http://chineseinput.net/에서 pinyin(병음)방식으로 중국어를 변환할 수 있습니다.
변환된 중국어를 복사하여 사용하시면 됩니다.
이달곤,Lee, Dal-Gon 한국과학기술단체총연합회 1998 과학과 기술 Vol.31 No.5
과학기술계 연구와 개별활동은 1.연구자 개인2.연구팀이나 연구실 3.연구기관 4.정부부처 5.국가 등 5개의 링 위에서 존재한다고 본다. 이 5개링중 가장 중요한 것은 정신활동의 모태인 첫번쨰인 "개인 링"과 공정하고 투명해야 할 두번째 "연구팀의 링"으로 이 2개의 링이 원활히 작동할 수 있도록 과학기술계는 개혁의 역량을 모아야 할 것이다.
이달곤,Lee, Dal-Gon 한국과학기술정보연구원 2003 지식정보인프라 Vol.12 No.-
지난 30여년 간 우리나라는 추격적인(catch-up)기술개발을 통해 효과적으로 선진국과의 기술격차를 좁히는데 성공하였다. 그러나 기술부문의 제조생산에는 큰 발전을 이룩하였음에도 불구하고, 원천기술(original technologies)의 기초가 되는 연구는 매우 미흡한 수준에 머물고 있다. 따라서 성장엔진으로서 새로운 기술을 창출할 수 있는 지식이 활발히 생산될 수 있는 여건을 조성하는 차원에서 과학기술정보인프라정책에 관심을 강화할 필요가 있다.
군축이론(軍縮理論)에 입각한 남북한(南北韓) 군축협상(軍縮協商) 대안(代案) 연구(硏究)
이달곤 ( Dal Gon Lee ) 평화문제연구소 1989 統一問題硏究 Vol.1 No.1
The paper developes several feasible policy alternatives for the arms control in the Korean peninsular. Theories concerning conventional arms control are far from complete and the Korean situation seems to be too peculiar to be addressed with the theories developed at this time. Four main alternatives are developed in a very practical manner and a couple of related ideas are briefly discussed with some reservations. These reserved alternatives can be fully developed during the processes of future negotiation with North Korea. The four alternatives of arms control include : ① chemical- biological weapons ; ② force level ; ③ forces deployment with special emphasis on DMZ ; and ④ weapon classes and transarmament. In addition to the detailed analyses of these four options, defense budget control and research and development control, including limited transfer of arms, arc dealt briefly. In the area of arms control research, self-confidence on their military capability, confidence- building measures, inspection or verification process, and sanction against violation are considered major elements for analysis. In this study, additional criteria are created for the purpose of comparison of the alternatives developed, and the four elements mentioned above are used where it is necessary. The criteria include, ① stability of the military relationship; ② verifiableness ; ③ military utility ; ④ sanction ; ⑤ consistency with reunification policy ; ⑥ negotiability; ⑦ legitimacy or fairness; and ⑧ internal negotiability. Each option is evaluated accoding to the above eight dimensions. Although the criteria are not mutually exclusive nor jointly exhausted, different dimension helps clarify contents and potential impacts of each alternative. The shoratges of an option mentioned in the study must be alerted when Pyungyang urges a specific alternative, Because the negodation cannot be carried out on the basis of a master plan which is designed to dominate the other side, the options developed above should be adapted to changing processes of negotiation interaction, When a side design a counter-offer, the side must take the offer made by the other side into consideration strategically. For such a dynamic interaction, only a direction for utilizing the developed options can be suggested. At the beginning, various confidence-building measures, should be Sougth with other tensionrelease measures, such as, indirect or direct economic interchange, political contacts, or cultural or Personal exchanges. Wiith confidence - building measures, forces deployment can be negotiated with special emphasis on DMZ. With the implementation of several minor measures, each side can get the needed information regarding the intention of the other side and they can provide a proper time period for deepening the confidence for each other. When the both sides come at a high revel of trusting each other, chemical and biological weapons can be controlled or denounced actually. Also, the manpower related to the arms can be reduced to a certain level. Because the said tactical nuclear weapons are deployed as a deterrence aggainst such chemical and biological arms as well as the similar nuclear weapons in China and USSR, this is the stage for discussing withdrawal of the nuclear weapons from Korea. With the guarantee of related superpowers, the fate of U.S. troops can be decided, With the successful implementation of above measures, the two sides can negotiate on size of armed forces. In discussing reduction of forces level, special forces, including guerilla band and light infantry, should be the first target. The ultimate forces level each side will maintain is hard to be set at a fixed number, bur the range should be decided and verified with minimum uncertainty. The weaponery control can be realized at this stage and such an action must be guided by the concept of transarmament.The importance of preparation for arms control negotiation cannot be overem - phasized. There must be some institutional arragements for preparing the negotiation and the process must be well designed to accomodate various views on arms control and North-South dialogue. Abo close and intimate relationship between theorists and practitioners should be emphasized for the success of arms control in the long run. 군축이론(軍縮理論)에 입각한 남북한(南北韓) 군축협상(軍縮協商) 대안(代案) 연구(硏究) Alternatives for the Arms Control Negotiation in Korea 12500 1