Strategic Metamorphosis from Sisyphus to Chameleon? North Korean Security Policy and Military Strategy

( Sung Hack Kang ) 한국국방연구원 1995 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.7 No.1

National security is basically an ambiguous symbol. Like a chameleon, it has been determined by the supreme decision maker of a nation, depending upon the given spatial and temporal conditions. Nevertheless, national security has been conventionally understood to protect, preserve and defend the lives and properties of the people and their territory. To put it differently, it has meant military defense from the external military threat. But since the end of War II, its meaning has been extended beyond any material damage to include the protection of the vital values of a nation. Then, the protection of existing vital national values through the maintenance of the status quo is the first imperative for government policy, which can employ all kinds of means: political, economic, diplomatic, cultural, and military methods. Among those methods, the military one has been referred to as military strategy. The military strategy of most nations adopted a defensive attitude, namely deterrence to maintain the status quo, which is the first objective of their security policies. Historically, only the nations with revisionist and expansionist goals adopt an offensive military strategy. Such nations were many in history, but they have been rare during specific periods. North Korea has been one of these nations. With an expanded definition of security-the communization of the whole Korean peninsula-the Kim II Sung regime has tried to achieve this anti-status quo positive goal by means of military power, but has failed. For him, war is continuation of the revolution by other means. He can be said to have followed the principle of simplicity in military strategy by consistently pursuing communist unification. However, a chance for the unification of the Korean peninsula by means of a second surprise attack has not come. The continuous presence of American troops in South Korea has almost certainly assured North Korea of another defeat. However, Kim II Sung`s belief in and adherence to a revolutionary war dogma made him almost blind to the need for being faithful to the South-North dialogue. Kim II Sung has waited for a fortuitous opportunity to come. He believed that after the complete pullout of US troops from South Korea, the "center of gravity" of South Korea would return to Seoul and be limited there. He then would be able to gain a victory in his revolutionary war through an offensive strategy as the North Vietnamese did. He waited for the culminating point of offensive, holding the communist view that history was on his side. However, history has turned out to be not on his side. By the present moment, the Kim Jong-il regime has not yet presented the new security policy. It is not clear whether North Korea will abandon the ultimate goal it has continued to pursue during the past half a century, that is, the communization of the Korean peninsula, or will change its military from offensive to defensive strategy by adapting the deployment of its military forces. However, one thing is clear that it will never be easy for the North Korean regime to change radically its traditional military strategy. North Korea has pursued the goal of communist unification of the whole Korean peninsula by military forces like a Sisyphus. The glaringly increasing gap between its goal and its ceaseless efforts might lead one to apply Santayana`s definition of a fanatic, rather than the myth of Sisyphus, as one who redoubles his efforts as he moves further away from his goal. In any case, a Sisyphus cannot become a chameleon at will, because of the law of inertia also works in the political world.

