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지자체는 택지건설과 관련하여 인허가권을 남용하는가? - 토공의 기반시설투자 적정수준을 모색하기 위한 시론
유정식(Chung-Sik Yoo) 한국주택학회 2007 주택연구 Vol.15 No.1
이 논문은 지방자치단체들이 인허가권을 무기로 택지개발 시 택지개발과 직접적인 관련이 적은 각종 지역 민원사업을 택지개발 공기업 (토공 및 주공)에 전가하고 있는가에 대해 실증적으로 연구하고 이를 토대로 적정 기반시설 수준에 대해 논의하는 것을 목표로 하고 있다. 실증분석결과는 다음과 같다. 1) 전체 자료를 검토해 볼 때 강성인지자체가 시설비를 더욱 부담시킨다는 토지공사의 주장은 근거가 있다. 2) 수요조건이 좋은 지자체일수록 시설비를 더욱 부담시킨다는 결론을 얻을 수 있기 때문에 택지개발에 따른 편익을 지자체가 지역 민원사업을 통해 환수한다는 측면도 실증적으로 근거가 있다. 3) 토지공사가 시설비부담을 수요조건이 좋은 곳을 찾아 선택적으로 택지를 개발하는 방식을 통해 최종수요자에게 전가한다는 증거를 발견하기 어렵다는 것은 토지공사의 공공성이 사업집행에 있어 상당히 중요하게 작용하고 있다는 근거로 삼을 수 있다. 4) 따라서 자의적으로 인허가권을 남용하는 지자체 - 예상되지 않은 시설비 증가 - 택지개발 비용 상승의 경로를 통해 i) 최종수요자 가격으로 일부가 전가되며, ii) 토지공사의 수익성을 악화시키고, iii) 토지공사는 그러한 수익성악화를 보전하기 위해 가격전가가 쉬운 지역에서 좀 더 많은 수익을 올리려 노력할 것이라는 추론이 가능하다. 적정한 시설설치 범위는 수요조건이 불리하여 개발이익이 발생할 확률이 낮은 지역에서는 무사업, 수요조건이 좋아 개발이익이 상당히 존재할 것으로 보이는 지역에서는 3대 사업이라고 할 수 있는 도로교량, 하수종말처리, 상수시설 등의 범주 안에서 지자체의 특성에 맞고 특별한 요구가 존재하는 사업을 선별적으로 수행하는 것이 바람직할 것으로 보인다. Do local governments abuse legal rights in housing land development? To empirically examine this question, we do some regressions based on an internal data set provided by Korea Land Corporation (KLC). The findings are as follows ; 1) overall, KLC"s argument that hardcore local governments tend to take advantage of their legal rights in favor of their local development plan seems to be valid 2) this is more so where housing demand is booming 3) KLC"s role as a public entity is not systematically distorted by this trend 4) Therefore, abuses of legal rights leading to an unexpected increase in land development cost seem to cause a damage in public housing development plan.
유정식 ( Chung Sik Yoo ) 한국협동조합학회 2012 韓國協同組合硏究 Vol.30 No.1
After a path-breaking understanding between labor and management in Hyundai Motor Company on the stronger rights of labor union crossing over some areas of the management "prerogatives", Korean workers` participation in management has become the hottest potato in Korean politics and economy. This paper investigates deep issues involved in this debate, with the following implications. First, participation should be accompanied by accountability, which cannot be easily assured. Second, information sharing through participation strongly requires disciplines in keeping secrecies, but this cannot be expected for those board members who are selected as a representative of union workers. Third, successful management sometimes presupposes swift decisions urgently needed, but worker representatives may not be easily pursuaded since they are bound to follow union`s decisions. Fourth, workers` participation reflects the idea of industrial democracy, but it may actually hurt the ideal since they only answer to the requests of regular employees of big firms against the interests of irregular workers who should be of a real concern. Finally, conflict rather than cooperation is a common practice in Korean workplace and this historical legacy has produced hotilities and disbelieves between workers and managers, resulting in strong but unsuccessful government interventions. All these combined, we may conclude that workers` full participation in management is unwarranted to be successful in Korea.
柳禎植 연세대학교 대학원 1994 延世論叢 Vol.30 No.1
Abstract New welfare economics prescribes that if there exists a potential gain from a policy measure it should be recommended no matter whether the actual compensation is paid or not. In theory, it is a strong value judgment since it does not take care of the distributional bias. A necessity of actual compensation fits into the context from this point. If a policy change has a positive efficient gain but has a distributional bias which imposes an effective barrier against the change, then compensating the losers will be an efficient arrangement, given the condition that the compensation necessary to secure consent is smaller than the quantity by which the community's output will rise as a consequence of effecting a policy change. Arguments against actual compensation are, however, logically persuasive if we stand purely on ethical ground ; measurement problems, moral hazard costs, the possibility of overcompensations, philosophical issues, public choice problems and so on. In this paper, we argue that compensation should be treated as a strategic vehicle to nurturing an institutional arrangement for an implementation of a certain policy reform which is desirable. That is, compensation should not be treated as a means to improve welfare unanimously as new welfare economics would suggest, in which sense compensation is largely unwarranted. More importantly, arguments against compensation may be positively exploited for meaningful guidelines of actual compensation. Some implicit conclusions are derived from this survey. First, compensation payments (the collection of revenue for the compensation) should take the form of lump-sum payments (tax). Second, compensation payments should be designed and organized strategically rather than from the ethical considerations. In this sense, compensation payments should enlarge the flexibility and feasibility of a certain policy change and should not be a binding constraint. Third, Time dimension of compensation payments is very important ; dynamically, moral hazard problems should be minimized. Fourth, the method of extracting resources for compensation payments should be considered simultaneously ; transfer mechanism itself should become a strategy. In a positive direction, compensation policy would constitute another policy change. If we stand on pragmatic imperatives, a question whether we compensate or not is no more relevant since they become special cases when compensation equals zero and full. In this framework, arguments against compensation turn into guidelines by which actual compensation could be scrutinized and evaluated.