지전략(地戰略)적 시각(視角)에서 본 북(北)·중관계(中關係)의 지속(持續)과 변용(變容)에 대한 비판적(批判的) 연구(硏究) -김정은(金正恩) 시기(時期)를 중심(中心)으로-

이상만 ( Lee Sang Man ),김동찬 ( Kim Dong Chan ) 한중사회과학학회 2017 한중사회과학연구 Vol.15 No.4

This paper conducts critical study on the continuity and change between North Korea-Sino relations from the perspective of “Geo-Strategy”. This paper not only warns the return of the Cold War mentality, but also emphasizes the argument that we can solve security problems in the Northeast Asia through expanding geo-economic cooperation. This paper consists of four chapters. The first chapter is an introduction. As a analytical framework, the second chapter will logically explain North Korea-Sino relations in the course of circulation of specificity and universality. The third chapter will analyze the continuity and change of geo-strategical values between North Korea-Sino relations as a practice plan. The fourth chapter will propose some evaluation and prospects. In these days, there are many different points of view on North Korea-Sino relations, and it mainly depends on how to understand “If the lips are gone, the teeth will be cold(唇亡齒寒)” relations between two countries in the Cold War era. Independent domestic and foreign policies of North Korea has had vast impact on North Korea-Sino relations and China’s policy on North Korea, and especially in recent times, North Korea variable becomes core factor that cause the change of international order in the Northeast Asia. For example, North Korean nuclear test and deployment of THAAD in South Korea are very important variables in the Northeast Asia, and these issues are closely related to China. However, it’s time to expand geo-economical way of thinking to promote regional economic integration, even though ongoing geo-political disputes are escalating at a rapid speed. This paper argues that relations among South Korea, North Korea, China and the U.S. should and could be solved by geo-economical community based on reconciliation and cooperation without any confrontation or conflict. Therefore, this paper suggests “two-track approach” to solve various realistic problems. In other words, South Korea, China and the U.S. should induce North Korea to join economic community in the Northeast Asia by improving inter-Korean relations and reopening inter-Korean economic cooperation, at the same time, they also should achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula by solving security dilemma of North Korea.

