동북아 지역질서의 재편 : 미·일·중 삼각관계와 한국의 안보외교 Trilateral Relationship among U.S., Japan and China and South Korea's Security Diplomacy

이기종 한국전략문제연구소 1998 전략연구 Vol.5 No.2

The existing power arrangement in Northeast Asia can be characterized as one of confrontation between a new United States-Japanese alliance and China in the context of a strategic triangular relationship among the three countries, involving mutual conflict and cooperation. It is expected that, in the 21st century, there will emerge a pattern of confrontation between the United States and China, on the world level, and one between Japan and China, on the regional level. If a conflict between the United States and Japan should grow or if the former's armed forces stationed in East Asia should be cut down, there would reemerge the strategic triangular arrangement among the three major powers. In this case, each of the three countries would seek to gain Russia, which became relatively weekened, over to its side. Such an effort is already being made. Recently, China declares that it will proceed with a strategic partnership with Russia against the reinforcement of the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Japan also tries to establish a new cooperative relationship with Russia in spite of a dispute over its four northern islands. In addition, the United States seeks to strengthen its relationship with Russia. This paper examines triangular relationships among the United States, Japan, and China, and then North-South Korean relationships, as will be developed as the result of a reshuffle of power in East Asia. In the Cold War era, persistent confrontation existed between the three southern powers, including the U.S., Japan, and South Korea, and the three northern powers, such as the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. However, such a confrontation pattern has been attenuated by the following events: the end of the Cold War, the normalization of South Korean diplomatic relations with Russia and China in the early 1990s, and a U.S.- North Korean agreement on the nuclear issue in Geneva in October 1994. On the other hand, there has been some continuity in military relations. The U.S.-South Korean and Chinese-North Korean alliances have been maintained. After Russia abrogated its military alliance relationship with North Korea, it has pursued a balanced policy toward two Koreas. This paper provides four scenarios of power arrangements which will develop in Northeast Asia in the 21st century. First is the case in which South Korea will maintain its alliance with the United States and its friendly relationships with China, Japan, and Russia. and in which it will continue its current confrontation with North Korea. This scenario is the best one from the South Korean perspective. In this case, Pyungyang will be isolated, and Seoul will seek to induce it to open and reform its system by means of pressure from the four neighboring major powers. As the second best one, another scenario is the case in which confrontation between the U.S.-South Korean alliance and North Korea will reemerge, and in which China, Japan, and Russia will take a neutral position. In this scenario, if South Korea, through its diplomatic efforts, reinforces its economic cooperation with China, and builds political and military confidence with the Baijing regime, it is highly likely .that the alliance relationship between North Korea and China will be abrogated as in the North Korean-Russian case. The third scenario is the worst one in which confrontation will develop between South Korea and the North Korean-Chinese alliance, but in which the United States, Russia, and Japan will adopt a neutralist or pro-North Korea policy. It is difficult to expect that this case will work. Nevertheless, it might happen if the U.S. forces in Korea should be withdrawn and if China should become a hegemonic power, while maintaining its alliance with North Korea. The last scenario is the case of direct confrontation between South and North Koreas. This case will take place when the four major powers make cross-recognition of two Koreas after North Korea's diplomatic normalization with the United States and Japan. As a theory of the North Korean regime's breakup has been recently raised, analysts assume that there would be a five-major power arrangement in which a unified Korea would function as a balancer in maintaining the balance of power in Northeast Asia. If Pyungyang successively soft-lands through the recovery of its economy and its diplomatic normalization with Washington and Tokyo, however, it is expected that there will emerge a six-power competitive arrangement. In this case, interactions between the United States, Japan, and China, on one hand, and two Koreas, on the other hand, will actively take place, while Russian influences will diminish. This research provides several predictions about power relationships among the four major powers and in the Korean peninsular from short-, middle-, and long-term perspectives. From a short-term perspective, there exists a confrontation relationship between the U.S.-Japanese alliance and China on the regional level. It is predicted, on the level of the peninsular, that the U.S.-South Korean alliance and the South Korean-Japanese cooperative relationship will be maintained, along with the Chinese-North Korean alliance. From a middle-term perspective, the cross-recognition of two Koreas will weaken the U.S.