Spatial Market Integration of Regional Fertilizer Markets in the Philippines and Determinants

Eva Salve T,Bacud,Julieta A,Delos Reyes,Maria Angelica C,Torres,Christhaline A,Arellano 한국무역연구원 2019 The International Academy of Global Business and T Vol.15 No.1

Purpose - While several studies focusing on the integration of rice markets in order to lower prices have been conducted, little is understood about the market integration of production inputs. Price variation in production inputs, however, is also a strong factor influencing rice prices. Fertilizer is among the major inputs in rice production, implying that any change in fertilizer prices would have implications on rice prices. As fertilizer tends to register high prices and wide disparities in domestic markets, lowering its price is deemed to be effective in increasing its uptake among rice farmers. This paper attempted to answer the following research questions: (1) How closely integrated are the domestic fertilizer markets? (2) Is there price leadership, and correspondingly, are there price followers? (3) Do higher fertilizer prices exist in more segmented markets? (4) What are the determinants of price differences and market integration across regional fertilizer markets? Design/Methodology/Approach - In order to test for spatial market integration, the correlation coefficient analysis, Granger causality and the Johansen cointegration test were employed. The Johansen cointegration test was performed on 2000-2017 price series data of urea and complete fertilizer of all 16 regions in the Philippines. Findings - It was found that 95% of regional markets for urea and 81% for complete fertilizer were integrated. Rice-producing regions tended to act as price leaders, whereas regions producing less rice were price followers. Results from OLS regression analysis suggest that lower price differences tended to prevail in integrated markets and infrastructures; distance and output difference are among the determinants of market integration. Research Implications - Identifying which markets are integrated is extremely crucial in policy development as it allows the government to fast track its interventions. In integrated markets, any price fluctuation in one market is also likely to happen in another integrated market. It therefore signals to the government in which regions to focus the interventions on, especially in its efforts to stabilize the prices of rice. For instance, it could implement centralized policies in integrated fertilizer markets, and decentralized policies in less integrated ones. Having identified the determinants that influence integration should also allow the government to decide what kind of interventions to implement in order to promote the integration of spatially segregated markets.

