지배주주에 의한 소수주식의 전부취득에 관한 연구

주기종(Ju Gijong) 한국법학회 2015 법학연구 Vol.58 No.-

2011년 상법 개정할 때에 지배주주에게 소수주식을 전부 취득할 수 있는 제도를 신설하였다. 하나는 지배주주의 소수주식매도청구권이고, 다른 하나는 소수주주의 주식매수청구권이다. 이와 같은 제도의 도입은 소수주주의 존재로 인하여 생기는 기업경영비용을 줄이고 경제환경 변화에 대한 탄력적인 대응을 할 수 있도록 함으로써 기업경영의 효율성을 향상시키며, 기업지배구조의 개편을 자유롭게 할 것이라는 긍정적인 기대를 하고 있다. 그러나 소수주주에게는 소수주주의 의사에 반하여 소유주식을 매도해야만 하는 지배주주의 소수주식매도청구의 경우에는 소수주주의 재산권이 침해될 수도 있으며, 소수주주의 의사와 상관없이 회사에 대한 기대이익이 사라질 수도 있다. 이에 대하여 공정성 확보 차원에서 상법의 규정은 경영상의 목적과 주주총회의 승인을 얻도록 함으로써 소수주주를 보호하려하지만, 경영상의 목적 그 자체의 추상적인 개념에 대하여 논란이 있고, 매도청구의 요건, 행사방법, 행사효과 등에서 구체적 기준이 없는 부분도 있어서 여러 문제가 제기되고 그에 대한 논란들이 있다. 이 논문에서는 많은 논란거리들 중에서 지배주주 지분의 산정 범위, 지분보유시점, 지분보유기간, 경영상의 목적의 제한여부, 주주총회 승인 후 주식매도청구권의 행사기간, 소수주주의 주식매수청구의 행사의 용이성 확보 방안, 매매가액의 협의 방법, 공탁대상의 매매가액의 의미등에 관해서 다루었다. 위에서 적시한 문제에 대해서 소수주주축출제도의 도입취지와 규정상의 내용을 바탕으로 기존논란에 대한 검토와 입법적 보완책 등을 제시함으로써 지배주주의 소수주식전부취득제도의 활용성을 높이고, 부작용을 최소화하고자 하였다. Pursuant to the 2011 amendment to the Commercial Act, a new system was established to permit a controlling shareholder to acquire the whole of minority shares, under which a controlling shareholder has a squeeze-out right, by which the controlling shareholder may require minority shareholders to sell all shares held by them, while minority shareholders have a sell-out right, by which minority shareholders may require the controlling shareholder to purchase all shares held by them. The system was introduced in order to improve the efficiency in corporate management by reducing the costs of management incurred to corporations by the existence of minority shareholders and by helping corporations flexibly respond to changes in economic conditions, and it is positively expected that the system will make it free to reform the existing corporate governance. However, the exercise of a controlling shareholder’s squeeze-out right to require minority shareholders to compulsorily sell shares held by them against their will is likely to violate minority shareholders’ property rights and is likely to cause a disadvantage to minority shareholders, resulting in minority shareholders’ loss of expected gains from the company, regardless of their intention. In order to secure fairness as a means to protect them from such disadvantage, relevant provisions of the Commercial Act require that a squeeze-out right be exercised only for purposes of management and subjected to approval from the general meeting of shareholders so as to protect minority shareholders, The abstract concept of the “purposes of management” is controversial, and the lack of specific standards for requirements for the exercise of a squeeze-out right, methods and effects of the exercise of such right, and other aspects has created many problems and controversies. Among many issues in controversy, this treatise mainly deals with the determinable scope of a controlling shareholder’s shares, the timing of share-holding, the period of share-holding, whether there is any restriction on the purposes of management, the deadline for the exercise of a squeeze-out right after obtaining approval from the general meeting of shareholders, measures to facilitate minority shareholders’ exercise of a sell-out right, methods of negotiation on sale prices, the significance of sale prices eligible for deposit in court, etc. It is intended to review existing controversies over the issues mentioned above, according to the purposes of introducing the system for squeezing out minority shareholders and relevant regulations and to propose a legislative amendment so as to enhance the utility of the system permitting the compulsory acquisition of all minority shares, while minimizing adverse effects.