미중 패권 경쟁과 북미 관계: 부시 행정부에서 트럼프 행정부 시기를 중심으로

이원영 국가안보전략연구원 2018 국가안보와 전략 Vol.18 No.4

President Trump declared his foreign policy as ‘America First’ and ‘Peace through Strength’ which resulted in pressing China to prevent from rising. And he declared the trade war with China in 2018. But in 2018, Trump’s policy for North Korea changed from ‘Maximum Pressure and Engagement’ to Summit and took a deal for the denuclearization of North Korea in spite of that he exchanged word bomb with the North Korea and considered the military attack in 2017. How could the change happen? After post-cold war, the grand strategy of U.S. for Northeast Asia, especially for China was the ‘defensive accommodation’. At Bush Administration, Sino-U.S. relation was a kind of cooperation, called as ‘Chimerica’, and the policy for North Korea was the ‘unilateral coercion’. But after the global financial crisis, China rose quickly, and then Obama declared ‘Pivot to Asia’, which meant rebalancing, and the policy for North Korea was ‘Strategic Patience’ which aimed at the construction of multilateral deterrence regime. But the rebalancing oscilated and failed to prevent from China rising and ‘Strategic Patience’ failed to keep from North Korea advancing the nuclear capability. Trump determined to press China as strong as possible within ‘defensive accommodation’. In this situation, the change of the relation with North Korea might lead the crack of strategy of China for Northeast Asia and the China-North Korea Alliance. Thus under the U.S. unipolar structure, the strategy to prevent from China rising could expand the range of choice including the conversation for the denuclearization of North Korea. But if the great strategy of U.S. change from ‘defensive accommodation’ to ‘offensive containment’ as a result of the Sino-U.S. competition for hegemony, the U.S.-North Korea relations will be uncertain. Now South Korea has the trilemma which is not easy to be compatible, consolidating Kor-U.S. alliance, reinforcing Kor-China relations, and the establishment of the peace regime of Korean Peninsula. In spite of trilemma, that is the inevitable task for South Korea toward the peace of Korean Peninsula. 미국의 트럼프 대통령은 ‘미국우선주의’와 ‘힘을 통한 평화’를 자신의 대외 정책으로 천명하였으며, 대통령 당선 직후부터 중국에 대한 정치적⋅ 경제적인 압박을 예고했으며, 2018년에는 중국에 대하여 무역전쟁을 선포했다. 그러나 2017년까지 말폭탄을 직접 주고받았고, 군사적 공격까지 검토했던 북한에 대해서는 2018년, 정상회담을 하였으며, 비핵화 협상을 진 행했다. 탈냉전 이후 미국의 동아시아, 특히 중국에 대한 대전략은 ‘방어 적 수용’이었다. 이에 입각하여 부시 행정부 시기 미중 관계는 ‘차이메리 카’로 불렸던 협력의 시기였으며, 이 시기 대북정책은 일방주의적 강압이 었다. 반면에 오바마 행정부 시기 중국의 부상이 현저해지자 미국은 중국 에 대한 ‘재균형’을 추구하였으며, 이 시기 대북정책은 ‘전략적 인내’를 통 한 다자주의적 억지레짐의 형성이었다. 그렇지만 ‘재균형’ 전략은 일정하 게 진동하였고, 결국 중국의 부상을 저지하지 못하였으며, ‘재균형’ 전략 에 입각한 ‘전략적 인내’는 북한 핵능력의 고도화를 저지하지 못하였다. 트럼프 행정부는 ‘방어적 수용’의 범주 내에서 중국의 부상 저지를 위한 최고의 압박을 결정하였다. 그런데 북미 관계의 변화는 중국의 동북아 지역 전략의 균열을 가져올 수 있으며, 북중 동맹에도 균열을 야기할 수 있는 문제였다. 따라서 미국 단극 구조에서 도전국으로 간주되는 중국의 부상 저지라는 전략적 선택 하에서, 중국의 동맹인 북한과의 관계 개선이라는 정책적 선택지가 등장할 수 있었던 것이다. 그렇지만 현재 진행되는 미중 갈등의 타협 여부에 따라 북미 관계는 다시 불확실성에 빠질 수 있다. 이러한 상황에서 현재 교착 상태에 있는 비핵화 협상 진전을 위한 대안을바탕으로 북한을 설득하고, 그에 대한 미국의 동의와 중국의 지지를 이끌어 내어야 한다는 것이 한미 동맹의 공고화, 중국과의 협력 강화, 한반도평화 구축이라는 트릴레마 극복을 위한 우리의 과제이다.