지방세법상 시가인정액 제도에 관한 고찰

김신언,이광영 한국세무사회 부설 한국조세연구소 2023 세무와 회계 연구 Vol.12 No.2

From 2023, the acquisition tax base calculation method reflects the real value of the taxable object in principle, but unlike in the past, it has been revised to classify the actual price of acquisition for paid acquisition and the market price recognition amount for gratuitous acquisition. The definition of the market price recognition amount of gratuitous acquisition in local tax law is almost the same as the article of current market price designated in the Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act by applying that concept of the current market price of national tax. However, the current local tax law specifically excludes the price of expropriation recognized by the Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act, although the sale and purchase value, appraised value, and price of public auction are recognized as market value. In addition, when calculating the tax base of acquisition tax, different tax bases are applied depending on inheritance and gift. The timing of gratuitous acquisition and the evaluation period of the market price recognition amount are also different from national taxes. Accordingly, it has been argued that the scope of application of the market price recognition amount of the local tax law should be completely the same as the current market price of the national tax for inter-law consistency. Here, it is reasonable to revise the tax law's market price concept to convert transactions occurring in incomplete competitive markets into ideal and objective prices in fully competitive markets. Because it conforms to the concept of the current market price of the tax law that converts transactions occurring in incomplete competitive markets to ideal and objective prices in completely competitive markets. This is because if the expropriation price is excluded from the range of the market price recognition used in the incomplete step to infer the price of an unrealized transaction, the assessed value eventually becomes the tax base and cannot reflect the real value of the current taxable object. However, since national and local taxes have their own areas of financial purpose and collection procedure, indiscriminate unification without considering the characteristics of the tax items does not necessarily produce efficient and reasonable results. Specifically, it is reasonable to set the assessed value as the standard as in present system because using all real estate values acquired through inheritance from local taxes that do not recognize inheritance deductions as the tax base for acquisition tax will incur an excessive tax burden on taxpayers. Unlike the time of gratuitous acquisition of real estate as a registration date in national taxes, the local tax law is also necessary to maintain the current law as a contract date or a short evaluation period as a procedural reason for the establishment and determination of acquisition tax obligations. 2023년부터 시행된 취득세 과세표준 산정방식은 원칙적으로 과세대상의 실질가치를 반영하되 종전과는 달리 유상취득은 사실상의 취득가액, 무상취득의 경우 시가인정액을 원칙으로 과세하고 있다. 지방세법상 시가인정액은 국세의 시가 개념을 준용하면서 「상속세 및 증여세법」에서 사용되는 시가의 조문과 거의 동일하다. 하지만, 현행 지방세법은 구체적으로 매매사례가액, 감정가액, 공매가액은 시가인정액으로 하나 「상속세 및 증여세법」에서 인정하는 수용가액을 제외하고 있다. 또한, 취득세의 과세표준을 산정할 때 상속과 증여는 각기 다른 과세표준을 적용한다. 무상취득의 시기나 시가인정액의 평가 기간도 국세와 차이가 있다. 따라서 법률 간 정합성을 위해 지방세법의 시가인정액 기준을 국세의 시가와 완전히 같게 하여야 한다는 주장이 제기되었다. 여기서 시가인정액의 범위에 수용가액도 포함하는 것은 불완전경쟁시장에서 발생하는 거래를 완전경쟁시장의 이상적이고 객관적인 가격으로 전환하는 세법의 시가 개념에 적합하므로 타당하다. 미실현된 거래의 가격을 유추하기 위한 불완전한 단계에서 사용하는 시가인정액의 범위에 수용가액을 배제하면 결국 시가표준액이 과세표준이 되어 현재 과세대상의 실질 가치를 반영할 수 없기 때문이다. 하지만, 국세와 지방세는 그 재정 목적과 징수 절차상의 고유한 영역이 존재하므로 세목의 특성을 고려하지 않고 무분별하게 통일시키는 것이 반드시 효율적이고 합리적인 결과를 도출하지 않는다. 구체적으로 상속공제를 인정하지 않는 지방세 체계에서 상속으로 취득하는 부동산 가액을 전부 취득세 과세표준으로 하게 되면 납세자에게 과도한 세부담을 발생시키므로 현행과 같이 시가표준액으로 하는 것은 타당하다. 부동산의 무상취득 시기를 국세에서 등기일로 하는 것과 달리 지방세법에서 계약일로 정한 것이나 상속으로 인한 평가기간을 국세보다 짧게 한 것도 취득세 납세의무 성립과 확정의 이론 및 절차적인 사유로 합리적이다.

Measuring the Impact of Competition on Pricing Behaviors in a Two-Sided Market

Kim, Minkyung,Song, Inseong Korean Marketing Association 2014 ASIA MARKETING JOURNAL Vol.16 No.1

The impact of competition on pricing has been studied in the context of counterfactual merger analyses where expected optimal prices in a hypothetical monopoly are compared with observed prices in an oligopolistic market. Such analyses would typically assume static decision making by consumers and firms and thus have been applied mostly to data obtained from consumer packed goods such as cereal and soft drinks. However such static modeling approach is not suitable when decision makers are forward looking. When it comes to the markets for durable products with indirect network effects, consumer purchase decisions and firm pricing decisions are inherently dynamic as they take into account future states when making purchase and pricing decisions. Researchers need to take into account the dynamic aspects of decision making both in the consumer side and in the supplier side for such markets. Firms in a two-sided market typically subsidize one side of the market to exploit the indirect network effect. Such pricing behaviors would be more prevalent in competitive markets where firms would try to win over the battle for standard. While such qualitative expectation on the relationship between pricing behaviors and competitive structures could be easily formed, little empirical studies have measured the extent to which the distinct pricing structure in two-sided markets depends on the competitive structure of the market. This paper develops an empirical model to measure the impact of competition on optimal pricing of durable products under indirect network effects. In order to measure the impact of exogenously determined competition among firms on pricing, we compare the equilibrium prices in the observed oligopoly market to those in a hypothetical monopoly market. In computing the equilibrium prices, we account for the forward looking behaviors of consumers and supplier. We first estimate a demand function that accounts for consumers' forward-looking behaviors and indirect network effects. And then, for the supply side, the pricing equation is obtained as an outcome of the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in pricing. In doing so, we utilize numerical dynamic programming techniques. We apply our model to a data set obtained from the U.S. video game console market. The video game console market is considered a prototypical case of two-sided markets in which the platform typically subsidizes one side of market to expand the installed base anticipating larger revenues in the other side of market resulting from the expanded installed base. The data consist of monthly observations of price, hardware unit sales and the number of compatible software titles for Sony PlayStation and Nintendo 64 from September 1996 to August 2002. Sony PlayStation was released to the market a year before Nintendo 64 was launched. We compute the expected equilibrium price path for Nintendo 64 and Playstation for both oligopoly and for monopoly. Our analysis reveals that the price level differs significantly between two competition structures. The merged monopoly is expected to set prices higher by 14.8% for Sony PlayStation and 21.8% for Nintendo 64 on average than the independent firms in an oligopoly would do. And such removal of competition would result in a reduction in consumer value by 43.1%. Higher prices are expected for the hypothetical monopoly because the merged firm does not need to engage in the battle for industry standard. This result is attributed to the distinct property of a two-sided market that competing firms tend to set low prices particularly at the initial period to attract consumers at the introductory stage and to reinforce their own networks and eventually finally to dominate the market.

