中國村民委員會選擧 一모델 調査分析

조수성(Cho, Soo-Sung) 계명대학교 국제학연구소 1999 국제학논총 Vol.3 No.-

중국 농촌기층 거버넌스의 현황 및 대안탐색

조수성 ( Soo Sung Cho ) 대한정치학회 2011 大韓政治學會報 Vol.18 No.1

중국 농촌의 기층거버넌스는 ``향정촌치``의 구조를 이루고 있다. 즉 향진인민정부가 행정기능을 수행하고 촌민위원회가 자치기능을 실행하는 구조이었다. 이러한 구조 속에서 두 기관은 거버넌스 행위주체들이 민주적 참여와 협상을 진행하는 수평적 네트워크를 형성하지 못하고 있다. 더욱이, 중국공산당 단일영도원칙은 이러한 상하수직구도를 더 강화하여, 결국 향진 공산당위원회와 공산당 촌지부가 거버넌스 주체로써 활동하고 있다. 이러한 문제점을 개선해야한다는 공감대가 정계와 학계에 널리 형성되면서 농촌기층정치 분야의 주요과제가 되었다. 이에 2004년부터 연속 7년간 1호문건을 농촌문제로 채택하였으며 그 주요내용으로 농촌기층 거버넌스 건전화를 다루고 있다. 즉, 촌민자치 메커니즘을 활성화하고, 민주적 협의방식인 일사일의제도를 완비하고, 농촌 민간단체를 결성하고, 농촌엘리트를 육성하라고 주문하고 있는 것이다. 2009년에는 농업세폐지 후 가속화되고 있는 농촌기층조직 재정악화문제에 대한 해결방안을 모색하라고 하였으며, 2010년 올해에는 ``중국 실정에 부합하는 농촌기층 거버넌스 메커니즘을 확립하라``고 하였다. 이러한 지침내용 중 가장 주목할 만한 것은 ``중국특색 거버넌스 모델``을 만들자는 것이다. 이는 서구의 거버넌스이론을 중국의 정치실정에 적응할 수 있도록 중국화하며 특히 중국공산당이 농촌기층 거버넌스에서 영도적 행위주체로써 활약해야 한다는 것을 중심 내용으로 하고 있다. 이에, 중국의 학자들이 합리적인 개선방안들을 제기하고 있고 일부학자들은 보다 진보적인 제안을 내놓고 있다. 하지만, 중국정치현실에 비추어 볼 때, 중국공산당의 역할증대를 제한하는 것은 거의 불가능하므로, 절충적 의미에서 농촌기층 거버넌스의 이원화구조를 제안해본다. 즉 중국공산당 조직과 기타 거버넌스 주체들을 분리하고, 향진인민정부·촌민위원회·촌민 그리고 사회민간단체들 간에 수평적 네트워크를 형성하자는 것이다. The basic level governance in China is ``township-government and village self-governance`` system. In this system, it is common that township-government plays a leadership role instead of a directive role to village committee. Therefore, it is hard to build up the horizontal network which governance transactors can carry out democratic participation and corporation. Especially the principle of unique leadership of the CCP(Chinese Communist Party) more strengthens the top-down structure, and so township CCP committee and village CCP branch play critical role in governance network. In order to reform these unreasonable conditions, the China central government and Chinese scholars think on the new governance model in rural basic level. For this, CCP adopt the first-article of the year as rural problems from 2004 to 2010. Those articles recommend several kinds of measures improving and perfecting on governance. Those include : invigorating village self-governance; stabilizing ``one-matter one-discussion system``; forming local non-government organizations; cultivating local elites. 2009 article also asked to draft possible solutions for financial embarrassment which rapidly accelerated after abolishing of agriculture- tax. And 2010 this year the first-article suggested to establish rural basic level governance mechanism which is correspond to China reality, so-called ``rural governance model with Chinese characteristics``. Its core point is the township CCP committee and village CCP branch have to be the main agents of basic level governance. Plenty of Chinese scholars those who especially majored in governance politics also agree with the opinion which the western governance theory can not be transplanted into China as it is. Among them, a few are offering some kinds of progressive directions about new model. But it is nearly impossible to deny or restrict the authority of CCP on rural politics. Therefore, this paper suggest the dual governance system, that is, the one is CCP committee and the other is the horizontal governance network composed with township government, village committee, villagers and social organizations.