-South Korean and Chinese-North Korean alliances. In this situation, the major powers as well as two Koreas will compete diplomatically with one another in order to establish a balance of power in Northeast Asia to their own advantage. From a long-term perspective, it can be assumed that change in the East Asia policy of the United States will lead to the weakening of its influence and, thus, the strengthening of the South Korean-Chinese relationship. At the same time, multilateral security cooperation would be institutionalized. In this case, South and North Koreas will vie not only with each other but also with the four major powers without regard to their existing alliance relationships. After the normalization of the North Korean-U.S. diplomatic relationship, China will not remain indifferent to the situation in which the peninsular will fall under the exclusive influence of the United States. Nevertheless, Washington will seek to induce the two Koreas to pursue pro-American policies, After the cross-recognition of two Koreas, Japan will actively make such an effort to gain economic access to North Korea that it will have economic influence on the peninsular, unlike United States and Chinese efforts to exercise security influence. If the relationships among the three major powers and, especially those between the United States and China, should develop in the form of strategic cooperation, progress would be made in North-South Korean relations and, therefore, peace would be established in Northeast Asia. On the other hand, when the relationships between the United States and China become worsened or when those between Japan and China develop into hegemonic competition, both of two Koreas will adopt a policy of maintaining the status quo in the peninsular, while trying to create a balance of power to their advantage in the region. In the meantime, each of the major powers will pursue a policy of unifying the peninsular on the basis of its own superior power position. The purposes of this paper is to predict the possible rearrangement of power relationships in the context of increasing insecurity in Northeast Asia and to examine South Korea's security measures. For these purposes, first of all, it describes the aspects of conflict and cooperation in the triangular relationships of the United States, Japan, and China, which resulted not only from the collapse of the Soviet Union but also from the subsequent weakening of Russian influence. It is predicted from a short-term perspective that those relationships will tend to be cooperative in their economic and security aspects. From a long-term perspective, however, they will show increasing conflict as the result of hegemonic competition, including emerging confrontation between the United States and China, around the year of 2020 when the latter's level of GNP becomes highest in the world. Secondly, the research examines the trend of changes in power relationship and possible new arrangements in Northeast Asia. By doing so, it intends to provide South Korea's security measures. Since the existing arrangement of confrontation between the United States-Japanese alliance and China is expected to change into one of military and hegemonic competition between Japan and China, along with the diminution of American influence, South Korea and other Asian countries need to prepare for it. Thirdly, the paper presents several models of power arrangements likely to develop around the Korean peninsular. In particular, it is predicted that, in the process of competition among the countries concerned after the cross-recognition of two Koreas, they and the four major powers will contend diplomatically with one another in order to gain more influence and security. Despite existing confrontation between the United States-South Korean alliance and Japanese-South Korean cooperative relationship, on one hand, and the Chinese-North Korean alliance, on the other hand, there is a likelihood that a new cooperative military relationship between South Korea and China will result from the reinforcement of their economic cooperation as well as from North Korea's diplomatic normalization with the United States and Japan. Finally, this research provides South Korea's security measures to meet the rearrangement of power relationship in Northeast Asia and its effects on the peninsular. (1) Seoul should proceed with active security diplomacy designed to produce a balance of power in the region. In the 21st century, by attaining its goal of becoming an advanced nation, South Korea has to enter into a five-major power system. In this system, it should play the role of a balancer in maintaining peace and the balance of power by carrying out an active strategy of engagement. In addition, it not only should contain the North Korean threat through a Bismarck-policy of forming various alliances, but it also should build strong mechanisms for its security. (2) Bilateral alliance relationships should be strengthened. Although the U.S.-South Korean alliance has recently loosened, it will be of greater strategic value in checking a Chinese threat in the case of deepening Sino-American confrontation in the 21st century. The South Korean-Japanese cooperative relationship has to be more extended in political. military, and cultural areas. The friendly relationship between Seoul and Baijing also should be extended on the basis of their economic cooperation so as to pave the way for the unification of the peninsular. (3) A system of multilateral security cooperation should be created in the Northeast Asia. Although there has been no tradition of security dialogues and confidence among the major powers, the South Korean government has to play a leading role in establishing such a system as an institutional mechanism for the peace and security of the peninsular. Because South Korea, in comparision with the major powers, has limited military capabilities to guarantee its security, it should depend upon preventive diplomacy through multilateral security cooperation in the case of a crisis in the peninsular or territorial and maritime disputes in the region. (4) Certain measures should be taken to reinforce South Korean armed forces in the direction of attaining self-reliant national defense. Based on a self-sufficient defense strategy, the armed forces have to be capable of defending against any probable external invasions. In preparation for the existing North Korean threat as well as for any expansionist moves resulting from Sino-American hegemonic competion and the military buildups of China and Japan, South Korea should strengthen its naval forces and accelerate the modernization of military equipments and weapons. The above-mentioned measures are necessary for maintaining peace and security in Northeast Asia and the peninsular. Moreover. they will provide a basis for Korean unification.