김정일-후진타오 시대의 북중관계: 불안정한 북한과 부강한 중국의 비대칭협력 강화

이상숙 ( Sang Sook Lee ) 경남대학교 극동문제연구소 2010 한국과 국제정치 Vol.26 No.4

이 연구는 강대국과 약소국 간 ``비대칭관계``의 특성을 통해, 제1, 2차 북한 핵실험 이후 북중관계를 비교하여 그 변화 원인을 분석한다. 북중관계의 비대칭 전략관계적 특성은 첫째, 약소국보다 강력함에도 불구, 강대국은 약소국에게 용이하게 원하는 것을 강제할 수 없다. 중국은 북한에게 강력한 압력을 가할 수 없었고 핵을 포기하도록 영향력을 행사할 수 없었다. 둘째, 강대국에게 약소국에 대한 안보지원은 상당한 부담이지만, 약소국이 없어지거나 불안정한 상황인 경우 더 큰 부담이 발생하고, 기존 약소국의 현존이 더 유리하므로 안보지원 또는 협력을 한다. 중국은 북한 체제유지가 외교적으로 부담되지만, 북한 체제가 없어지거나 불안정한 상황을 가장 우려한다. 2003년 김정일-후진타오 시대 개막 이후 북 중 관계의 전략적 협력 강화 원인은 첫째, 북한의 핵실험을 통한 핵위기 조성과 지역 안보위기 확대의 상황적 변화이다. 둘째, 후진타오 주석 중심의 ``화평발전``을 앞세운 제4세대 지도자의 등장으로 인한 지도자의 변화이다. 셋째, 중국의 지속적 발전을 위한 자원외교와 동북지역 발전의 필요성이다. 중국은 제1차 핵실험 시 북한에 대한 비난의 목소리를 높이고 대북제재에 동참하였지만, 2009년 핵실험 감행에도 불구하고 대북지원을 강화하고 있다. 이러한 중국 대북정책의 변화는 북한의 대내 불안정성과도 관련 깊다. 첫째, 북한 핵실험 재개와 동북아 안보환경의 변화, 둘째, 북한 최고지도자의 건강이상과 후계체제 구축의 본격화, 셋째, 북한의 화폐개혁과 이에 따른 혼란이다. 대내 불안정성 심화로 인한 북한의 위기조성에 대해 중국의 대응방식이 변화된 것으로 분석된다. This study focused on the change of China`s policy toward North Korea after the second nuclear test of North Korea in 2009 and analyzed the reason of the change using asymmetric strategic relations. Sino-North Korea`s relations have asymmetric strategic characters. China could not give pressure to North Korea for abandonment of nuclear weapons. Moreover, China is burdened by North Korea, however, very worried about the collapse or unstable situation of North Korea. Beginning Hu Jin Tao era of China in 2003, Sino-North Korea`s relations expanded the strategic cooperation. The reason of this cooperation as follows; the first reason is North Korea`s making the crisis of nuclear test. The second one is Hu Jin Tao and the fourth generation leadership`s assumption seeking ``peaceful development``. The third one is the need of resource diplomacy on China`s eco-nomic development and the development of North Eastern China. China denounced North Korea`s the first nuclear test in 2006 and agreed the economic sanctions against North Korea. However, China gave North Korea the economic supports in the second nuclear test in 2009. The main reason of this is the instability of North Korea in 2008~2009. Concludingly, China`s responses to the North Korea`s crisis depended on the instability after the second nuclear test of North Korea.

1960년대 초반 북중관계 밀착 연구

한상준 중국근현대사학회 2022 중국근현대사연구 Vol.94 No.-

The early 1960s was a time when North Korea-China honeymoon relations reached their peak. However, most of the studies so far examining the background and causes of the close relationship between North Korea and China show limitations in that they have been limited to small and medium-sized disputes. Therefore, this paper conducted an analysis and review of the closeness of North Korea-China relations in the early 1960s with the intention to overcome such limitations and supplement the deficiencies of existing studies, and the following conclusions were drawn. First, it was confirmed that North Korea-China secret relations in the early 1960s developed on the continuity of the friendly bilateral relations that had already been established at the end of the 1950s, and that there was an inertia of close relations between North Korea and China that had continued since the late 1950s. In fact, it could be said that North Korea-China relations reached the highest point in 1958, when the Chinese military withdrawal was finally completed. The complete withdrawal of Chinese troops was also an event that simultaneously showed the uniqueness and robustness of bilateral relations between North Korea and China in the late 1950s. The fact that China's internal decision to withdraw its troops at the end of 1956 was a symbolic measure that it changed its policy toward North Korea from a ‘interference policy’ to a ‘non-interference policy’. The change in North Korea policy promoted by China had an impact. Second, the context and flow of the small and medium-sized disputes surfaced, which became the international background and condition for close relations between North Korea and China in the early 1960s, were reviewed in detail from 1958. Although some researchers have paid attention to a series of situations that occurred in 1958 while conducting the analysis of the small and medium-sized conflict, there are not many studies on small and medium-sized conflicts in Korean academic circles. explanation was insufficient. Third, the background and causes of close relations between North Korea and China in the early 1960s were explored through analysis of the international conditions and environment that China faced. In the sense that studies examining the closeness of North Korea-China relations in the early 1960s were not actively attempted from China's position and situation, this paper contributed to broadening the perspectives and perspectives of related studies. In fact, from the late 1950s to the early 1960s, the environment and conditions of the international situation surrounding China were very unfavorable to China. China faced the Soviet threat from the northwest, the Indian threat from the southwest, and the American threat from the south, and China's national security was in a very unstable state.