소수주주 축출 목적의 주식병합 - 대법원 2020. 11. 26. 선고 2018다283315 판결에 대한 평석을 겸하여 -

정대익 한국상사판례학회 2022 상사판례연구 Vol.35 No.4

Unlike stock splits, the Commercial Act does not have general provisions on reverse stock splits, allows reverse stock splits, only in specific cases such as capital reduction. Due to this legislative attitude, it is controversial whether reverse stock splits is allowed for purposes other than those permitted by the Commercial Act, especially for the purpose of squeeze out of shareholders. Through the revision of the Commercial Act, controlling shareholders' rights to request sale (squeeze out, Article 360-24 of the Commercial Act), a general means for squeeze out of minority shareholders, was introduced. It is a subject of further debate, whether a squeeze out of shareholders through reverse stock splits despite the controlling shareholders' rights to request sale is allowed. The Supreme Court 2020. 11. 26. Sentence 2018da283315 ruling is a precedent that directly dealt with squeeze out of shareholders through reverse stock splits. Under the premise that squeeze out through reverse stock splits is allowed, this precedent reviewed the reverse stock split based on the principle of equal treatment of shareholders, prohibition of abuse of rights and good faith, and fair compensation to shareholders who are expelled due to the occurrence of fractional shares in the reverse stock split process. The Supreme Court held that even if the reverse stock split resulted in the squeeze out of shareholders, it was legal because it met the above mentioned criteria. It is difficult to agree with this conclusion for the following reasons. First, the Supreme Court narrowly grasped the principle of equal treatment of shareholders, which performs an important function of protecting minority shareholders, only from the perspective of formal equality. The issue of substantive inequality, in which minority shareholders other than major shareholders lose their shareholder status as a result of the reverse stock split, was ignored. Second, there is a remarkable imbalance between the company's interest of capital reduction through the reverse stock split and the minority shareholder's interest (the interest of maintaining shareholder position) that is infringed upon by the occurrence of fractional stocks due to the revers stock split. Since the main purpose of squeezing out minority shareholders rather than capital reduction is objectively recognized, the purpose of the company's offense can not be denied. Therefore, all the conditions for abuse of rights are met. An excessive reverse stock split ratio is also recognized as a violation of the duty of good faith, which requires consideration to minimize the infringement of shareholders' interests, unless there are special circumstances in the event of a reverse stock split. Third, the procedure for dealing with fractional shares under the current Commercial Law does not guarantee fair compensation to the shareholders. Therefore, it is undesirable to allow the occurrence of fractional shares through reverse stock splits without restriction and to protect the interests of minority shareholders through ex post compensation in a state where fair compensation for fractional shares is not guaranteed. Fourth, the squeeze out of minority shareholders should be allowed within a reasonable range only in exceptional cases recognized by the Commercial Act, and the controlling shareholders' rights to request sale introduced by the Commercial Act should be used for squeeze out except where expressly permitted by the Commercial Act. The squeeze out of minority shareholders through reverse stock splits for the purpose of circumventing these restrictions is not permitted in principle. Fifth, in order for the squeeze out of minority shareholders through a reverse stock split to be exceptionally justified, there must be a business purpose, and the reverse stock split must be necessary, appropriate, and proportionate to achieve the business purpose.

폐쇄적 주식회사에 있어서 소수파 주주의 보호 방안

유시창(Ryu, Si-Chang) 경희법학연구소 2009 경희법학 Vol.44 No.2

The format of stock company was not legislated for the close corporation which is generally characterized by a limited number of shareholders, an active shareholder participation in management and the lack of a public market for the stock owned by the minority shareholders. The majority shareholders in close corporation can easily engage in illegal conduct or oppressive conduct. The common forms of oppressive conduct include the failure to declare dividends, removal of a minority shareholder from management and excessive compensation to the majority shareholders. When the close corporation is misused by the majority shareholders to engage in the shareholder oppression, the close corporation is plunged into confusion. Although the minority shareholders seek judicial relief for the oppressive conduct, the dispute between shareholders inflict lots of loss on the minority shareholders without mentioning a satisfactory settlement. However the minority shareholders in close corporation have no way to withdraw from the close corporation, since they have difficulty in finding the resale market for their stocks. This article will examine the present situation of the close corporation in Korea and the method to protect the minority shareholders. It will propose to expand appraisal right, to enlarge autonomy of the by-law, to approve the special meeting for the benefit of the minority shareholders on critical issues or to enforce the court order to purchase the stocks owned by the minority shareholders in order to provide protection for the minority shareholders in close corporation.

주주축출의 정당성과 그 한계

강대섭 부산대학교 법학연구소 2023 법학연구 Vol.64 No.4

It is an established principle that corporate shareholders can participate in the management of the company by exercising voting rights in proportion to the number of shares owned, and as co-owners and investors of the company, they can receive profit dividends or distribution of residual assets from the company according to the same principle. The protection of Shareholders’ rights regarding dominant interests and property interests is an essential requirement of the Company Law that must be taken into consideration when a corporation issues shares or carries out the reorganization of company. In response to changes in the economic environment, the Company Law has introduced the cash-out merger and the acquisition of all the shares of minority shareholders, etc. to change or reorganize a corporate mechanism or business. These statutes aim to advance the efficient and flexible operation of the company. At this time, the basic principle is to maintain the status of shareholders or their investment opportunities. But in the interest of advancing the efficient and flexible operation of the company, cash-out merger, etc. should be permitted in spite of the opposition of minorities. At this time, it is necessary to protect minority shareholders who will lose, in effect, their shareholder status against their will. As one of the methods, it is examined whether the company's business purposes is necessary to eliminate the minority shareholders. While introducing the acquisition of all minority shares, the Company Law strictly establishes the qualifications of controlling shareholder and requires the legitimate business purpose as an affirmative requirement. But it does not set this in the case of a freeze-out merger. As a result, it is questionable whether the mere fact that the merger ratio is fair and that the opposite shareholders are given the appraisal right justifies the squeeze-out of minority shareholders and provides a enough protection for minority shareholders. In this paper, first I will describes the squeeze-out statutes in the Company Law. I will examine the function and meaning of legitimate business purpose according to whether it is stated as a requirement or not. Based on this, I will explain whether minority shareholders can be protected by invalidating a transaction for the squeeze-out of shareholders that has no valid business purpose or violates the equality of shareholders. Finally I will provide the conclusion about the limits of shareholder squeeze-out and the methods of protection of minority shareholders.