공정거래법 심결사례 해설 및 평석

이기종 한국공정경쟁연합회 2001 경쟁저널 Vol.- No.68

아스피린과 플라빅스의 수술 전 지속적 사용이 무심폐기 하 관상동맥우회술에 미치는 영향

이기종,이교준,양홍석,안지영,유경종 대한흉부외과학회 2006 Journal of Chest Surgery (J Chest Surg) Vol.39 No.1

배경: 아스피린과 플라빅스는 관상동맥 환자들에게 가장 흔히 사용하는 항혈소판 제제이나 수술 후 출혈 성향의 증가에 대한 우려 때문에 수술 5일에서 7일 전에 복용을 중단하는 것이 일반적이다. 본 연구에서는 이들 약제들의 지속적 사용이 무심폐기 하 관상동맥우회술(Off pump coronary artery bypass grafting, Off pump CABG) 후의 결과에 어떤 영향을 미치는지에 관하여 조사하였다. 대상 및 방법: 2004년 3월부터 2005년 2월까지 Off pump CABG를 시행 받은 123명의 환자들을 대상으로 하여 수술 전후에 아스피린과 플라빅스를 끊지 않고 지속적으로 사용한 군(n=45, 36.6%)과 적어도 수술 1일 이전에 끊은 군(n=78, 63.4%) 사이에 수술 전후 혈소판, 헤모글로빈/헤마토크리트 수치, 수술 후 출혈량, 도관 개통률, 수술 시간 등을 비교하였다. 또한 대상환자들을 수술 전에 아스피린을 1달 이상 사용했던 장기 사용군과 그렇지 않은 군으로 구분하여 상기 요소들을 비교하였다. 결과: 수술에 의한 사망은 없었으며 출혈에 관한 합병증으로는 출혈에 의한 재수술과 상부 소화관 출혈이 각각 1예씩 있었다. 지속적으로 사용한 군과 그렇지 않은 군의 비교에 있어서는 수술 직후와 수술 후 1, 2일의 혈소판 수치가 지속적 사용군에서 유의하게 낮았으나(p=0.02, p=0.002, p=0.021) 수술 후 출혈량, 수혈 빈도, 출혈 관련 합병증 및 도관의 개통률에는 차이가 없었다. 아스피린을 1달 이상 사용한 장기 사용군의 경우 그렇지 않은 군에 비하여 수술 전후의 혈소판 수치가 지속적으로 낮았으나 출혈량, 수혈 빈도, 합병증 및 도관의 개통률에는 차이가 없었다. 결론: 아스피린과 플라빅스의 Off pump CABG 전후의 지속적 사용은 수술 후 일시적인 혈소판 수치의 감소를 초래할 수 있으나 수술 후 출혈량, 수혈 여부, 수술 시간, 출혈과 관련된 합병증 및 도관의 개통률에는 영향을 주지 않았다. 그러므로 Off pump CABG에 있어서 아스피린과 플라빅스는 수술 전까지 지속적으로 사용하여도 될 것으로 생각한다.

