바이든 정부의 대중동정책 : 핵심 이슈와 전망

장지향 제주평화연구원 2021 JPI Peace Net Vol.2021 No.3

On the Road to Moderation: The Role of Islamic Business in Transforming Political Islamists in Turkey

장지향 서울대학교 국제학연구소 2006 Journal of International and Area Studies Vol.13 No.2

Economic liberalization policy in the 1980s engineered a shift from import substitution and a first generation of state-sponsored industrialists to export orientation and a new generation of entrepreneurs committed to Islamic values in the Middle East and North Africa. Outward-driven Turkish Islamic business in manufacturing and services became economically empowered in the globalization process and organized its own encompassing business representation. In doing so, the new riches have motivated their Islamist counterpart in politics to adopt more market-oriented programs in order to secure their business interests through the networks of Islamic community where the exclusion by the secularist state formed a sense of solidarity.

Differentiated Modes of Interest Representation and the Politics of Transitional Regimes in Turkey and Egypt

장지향 한국외국어대학교 외국학종합연구센터 2009 International Area Review Vol.12 No.1

1. Calculations and Choices in Asymmetric Conflict: 2. Incentivizing Ethnic and Religious Identity in Turkey

장지향 한국세계지역학회 2012 世界地域硏究論叢 Vol.30 No.2

This work analyzes how and why protracted asymmetric conflict persists and changes. It argues that the paradigm of strategical calculations and choices provides more accurate answers to the question than the theory of symbolic group fears and myths. Ethnic and religious conflict occurs if and when parties do not possess credible information about the behavior of others. Also, likelihood of a conflict settlement depends on the probability of winning, the time estimate required to win, the cost rate of conflict, and the payoff values from winning. In fact, the recent transformations in asymmetric conflicts among the secular Kemalits, the Kurdish nationalists, and political Islamists in Turkey can be explained by the incentive-driven approaches. Due to the significant rise of pro-Islamic JDP and the sudden status change of Iraqi Kurds, the preferences of actors have been largely modified. In specific, given that the stakes of psychological conflict are not based on tangible materialistic resources and thus not dividable, the probability of settlement in identity asymmetry is higher than others. In turn, political control conflict deals with quite limited stakes and induces high competition. Thus, risk-aversion in political authority asymmetry is often enough to motivate conflict escalation.

90년대 터키의 정치변동 연구 : 이슬람 복지당(Refah Partisi)의 집권을 중심으로

장지향 한국외국어대학교 중동연구소 1997 중동연구 Vol.16 No.1

Turkey was launched as a secular republic in 1923 after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, a suzerain state in the Islam world. Therefore, the Turkish political system has been led by secular politicians since the beginning of the republic. The Islamic-oriented Welfare Party(Refah Partisi), whose ideology are based on the Islamic law Sharia, however, came to power in the 1995 national elections. This study will examine the Welfare Party's success in the recent elections including the 1994 local elections throughout the country. In this paper, I examine factors that bring about the political change, the Welfare Party's rise in the 1990s. Also, a structural approach, analyzing state-society-the Welfare Party relations, is used. This paper is composed of five chapters. In the introduction, I present a framework and methods of this study. In the second chapter, 1 briefly outline the role and influence of Islam in Turkish politics. In the third chapter, I describe the growth and success of the Welfare Party(after 1980) over the National Order Party(Milli Nizam Partisi; 1970-1971) and the National Salvation Party(Milli Selamet Partisi; 1972-1980), the precursors of the Welfare Party. In the fourth chapter, I explain the internal and external factors and the characteristics of political change in Turkey during the 1990s. In the final chapter, I present the conclusions of my analyses. In conclusion, there are three main findings according to my analyses about factors accounting for political change in Turkey; First, the change and realignment in the Turkish party system. Second, the increasing economic frustration and difficulties within the inequitable socioeconomic structure. Third, the growing external pressures of the new world order in the post Cold-War era. Consequently, the independent variables of this study are the above three factors characterized by the instability of the state that represents all the secularist power in Turkish politics, or the diminution of the state's capacity to control crises from the mid 1980s. On the other hand, the extraneous variable is the Welfare Party's remarkable shift more towards left of the center in the late 1980s under the state control over the Islam.