집중투표제에 관한 연구 - 미국에서의 찬반론을 중심으로 -

이종훈 단국대학교 법학연구소 2023 법학논총 Vol.47 No.1

The grounds of the dissenting opinion on a cumulative voting are as follows: First, the cumulative voting could be misused for the narrow interest of particular groups such as minority shareholders, not for all interest groups in the corporation including shareholders, at the expense of the corporation wholly. Next, the cumulative voting makes the corporation vulnerable to takeover and would become a device by which competing corporations could spy upon each other and could not preventing a minority member elected by minority shareholders from dispensing information about affairs of the corporation as a means of espionage. And, the cumulative voting can polarize the board and insulate managers from the full force of the market for corporate control and has the further property of impeding changes of control, thus supporting the position of managers. Furthermore, the use of cumulative voting would involve a fierce campaign of proxy solicitation. On the contrary, the grounds of the supporting opinion are as follows: First, the cumulative voting is basically fair. And, the cumulative voting, even if unused, represents potential power to assert shareholder points of view and interests, and thus it may act as a checking influence on the directors. Next, the cumulative voting is likely to be associated with higher firm value because minority shareholders can limit major shareholders’ opportunity to pursue private benefits that hurt firm value. Furthermore, the cumulative voting not only protects the interest of minority shareholders but was a substantial contribution to the public welfare where publicity about corporate proceedings is desirable for the public confidence. Finally, the cumulative voting may often intimidate management into changing the composition of the board, dismantling takeover defenses, revising executive compensation packages, and often provides an impetus for these types of reforms to bypass the cost and adverse publicity of the confrontation. In my view on the dissenting and supporting opinions, what I would like to mention first is that even if it could be admitted that several shortcomings including intensified competition of obtaining proxies on the cumulative voting exist, where minority shareholders should exist under the structure of corporation, it would be fair that the cumulative voting bestowing an opportunity to participate in the management on directors representing the minority shareholders should be allowed. In addition, to my way of thinking, it must be permitted that a right to make directors, agents of shareholders, regardless of majority or minority shareholders, participate in the management of the corporation proportionate to the ratio of ownership thereby is allowed. The last thing I want to assert is that considering a public value like a sound development of capitalism through an enlargement of people’s participation where more people could invest in the corporation by providing the minority shareholders with a chance for any director on behalf thereof to enter into the board of directors, I think that at least in the listed corporation where minority shareholders are going to exist, it should be guaranteed that the cumulative voting could be exercised whenever minority shareholders want. 먼저 집중투표제 반대론의 논거는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 집중투표제는 회사의비용을 사용하면서도, 주주를 포함한 모든 회사이해관계자를 위해서가 아닌, 특정 이익집단만을 위해서 잘못 사용되는 문제점이 있다. 둘째, 집중투표제는회사를 인수합병의 위험에 취약하게 만들며, 경쟁회사가 기밀을 탈취하는 수단으로 악용될 수 있고, 소수주주가 자신이 선임한 이사를 통해 회사의 중요정보를 빼내는 수단으로 악용될 수 있다. 셋째, 집중투표제는 이사회를 대주주측 이사들과 소수주주측 이사들로 양극화시킴으로써 오히려 회사지배력으로부터 경영진을 차단시키는 효과를 통해 경영진의 지위를 공고히 시키게 하는 문제를 발생시킨다. 넷째, 집중투표제를 이용하려는 소수주주들로 인하여 위임장경쟁이 촉발되게 되는데, 특히 경영진이 회사에서의 그들의 지위를 이용하여회사의 비용을 사용함으로써 만일 경영진이 위임장경쟁에서 승리할 경우 사실상 사용된 회사비용이 패배한 소수주주들에게 전가되는 문제를 발생시킬 수있다. 다섯째, 집중투표제는 소수주주가 집중하여 투표할 수 있는 주식수와 이사회의 이사정원수에 그 효용성이 달려있기 때문에 궁극적으로 소수주주를 효율적으로 보호해왔다고 볼 수 없다. 다음으로 집중투표제 찬성론의 논거는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 집중투표제는 기본적으로 공정에 근거한다. 즉, 주주는 자신이 속한 회사에 중요한 이해관계를가지는 경우 소유지분에 비례하여 이사회에 자신을 대표할 자를 선임할 기회가 부여되는 것이 형평의 원칙에 맞는다. 둘째, 집중투표제는 그 존재자체만으로도 소수주주의 견해와 이해관계를 주장할 잠재적인 힘을 보여주게 됨으로써이사들에 대한 견제수단으로 작용할 수 있다. 셋째, 집중투표제는 회사의 가치를 상승시키는데, 왜냐하면 집중투표제는 회사지배를 위한 시장의 기능을 촉진시키기 때문이다. 넷째, 집중투표제는 소수주주의 이익뿐만 아니라, 이사회에서의 정보공개를 통해 대중의 신뢰를 받게 됨으로써 공익에 실질적으로 기여한다. 다섯째, 간접적으로 경영진으로 하여금 이사회구성의 변화를 가져오게만드는 압박수단으로 작용하기도 하고, 인수합병 저지수단을 무력화시킬 수도있으며, 경영진 보수안을 수정시키는 등 경영진의 개혁을 촉발시키는 촉매제역할을 할 수도 있다. 검토해 보면, 위임장경쟁이 격화되는 등 반대론이 지적하는 바와 같은 문제점이 일부 있는 것은 인정되나, 소수주주가 존재할 수 밖에 없는 회사구조를만들었다면, 소수주주를 대표할 이사를 경영에 참여할 기회를 부여하는 집중투표제를 허용하는 것이 형평의 원칙에 맞으며, 이사회라는 경영결정제도하에서도 all or nothing이 아닌, 대주주든 소수주주든 각자의 소유비율에 따라 대리인을 참여시킬 권리를 민주주의 뿐만 아니라 자본주의 체제하에서도 보장하는 것이 옳다고 생각한다. 끝으로 소액주주들의 의사를 대변해 줄 이사를 이사회에 진출시킬 수 있는 기회를 제공해 줌으로써 더 많은 국민이 투자를 하도록 만들 수 있게 된다는 국민참여확대를 통한 자본주의의 건전한 발전이라는 공익적 가치를 감안할 때, 우리나라의 경우 많은 소액주주들이 있을 수 밖에 없는 상장회사만이라도, 최소한 지금처럼 집중투표제가 사문화되는 일은막아야 된다고 생각한다.