중국의 대북 경제정책과 경제협력에 관한 연구

박종철 한국동북아학회 2012 한국동북아논총 Vol.17 No.1

This research is to analyze China leadership’s Korea economic policy toward North after North Korea’s second nuclear test, and major changes and structure of North Korea-China economic cooperation and of borderland development. China’s economic cooperation to North Korea until in the middle of 2000’s was mainly on simple trading and small scale investment. Chinese government did not approve large scale investment in North Korea. In late 2000’s, North Korea-China economic cooperation is entering state of borderland infrastructure development and expanding industry cooperation. After 2009, North Korea-China economic cooperation maintains its background of China-US conflict, strengthened South Korea-US alliance, serious South Korea-China conflict and North Korea’s systematic crisis. Especially, increasing tension in the Korean peninsula, North Korea-China economic cooperation and borderland development after the second nuclear test have strong correlation. For revitalizing North Korea-China economic cooperation, China is approaching from a perspective of strengthening the Korean peninsula status quo and North Korea is approaching from a perspective of maintaining its system strategically. Under Hu Jintao-Xi jinping and Kim Jong Un’s collective leadership system, North Korea-China economic cooperation is maintaining its status quo plus reinforcement. 이 연구는 제 2차 북핵실험 이후 중국지도부의 대북경제정책의 조정과 북중 경제협력과 접경개발을 둘러싼 주요 변화와 구조에 관한 분석이다. 한중수교 이후 2000년대 중반까지 중국의 대북 경제협력은 단순한 무역거래나 소규모 투자가 중심이 되었었다. 그러나 2000년대 후반기 북중경제협력은 접경지역 인프라 건설과 산업협력으로 확대되는 국면을 맞고 있다. 2009년 이후 북중 경제협력은 중미갈등과 한미동맹, 한중갈등, 그리고 북한의 체제위기를 배경으로 하고 있다. 특히 제2차 북핵실험 이후 한반도를 둘러싼 긴장 고조와 북중 경제협력과 접경개발은 밀접한 상관관계를 맺고 있다. 북중 경제협력의 활성화에 대하여 후진타오-시진핑 정권은 한반도 현상유지강화라는 관점에서 접근하고 있으며, 김정일-김정은 정권은 체제유지전략의 관점에서 접근하고 있다. 이러한 북중 경제협력은 김정일 사후 김정은 집단지도체제 하에서도 현상유지강화가 이루어지고 있다.