편광회전 반사간섭계를 이용한 광전류센서

장지향,추우성,김훈,서준규,김경조,김준휘,오민철,Jang, Ji-Hyang,Chu, Woo-Sung,Kim, Hoon,Seo, Jun-Kyu,Kim, Kyung-Jo,Kim, Jun-Whee,Oh, Min-Cheol 한국광학회 2010 한국광학회지 Vol.21 No.4

폴리머 광도파로를 기반으로 제작된 편광유지 3-dB 방향성 광분배기, 편광기, 위상 변조기 등의 광부품들을 이용하여 편광 회전 반사 간섭계형 광섬유 전류 센서를 제작하였다. 광섬유 전류센서를 위해 필요한 상기 광부품들을 개별적으로 설계 및 제작하여 특성을 확인하였으며, 전류 측정을 위해 사용되는 광섬유 센서 코일에서 발생되는 스트레인에 의한 복굴절을 제거하기 위하여 $850^{\circ}C$의 온도에서 24시간 동안 열처리를 실시하였다. 완성된 반사 간섭계형 광섬유 전류 센서를 이용하여 전선에 흐르는 전류의 크기를 측정하는 실험을 수행하였으며 전류의 양에 비례하는 안정적인 응답 특성을 확인하였다. Fiber optic current sensors based on polarization-rotated reflection interferometry are demonstrated by incorporating them into polymeric optical waveguide components, including polarization-maintaining 3-dB couplers, TE-pass waveguide polarizers, and thermooptic phase modulators. To remove the bending induced birefringence, optical fiber coil is annealed at $850^{\circ}C$ for 24 hours. The reflection interferometry comprising polymer waveguide devices exhibit a highly stable output signal corresponding to the flowing current.

Weak State, Weak Civil Society: The Politics of State-Society Relations in the Arab World

장지향 서울대학교 국제학연구소 2009 Journal of International and Area Studies Vol.16 No.1

Most Arab states are categorized as authoritarian state-corporatist characterized by limited legitimacy, coercive security apparatus, and inefficient administration. Despite apparent similarities with the supreme state and primordial society, Arab states also possess distinct variants. In conservative state-corporatist states including Saudi Arabia and other kinship-based monarchies, the state is weak due to the low autonomy from and high immersion into particular social groups. On the other hand, in populist state-corporatist states, such as Egypt and other single-party ruled republics, the state is weak because of the high insulation from and low responsiveness toward the broad social structure. In a similar vein, while the civil society of the former is weak owing to the highly submissive attitudes toward the state, that of the latter is weak due to the radical and militant attitudes toward the state.

The Paradox of Liberalization: State, Structural Adjustment, and Political Transition in Turkey and Egypt

장지향 한국이슬람학회 2010 한국이슬람학회논총 Vol.20 No.3

Regarding the political implications for states that engage economic liberalization, many have been optimistic about the role market reform might play in political liberalization. However, this paper argues that economic liberalization necessitated by changes in the international economy does not lead to democratization. Through structural adjustment, states with low capacity might be able to achieve an initial spurt in economic liberalization. The relaxation of specific constraints that were blocking private market activity can be accomplished with minimal institutional changes. Yet, states become more vulnerable as a result of partial market reform, and it might be harder to bear political liberalization. Thus, weak states rather tend to rely on undemocratic mechanisms to suppress opposition. Namely, when state capacity is low, there may be some economic liberalization but we can not expect much political liberalization. These general arguments are illustrated through case studies of Turkey and Egypt. As a result of a severe debt crisis, Turkey and Egypt launched structural adjustment backed by IMF in 1980 and 1987 respectively. Both Turkey and Egypt introduced some amount of economic liberalization, but subsequently induced broad dissents in society. Anticipating this reaction, Turkey as a relatively weak state and Egypt as a highly predatory weak state undermined political liberalization in order to secure their interests during the 1990s.