9ㆍ11 테러와 김정일 정권의 생존 전망

강성학 고려대학교一民국제관계연구원 2002 국제관계연구 Vol.6 No.1

It is commonly mentioned that everything has changed since the events of September 1, 2001. Evidently some things have changed; others have been reinforced; and others have become visible though previously had went unrecognized. America's war against terrorism will certainly have an impact on many states. North Korea has been one of the states on the list of terrorist states. Then we must raise the question, "Will the DPRK survive, say, by the year 2020?" The Kim's regime could be, like any other state's political regime, threatened to be overthrown, in theory, from "within" as well as from "without." Firstly, let me examine the possibility for Kim's regime to bo overthrown from within. Until now, there has been no known factor for us to speculate that there any noteworthy political opposition to Kim's regime within North Korea's borders. There has never been any report that may indicate even a symptom of rebellion against the leadership of the two Kims (i.e. Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il). In midst of the serious situation of nationwide starvation, there were many North Koreans who wanted to escape from North Korea at the risk of their lives. However, there were no people who dared to challenge Kim's leadership. Since he became the heir of Kim Il Sung in February 1974, Kim Jong Il consolidated his personal power basis throughout North Korea's governmental organizations and virtually ruled North Korea for the last almost three decades. Kim is a great pretender. Holding up the picket saying "Our way to Socialism" high, he pretends to be an infallible Philosopher-King who has perfect knowledge of the changing outside world and how to cope with it. But he is nothing but a violent tyrant. We know that the tyrant Stalin was not overthrown from within while he was alive, however terrible the tyrant might have been, not to mention Hitler(Unser Fuhrer), Mussolini(Il Duce) and Hirohito(Tenno Heika). Like his historical predecessors, "Supreme Leader Kim"(Dear Soo Ryong) in North Korea is not likely to be overthrown from within. Secondly, then, is there any possibility for Kim's regime to be overthrown from the outside? If Kim Jong Il is content in maintaining the status quo on the Korean Peninsula, it could be safely said that no outside powers including the United States have intentions to overthrow the Kim's regime in North Korea. Besides, China is and ally of a kind in that it would not let North Korea be unified by South Korea, as made clear by the massive military intervention during the Korean War to maintain North Korea as a separate political entity, most friendly to or at least not hostile to China. However Kim Jong Il continues to pursue a positive goal, an ambitious, revolutionary, revisionist, self-imposed historical mission to unify the whole Korean peninsula on his own terms by his own strategy, as his father Kim Il Sung did throughout his life time, though without success. In other words, Kim continues a revolutionary war against South Korea. For Kim, war is merely a continuation of politics by other means. Such a strategic mindset was handed down from Clausewitz to Lenin to Stalin and Mao to Kim Il Sung and finally to Kim Jong Il. Yet Kim Jong Il has also a distorted form of the Clausewitzean dictum. For Kim Jong Il, a hereditary prince, as for Machiavelli, "the arts of peace are those of non-violent war by fraud." For Kim, peace also is a mere continuation of war by other means. Kim Jong Il employed the strategy of mendicant brinkmanship to outside powers. They could not ignore Kim. North korea's internal disaster will explode over Northeast Asia. To prevent that, the U.S. must sustain the repugnant regime. Food and energy donations propped up the most repressive government in the world, because North Korea's missiles with nuclear, biological or chemical bombs can reach South Korea and Japan, two key U.S. allies. Kim's mendicant brinkmanship has been successful until now. U.S. strategy since the Cold War has focused on conventional regional war. The geographic scale of this war can be specified since it comes from the Korean peninsula. Within it, the U.S., together of course with South Korea, has prepared for conventional warfare in which nuclear, chemical, biological weapons, and ballistic missiles are not to be used. This plays to American strengths. No nation could stand up to the United States in such a war. But North Korea has been trying to overcome the U.S. psychological and military advantages. North Korea has been diversifying into nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. In Clausewitz's terminology, biological weapons move the center of gravity of the war from the front, where the U.S. has advantage, to the rear, the population centers, where the U.S. clearly does not. Germ weapons target innocent lives, not military force. It would be suicidal for North Korea to launch such an attack, but the possibility it might do so makes Washington thread more carefully, especially after the tragic incident of September 11, 2001. North Korea's hitting Seoul or Tokyo or both cities with anthrax bombs will be horrible. Therefore, North Korea may be treated more gingerly. There is no doubt that the inter-Korea summit meeting was an historic event. It is a timely intriguing question whether the inter-Korea summit meeting will be a historical turning point for Korea's national history of turn out to be nothing but deceptive pageantry carefully choreographed by Kim Jong Il. By now, most indications in the post-summit period suggest that hopes were raised too high and too prematurely. One thing is still clear; Kim Jong Il has no intention to change his exclusive policy, not to mention not giving in to external pressure to compromise. Kim Jong Il will continue to behave like a hedgehog toward the outside world, holding up the anachronistic icon of "Juche" high. As Aristophanes said, "You can not teach a crab to walk straight." Despite Hamish McRae's optimistic prediction that it is very hard for him to see anything other than unification of North and South by 2020, South Korea's sunshine will not be able to lighten Kim's kingdom of darkness as long as Kim Jong Il is alive, even by the year 2020. the inter-Korean relationship is ruled by a kind of unit-veto system. Like the weather, we can always talk about it, but no one can do anything about Kim's totalitarian regime in North Korea especially as long as China supports it. In short, my crystal ball is not clear, but at least I can say that the DPRK will not be overthrown from the outside, either. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, it would be better for us to remind ourselves of what English poet William Blake sang at the dawn of the nineteenth century: "You throw the sand against the wind, And the wind blows it back again."