북한 핵 개발의 환경, 논리, 경로: 중국 경험과의 비교

이희옥,신지선 국가안보전략연구원 2021 국가안보와 전략 Vol.21 No.3

This study aims to analyze the similarities and differences of nuclear weapon development programs between China and North Korea. Especially this study assumes that North Korea refers to China’s logic for nuclear development throughout official primary documents. This assumption stems from the observation that the environment of nuclear tests between two countries was similar in terms of path dependency, despite differing international conditions, such as North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT system. Additionally, China completed the so-called ‘Two Bombs and One Satellite’ despite U.S. diplomatic pressure, division of the socialists bloc, and severe domestic economic crisis. Later, China normalized its relation with the U.S., and thereafter, pursued ‘Reform and Opening Policy’. Similarly, North Korea tested its nuclear bombs and artificial satellites despite strict opposition from socialist friendly countries and domestic economic crisis incurred by the ‘Arduous March Economic Season’. Regardless of the possibility of realization, North Korea declared itself a nuclear state, while pursuing a ‘Socialist Economy Construction’ and a North Korean-type reform similar to what China had done in the past. Moreover, North Korea announced a ‘No First Use Policy’ and a defensive nuclear strategy, again similar to what China had done. However, North Korea was not recognized as a nuclear state after it withdrew from the NPT system. Even when China requested to North Korea to denuclearize, which caused a conflict between two countries, North Korea decide to ignore such request and endure a long-term ‘Cognition Struggle’. The assumption that North Korea had followed China’s process and strategy in their nuclear development program can be confirmed by primary documents, mainly Renmin Ribao and Rodong Sinmun. This study stressed on the shortcomings of preceding studies on North Korea’s nuclear development by clarifying the similarities and differences of nuclear development between two countries. And this study will contribute new academic debates about North Korea’s post-nuclear processes. 이 글은 북한이 중국 핵 개발의 환경, 논리, 경로를 맥락적으로 참고했다고 보고 이를 1차 자료를 통해 확인하면서 핵 개발 논리의 유사성과 차이를확인하고자 했다. 사실 중국과 북한의 핵실험은 NPT 체제 탈퇴 등 환경과핵 보유에 대한 지도부 인식의 차이에도 불구하고 일정한 경로의존성과 유사성이 있다. 중국은 미국의 강력한 압력, 사회주의권 내부의 분열, 심각한경제위기 환경 속에서 이른바 ‘양탄일성(兩彈一星)’을 완성했다. 이후 미중관계를 정상화하고 이를 기반으로 ‘사회주의 현대화 건설’ 즉, 개혁개방정책을 본격적으로 추진했다. 북한도 미국의 체제위협, 우방 국가인 중국과러시아의 반대, ‘고난의 행군’이라는 경제위기에도 불구하고 핵과 인공위성실험을 감행했다. 실현 가능성 여부와는 무관하게 북한이 핵보유국을 선언하고 북미관계의 정상화를 통한 ‘사회주의 경제 건설’, 즉 북한식 개혁개방을 추진하고자 하는 패턴에는 일정한 유사성이 있다. 또한 북한은 힘의 비대칭성 속에 ‘핵 선제 불사용 원칙’이라는 방어적 핵전략을 채택한 것도 중국의 경험이 주효했다. 다만 북한은 NPT 체제에 탈퇴한 이후, 핵 보유 지위를 인정받지 못했고 중국도 북한에 비핵화를 요구하면서 북중관계의 갈등이 나타나자, 장기적인 인정투쟁(cognition struggle)이라는 과정을 거칠 수밖에 없었다. 북한의 핵 개발 환경, 논리, 경로에서 중국의 경험을 학습했다는 논의를 인민일보와 로동신문등의 1차 자료에 근거해 확인했다. 이 연구는 기존의 북한 핵 개발에 연구에서 누락된 부분의 근거를 보완하고, 북한과 중국의 핵 개발에 유사성과 차이를 보다 분명하게 드러낼 수있으며, 북한의 ‘핵 이후’의 발전경로에 대한 새로운 학문적 토론을 가능하게 할 수 있다.