공정거래법 심결사례 해설 및 평석

이기종 한국공정경쟁연합회 2001 경쟁저널 Vol.- No.69

공정거래법 운용성과와 향후 정책방향

이기종 한국경제법학회 2006 경제법연구 Vol.5 No.1

다면시장에서의 배제적 행위와 시장지배적지위 남용금지- EU의 구글 쇼핑 심결과 구글 안드로이드 심결을 중심으로 -

이기종 한국경제법학회 2018 경제법연구 Vol.17 No.3

The difficulty to appraise the indirect network effect in multi-sided markets should not be an obstacle to a timely intervention by competition authorities in those markets. The Google Shopping and Android decisions by the European Commission show that a competition agency could effectively remedy the exclusive behaviors in multi-sided markets by properly appraising the relationship between competitors, while taking the special characteristics of those markets into consideration. Analysing the issues raised by those decisions, this article draws several conclusions on the regulation of exclusive behaviors in multi-sided markets as abuse of dominance under the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. First, The indirect network effect in multi-sided markets could strengthen the dominance of platforms, despite the popular belief to the contrary. Second, large conglomerate platforms could employ various tactics to exclude smaller independent platforms. Third, the incentives for exclusive behaviors and their harms could be magnified in multi-sided markets. Even though predatory pricing was not an issue in Google shopping and android decisions, multi-sided markets could be a fertile soil for those behaviors. Thus Korea Fair Trade Commission also needs to pay more attention to those behaviors. 유럽위원회의 구글 쇼핑 심결과 구글 안드로이드 심결은 다면시장의 특성을 충분히 고려하면서도 효과적으로 사업자들 간의 경쟁관계를 파악해서 경쟁당국이 시장지배적 사업자의 배제적 행위를 제재할 수 있음을 보여주었다. 물론 이들 심결은 사법심사를 앞두고 있지만, 본 논문은 그 내용을 쟁점별로 분석한 결과 다면시장에서의 배제적 행위에 대한 공정거래법의 적용과 관련하여 다음과 같은 몇 가지 시사점을 도출해 내었다. 첫째, 다면시장의 간접적 네트워크 외부효과는 시장지배력을 약화시키는 요소로만 작용하는 것이 아니라 진입장벽을 높이거나 시장지배력의 전이를 가능하게 함으로써 시장의 쏠림 현상을 가속화할 수 있다. 둘째, 다면시장의 특성상 먼저 임계규모에 도달한 플랫폼이 기존 경쟁자 및 신규진입자를 약화시키거나 배제하기 위한 다양한 전략을 구사할 수 있으며, 특히 대규모 복합 플랫폼들은 소규모 전문 플랫폼들이 제공할 수 없는 다양한 혜택들을 결합하여 제공함으로써 후자를 배제할 수 있다. 셋째, 다면시장에 있어서는 차별적 취급 및 배타적 거래 등 배제적 행위의 동기도 더욱 크고 그 폐해도 클 수 있으며, 특히 끼워팔기는 종상품 시장의 경쟁을 제한할 뿐 아니라 주상품 시장 및 그 인접시장에서의 지배력을 더욱 공고하게 만드는 순환의 고리를 만들 수 있다. 넷째, 여러 유형의 배제적 행위(예: 끼워팔기와 배타적 계약)가 결합함으로써 강력한 배제적 효과를 발생시킬 수 있다. 또한 두 심결은 다루지 않고 있지만, 부당염매의 동기와 폐해 역시 다면시장에서 더욱 커질 수 있으며, 이는 무료시장이라 해서 예외가 아니므로, 공정거래위원회는 플랫폼 사업자에 의한 부당염매의 가능성에 대하여도 면밀한 주의를 기울여야 할 것이다.

공정거래법 심결사례 해설 및 평석

이기종 한국공정경쟁연합회 2001 경쟁저널 Vol.- No.65

베트남戰爭과 韓國軍參戰의 再照明

이기종 경희대 국제평화연구소 1989 平和硏究 Vol.8 No.1

고양이 지방간증

이기종 로얄에이알씨 주식회사 2005 로얄동물임상의학 Vol.3 No.4

공동연구개발에 대한 공정거래법의 적용에 관한 연구(2)

이기종 한국공정경쟁연합회 2001 경쟁저널 Vol.- No.65