美·日 關係의 現況

William H. Ginn Jr,박홍식 해군대학 1981 海洋戰略 Vol.- No.7

현 상태의 미일 안보관계는 일본의 자위대가 4반세기 전에 창건된 이래로 가장 밀접하고 또 가장 강력하며 그 관계는 매일 강화되고 있다. 그 관계는 우리의 상호협조 및 안보협정의 확고한 기초 위에 자리잡고 있으며 이 협정은 또한 모든 동북아시아의 안정에 대한 토대를 형성하고 있다. 미국의 핵심적인 이익이 이곳에 달려 있다는 인식과 필수불가결한 상호관계에 대한 인식은 최근 양 정부에 의해 충분히 시사되었다. 미국 측에 있어서의 시위방법은 공약배치된 새로운 방위체제, 대통령, 부통령, 국무 및 국방장관, 수많은 의회대표단, 합동참모회의의장, 많은 고위 국방부 및 군부요인들의 방문 등을 포함한다. 모든 이러한 행위들은 미국이 태평양 세력이며 또 계속 태평양 세력으로 남아있을 것이라는 것을 재차 확인하는 것이다.

Prospects for the Agreed Framework: What Do We Do Now:

( William J Taylor Jr ) 한국국방연구원 1995 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.7 No.1

The US-DPRK Agreed Framework is generally considered the "best" of a bad set of options to deal with North Korea`s nuclear program. The Agreed Framework has many serious weaknesses, including a delayed investigation of past North Korean nuclear activity, leaving South-North dialogue out of the web of interlocking steps taken by both sides, not specifying what security assurances would be granted, and, most importantly, not specifying special inspections in the document itself. While these inadequacies exist, the Agreed Framework should still be supported. If the framework were to collapse, the best available alternative at that time would be a return to economic sanctions, an inferior, although potentially necessary option. First, the United States Congress may not provide the necessary funding for the framework and the administration might not be able to generate the funding internationally. Second, Pyongyang may break the agreement. Under any circumstances, it is clear that North Korea will continuously attempt to extract every possible extra concession at every conceivable turn-from Washington and from Seoul. In case the framework does collapse, and to encourage Pyongyang to abide by it in the meantime, a contingency plan for sanctions against the DPRK must be prepared. While military strikes are not a viable option, graduated economic sanctions are the best conceivable alternative. If Pyongyang does not live up to its end of the bargain, all major international actors should support this alternative. In order to prepare for this contingency, the United States and South Korea must also prepare more realistic reenforcement plans for the Combined Forces in Korea to deal with the real risks involved in implementing sanctions. In the meantime, the author proposes a number of steps all sides can take to encourage the prospects for success of the Agreed Framework. These include: generating greater bipartisan support for the framework in the United States, repeated requests for earlier access to the two nuclear waste sites at Yongbyon, a greater willingness to use the leverage, both "carrots" and "sticks" that we hold over Pyongyang to deal with their repeated requests for further concessions; and, most importantly, an assurance from the Clinton administration that future US defense budgets will be sufficient to ensure that the United States can fight and win two major regional wars simultaneously.

제2부 세계경제와 동구제국 ; 제1장 변화의 방향

William Diebold,Jr . 경남대학교 극동문제연구소 1981 80년대의 미소관계 Vol.- No.-

BIOLOGICALLY-BASED DOSE-RESPONSE MODEL FOR NEUROTOXICITY RISK ASSESSMENT

William Slikker, Jr,David W. Gaylor 한국독성학회 1990 Toxicological Research Vol.6 No.2

Emerging Disease Problems in Korean Rice and Their Origins

William M. Brown. Jr. 한국식물병리학회 1976 한국식물보호학회지 Vol.15 No.1

US-Korean Security Relations: Post-Reunification

( William J Taylor Jr ),( Michael J Mazarr ) 한국국방연구원 1992 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.4 No.1

This paper examines the future of Korea and its security relations with the United States. Unification, it contends, may be approaching faster than many have believed, and irrespective of the timing, unification is inevitabl-the questions related to it are how and when, not whether. Once unified, Korea will undoubtedly face a difficult period of adjustment as it seeks to fit itself into the new security equation in Northeast Asia. The paper examines that transition. It looks at the security envi-ronment in which a unified Korea would find itself, and sketches out a number of potential strategies by which Korea could guarantee its security: an independent militarism, an alliance with a regional power, neutrality, collective security, and others. It concludes that a unified Korea will probably continue to prefer a security relationship with the United States to any other ultimate security guarantee. Assuming that Korean-US security relations will continue after unification, the paper concludes with an assessment of the current challenges facing the relationship, including domestic politics on both sides and defense industrial cooperation.

