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陳泰弘 弘益大學校 東北亞企業經營硏究所 2005 企業經營硏究 Vol.2 No.-
This paper studies a desirable direction of universal banking in Korea.. The analysis of this paper suggests that universal banking should be expanded through holding companies that control a variety of financial institutions including banks, security firms and insurance firms. The difficulty of financing by small firms in Korea can be alleviated by universal banking through holding companies. Also the conflict of interest problem can be solved.
陳泰弘 홍익대학교 산업기술연구소 1997 産業技術 Vol.7 No.-
The purpose of this paper is to discuss and search for future Korean financial system. After features of financial system of U.S Japan and Germany are compared, what should be learned from those systems are presented. First, since each financial system has its own historical and cultural backgrounds, following a specific model of a country is not necessarily a good strategy for restructuring Korean financial system, Secondly, an important lesson from the comparison is that financial system of those countries have one feature in common. Infrastructure are well developed such that investors' rights are protected. Modifying bank-based model of Japan is suggested as an alternative for future Korean financial system.
진태홍 홍익대학교 산업기술연구소 1999 産業技術 Vol.9 No.-
The corporate governance system of Japan has recently changed a lot. For example return on equity rather than sales is employed as a measure of corporate performance. The main bank system has weakened as big firms go to stock markets out of banks for outside financing. Cross stock ownership between firms and banks has also weakened as banks sell stocks in order to improve the soundness. The change of corporate governance of Japan is interpreted as an effort of firms and bank to improve efficiency with the change of economic environments. This paper analyzes economic rationale for a couple of outstanding changes of Japanese corporate governance system such as the weakening of restructuring function of debts, the increase of spin-offs and the re-introduction of holding companies. The analysis of this paper is done mostly by literature survey. As for the weakening of restructuring function of debts the literature shows that early warning system signalling the necessity of restructuring of firms in destressed industry from the possibility of financial distress of highly leveraged firms which had worded in the seventies no longer worked in the eighties due to the lowered leverage of Japanese firms. The spin-off of Japanese firms is analyzed to play a role of inducing firm specific investments of employees of wholly-owned subsidiary since parent firms can commit not to appropriate human resources of subsidiaries through spin-off.
陳泰弘 홍익대학교 동북아기업경영연구소 2004 企業經營硏究 Vol.1 No.-
This study suggests a new corporate governance mechanism in a knowledge-based economy of Korea. A review of literature shows that the corporate governance for the maximization of shareholder wealth in firms that grow mostly from firm specific investments of employees can not maximize the wealth of shareholders. This study argues that a new corporate governance that gives employees incentives for firm specific investments can enhance the value of the firm in a knowledge based economy. Given that a knowledge based economic system is required for a further growth of Korean economy, the corporate governance of Korea should also adjust to a new economic situation.
陳泰弘 홍익대학교 산업기술연구소 2002 産業技術 Vol.12 No.-
This study explores implication of relationship banking for financing of small firms in Korea. It is shown that relationship banking help small firms borrow money from banks. Consolidation of banks, however, is found to destroy established relationship between banks and small firms. This study suggests that policies that induce consolidated banks maintain relations with small firms should be formulated.
陳泰弘 홍익대학교 산업기술연구소 2003 産業技術 Vol.13 No.-
This study reviews institutional reforms related to corporate governance in Korea since the economic crisis of 1997 and suggests policies for improving corporate governance. It is shown that corporate governance practices such as representation the interest of shareholders, investor protection have improved in korean firms since the crisis of 1997. However, most of corporate governance reforms have not been effective enough due to the disparity of control right and cash flow right of controlling shareholders of korean firms. Policy suggestions for improving corporate governance in Korea are as follows. First, class action should be allowed to enhance investor protection. Secondly, corporate governance of firms should be improved by market, not by regulation. In this respect, more governance ratings should be encouraged.