냉전시기 중공의 외교노선과 북중관계의 전개

한상준(Han Sang Jun) 중국근현대사학회 2021 중국근현대사연구 Vol.91 No.-

This paper examines the development of North Korea-China relations during the Cold War by analyzing the foreign policy of Communist China from the 1950s and to the 1970s. From a macroscopic perspective, the distinctiveness of North Korea-China relations during the Cold War was defined by the Cold War structure in East Asia that forced solidarity between the two countries. Amid the Cold War confrontation between the two ideological camps, there was a basic coincidence of interests and positions between North Korea and China, which were pitted against the ‘common enemy,’ the United States. Factors such as the common historical experience of fighting together in war, the closely interdependent geopolitical conditions, and the ideological homogeneity of the communist regime, all acted together to further strengthen the solidarity between North Korea and China. In other words, the distinctiveness of North Korea-China relations stemmed from the circumstances and conditions in which the two nations had to share mutual interests. North Korea-China relations from the 1950s to the 1970s were influenced by the distinctiveness of the bilateral relations, China’s policy on the Korean Peninsula, and changes in Communist China’s foreign policy. Among them, the distinctiveness of North Korea-China relations and China’s policy on the Korean Peninsula have influenced North Korea-China relations as fixed constants. And the foreign policy chosen by Communist China in line with the changes in the international environment surrounding North Korea and China was a variable that affected the relations between the two countries. The greatest national task facing Communist China since the establishment of the regime was to successfully implement the economic construction of New China, and for that purpose, stability in the international environment around China was absolutely necessary. Accordingly, China’s foreign policy aimed to create a stable international environment, and China’s policy to maintain the status quo on the Korean Peninsula was prepared as an extension of such a diplomatic line. Therefore, China’s policy toward North Korea during the Cold War was derived from China’s policy to maintain the status quo on the Korean Peninsula. China’s policy to maintain the status quo on the peninsula was consistent throughout the Cold War era, and it was a constant that defined the development of North Korea-China relations between the 1950s and the 1970s along with the distinctiveness of North Korea-China relations. Meanwhile, North Korea-China relations during the Cold War were also influenced by China’s domestic and international situations and China’s foreign policy, which were variables in the development of the bilateral relations. This paper analyzes the relationship between North Korea and China amid the characteristics of China’s diplomatic lines for each period from the 1950s to the 1970s. Chapter 1 examines China’s policy toward North Korea and the development of North Korea-China relations in the 1950s, when China was completely focused on its relations with the Soviet Union. During this period, China implemented an ‘interventionist policy’ toward North Korea based on close cooperation with the Soviet Union. China’s ‘interventionist policy’ toward North Korea switched to an ‘appeasement policy’ in 1956, and this study explains the cause, process, and result of such a policy shift in the context of the development of North Korea-China relations in the 1950s. Chapter 2 analyzes the impact of China’s ‘left turn’ in China’s foreign policy in the 1960s, the escalating conflict between North Korea and China during the Cultural Revolution, and the deepening of the Soviet security threat to China on the development of North Korea-China relations. Chapter 3 explores the impact of China’s great diplomatic change in the 1970s on North Korea-China relations, and examines the relationship between the two countries in the context of Communist Ch

북한의 대중협상전략과 우리의 대응전략

장공자 한국통일전략학회 2009 통일전략 Vol.9 No.2

The major objective of this research is to analyze the characteristics of the negotiation strategy for Sino-North Korea relations. However, from the opening and reform period to the present, the Sino-North Korea relationship has presented dual characteristics repeating union and laxity according to China's interest in the global order. The history and status of the relationship to the nature of the report, identified China and North Korea would like to imagine will be based on negotiation strategy. The purpose of such negotiation strategy is to achieve political stability and economic recovery while restraining the U.S. hostile policy toward North Korea. North Korea will adopt combined policies of alliance, appeasement and issue based support .Common interests of China and South Korea from North Korea a few, because Korea and the U.S. reaffirmed the alliance and solidarity of the Korean peninsula in cooperation with the U.S. to have a adjust to the problem. To discuss the issue of the Korean peninsula, South Korea must also able to attend any meeting of the diplomatic efforts so that South Korea will have to. 북한과 중국의 관계는 국제 정세변화와 북한 내부상황의 변화에 따라 이데올로기를 공유하는 동맹의 관계에서 실리위주의 호혜적 동반자의 관계로 변화해 가는 과정을 거쳤다. 이 과정에서 양국은 우호와 마찰이 끊이지 않고 반복되면서도 협력하는 양면성을 보였다. 중국은 북한의 핵개발 시도를 경제적, 전략적 취약성으로 인한 방어적 선택으로 인식한다. 중국은 북․중관계의 미래지향적 변화의 필요성에 따라 북․중관계와 북핵문제를 분리 접근하고 있다. 북․중 간의 협상내용은 통상적 관례가 공개하지 않는 것으로 되어 있어 이에 대한 문헌자료를 접하기가 어렵기 때문에 현재 실시하고 있는 외교정책과 정치지도자들의 외교활동을 통해 추측하고 반증할 수밖에 없다, 북한의 대중 협상에서 추구하고자 하는 궁극적인 목적은 체제안정과 경제회복 그리고 미국의 적대정책에 대한 억제 등이다. 그러므로 북한의 협상전략은 동맹과 유화작전 그리고 현안에 따라 지지를 하는 등의 복합적인 형태로 나타났다. 북한은 대중협상에서 첫째, 독립자주, 주체외교의 전략을 구사하며 둘째, 맞대응하는 전략, 셋째, 상응하는 물질적 요구를 제시하는 전략 그리고 넷째, 협상에 전제조건을 제시하는 전략을 쓰고 있는게 특징이다. 한반도문제에서 중국과 한국의 이해가 충족되는 부분은 극히 적을 수밖에 없다. 따라서 한국은 한․미동맹의 결속을 재확인하고 미국과의 공조 속에 한반도문제를 조율, 조정해야 한다. 아울러 한반도문제를 해결하기 위한 어떠한 전략회의에도 반드시 우리가 동참할 수 있도록 외교적 노력을 기울려야 한다.

