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북한 군사전략의 역사적 고찰 : 트로이 木馬에서 러시아 룰렛으로? From a Trojan Horse to Russian Roulette?
강성학 한국전략문제연구소 1997 전략연구 Vol.4 No.3
Kim Ⅱ Sung's political regime in North Korea was. in a manner of speaking. a "son"of Stalin's Soviet Union. As a result, it goes without saying that the North Korean regime's interest was the same as that of the Soviet Empire. As demonstrated during the Korean War. North Korea's military strategy was a kind of "gift" from Stalin. whose own military strategy had been based on the strategic thought of Carl von Clausewitz, reformulated from personal experience during the Russian civil war. and "perfected" in World War II. Its principles were these: first, concentrating military forces for the decisive moment against the most vulnerable point of the enemy: second, seizing the culminating point of offense and maintaining a simultaneous offensive attack: third, preserving the reserve forces: forth. agitating a people's uprising within the enemy country. These principles were not at all new to the students of Clausewitz. who lived not only in Europe but also in Russia and China. In that sense. Stalin was a faithful disciple of Clausewitz, the conservative, "reactionary" philosopher of war. Kim II Sung applied Stalin's military strategy to the Korean peninsula in the following ways. First, to establish unified communist regime throughout the Korean peninsula. Second. to implement the all-out offensive operation using the regular army and based upon overwhelming military forces. Third, to agitate the armed uprising of South Korean people which could play the role of a kind of Trojan Horse at the decisive moment. Forth, to rapidly occupy Seoul, the center of gravity in South Korea. Fifth, to strengthen political propaganda aimed at South Korea under the banner of peaceful national unification in order to divert attention away from political and military leaders and to divide South Korea's public opinion. Sixth, to provoke frequent armed skirmishes along the 38th parallel and routinize them in order to desensitize the fear of security of South Korean political and military leaders as well as common soldiers. Seventh, to attempt to dispatch as many trained communist partisans as possible into South Korea in order for them not only to instigate South Koreans but also to lead them effectively when the time comes. The North Korean military strategy of revolutionary war was almost successful at least in the very early stage of the Korean War in 1950. As Clausewitz argued, war has its grammar but not its logic. War is the world of "glorious" uncertainty. It turned out that North Korea's military strategy had been based upon one critical -- but incorrect -- assumption: that the United States would not return to South. Korea after departing in 1949. This false assumption neutralized all of the early military successes of North Korea and put the North Korean regime in jeopardy of extinction during the latter stages of the Korean War. Thanks to China's timely and massive intervention, the Kim II Sung regime was barely saved from destruction. However, Kim II Sung did not deviate from the fundamental purpose and principles of his military strategy of the last war, though he did reflect upon several mistakes made in implementing the principles of North Korea's military strategy, which had been copied from Stalin's strategy. North Korea simply added one more important purpose to its strategy: the complete pull out of American troops from South Korean soi1. Unless such a withdrawal occurred, it would be very hard for North Korea to reach another culminating point of military offense. During the 1960s, North Korea showed some tactical imitation of General Giap of North Vietnam who had employed Mao's revolutionary war tactics in the theater of the Vietnam War. But Mao's strategy was basically a defensive war strategy of protracted war with a passive goal. while Kim II Sung had a positive goal requiring "first strike." With the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969, North Korea had expected American troops to leave South Korea unilaterally. Therefore, it began participating in the North-South dialogue. while also secretly digging several underground tunnels through which it could dispatch its so-called "special