주식병합을 통한 소수주주축출 문제 해결 방안

김지환 한국상사법학회 2021 商事法硏究 Vol.40 No.2

A reverse stock splits permit a recapitalization, merger and acquisition or company split under the Korean Commercial Law. But recently, controlling shareholders use to squeeze out a minority shareholders by means of reverse stock splits. A reverse stock split provides an attractive method for eliminating the minority shareholders of a closely held or public corporation. Korean Commercial Law provide an appraisal remedy to shareholders squeezed out by merger or company split, but none expressly authorizes appraisal in the event of a reverse stock split. Futhermore, fair valuation of close corporation stock is extremely difficult because of the absence of a ready market for close corporation shares. Minority shareholders in close corporations, therefore, must rely on the judiciary to protect their interests from majority oppression. In America, courts have held that controlling shareholders, like directors, owe a fiduciary duty to the minority. Typically, Courts have adopted three test in acquiring exclusive control by means of a reverse stock split. First, courts require that the majority have a valid business purpose for squeeze-outs. Second, the transaction must be free of any taint of fraud, misrepresentation or non disclosure. Third, the minority shareholders must be paid fair price for their stock. In Japan Company Law, when a corporation intends to consolidate its shares, it require a resolution at a shareholders meeting, the ration of the consolidation, notice to shareholders, demand to cease reverse stock split and dissenting shareholders appraisal rights. A corporation can use merger or company split by way of a reverse stock split to remove minority shareholders, but it is problem to use recapitalization by way of a reverse stock split, because such a technique may harm the interests of minority shareholders. Thus, courts should consider such factors - a abuse of rights, in good faith or equality of shareholders – in establishing an appropriate standard test to protect minority shareholders. 지배주주가 주식병합을 함으로써 소수주주를 축출하는 것은 본래 상법상 예정되어 있지 않다. 주식병합은 단독으로 할 수 없고 자본금감소(440조), 합병(530조 2항) 또는 분할(530조의11 1항)을 원활히 하기 위한 수단으로 함께 사용한다. 그런데 실무에서 주식병합 비율을 높게 설정하고 소수주주가 보유한 주식을 단주로 만듬으로써 지배주주가 소수주주를 축출하는데 사용하는 사례가 발생한다. 합병이나 분할 시 주식병합을 통하여 소수주주를 축출하더라도 이것은 사업목적이 명확하고 소수주주 축출은 결과적인 현상에 불과하며, 나아가 소수주주를 보호하기 위한 제도적 장치도 어느 정도 마련되어 있으므로 이를 문제 삼기는 어렵다. 그러나 자본금감소의 수단으로 주식병합을 하면서 소수주주를 축출하는 경우, 소수주주에 대한 보호 제도도 미흡하고, 공정한 가격을 받는다는 보장도 없다. 미국 MBCA는 주식병합 절차에서 주식매수청구권을 인정하고 있고(NBCA §13.02(a)(4)), 일본 회사법은 주식매수청구권(일회 182조의4, 116조 1항 2호), 유지청구권(일회 182조의3), 사전·사후 공시제도(일회 182조의2, 일회 182조의6 1항)를 두고 있다. 나아가 미국 법원에서는 ① 사업목적 기준, ② 공정한 절차 기준, ③ 공정한 가격 기준을 그 심사 요건으로 삼기도 한다. 일본 학계는 소수주주가 근로자로서의 지위로 보수를 받고 있는 경우와 같이 폐쇄회사라면 주주총회결의 하자 여부, 주주평등의 원칙 위반 여부, 권리남용 위반 여부 등을 구체적으로 따져 보아야 한다는 입장이다. 최근 우리 대법원은 울트라 사건에서 주식병합 및 자본금감소를 통한 소수주주 축출에 대해 단주 발생은 주주평등의 원칙의 예외에 해당하고, 단주를 임의 매각하려면 법원의 허가를 받으므로 그 금액의 적정성 판단이 이루어지며, 자본금감소 및 주식병합 주주총회에서 절대 다수의 찬성이라면 단체법적 행위에 불공정이 있다고 보기 어렵다고 판시하였다. 이 판결이 주식병합 및 자본금감소를 통한 소수주주 축출을 일반적으로 인정한 것은 아니지만, 논지 전개에 있어서 형식적으로 주주평등의 원칙을 해석한 점, 신의성실의 원칙 및 권리남용 등을 판단할 때 주식병합의 목적이 소수주주의 축출에 중점을 둔 것인지에 대한 판단 미비는 아쉽다.