EMERGING DISEASE PROBLEMS IN KOREAN RICE AND THEIR ORIGINS

William M. Brown Jr 한국응용곤충학회 1976 한국응용곤충학회지 Vol.15 No.1

As the technology of rice production in Korea has rapidly developed and progressed over the last few years, many problems in rice production have been solved. But with the introduction of new genetic material, the increased use of pesticides, higher fertilizer rates and closer plantings, new problems are beginning to emerge. The brown plant hopper outbreak in 1975 resulted to a great extent from some of the changes in management practices. Some rice diseases and nutritional problems that have existed in Korea but have not been considered of serious consequence, are now becoming increasingly severe and possibly as limiting as the hopper outbreak in 1975. Other diseases and nutritional problems are completely new and their cause and significance have not yet been adequately defined. In this discussion there is no Intention to state, nor is there evidence to support a statement, that any of these problems are going to be limiting factors in the future production of rice on the Korean peninsula. Rather this is an attempt to bring together some of the current field problems in Korean rice so that they can be discussed and where necessary receive suitable consideration for research and control.

Colonic Motility in Health and Disease

( William J. Snape Jr ) 대한소화기학회 1993 SIDDS Vol.2 No.-

Strategic Opportunities in Northeast Asia

( William J Taylor Jr ),( Michael J Mazarr ) 한국국방연구원 1989 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.1 No.2

This essay suggests that the security context in Northeast Asia is changing rapidly, and that US security policies must evolve to meet changing realities. It outlines what the basic shifts appear to be and proposes a number of specific policy options that the Unites States ought to pursue. In terms of the changing environment, the essay addresses four major trends. First, the Unites States will be forced to surrender to some degree its traditional role as security guarantor in Northeast Asia, a result dictated in large part by US defense budget shortfalls. Second, the USSR and China have dynamic new economic and political objectives and they desire regional detente. Third, South Korea is undergoing massive political and economic change change complicated by a number of specific factors, including trade frictions with the United States, growing nationalism, and the drive for reunification. Finally, North Korea remains a repressive, closed, dangerous state. The authors propose a number of courses to deal with these shifts, all under the rubric of a new strategy for Northeast Asia. The essay rejects calls to pressure South Korea on trade or burden sharing grounds-Seoul has made major progress in both areas, and in fact spends more on defense than any other US ally. South Korean nationalism would also tend to render such efforts counterproductive. The United States should, on the other hand, reorganize the military command structure to allow greater South Korean participation, including turning over command of all ground forces to a Korean General. The United States also ought to announce a phased reduction of its forces in South Korea, and tie that reduction to progress in conventional arms control between the two Koreas. US officials should continue to express strong support for Seoul`s Nordpolitik and for the process of reunification, and should pledge its willingness to withdraw all its troops once both sides are satisfied that the reunification process has advanced to a stage where hostilities are virtually ruled out. These policies would provide a means for the United States to respond both to political and economic developments in South Korea and to Mikhail Gorbachev`s heady public relations campaign. As such they would constitute a first step in reviving US global leadership.

Is Peaceful Unification Possible?

( William Taylor Jr. ),( Abraham Kim ) 한국국방연구원 1997 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.9 No.1

Peaceful unification under the current DPRK leadership or any leadership under the juche system is a pipedream. For decades, the juche ideology has been institutionalized and entrenched into the North Korean society. Kim Jong-il`s legitimacy as Kim I1 Sung`s successor is based upon his ability to perpetuate this ideology and its socio-political system. To ensure that he is committed to his mandate, the leaders of the Korea Worker`s Party, who also depend on juche for their livelihood and authority, hold Kim Jong-il accountable. However, saving the country from its current economic crisis would necessitate dismantling the intrusive bureaucratic party system and heavy-handed control of the economy required under the juche system. Without addressing North Korea`s economic problems, the plight of the country, not to mention the regime, looks dim. Thus, Kim Jong-il is faced with a Catch-22 situation in which the two pillars of his legitimacy are mutually destabilizing. Ultimately, this dilemma will lead to the erosion of his authority. In the meantime, Pyongyang is pursuing a three-pronged strategy to address its economic crisis while maintaining its juche system: mobilizing its people to endure economic hardship; promoting the Rajin-Sonbong special economic Zone, and soliciting international humanitarian aid to feed its starving population. But, all these efforts have failed to bring any substantive change or improvement to North Korea`s economic situation. And, it is unlikely that North Korea`s predicament can ever improve under the juche system. The United States, South Korea and Japan all prefer a soft landing for the DPRK and peaceful unification. South Korea especially understands that the financial costs of a DPRK hard landing would be staggering. But a soft landing requires North-South dialogue based, for example, on the fundamental principles of the 1992 Agreement on Nonaggression, Reconciliation, Cooperation and Exchanges. A straight line projection of conditions in the North, where almost everything that can go wrong is going wrong, leads to the conclusion that the juche system will implode by coup d`etat, revolution or anarchy. As present conditions proceed tensions will mount on both sides of the DMZ, and at times of high tension, wars can start by accident or miscalculation. There is also the possibility that North Korea could make a limited attack south to envelop Seoul, stop, and sue for peace. This would be more likely if the DPRK leadership were to consider South Korea`s political system and economy to be in serious trouble and the resolve of the Clinton administration weak. Whatever the scenario, Washington, Seoul and Tokyo must prepare for the eventuality of war by taking immediate steps to better defend Seoul and much of Japan against North Korean surface-to-surface missiles, and to improve the air defense and counter-artillery capabilities around Seoul. Defending or significantly limiting damage to Seoul not only prepares for an unwanted war, but also removes Pyongyang`s diplomatic "ace in the hole," that is, its capability to destroy Seoul.