조선 후기 貢價의 체계와 추이

이헌창(Lee Hun-Chang),조영준(Cho Young-Jun) 한국사연구회 2008 한국사연구 Vol.142 No.-

The prices of tribute items were very stable from around 1750 when Tribute Institution was consolidated until the middle of the 19th century. Not only the primary tribute prices(元貢價) but also the secondary tribute prices(別貿價) were officially fixed. And they have scarcely changed over time. Both the primary and secondary tribute prices changed within a 5% level respectively during the period from the 1810s to the 1860s. The state endeavored for an efficient adjustment of tribute prices only in limited extent. The secondary tribute prices were rather closer to the primary tribute prices than the market prices. In this regard, the tribute prices formed an independent price category distinct from the market price. The primary tribute prices of the same items seldom differed each other in case that the same items were dedicated to royal family in various ways, or both to royal family(供上) and to government(各貢). However, they often differed each other in case that the same items were dedicated to government in various ways. This tribute price disparity can be explained by supply prices, different purposes of use, and the autonomy of respective tribute procuring offices' accounts. The fact that the primary tribute prices of the same items often differed between provincial offices(各道廳) under Seonhyecheong(宣惠廳) exhibits the lack of efforts to increase fiscal efficiency. The secondary tribute prices of the same items also often differed each other, depending on their procuring agents. The different tribute prices for the same items not only reflected supply costs, but also revealed the weak integrating power of Seoul market and the state's insufficient effort and will for fiscal efficiency. The primary tribute prices are estimated to have been around 1.7 times the secondary tribute prices of the same items and a nearly threefold higher than their market prices, where the secondary tribute prices are approximately 1.7 times the market prices. The state, consumer of tribute goods, calculated the tribute prices, considering their market values. Because tribute purchasing agents, namely the tribute merchants(貢人) were officially designated, and prices for tribute items were officially fixed, the tribute prices deviated from their market values. The higher-than-market prices of tribute items reflected the corvee labor burden of tribute merchants, the cost of their procurement and delivery, and even appropriate merchant profits. Although we suggest several reasons for the fact that such high tribute prices had remained over two centuries, the state can not be relived from a criticism that it was short of efforts to increase the efficiency of tribute procurement. The state could not reduce cost by flexible coordination of tribute prices to correspond to market prices and thereby it could not shut out privilege seeking activities of tribute merchants. However, it had maintained stable procurement institution of government purchase goods with a small nuisance to the people for a long time. The faithful Confucian state Chos?n chose stability and egalitarianism over efficiency for its policy goal. Notwithstanding the fact that the state paid the tribute prices much more than the market value, the relationship between state and tribute merchants was reciprocal for economic transaction and the tribute merchants must have paid market prices for purchasing tribute items. Nevertheless, the application of officially fixed prices which were much higher than their market prices in a massive procurement of tribute items restrained further market deepening.