북중동맹의 공고성에 관한 연구

강정일(Kang Jung-Il) 한국전략문제연구소 2012 전략연구 Vol.54 No.-

본 논문에서는 북중동맹의 조약체결 내용을 중심으로 북중동맹이 과연 약화되고 있는지, 아니면 여전히 공고한지에 대해 살펴보았다. 변화하는 북중관계를 고찰해보기 위해 본 논문은 북한을 지탱하고 있는 한 축인 북중동맹조약의 이행 여부를 중심으로 중국과 북한의 관계를 살펴본다. 연구결과는 크게 세 가지 측면에서 중국과 북한이 주장하는 것과 달리 그들의 동맹은 공고하지 않다는 사실을 보여준다. 첫째, 북중동맹조약의 체결 내용과 달리 중국은 적대국이었던 한국과 국교를 체결하였다. 둘째, 군사와 무기분야에 있어서의 북중 간의 교류와 협력 원활하지 못한 상황이다. 셋째, 북핵문제를 포함한 북한의 지속되는 대남 무력도발은 중국에 있어 상당한 부담으로 작용하고 있으며, 이에 따라 양국 정부는 관련 문제에 대해 첨예한 의견 차이를 보이고 있다. 본 논문은 북중 관계의 주요 현안인 한중수교, 북중군사교류, 북핵문제를 〈조중 우호협력 및 상호원조조약〉에 규정된 양국의 의무를 중심으로 재평가해 보았다는 점에서 의의를 찾을 수 있다. This paper seeks to examine changes in the Sino-North Korea relations regarding the extent to which obligations prescripted by the Sino-North Korean Alliance Treaty have been discharged since the establishment of the Sino-North Korean Alliance in 1961. Contrary to the Chinese and North Korean argument that the Sino-North Korean Alliance has been consolidated, this paper reveals three clear signs of declining cooperative relations between China and North Korea: relative decrease in Chinese military aid to North Korea, establishment of deplomatic relations between China and South Korea, and political burden imposed to China by North Korean nuclear issues and continuing military provocations agsainst South Korea. If the clauses of the Sino-North Korean Alliance treaty are considered, all these events are reflecting that the Sino-North Korea alliance is not what it used to be.

3, 4차 북핵실험 이후 북중관계와 동맹 딜레마

김남성 고려대학교세종캠퍼스 공공정책연구소 2016 Journal of North Korea Studies Vol.2 No.1

Sino-North Korean relations have reached a new deadlock after North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in January 2016. Particularly, China faces a very difficult position in the international community. As one of the G2 it is required to join sanctions against North Korea, but at the same time it needs to help the country according to their pact of alliance. When North Korea tested its third nuclear test, China had been rather harsh on North Korean leadership. Unlike the latter’s first and third nuclear tests, China actively participated in the UN sanctions and openly criticized the regime for its third nuclear test. However as time passed, it was revealed that China’s sanctions against North Korea was toothless and short-lived. China lifted the ban on oil export to North Korea, which has been a lifeline for the regime. Sino-North Korea trade had not declined. With North Korea’s fourth nuclear test, the trade between the two countries even increased. This paper examines the reasons behind China’s inability to abandon North Korea even though it displayed apparent participation in sanctions against the regime. In so doing, the paper shows that China is facing an alliance dilemma and that North Korea’s geopolitical and strategic value serve as the ‘Weak State Power’ against China.