정치변동 하의 베이징 후퉁 지역사회

조수성(Soo-sung Cho) 한국정치학회 2001 한국정치학회보 Vol.35 No.1

본 논문은 중국에서 1978년 개혁개방정책 실시 이후 출현한 민주화 운동이 1989년 천안문광장에서 유혈 진압되고 시민사회로의 발전이 지체되고 있는 원인을 베이징시의 주민위원회 활동을 통하여 밝혀보았다. 주민위원회는 정부와 공산당의 정책과 법률을 홍보선전하며 이의 효과적인 집행을 위하여 주민을 동원한다. 또한 지역주민들이 바람직한 사회주의 시민상을 정립하도록 정신교육을 진행한다. 그리고 지역사회의 갈등을 감소시키고 치안을 유지하기 위하여 자체 순찰활동을 치밀하게 실시하고 있다. 이외에 주민들의 불편사항을 해결해 주고 주민들의 의견을 수렴하기도 한다. 그러나 이러한 활동들은 모두 감독 행정기관인 가도판사처가 상부기관의 지침을 받아 하달하는 지시에 의해 이루어지고 있는 것이다. 따라서 주민위원회는 주민들을 위한 자치활동보다는 정부와 공산당을 위한 봉사활동을 훨씬 더 많이 수행하게 되며 이는 곧 지역사회 안정 메커니즘으로 작용하게 되는 것이다. 이와 같이 중국 정부와 공산당이 개혁개방정책 이후에도 여전히 주민들의 자치조직인 주민위원회를 통하여 주민들의 일상생활과 사회활동을 일일이 관리 통제하고 있기 때문에 중국에서 시민사회가 출현하기 어려운 것이다. Why hasn't a civil society yet been developed in China after the cracking down on the Tiananmen democracy movement? This study tries to find some partial answers to the question by investigating the role of the Residents' Committee (jumin weiyuanhuii, the urban neighborhood organization in China. From 1997 to 1999, interviews with cadres of the Resident's Committee and ordinary citizens in the Beijing Hutong area were conducted for this study, pertinent original documents and publications were collected, and the intermediary role of the Committee between government agencies and individual households was analyzed. The Resident Committee is a base-level organization which covers an urban area including 100 to 1000 households. According to the Organization Law, its duty is to accomplish several responsibilities: aid the government in carrying out numerous administrative and policing decisions; disseminate the laws and regulations of the state; educate the citizenry to build a 'socialist-mental-civilization'(shehuizhuyi jingshen wenming), maintain public safety, resolve common disputes occurring among residents; and collect citizens' opinions and report them to the upper government agencies. That is, the Residents' Committee has to accomplish tasks for the state by resolving everyday household problems. As the Residents' Committee is a self-reliant organization composed of ordinary residents, theoretically it has to represent the interests of the citizens first, but actually it mainly serves to satisfy the demands of the state. Because the Committee is totally controlled by the Street Office (jiedao banshichu), which is the lowest administrative agency, it therefore merely is a state-mandated quasi-government organization. Also, the Street Office interferes with the process of Committee elections behind the scenes and produces cadres who will serve as a puppet of the state. Furthermore, it orders the Committee what to do and supervises all the activities of the Committee. Then, in order to successfully mobilize residents for those tasks given by the government, the cadres of the Committee visit each household at any time, keep face to face contacts with citizens and gather all sorts of information about every neighborhood. Therefore, the Committee functions as a social-safety mechanism. As a result, the state can have a strict control and supervise the everyday lives and social activities of the citizens through a close watch over the Residents' Committee. Therefore, in conclusion, it is very difficult to have a civil society emerge under such a political atmosphere in China.