주주제안권과 그 한계

전현정(Hyun Jeong Jeon) 한국법학원 2018 저스티스 Vol.- No.164

주주제안권이 도입된 지 거의 20년의 세월이 지났다. 주주제안권은 소수주주가 주주총회에서 심의할 의제나 의안을 제안할 수 있도록 함으로써, 주주총회의 의사결정에 주주를 참여하여 회사의 경영에 주주의 의사를 반영시키고자 한 것이다. 상법 제363조의 2 제3항에서 주주제안이 있는 경우에 이를 주주총회의 목적사항으로 해야 한다고 규정하고 있다. 그런데 주주제안이 된 내용이 그대로 주주총회에 상정되어야 하는지 문제된다. 즉, 주주제안권이 행사되었기 때문에 무조건 주주총회의 목적사항으로 삼아야 하는지, 아니면 주주제안권의 행사를 규제하거나 제한할 수 있는지 문제된다. 서로 양립 가능하지 않은 주주제안권이 행사되거나 논리적으로 선결되어야 할 문제를 생략한 채 주주제안권이 행사되는 경우 이사회는 주주제안의 본질적인 취지를 벗어나지 않는 범위 내에서 주주제안된 내용을 변형 상정할 수 있다고 보아야 한다. 이사회가 주주총회의 소집이나 진행 등의 운영을 맡고 있기 때문에, 주주제안권을 침해하지 않는 한도에서는 이사회가 주주총회를 효율적으로 운영할 수 있도록 하여야 한다. 한편 집중투표와 주주제안권은 별개의 문제로서, 주주총회에서 복수의 이사를 선출할 것이 확정되었을 때에 비로소 문제되는 것이다. 집중투표 청구 자체는 주주제안의 내용이 될 수 없음을 주의하여야 한다. 주주가 적법한 절차를 거쳐 주주제안을 하였는데도 이사회가 이를 거부한 경우, 주주총회결의의 효력은 원칙적으로 주주제안이 의안제안인지 의제제안인지에 따라 달라진다. 의안제안의 경우에는 주주총회결의 취소 사유가 있다고 볼 수 있지만, 의제제안의 경우에는 그에 상응하는 결의가 없기 때문에 취소 사유가 없다고 보아야 한다. 다만, 의제제안의 내용이 주주총회에서 이루어진 다른 의제에 대해 전제관계에 있고, 전제로 되는 의제제안의 부당거절이 없다면 다른 의제에 대한 결의가 달라질 가능성이 있는 경우에는 그 결의는 취소 사유가 있다고 보아야 한다. 한편 적법한 한도에서 변형 상정이 되었다면 주주제안권이 침해되었다고 볼 것은 아니다. 현재 실무에서는 주주제안된 내용이 그대로 주주총회의 안건으로 상정되어야만 주주제안권이 침해되지 않는다고 보는 경향이 있다. 그러나 이것은 주주제안권을 지나치게 평면적으로 이해한 것이다. 소수주주가 회사의 의사결정에 실질적으로 참여하는 것을 보장하면서도 주주총회의 공정하고 효율적인 운영이 가능하도록 주주제안권의 행사를 적절하게 규율할 필요가 있다. The shareholder proposal right in Korea was introduced nearly 20 years ago to protect the interests of minority shareholders. This right allows minority shareholders to propose agendas or agenda items that require a resolution of the general shareholders meeting and thereby provides opportunities for minority shareholders to participate in company management.106) Under Article 363-2(3) of the Korean Commercial Code, minority shareholders can participate in the decision making process of the company since they are granted the right to submit proposals for consideration at the general shareholders meeting. If the relevant proposal is not considered, whether this infringes upon the shareholders’ rights becomes an issue. In other words, whether the submitted proposal should be included as an item of the agenda since minority shareholders have exercised their right, or by what means can the right be limited and restricted, can become problematic. In most cases, compared with the matters that are dealt with at the general shareholders meeting, minority shareholders submit inconsistent proposals or fail to deal with matters that should have been decided before the submission of the proposals. For these cases, the board of directors can make decisions to amend the minority shareholders’ proposed agenda to the extent that the amendment does not alter the original intent of the proposal. Since the board convenes and conducts the general shareholders meeting, they should be able to make decisions for the efficient conduct of the meeting. The boards’ convening and conducting of the general shareholders meeting, of course, assumes that the minority shareholders’ proposal rights are not infringed upon. In this regard, however, cumulative voting and shareholder proposal are separate matters and become an issue when a decision to elect multiple directors becomes necessary. A cautionary note is that cumulative voting itself cannot be the content of a shareholder proposal. If a shareholder proposal was legitimately made by the shareholders but the board of directors rejects the proposal, then the resolution of the general shareholders meeting may be nullified. Here, the distinction is drawn between whether the proposal was for agendas or agenda items. For shareholder proposals for agenda items, there may be grounds to cancel the resolution adopted at the general shareholders meeting. On the other hand, for proposals for agendas, there are no grounds for cancellation since no resolution similar to the resolutions adopted for agenda items is adopted for agendas. However, if a proposal for an agenda constitutes a prerequisite for another agenda at a general shareholders meeting and if there was a possibility that a resolution relating to such other agenda adopted at such meeting would not have been adopted absent unreasonable refusal of the proposal for the agenda, there may be grounds to cancel the resolution adopted for such other agenda. Having said that, if the agenda was modified within a certain legal framework, then this should not be viewed as an infringement on the shareholder proposal rights. In practice, however, most hold the view that the proposal of shareholders must be presented without modification at the general shareholders meeting as agenda in order for the proposal rights to be preserved. This view is an overly one dimensional understanding of the shareholder proposal right. This paper highlights the necessity of regulating minority shareholders’ rights to a certain extent in order to hold fair and efficient general shareholders meetings. The author argues that a balance between protection of minority shareholders’ right to participate in the decision making process of the company and efficient conduct of the general shareholders meetings is attainable.