“SOFT PRICE REGULATION” IN THE NON-REGULATED INDUSTRY: PRICE CAP INFLUENCE ON THE INCENTIVES TO COLLUDE

Dina Tsytsulina,Svetlana Avdasheva 글로벌지식마케팅경영학회 2014 Global Marketing Conference Vol.2014 No.5

Antitrust deals with the competitive consequences of conduct by firms in the market. Marketing places emphasis on understanding how firms compete from individual perspective; by studying the thinking and motivations of managers and purchase preferences of consumers. As an academic discipline marketing aims to describe and predict the performance of companies engaged in exchange to reach organizational goals (Gundlach, Phillips, & Desrochers, 2002). For antitrust, the complementary nature of marketing's constitutes in providing a basis for understanding the nature of competitive conduct and the welfare of consumers. The influence of antitrust on marketing strategy raises many concerns. There is a strand of literature investigating how the antitrust law perceives different marketing activities. Many common marketing practices are coming under greater scrutiny from regulators, antitrust lawyers and scholars. It is essential for companies to understand how that will affect competition. When considering marketing issues such as distribution policy, product line extension, enhancing the company’s positive image, they may not realize the increasing likelihood of violating antitrust laws (Bush & Gelb, 2005). Brodley (1982) analyzes how joint ventures may threaten competition by falsifying competitive incentives among joint venture participants. He describes various incentive-modifying remedies that mitigate anticompetitive risks, and then applies this presumptive approach to various types of joint ventures. Some papers analyze how antimonopoly decisions can influence management of transaction. Joskow (2002) shows the importance of the application of transaction cost economics (TCE) to antitrust legal rules and antitrust remedies specification because it may result in different legal rules comparing to cases ignoring TCE ideas. He emphasizes that antitrust legal rules must be sensitive to the information and analytical capabilities of institutions in the market, the characteristics of potential anticompetitive behavior, market structures etc. Not only the development of marketing practices challenges antitrust enforcement. Antitrust policy can impose significant and long-lasting restrictions on marketing policies of companies, including pricing decisions. One relevant for Russia example is pricing antitrust remedies under the merger deals clearance or investigations on the abuse of dominance. In order to prevent abuse in a form of excessive price antitrust authorities set ‘soft price cap’ on the domestic market price using different benchmarks including quotes in the world commodity markets, price of export contracts, price of export contracts net of transport cost and custom duties, best (lowest) price of export contract etc. This type of remedies is already applied for chemicals, electric steel, cocking coal, aluminum and other commodities. Reform of tariff regulation in Russia takes this path also: from the next year price cap for natural gas for industrial customers will be set at the level of contract price of the largest supplier Gazprom net of transport cost. We argue that this type of remedies being imposed in order to protect customers of dominant company can diminish incentives to compete, along with the restricting incentives for an efficiency-improvement. This paper investigates how soft price regulation affects companies` behavior. In many regulated industries over the world price cap as a method of price regulation replaces cost-plus pricing. It is a kind of incentive regulation introduced in order to enhance productive efficiency by strengthening sellers’ incentives for cost reduction (Laffont, 1993; Cabral & Riordan, 1989) as well as incentives for more efficient pricing. A price-cap regulation might be suggested to address the market by making it extremely difficult for the industry to use price as a marketing strategy and by reducing the available sources the industry has for spending on marketing and lobbying. However pricing under cap is not neutral for competition in the market. We argue that the impact of price cap regulation on market competition depends on the design of cap. More specifically if cap for one (regulated) market depends on the price of the supplier in other (non-regulated) market, there is sub-type of price cap regulation (known in Russian tariff regulation as ‘netback minus’) that enhance incentives to collude in non-regulated market. Traditionally impact of price caps on collusion is analyzed in the framework of focal point problem. Price ceilings might weaken competition serving as collusive focal points for pricing decisions (Schelling, 1960; Scherer & Ross, 1990). According to the Folk Theorem (Tirole, 1988) any individually rational prices can occur as a Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated games with sufficiently high discount factor. In collusive equilibrium, companies face a coordination problem so that price ceilings may become a focal point on which companies may coordinate. It means that price ceilings may facilitate tacit collusion, increase its stability and lead to higher prices on the market. In addition, price ceilings may become a signal that if firms charge prices below that level than they would not be investigated for collusion by government authorities. Thus, it becomes less risky to maintain collusion at price level that government assess as binding. There is a strand of literature providing the empirical evidence for a collusive focal-point effect of price ceilings in different markets. Knittel and Stango (2003), studying data on state-level price ceilings on credit card charges during the 1980s, find that companies used state-level price ceilings as focal points to sustain tacit collusion. Ma (2007) investigates price ceilings in Taiwan’s flour market and argues that firms set prices above competitive levels during most of the regulation period. Moreover, all flour firms set their prices equal to ceilings. Some s

