurian nation but also the conclusion of the USSR‐Japan nonaggression treaty failed to happen because of the USSR’s concern for the infiltration of communism and the opposition of the military. Having seen all of this happen, China then, focused its concern on the diplomatic battlefield of the League of Nations. China also quickly recovered its former international relationships with the USSR. The USSR did remain open to the possibility of future conclusion of the nonaggression policy with Japan, emphasizing its necessity. However, the relationship between the USSR and Japan in terms of diplomacy and the Manchurian nation approval issue definitely became a temporary respite. Hence, in the end, China’s tactic to offer an absolute recovery of the international relationship with the USSR was successful in that it did stop the USSR from approving of the Manchurian nation and also let China have the inside track in the League of Nations. International relationship in East Asia after the Manchurian incident was one where all of China, Japan, the USSR, and the Manchurian Nation kept each other in check while at the same time collaborating with one another to achieve their own diplomatic goals.

기억과 표상으로서의 倭館, 津江兵庫 追幕碑의 건립과 古館公園의 조성

김동철 釜山大學校 韓國民族文化硏究所 2008 한국민족문화 Vol.31 No.-

The Japan Town of Dumopo(豆毛浦倭館) in Busan was established in 1607. Japan demanded a moving of Japan Town by reason of a limited site. Japanese envoy was accredited in order to negotiate about a matter of its moving. Tsue Hyogo, Japanese envoy dropped dead in 1671. Japan Town moved into Yongdusan Park(龍頭山公園) on this occasion. His death was a dramatic incident in a history of Japan Town. Japanese settlement stood around Japan Town after the Opening of a Port in 1876. Japanese residents got down to work remembering and transmiitting Japan Town which lasted for 270 years. The first work was to remember Tsue Hyogo. His tomb were built in the site of Japan Town of Dumopo in 1879. It was the first memorial of Japan Town which Japanese built in Busan. In 1909, the monument of his achievement was elected in Yongdusan where the Japan Town of Choryang(草梁) had been established. Local government of Busan built Gogwan Park around his monument in 1914. Most of magazines and journals gave a lot of space to looking back on Tsue hyogo when Busan entered upon the fiftieth anniversary of its opening in 1926. He was described as a benefactor of growth of Busan as well as a victim of opening a port. The statue of Oike Tadasuke(大池忠助), Pioneer developing Busan port was set up in the park in June, 1928. Gogwan Park was renewed by building a garden of Japanese style. It had been called Oike Park(大池公園). The park was renamed Shyowa Park(昭和公員) in memory of accession to the throne of Shyowa(昭和), the Emperor of Japan. Gogwan Park was a place to remember and transmit two men of Tsushirma(對馬島) birth to Japanese. Gogwan Park including the monument of Tsue Hyogo, the statue of Oike Tadasuke revived a Japan Town as a Memory and a Symbol.

일본의 차세대 전투기 획득 및 개발과정을 통해 보는 미일동맹

조비연 육군사관학교 화랑대연구소 2018 한국군사학논집 Vol.74 No.3

While a “new era,” “breaking new ground,” and “deepening” have characterized the US-Japan defense alliance since the return of the Abe Cabinet in 2012, this article begins from an empirical curiosity on the extent of ‘deepening’ in their relations. Building upon the rationale that the dynamics of cooperation in high-technology sector may serve as the “microcosm of US-Japan relations” – an empirical testbed for examining the changes and continuity in their relations – this article proposes a comparative analysis on Japan’s two fighter-jets production agreements with the US – the 1980s FS-X program for F-2/F-16 production and the recent F-35A Joint Strike Fighter. Juxtaposing the recent F-35 deal to the preceding FS-X program in the 1980s, what are the empirical realities of the changes in the US-Japan alliance relations? How does the F-35 deal differ from the preceding US-Japan fighter-jet program, FS-X(F-2/F-16)? Is a ‘new era’ of cooperation imminent in the fighter-jets sector? The main findings are that the trajectory in the levels of cooperation between the US and Japan in the fighter-jets venture adheres to the general trend towards a ‘new era’ of alliance deepening under the Abe Cabinet. The shared China threat and overall changes in the strategic environment have come to construct relatively more amicable setting for the US-Japan cooperation in the sector. At the same time, this article also finds that it is important to place such deepening in a continuum of US-Japan cooperation since the 1980s FS-X program, rather than an abrupt transformation during the Abe Cabinet. Indeed, the gradual accumulation and institutionalization of dialogues and cooperation have been critical, reinforcing as complementary push for Japan’s alliance-premised fighter-jets acquisition during the Abe Cabinet. Lastly, the article takes note of the US’s continued restrictions in transferring the state-of-the-art-technologies as well as the Japan’s continued kokusanka drive and variety of preferences at home, which would work to limit the full-fledged emergence of US-Japan Inc. despite progress in the US-Japan cooperation in the fighter-jets venture.