세계화 시기 자본의 민주적 함의: 이슬람 자본의 성장에 의한 무슬림 포괄 정당의 부상에 대한 이론적 고찰

장지향 서울대학교 국제학연구소 2010 국제지역연구 Vol.19 No.1

This paper surveys the role of independent bourgeoisie with accumulated structural power in promoting liberal democracy. It examines the conditions under which the eighteenth history of European conjectures about economic interests taming political passions transposes into quite similar atmosphere of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century in the Middle East and North Africa. In doing so, this work proposes that growing Islamic business interests in the era of globalization in Turkey and Egypt played a significant role in transforming their Islamist counterpart in politics into moderate Muslim catch-all parties. Since the Islamic bourgeoisies as the new riches from the globalization process knew that it was not possible for them to secure complete control of the secular state, they rather supported minimal state, rule of law, and pluralism. Furthermore, the Islamic capitalists motivated the political Islamists to abandon their radical attitudes, to accommodate themselves to the give and take of democratic politics, and to adopt more liberal and market-oriented programs favorable to business interests. In explaining the recent moderation and de-radicalization of the Turkish and Egyptian Islamic parties, many works have followed one of the two paths emphasizing either the internal pressures of political institutionalization in empirical institutionalism or the micro foundations of actors' incentives and strategic calculation pursuing their opportunities in rational choice institutionalism. However, these competing explanations did not offer a coherent answer regarding timing. This work focusing on a critical turning point as the globalization process, argues that the growing drive of the Islamic capitalists for profits, markets, and stability in the globalization era has contributed to moderation and de-radicalization of the political Islamists. The Islamic capitalists without hope of capturing control over the state have sought to coexist with the incumbent regime in order to secure their business interests. In doing so, they have disciplined the fundamentalist political Islam and strengthened more liberal factions, who ultimately play by democratic rules within system. 이 글은 세계화 시기 독립적인 부르주와 계급의 정치적 역할에 대해 이론적으로 고찰하고 있다. 19세기 유럽 사례를 통해 입증된 자본의 민주적 함의를 최근 중동 무슬림 세계에서 발견되는 이슬람 자본에 의한 정치세력의 온건화 현상에 적용하여 재검토하고 있다. 즉 “자본의 부드러운 힘”에 의한 권력구조의 변화를 조명하면서 1990년대 중반 이후 터키와 이집트에서 진행된 이슬람 정치세력의 탈급진화와 제도권 편입은 1990년대 초 세계화가 확산됨에 따라 성장해온 이슬람 자본의 이해관계 때문이라고 주장한다. 이슬람 자본가는 경제적 이익을 추구하는 과정에서 이슬람 정치세력으로 하여금 작은 국가, 법과 질서 준수, 다원주의와 같은 자유 민주주의의 핵심가치를 지지하도록 유인했기 때문이다. 한편 온건화를 강제해내는 제도적 압력에 주목하는 실증적 제도주의나 행위자에 의한 전략적 온건화를 강조하는 합리적 선택 제도주의는 이러한 온건화의 시점에 대해 명확한 해답을 제시하지 못하고 있다. 하지만 정치경제적 접근은 자본이 구조적 힘을 보유하게 된 시점과 이후 등장한 새로운 동맹관계에 주목한다. 다시 말해 세계화라는 변화를 통해 부와 영향력을 축적한 신흥 이슬람 부르주와가 자신의 이익을 보호하기 위해 개혁파 이슬람 정치세력과 동맹을 맺고 이들의 입지를 강화시켰으며 더 나아가 이들로 하여금 보다 적극적으로 자유주의적 정책을 채택하도록 이끌었다고 본다.

Explaining and Theorizing Development:Historical Structures and Strategic Preferences in the Comparative Political Economy of the Middle East and North Africa

장지향 한국세계지역학회 2010 世界地域硏究論叢 Vol.28 No.2

In explaining the determinants and variations of development, both rational choice and historical institutionalism share an assumption about the prominent role of the state which constrains actors' perceptions and choices. However, historical institutionalist approach is more successful in providing the state as an active and primary role and in focusing on the diversity of institutional arrangements rooted in its own historical structures and situations. In most developing countries, particularly the Middle East and North Africa, the incumbent regimes do not allow space for societal actors in order to keep their invested interests. Therefore, it is plausible to suppose the role of the state as an initial condition in causal explanation of power asymmetries and settings. As a minimal condition for development, the state should possess at least quasi-pluralist structures where societal actors can have room for maneuver. As a maximum condition, the state should hold responsive autonomy through which the state facilitates a mutual interaction between the state and society in promoting development. Given these conditions, political reform or institutional transformation should be preceded or at least accompanied with economic reform. Otherwise, it is quite unlikely that the prospects of structural adjustment reform in the region show greater possibilities to succeed.