러시아의 대외 군사·안보정책 결정과정 : 대한반도 정책에 미치는 영향 Its Effects on Policy toward Korea

김병기 한국전략문제연구소 1998 전략연구 Vol.5 No.3

When Boris Yeltsin was elected President of the Russian Federation in 1990. the former Soviet republic lacked those crucial political institutions necessary for consolidating his power and authority. These organs-which existed in other republics. which thereby enhanced the political consolidation of former Communist Party members who came into power-constituted the republican Committee on State Security (or the KGB). the Ministry of International Affairs. and even Academy of Sciences and radio/television channels. Lacking the institutional bases for effective rule, Yeltsin on the other hand, inherited Soviet power ministries with whom he had to struggle to "Russianize" it. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation, and the Liberal Democratic Party which inhetrited the balk of the organizational and ideological remanants of the powerful Soviet Communist Party apparatus. moreover, generated major barriers towards institutionalization of Yeltsin's presidency. Such difficult situation, on the whole. helped generate the bloody suppression of the Parliament on October of 1993, the consolidation of the anti-center oriented Siberian Agreement of 1994, and even the Chechen crisis from the same year. Andrei Kozyrev followed a policy of full and complete Westernization in 1992, agreeing on all major issues which NATO and the United States positively thought. including the joining of the military coalition against Irag--a former ally of the Soviet Union. Such policy, however, brought not full economic, political and military integration with the West, but isolation and new ideological division along the shrunken border of the Russian Federation with the Baltic countries, and the CIS. Contrary to expectations, former members of the now defunct Warsaw Pact Organization began to join NATO, while even members of the former Soviet Union begin to seek membership. Kozyrev, all in all, ignored not only Russia's strategic interests vis-a-vis the West, but also, its immediate concerns in the Near Abroad where millions of ethnic Russians resided, who were facing daily economic, social and even political threats to their security. These problems were seriously politicized; the Communists and the Liberal Democrats along with the scattered Russian armed forces began to call for a turn towards "within" and the much ignored "Near Abroad." Between the years 1992 and the beginning of 1996, Kozyrev was forced to follow the lines of the domestic conservatives, thereby weakening the institution of the Presidency, and generating the popular image of a weak-willed administration. At the beginning of 1996 Yeltsin appointed Yevgeny Primakov--then the Director of Counter- Foreign Intelligence Agency--as Foreign Minister. A Middle Eastern expert by training and a long-time bureaucrat in the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee he began to reorient Russian foreign policy away from US/West Europe to the Near Abroad. In the national security concept developed in 1998, for example, the predominant emphasis is placed on domestic dimension, namely, stablized economic transition towards market economy, and parellel social conditions. In the field of external policy, Primakov proved instrumental in preempting a formation of second military coalition against Iraq--with the help of France and China. In fact, Primakov is reportedly supplying Iraq with nuclear technology for energy purposes. Primakov also actively opposed the expansion of NATO, pressuring the Baltic countries not to join the military bloc. Parenthetically, such show of pressure against the West meant that within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) no outside forces can interfere: moreover by exporting missiles to Northern Cyprus, an area controlled by Greece. which has a confrontation with Southern Cyprus. an area controlled by Turkey. Primakov intends to weaken NATO internally. by accelarating tension among the two members. The contraction of the border in the Western frontier. and threat of NATO toward it has forced Russia to seek compensation in the Southern frontier. In the Caucasus. Moscow was successful in forcing Georgia to join the CIS by supporting the Abkhazian seperatists as was also with Azerbaijan whose enemies Armenia and its seperatists in contentious Nargono-Karaback it also supported. Moscow felt threatened by the ethnic-disturbances in the Caucasus and the geopolitical encroachements being made by Turkey. a strong ally of the United States. Primakov is reinforcing Russia's relations with Iran for three reasons: (1) to offset Turkey. China and the US' influence in the Middle East and Central Asia: (2) to deny US rapproachment with Tehran with whom Washington desires closer trade and political relations: and (3) to export, like towards irag. nuclear related technology for energy purposes. In Kosovo. moreover. Primakov has intervened on behalf of the Serbs against the Albanians. whose forces are supported by the Western diplomatic community. These policies have earned Primakov not only the support of the Communists and the Liberal Democrats who form the majority in the Duma, but also, have strengthened Yeltsin's. domestic position through essential conservatization of Russia's foreign policy. It is support for these feats that Yeltsin awarded the highest medal of public service to Primakov as well as personally visiting him at the Foreign Ministry this year. Primakov has also recently engineered the breakthrough in the reestablishment of talks with Tokyo for normalizing its relations. a moved aimed at weakening the US grip on Japan. Moscow knows and appreciates the markedly grown influence of China in both Koreas: it also worries the recent improvement of US-Sino relations. Only by improving its relations with Pyongyang can Moscow redress its imbalnce on the Korean peninsula; but given the five years of freeze in its relationship. Moscow had no means of approaching Pyongyang other than by way of kicking out the South Korean diplomat as a way of showing Pyongyang that it is ready to deal more equally with North Korea. Given the current freeze in North Korean-US. North Korean-Japanese and inter-Korean talks. Seoul must be ready to exercise more independent initiative in its foreign policy.