troops"into the South. During the 1970s and 1980s. North Korea maintained its offensive military strategy, while trying to open direct diplomatic channel to the United States. The United States, however, did not respond positively to its overture, insisting that it was not interested in any bilateral negotiation with North Korea, which would exclude the South Korean government. The frustrated North Korean regime then employed the tactic of international terrorism, hoping to throw South Korea into a state of social confusion and instability as well as to obstruct the Olympic Games to be held in Seoul in 1988. In the wake -of the victorious, brilliant American military campaign in the Gulf War in 1991. North Korea adopted a two-pronged strategy of threatening South Korea on the one hand and cajoling the United States on the other. However. the true nature of North Korean policy has again been revealed in its recent submarine debacle. North Korea has been attempting to deceive the world, including South Korea and the United States. Stated differently, since its inception in 1945, North. Korea has never changed its ultimate goal on the Korean peninsula and its basic military strategy. It has consistently pursued conquering the entire Korean peninsula through military means. Peace has been merely a continuation of its policy by other means of the North Korean regime. It is, in a sense, quite understandable. because that goal is the only rationale for its continued existence. Besides, it is, generally speaking, not only difficult but also dangerous to change the military strategy of a country. A change in existing military strategy would produce a high level of friction and confusion within North Korean military forces. The effectiveness and ultimate success of any military strategy depends significantly on the principles of simplicity and perseverance. Military conceptions. after all. are not put on and taken off like different cloaks for different climates. Strategy is the expression of a man's mind. the embodiment of his entire military philosophy and convictions. A new military strategy implies a new type of mind. It calls for leadership by new enthusiastic men rather than by reluctant and disgruntled converts. North Korea has striven to build up a self-sustaining military capability. Since it has behaved in a certain way for the last fifty years. we must assume that it has a certain proclivity in that direction. There have been no indications that North Korea will abandon its long-held program for reunification under Kim II Sung's so-called "self-reliance." Therefore. without the emergence of new leaders, like a Gorbachev, North Korea would not and could not change its basic military strategy. Believing that North Korean leaders' minds. namely. policies and strategies, could be reformed fundamentally would be rank self-delusion. A revolutionary regime does not simply fade away. Rather it adopts "heroic" suicide. North Korea. waiting for another strategic culminating point of offense. has tried ceaselessly to build a Trojan Horse in South Korea and induce the United States to pull out all American troops on Korean soil. So far it has failed. If it were to adopt a coercive diplomatic method again. including the threat of nuclear development and an unrestrained build-up of missiles. it would be Kim Jong Il's final game of Russian Roulette. As Aristophanes said more than two and a half centuries ago. "You cannot teach a crab to walk straight." It is high time to listen to Cassandra.
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플라톤의 조선, 마키아벨리의 일본제국 그리고 미국의 아시아정책
강성학 고려대학교-民국제관계연구원 1999 국제관계연구 Vol.4 No.1
마키아벨리의 [군주론]을 집어드는 사람은 누구든 지금까지 정치에 관해서 쓰여진 가 장 유명한 책을 자신의 손에 들고 있는 것이다. 그것에 가장 가까운 경쟁서는 플라톤의 [공화정]이지만 그러나 이 책은 정치를 초월하는 맥락에서 정치를 논하고 있기 때문에 정 치가 제한적이고 종속적인 지위를 갖는다.” -하비 멘스필드 2세- “행운의 신은 여자이다.” -마키아벨리- “현실주의자를 사랑하는 사람은 없다.” -로버트 길핀- 플라톤에 의하면 국가가 덕스럽기 위해서는 작아야 하고 무기는 수호자계급에게만 주어져야 하며 외국무역의 타락적 영향으로부터 고립되어야 한다. 1) 그러나 마키아벨리의 눈으로 볼 때 그러한 정책적 처방은 비합리적이다. 왜냐하면 작고 쇄 국적이며 국민들을 무장시키지 않는 미덕의 국가는 크고, 개방적이며 국민들이 무장한 사악 한 국가들의 희생물이 될 것이기 때문이다. 마키아벨리를 “악의 교사”(teacher of evil)라 고 규정했고 모든 면에서 마키아벨리의 비르투(Virtu)보다는 플라톤의 미덕을 선호하는 20 세기의 플라톤주의자 레오 스트라우스(Leo Strauss)조차도 그의 마키아벨리에 관한 탁월한 저서의 말미에서 이 핵심적 사항에 대해서는 마키아벨리에 동의했다.
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