중국의 "공산당원 선진성유지 교육"의 실시배경 및 그 내용 분석

조수성 ( Soo Sung Cho ) 대한정치학회 2006 大韓政治學會報 Vol.14 No.1

중국 사영기업주의 정치참여 특징

조수성 ( Soo Sung Cho ) 대한정치학회 2015 大韓政治學會報 Vol.23 No.2

2002년 중국공산당 당장이 사영기업주의 정치적 역할을 허용하면서, 사영기업주들 의 정치참여는 확대되고 있다. 그들의 참여는 중국의 정치적 특성으로 인하여 참여채 널이나 참여형태 면에서 독특한 양상을 보인다. 중국공산당 영도 원칙과 인치 위주의 정치문화로 인하여, 정치적 안배방식이 활용되고 꽌시 네트워크가 주요한 채널로 가동 되고 있다. 이러한 환경 하에, 공산당ㆍ정협 또는 인대의 구성원이 되어 정책을 건의하고, 전국공상업연합회 등 이익단체를 통하여 이익을 표출하고, 당정 고위간부들과의 접촉을 통하여 이익을 도모한다. 그러나 이러한 정치참여는 법과 정책결정 과정에 자 주적으로 참여하여 집단적 이익표출을 하는 것이 아니고, 공산당과 정부의 정책집행 과정에 동원적으로 참여하는 특징을 보인다. Since, in 2002, the constitution of Chinese Communist Party(CCP) allowed private entrepreneurs to join CCP, political participation of private entrepreneurs was expended rapidly. Their participation patterns are very unique due to the Chinese political characteristics. The Chinese political culture mainly based on absolute leadership of CCP, closed election system, orientation to the rule of man and guanxi network. More to the point, the CCP obviously screens and recruits private entrepreneurs who are able to participate in formal political institutions by using ‘political arrangement’ system. In these circumstances, Chinese private entrepreneurs serve as the members of CCP, political consultative conferences and people’s congresses, they are willing to use the business associations for collective and individual interests, and also try to form symbiotic relationships with government officials. However, they obviously know that they have to play a dual role of representing both the state’s and the member’s interest within participation channels. In short, they mainly tend to mobilized into the policy implementation process.

필자약력

김판석(Pan Suk Kim),로빈슨(Thomas W. Robinson),박광득(Kwang Deuk Park),오일환(Il Whan Oh),유세희(Se Hee Yoo),유희문(Hee Moon Yoo),이일영(Il Young Lee),이희옥(Hee Ok Lee),조수성(Soo Sung Cho) 한양대학교 아태지역연구센터 1995 중소연구 Vol.19 No.1

중국정권초기 북경시 사회주의개조

조수성 중국학연구회 2000 중국학연구 Vol.18 No.-

1949년 정권건설 후 마아저뚱은 혁명시기 전략적으로 공조했던 소자본가와 민족자본가계급을 단계적으로 정리하는 사회주의개조를 정치·사회적인 면에서 강도 있게 진행하였다. 사회주의개조의 시발지이자 중심지는 수도인 베이징이었다. 마오저뚱은 '반혁명분자진압운동'·'삼반오반운동'·'삼대개조운동'등 일련의 정치운동을 전개하여 소위 사회주의에 부적합한 조직과 계급을 개조시켜 나갔다. 즉 국민당시기의 정보·경찰조직을 해체하고 소위 반사회적 인물을 도태시킨 후 새로운 행정조직망을 구축하고 수공업과 공상분야의 자본주의적 색채를 일소하는 단계적인 개조를 단행하였다. 이때 대민 선전교육과 밀착접촉 및 군중심리 이용 등 공산당특유의 대중조작수법이 총동원되었다. 1958년 초 베이징의 상점과 공장은 95%이상 '공사합영'과 '합작사'형태로 전환되었고 이 주인이었던 자본가계급은 임금노동자로 신분전환을 함과 동시에 지속적인 정치학습을 통하여 사회주의시민으로 개조되어 감으로써 마오저뚱의 계획은 완료되었다.

中國村民委員會選擧 一모델 調査分析 : '三上三下三公布' 모델 "Three Ups, Three Downs, and Three Announcements" Model