綜合討議

김병기,임병락,양한성,문기식,이은주,오종용 서원대학교 미래창조연구원 1989 서원대학교 미래창조연구원 학술대회지 Vol.1989 No.5

[신앙의 명가를 찾아서_평신도편] 김병기 · 병인박해 순교자 김보현(요한) 4대손, 고 김수환 추기경 친조카

김병기 미래사목연구소 2016 사목정보 Vol.9 No.2

습사료와 부상사료에 대한 강도다리( Platichthys stellatus)의 성장과 소화 특성

김병기 한국수산과학회 2012 한국수산과학회지 Vol.45 No.6

A study was carried out to observe the effects of feed types on the growth, feed preference, and enteric feed transition rate of juvenile starry flounder, Platichthys stellatus for 45 days. Fifty fish (avg. 135 g) were stocked each in replication, and fed a commercial extruded pellet diet (EP, 45% protein) and a moist pellet diet (MP, 65% raw mackerel+35% feed powder in wet basis), respectively. The MP presented the higher performance than that of the EP on the feed efficiency (68.3±0.9% for EP and 92.3±4.3% for MP) and the specific growth rate (1.07±0.07 for the EP and 1.20±0.05% for the MP). In contrast, the EP showed the higher feed preference in terms of the daily feed intake (1.57±0.08% for the EP and 1.30±0.01 for the MP) and the ad libitum feeding rate after a fast of 72 hours (1.73% for the EP and 1.35% for the MP). The feed transition rate through intestinal canals decreased exponentially in both the EP and the MP, showing the faster transition rate with the EP. In the result, starry flounder appeared to have the better feed preference to the EP, but have the higher feed efficiency and growth performance to the MP.

대포통장의 실체 및 문제점

김병기 한국금융소비자학회 2014 정책심포지엄 Vol.2014 No.4

THE ORIENTABLE NUMBERS OF A GRAPH

김병기 한국전산응용수학회 2014 Journal of applied mathematics & informatics Vol.32 No.3

For a connected graph G, there are orientations of G have different hull numbers, geodetic numbers, and convexity numbers. The lower orientable hull number h-(G) is defined as the minimum hull number among all the orientations of G and the upper orientable hull number h+(G) as the maximum hull number among all the orientations of G. The lower and upper orientable geodetic numbers g-(G) and g+(G) are defined similarily. In this paper, We investigate characterizations of the orientable numbers and the conditions that the relation h-(G)≤g-(G) < h+(G)≤g+(G) holds.

GM Daewoo Green Car Technology

김병기 한국자동차공학회 2010 한국자동차공학회 Workshop Vol.2010 No.10

PSCAD/EMTDC를 이용한 전기 저장장치의 모델링에 관한 연구

김병기,김기영,오승택,이문석,이주광,노대석 대한전기학회 2013 대한전기학회 학술대회 논문집 Vol.2013 No.11

Oral Presentation : Guided bone regeneration by using e-PTFE membrane in atrophic alveolar ridge: Case report

김병기,김수환,깅영성,김원경,이영규 대한치주과학회 2009 대한치주과학회 학술대회자료집 Vol.2009 No.2

임상연구 포스터 : 심미적 치관연장술을 이용한 상악전치부의 심미성 회복

김병기,김수환,김영성,김원경,이영규 대한치주과학회 2009 대한치주과학회 학술대회자료집 Vol.2009 No.1