의무공개매수 제도의 기능과 도입 가능성에 대한 검토

정준혁 한국증권법학회 2019 증권법연구 Vol.20 No.2

Most takeovers in Korea are structured as control transactions where the controlling shareholder sells its controlling stake to a third party at a premium through a private arrangement. Minority shareholders are neither offered the premium nor invited to sell their shares to the acquirer. Minority shareholders’ share value is heavily affected by the management and monitoring capabilities of the controlling shareholder and its exploitation of private benefits of control. Given the impact on minority shareholders that are triggered by the change of the controller, major jurisdictions regulate control transactions within the boundary of corporate law. In the US, while a controlling shareholder may freely dispose its controlling block stake at a premium, it remains liable if the stakes are sold to a looter. In the UK and EU, the acquirer of control is required to make a general offer to other shareholders at the same price per share that was offered in acquiring the controlling stakes, entitling minority shareholders an exit right at a premium. In Korea, however, corporate law does not provide any such protection devices. The mandatory takeover bid rule, first adopted in the UK in 1974 is now accepted by most major jurisdictions except for the US and Korea. The mandatory takeover bid rule discourages value decreasing inefficient transactions and prevents distorted choices by shareholders by relieving pressure to tender. By contrast, it may over-protect minority shareholders, discourage certain value-increasing efficient transactions and have negative impacts on the activity of control transactions as the amount of total purchase price necessary to acquire control of a company increases. Such disadvantages of the mandatory takeover bid rule are aggravated in concentrated ownerships. I suggest that minority shareholders shall be provided with an opportunity to sell their shares to the acquirer at market value. Unlike in the UK and EU style mandatory takeover bid rule, the acquirer shall not be required to pay a control premium to the minority shareholders who tendered their shares. The new proposal efficiently eliminates inefficient transactions without hindering value-increasing efficient transactions and provides minority shareholders with an exit right to sell their shares at market value, in case it is considered that acquirer may decrease the value of non-controlling shares. 우리나라 M&A 거래의 대부분은 지배주주가 자신이 보유하는 지배지분을 매각하는 방식으로 이루어진다. 지배주주는 경영권 프리미엄을 받고 시가보다 높은 가격에 지배지분을 매각할 수 있지만, 소액주주들은 보유 주식을 함께 매각할 기회를 갖지 못하고 회사에 잔존하게 된다. 소액주주의 주식가치는 지배주주 및 지배주주가 선임한 경영진이 어떻게 회사를 운영하는지, 지배주주가 회사로부터 사적 이익을 얼마나 편취하는지에 따라 달라지기 때문에, M&A 거래로 지배주주가 교체되면 회사에 잔존하는 소액주주는 많은 영향을 받는다. 이에 따라 각국의 회사법은 소액주주 보호를 위해 경영권 거래에 개입하고 있다. 미국에서는 지배주주가 자유롭게 지배지분을 제3자에게 매각할 수 있게 하되, 회사를 약탈할 의도를 가지는 자(looters)에게 매각할 경우 지배주주가 책임을 지도록 한다. 영국과 EU에서는 새로운 지배주주가 되는 인수인이 소액주주에게 지배주주와 동일한 가격에 지분을 매각할 기회를 제안하게 하는 이른바 의무공개매수 제도(mandatory takeover bid rule)를 통해 소액주주를 보호한다. 반면 우리나라는 미국이나 영국 및 EU와 달리 아무런 보호수단도 제공하고 있지 않다. M&A 거래 수단으로 가장 많이 사용되는 지배지분 매각 방식에 대해 회사법이 아무런 보호수단도 제공하지 않고 있는 셈이다. 의무공개매수 제도는 우리나라와 미국을 제외한 거의 모든 주요 국가들에서 채택하고 있다. 대상회사에 지배주주가 존재하는 상황에서 의무공개매수 제도는 (1) 소액주주들에게 매각기회를 부여하고(exit right), (2) 지배주주가 누리는 경영권 프리미엄을 소액주주도 누릴 수 있게 하는 기능을 수행한다. 의무공개매수 제도는 가치감소형 거래를 저지하고, 주주들의 매각압박을 해소하며, 소액주주를 충분히 보호하지만, 지배주주가 존재하는 상황에서는 가치증가형 거래를 일부 좌절시키고, 소액주주를 과잉보호하며, 인수인의 인수대금을 증가시킴으로써 M&A 거래의 성사를 어렵게 만든다. 이러한 문제점은 의무공개매수 제도 하에서 인수인이 경영권 프리미엄을 소액주주에게도 지급해야 한다는 것에서 대부분 기인한다. 이 글에서는 대안으로, 지배지분 주식양수도를 통해 지배주주가 변경되면 소액주주들이 새로운 지배주주에게 시장가격에 보유 주식을 매각할 수 있는 기회를 부여하는 방안을 제안한다. 잔존 소액주주들에게 인수인이 시장가격에 소액주주의 주식을 매수할 것을 청구하는 권리를 부여한다는 점에서 이를 매수청구권(sell-out right) 제도라 부른다. 매수청구권 제도는 앞서 살펴 본 의무공개매수 제도의 장점을 대부분 그대로 유지하면서도, 가치증가형 거래를 적게 저지하고 소액주주를 적절한 수준에서 보호하여 의무공개매수 제도의 단점을 최소화한다. 현행 제도와 비교하더라도 약탈자(looters)가 회사를 인수하는 것이나, 경영능력이 부족한 새로운 지배주주의 등장으로 인하여 소액주주가 불측의 손해를 입는 것을 방지할 수 있다는 장점이 있다.