조수성 계명대학교 국제학연구소 1998 국제학논총 Vol.3 No.-

Since the "Organic Law for Villagers Committee of the Peoples Republic of China (Draft)" was put into practice in June 1988, hundreds of millions of Chinese peasants have been participating in direct elections for their villagers committee members. In Mao's China, direct elections at the village level were limited to team leaders and villager's representatives, and most elections were indirect or even some positions were filled by appointment from higher up along the party line as in the case of village cadres who were appointed by CCP village party leaders or higher level authorities. Thus the insistence upon direct election for the villages committee members constitutes a significant innovation. While the villagers committee system was not yet instituted in the early 1980s, some localities had already elected villagers committee cadres. After 1988, however, all villages were electing their committee members, and some completed three or four elections cycles so far. But due to the vagueness of the Organic Law's instructions for carrying out elections and the absence of supporting regulations or legislation, the election experiment has varied greatly not only from province to province but also among counties and townships within the same province. Thus after more than ten years of implementation, many kinds of election types appeared in China. Out of these types only three models were recommended to the Ministry of Civil Affairs throughout the country by the The Chinese Political Science Association. Out of these three models, the one originating from Runan County will be analyzed in this paper. Summarizing the practices of various localities, the election procedure can be divided into the following stages: establishment of the body administering of the election, the mobilization of election and voter registration, determination of election methods, nomination of candidates, and balloting. Among these stages, the candidate nomination is the most problematic aspect of the whole process. Until 1980s, candidates were generally nominated by the communist party village branch or the township government or by the officials responsible for administering the election. But the Chinese peasants gradually became aware that the extant process of candidate nomination was not a desirable one, and they tried to figure out a more democratic nomination method for themselves. Villagers who have had more election experiences wanted to have a stronger voice in the process of candidate selection. As a result, some localities came up with election forms peculiar to their local conditions. One of these is the "three ups, three downs, and three announcements" model adopted by Runan County, Henan Province. The actual implementation of this model involved the following steps. First, villagers in various groups discuss and appraise each possible candidate to prepare an initial list of candidates and submits or "ups" it to the village election committee. At this stage, each group produces its own slate according to their preferences based on their majority opinion. Second, after reviewing the lists of candidates produced by various village groups or by the villager's representative conferences, the committee returns or "downs" an amended list back to the villagers for approval. Once the list has been reviewed and amended three times back and forth or "up and down", and also announced to the villagers in each stage, the administrator releases the final list of candidates and announces it three days before the election day. Since the candidates on the initial list are directly and freely put together by village voters, the initial lists have a wide representation and reflect the free will of the voters. Naturally there can be too many nominees on the initial lists-more than ten nominees are not uncommon-for a single position of village chairmanship, and the list has to be narrowed down to a manageable size of a handful of candidates. This selection of only a few final candidates materializes through the process of three "ups" and "downs". The focus of this model is to select candidates by means of negotiation and consultation between the voters and the village election committee. This model has some important positive implications. First, Chinese peasants can participate in the democratic process by voicing their opinions in the nomination of candidates before actual balloting. Second, through internal and advance compromises, this model can resolve conflicts, minimize overheating competition, and encourage social stability. Third, CCP village cadres can exercise their political power during the candidate adjustment period to keep up and strengthen their leadership on the villagers committee and villagers. This model also has some drawbacks. The main problem results from the fact that the consultation process is too vague and the restrictions are not clear enough. In particular, many local party branch secretaries and township cadres usually involved in the process may try to influence the election outcome. Consequently the peasant voters, not yet politically sophisticated, may not be able to free themselves from the conciliation or inducement of these dominant figures in the election process. Second, the present cadres can relatively easily be reelected by exercising their influence over election. This is because the leading figures responsible for administering the election process are the current villagers committee cadres. Under these circumstances, there can quite possibly be long-term career cadres. Third, this model is hardly practical in localities where deep-rooted factional or clan conflicts are predominant. This model, however, is relatively useful in stable villages. In order to minimize the influence peddling by the cadres and the process be kept transparent. I propose that in the first and second "up" processes the villagers take pre-election instead of consultations. Although this model of election has some problems to be resolved yet, the vast majority of localities in Henan Province conduct their elections according to this model and it is almost certain that this model will quickly spread to many other villages, because peasants generally consider they are exercising their political rights by voicing their opinions in the candidate selection processes.

中共의 政治社會化에서 메스콤의 役割 : 政權初期부터 文化大革命까지

趙壽星 韓國外國語大學校 外國學綜合硏究센터 中國硏究所 1984 中國硏究 Vol.8 No.-

毛澤東의 Proletariat獨裁論에 대한 檢討 : Marx Lenin 의 Proletariat 獨裁論과의 比較를 通해

趙壽星 영남대학교 통일문제연구소 1988 統一問題硏究 Vol.13 No.-