야구의 당겨치기와 밀어치기 동작의 비교 분석

강상학 한국스포츠리서치 2005 한국 스포츠 리서치 Vol.16 No.2

The present study conducted a comparative analysis of high school baseball batters' pull batting and push batting motions focused on kinematical variables such as time by section, angle. speed and batting posture. From the results of this study were drawn conclusions as follows. 1. The point of time of pull batting impact was later than that of push batting impact. 2. The angle of the support leg at the moment of impact was open wider in pull batting motion. 3. The rotation angle of the upper body and the rotation angle of the pelvis at the moment of impact were higher in pull batting motion. 4. The knee of the drive leg at the moment of impact was bent slightly more in push batting motion. 5. The moving speed of the center from rear to front at the moment of the drive foot's stepping on the ground and impact was slightly higher in push batting motion. 6. The maximum transitional velocity of the bat and the maximum rotating velocity of the bat just before impact were slightly higher in push batting motion. 7. The direction of stride on the drive foot's stepping on the ground was slightly more advanced in push batting motion, and the length of stride was slightly longer in pull batting motion. 8. The difference of height between the hands and the end of the bat at the moment of impact was larger in pull batting motion, and the difference of horizontal front and rear position was larger in push batting motion.

한국 외교정책의 특성 : 편승에서 쿠오바디스로? From Bandwagoning to Quo Vadis?

강성학 고려대학교 一民국제관계연구원 1997 국제관계연구 Vol.2 No.2

사회적 변화에 따라 정신질환자들의 피해망상 속에 나타난 박해자 유형변화

강승범,황인복,김한석,김승곤,김학렬,박상학,김상훈,황걸 朝鮮大學校 附設 醫學硏究所 2008 The Medical Journal of Chosun University Vol.33 No.3

Objective: The authors investigated the frequency of persecutors in persecutory delusions of the psychiatric patients who didn't undergo the arrest or traumatic injury, reside in Gwangju Jeonnam area, and were admitted to the hospital after the 5.18 prodemocracy movement in Gwangju in 1980 upward 10 years. Also this study investigated the frequency of the persecutors before and after the prodemocracy movement and in capital and Gwangju Jeonnam area. Subjects and Methods: Among the 896 patients who were admitted to department of psychiatry, Chosun University Hospital from Jan. 1. 1989 to Dec. 31. 1991, we choosed 144 patients with persecutory delusion who had lived in Gwangju Jeonnam area for 10 years after 5.18 prodemocracy movement as subjects. Persecutors were classified into 7 class: unspecified, family, neighbors, communist or spy, police or army or secret agent, impersonal, others. Results: 1) In our study, the frequency of persecutors was family, unspecified, neighbors, police or army or secret agent, impersonal, others, communist or spy in descending order. As compared to previous studies (1956-2003) including our study about frequency of persecutor at capital area and Gwangju Jeonnam area, and before and after 5.18 prodemocracy movement, 2) At capital area, in the early 1980s, police, family, neighbors, unspecified person was frequent in descending order. In the both of early 1970s, 1990s, neighbors, family, unspecified person, police was frequent in descending order. 3) At Gwangju Jeonnam area, in the early 1970s, family, unspecified person, neighbors, police was frequent in descending order. In the early 1990s, unspecified person and family, neighbors, police was frequent in descending order. 4) The police class was most frequent at capital area in the early 1980s. Conclusions: We suppose that class of persecutor in persecutory delusions of psychiatric patients are changing according to social change, and frequency of police class was decreasing in both of capital and Gwangju, Jeonnam area.

테니스 양손 백핸드의 운동학적 분석

강상학,성영호,김주희 龍仁大學校 體育科學硏究所 1998 體育科學硏究論叢 Vol.8 No.1

The purpose of this study was to identify the shot types of two-handed backhand, the merits and demerits of the types an dynamical causes of variations, the motions of five women tennis players were analyzed through three-dimensional video analysis system. With the results of the analysis, the following have been found: First, two-handed backhand has many elements necessary for offensive tennis play, makes it easy to have a good command of topspins or change balls without being pushed away by the opponent, and has many advantages for responding to grip changes or high-bouncing balls. Second, the shot types of two-handed backhand can be categorized into tringle shot type and pentagon shot type according to the forms of arms or the ways of grip-holding in impact. Tringle shot type, in which the right hand is near backhand eastern grip and elbow is stretched, shows less flexibility but more stability than pentagon shot type in which the elbow is bended. Third, all of the players who participated in this test used pentagon shot type and showed average increase of 20.6 centimeters in one frame from immediately before impact to immediately after impact.

냉전 후 유엔의 인도주의적 개입: 시지프스에서 이카루스로?