소수주주의 주식매수청구권 박탈로 인한 주주총회결의의 무효 여부

김성진(Sung-Jin Kim) 한국기업법학회 2011 企業法硏究 Vol.25 No.3

When there are certain fundamental corporate changes, appraisal rights provide dissenting shareholders the option to sell their shares back to the corporation for fair value. Examples of fundamental corporate changes are following; mergers, acquisition, divisions-mergers, consolidations, serious charter amendments, sales of substantially all the corporation"s assets and so on. The purpose of appraisal rights is to protect minority shareholders who do not want fundamental changes nor be forced to invest in new corporations against their free will. If proposed corporate action for fundamental corporate changes requiring appraisal rights becomes effective, the corporation must give a notice to all shareholders who are entitled to assert appraisal rights before shareholders" meeting. However, in the Supreme Court"s case(대법원 2010. 7.22. 선고 2008다37193 판결), minority shareholders who held about 9% of the total corporation"s shares were deprived of their appraisal rights because the corporation missed to give them a notice about fundamental corporate changes requiring appraisal rights before shareholders" meeting. Superior court of New Jersey in Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., held that majority shareholders, no matter however overwhelming it may turn out to be, may not deprive appraisal rights of minority shareholders, no matter how few they may be in number. Like this decision, the dissenting shareholders have right to object to corporation"s plan and obtain appraisal right of their respective shares. To do so, the corporation should have given minority shareholders (no matter how few they may be in number) a notice about fundamental corporate changes requiring appraisal rights before shareholders" meeting. This article focuses on discussing whether defects which deprived minority shareholders of appraisal rights make resolution at shareholders" meeting void or voidable. Part II reviews detail facts of the Supreme Court"s case to clarify the issues of this article. This part also overviews history and role of dissenter"s appraisal rights and finds out that shareholders in division-merger cases are able to have statutory appraisal rights like shareholders in merger cases. Part III addresses whether defects which deprived minority shareholders of appraisal rights make resolution at shareholders" meeting void or voidable under the Supreme Court"s case laws. Part IV discusses whether defects which deprived minority shareholders of appraisal rights make resolution at shareholders" meeting void or voidable under the U.S. case laws. Part V compares the Supreme Court"s case with another Supreme Court"s case(대법원 1993. 10. 12. 선고 92다28235, 28242 판결) which is factually similar to the former. Lastly, part VI, as a conclusion, proposes that defects which deprived minority shareholders of appraisal rights should make resolution at shareholders" meeting void to protect minority shareholders.

소수주주(小數株主)의 경영감시기능강화(經營監視機能强化)를 위한 법제(法制)의 총체적고찰(總體的考察) - 중(中)·소규모주식회사주주(小規模株式會社株主)의 경영감시기능(經營監視機能)에 관한 보완책(補完策)마련을 구상(構想)하며 -

서성호 ( Seo Seong Ho ) 한국상사판례학회 2016 상사판례연구 Vol.29 No.3

주주총회에서 지배주주를 제외한 소수주주는 경영감시기구의 정점에 있기 때문에 지금까지의 법제개선에 있어서는 소수주주의 역할에 기대하여 소수주주권을 법제하고 이후 강화하는 추세에 있었다. 그러나 이러한 소수주주권 강화법제는 대기업의 경우에는 지배주주라 하더라도 그들이 가지는 주식 소유분은 발행주식 총수에서 볼 때 그다지 크지 않고 오히려 기관투자자의 영향력이 큼에도 불구하고 경영권을 좌지우지하는 경향이 나타나고 있음에 따라 그 효과에 기대되는 바가 클 수 있는 반면, 실질적으로 오너경영으로서 대주주의 지배력이 큰 중·소기업의 경우에는 현실적으로 소수주주에게 기대하는 것 자체가 처음부터 무리였다는 생각에 오히려 채권자 역할론에 기대했었음이 현실적으로 바람직하지 않았나 하는 생각을 하게 된다. 그러나 근래의 법제개선에 관한 내용을 살펴보면, 특히 중·소규모주식회사의 법제개선은 참으로 현실과 동떨어진 형태로 이루어지고 있음을 알 수 있다. 즉, 2009년 5월 28일 상법개정으로 중·소규모주식회사의 경영감시체제는 사실상 존재하지 않게 되었다. 이에 관하여 입법자의 의도하는 바가 중·소규모주식회사의 경영감시체제에 관해서는 사실상 기존의 법제에서는 기대할 수 없었기 때문에 소수주주에 기대할 수밖에 없어서 그리 개정하였던 것이라면, 그 기대하는 감시권의 효과를 거두기 위해서 어떠한 보완책을 마련했어야 함에도 불구하고 아무런 보완책 없이기존 감사제도마저도 없애버리는 오를 범하고 말았다는 생각을 하게 된다. 따라서 본 연구에서는 주식회사감사제도에서 먼저 그 정점에 위치하는 소수주주의 경영감시제도에 관한 법제를 총체적으로 개관하는 것으로부터 시작하여, 대규모주식회사에 관하여는 소주주권 강화차원으로 도입된 주주제안권에 관련된 일본의 판례를 통한 실정법상의 문제점이 무엇인지 고찰하여 우리의 대기업에서의 실효적 감사제도의 일환으로써 Traditionally shareholders have been recognized as the owner of a company, albeit conceptually. Recently this recognition is confronting realistic changes triggered by across-the-board introduction of the law protecting the creditors within the Commercial Code due to development and expanded issuance of class shares and class debentures. Accordingly, while the phenomenon of traditional conception on the status of the shareholders`` general meeting as the substantial supreme authority being threatened, the function of internal auditor to monitor and supervise the management has weakened or auditor``s position itself is removed, so that legislation is adopted that rather anticipates such role to be taken by the general shareholders`` meeting. As such, it is true that strange phenomenon is occurring that threatens the basic concept or theories of the joint stock company. These changes may be regarded as the phenomenon that did not occur in an instant recently, but as the gradual after-effect of systemic improvement due to the need of the age. From another aspect, this phenomenon can be understood as the by-product of the abandonment of or a breakthrough from the malfunction of managerial institution as monitoring and supervisory institution within the existing Korean legal system on the joint stock company. Looking back, minority shareholders excluding the controlling shareholder at the general shareholders`` meeting are at the summit position of the auditor system, and so the legislative improvement so far has been on the trend to legalize the minority shareholders`` right and further strengthen such right subsequently, in anticipation of minority shareholders`` role. In case of large corporations, the shareholding of controlling shareholders show the trend to dictate the managerial rights despite of their relatively low shareholding ratio vis-a-vis the total number of shares outstanding despite of the big influence of the institutional investors, and much can be expected from the legislation of strengthening minority shareholders`` rights. Meanwhile in case of SMEs with prevalent control by the major shareholder as the owner, any anticipated role by minority shareholder was not logical in reality from the start. Rather it would have been desirable in reality to anticipate the role of the creditor theoretically. However, in consideration of the proceeding of the recent improvement in legislation, it is found out that the improvement in legislation for small to medium sized corporations are realized in a way that is so far apart from the reality. In other words, based on the revision of the Commercial Code on May 28, 2009, the managerial supervisory system in small to medium corporations became de facto non-existent. With respect to this situation, if the legislator in question adopted such revisions because nothing could be expected for managerial supervisory system of small to medium sized corporations in reality from existing legal system and the only expectation could be upon the minor shareholders, a certain supplementary measure should have been prepared so that the expected effect of the supervisory right could be realized. But now the legislation is regarded as a failure as the previous auditor system has been removed without any complementary measure. Accordingly, the author disagreed to the revised Commercial Code on May 28 2009 and April 14 2011, pointing out the problem in the revisions and recommending improvements. But so far no effort can be found to improve such problematic legal system. Therefore this study commences from the comprehensive overview of the legal system on managerial supervision by minor shareholders positioned at the summit of the corporates`` auditor system. Then on large scale corporations, this study reviews what is the problem in positive law through the Japanese judicial precedents on the shareholders`` right to make proposal adopted for enhancing minority shareholders`` rights, in order to consider how the shareholders`` right to make proposal as part of effective auditor system in Korean large corporations could settle down as a law or as an interpretation thereof. Subsequently for small sized joint stock companies, this study feels out the possibility of supplementing the supervisory function by methods such as delegating supervisory function to creditor (individual creditor or creditors`` committee) in addition to the suggested points and proposals at the author``s previous research theses, and simultaneously pursues the method that would enhance the effectiveness of the supervisory function of minor shareholders or creditors by introduction of other systems.