강성학 고려대학교 일민국제관계연구원 2001 국제관계연구 Vol.5 No.1

The post-cold war men and women suddenly rediscovered that the Charter of the UN began with "we, the people of the United Nations‥" not we, the states of the United Nations‥‥ and began to argue that the principle of the UN should not be state sovereignty but individual's sovereignty or human rights, and urging the UN to act on the new interpretation of the Charter. This post-cold war challenge to state sovereignty is very peculiar and profound when viewed in the long international history. Because, instead of strong states violating the sovereignty of weaker states in order to preserve or expand their power position and ideology as in the past, the world is now faced with a different manifestation of self-determination: post-modern revolting against the existing states. The new problem of intervention in domestic affairs has been the main business of the UN for international peace and security in the 1990s. It might be said that UN peace-keeping operation moved from the so-called first generation of Chapter 6 1/2 to the second generation of Chapter 6 3/4. And it was mostly due to the so-called CNN factor. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then UN Secretary-General said, in 1995, "CNN was the sixteenth member of Security Council." The CNN factor is real, but it remains to be seen whether its effectiveness will stand the test of time. Humanitarian intervention is a distinct form of UN's collective action. If humanitarian intervention is conflated with threats to peace and self-defense against aggression, it could tempt great powers to intervene out of self-interests, using human rights and vague threats to peace as a pretense, even though no armed attack has occurred, the only condition allowing unilateral acts of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter. This danger is especially serious and destabilizing if unilateral intervention is allowed. Undifferentiated concept of intervention could also increase opposition from the weak states. Their opposition would be less likely with a more strict understanding of humanitarian intervention. Anyway, weak states are unenthusiastic about intervention, because it usually occurs against them but not against the powerful, as we witness in the cases of East Timor and Chechnya in 1999. Until 1990 or there about UN peace-keeping was mostly identified with the myth of Sisyphus, the mortal condemned forever to push a boulder almost to the top of a hill, only to have it roll back down. But since 1993 prevailing myth has gone from Sisyphus to Icarus, an aeronaut who flew so high that the sun melted the wax in his wings, and plunged to his death. In going into places like Somalia, Angola, Bosnia, and Rwanda, the United Nations has overextended itself and risked complete meltdown. The best way to ensure the success of humanitarian intervention is to make sure that collective intervention under the banner of the United Nations is fair, remains within the limits of a clear mandate, its limited capability, and does not appear as the tools of certain great powers. The UN should not overstretch its limited capability even for noble humanitarian intervention. Otherwise, a new imperative of humanitarian intervention will soon turn out to be old impropriety of nothing other than imperialistic outside intervention. Considerable vigilance and discretion is required. Prudence is the key to good statesmanship. To put it another way, we should follow the principle known as proportionalism, which was adopted by some Catholic theologians on certain vexing moral issues. Proportionalism can provide a useful moral approach to humanitarian intervention. Proportionalism could be anathema to moral and ideological pursuits. It tempers implacable principle with common sense, because humanitarian intervention should not be another crusading for humanity. Selection is the fate of everyone. In short, the temptation for humanitarian intervention might be very wise advice of Daedalus, the strong, but we have to listen to the father of Icarus. Do not fly too high!

유엔과 미국 : 교황과 황제처럼 Like a Pope and an Emperor?

강성학 고려대학교-民국제관계연구원 1997 국제관계연구 Vol.2 No.3

테니스 서브의 운동학적 분석

강상학 한국스포츠리서치 2004 한국 스포츠 리서치 Vol.15 No.4

This study carried out a kinematical analysis of four tennis players' serve motions, and drew conclusions as follows. 1. As for service footwork, all the four players preferred the pose of pin-point stance. 2. The width of back swing stance was around one third of their height. 3. All the four players landed first their left foot into the court just after impacting, and jump on impacting was generally high but they had the style of foot-up, in which their first step hardly entered into the court. 4. The forwarding speed of the body center appeared highest just before impacting and lowered slightly just after impacting. 5. The height of toss appeared low in general. 6. According to the moving track of the racket head center, player s1 and s2 used fiat serves in which the racket head did not move right or left and player s3 and s1 spin serves in which the racket head moved significantly to right or left. 7. What appeared to play the largest role in speeding the racket head was segmental motion by the inner twist of the upper arm.

釜山市 公共서비스 供給의 民營化에 관한 硏究 : 衡平과 能率의 觀點에서 Search for Efficiency and Equity

金學魯,姜成哲,金仁 釜山大學校 行政大學院 地方行政硏究所 1991 地方과行政硏究 Vol.3 No.1