“SOFT PRICE REGULATION” IN THE NON-REGULATED INDUSTRY: PRICE CAP INFLUENCE ON THE INCENTIVES TO COLLUDE

Dina Tsytsulina,Svetlana Avdasheva 글로벌지식마케팅경영학회 2014 Global Marketing Conference Vol.2014 No.7

Antitrust deals with the competitive consequences of conduct by firms in the market. Marketing places emphasis on understanding how firms compete from individual perspective; by studying the thinking and motivations of managers and purchase preferences of consumers. As an academic discipline marketing aims to describe and predict the performance of companies engaged in exchange to reach organizational goals (Gundlach, Phillips, & Desrochers, 2002). For antitrust, the complementary nature of marketing's constitutes in providing a basis for understanding the nature of competitive conduct and the welfare of consumers. The influence of antitrust on marketing strategy raises many concerns. There is a strand of literature investigating how the antitrust law perceives different marketing activities. Many common marketing practices are coming under greater scrutiny from regulators, antitrust lawyers and scholars. It is essential for companies to understand how that will affect competition. When considering marketing issues such as distribution policy, product line extension, enhancing the company’s positive image, they may not realize the increasing likelihood of violating antitrust laws (Bush & Gelb, 2005). Brodley (1982) analyzes how joint ventures may threaten competition by falsifying competitive incentives among joint venture participants. He describes various incentive-modifying remedies that mitigate anticompetitive risks, and then applies this presumptive approach to various types of joint ventures. Some papers analyze how antimonopoly decisions can influence management of transaction. Joskow (2002) shows the importance of the application of transaction cost economics (TCE) to antitrust legal rules and antitrust remedies specification because it may result in different legal rules comparing to cases ignoring TCE ideas. He emphasizes that antitrust legal rules must be sensitive to the information and analytical capabilities of institutions in the market, the characteristics of potential anticompetitive behavior, market structures etc. Not only the development of marketing practices challenges antitrust enforcement. Antitrust policy can impose significant and long-lasting restrictions on marketing policies of companies, including pricing decisions. One relevant for Russia example is pricing antitrust remedies under the merger deals clearance or investigations on the abuse of dominance. In order to prevent abuse in a form of excessive price antitrust authorities set ‘soft price cap’ on the domestic market price using different benchmarks including quotes in the world commodity markets, price of export contracts, price of export contracts net of transport cost and custom duties, best (lowest) price of export contract etc. This type of remedies is already applied for chemicals, electric steel, cocking coal, aluminum and other commodities. Reform of tariff regulation in Russia takes this path also: from the next year price cap for natural gas for industrial customers will be set at the level of contract price of the largest supplier Gazprom net of transport cost. We argue that this type of remedies being imposed in order to protect customers of dominant company can diminish incentives to compete, along with the restricting incentives for an efficiency-improvement. This paper investigates how soft price regulation affects companies` behavior. In many regulated industries over the world price cap as a method of price regulation replaces cost-plus pricing. It is a kind of incentive regulation introduced in order to enhance productive efficiency by strengthening sellers’ incentives for cost reduction (Laffont, 1993; Cabral & Riordan, 1989) as well as incentives for more efficient pricing. A price-cap regulation might be suggested to address the market by making it extremely difficult for the industry to use price as a marketing strategy and by reducing the available sources the industry has for spending on marketing and lobbying. However pricing under cap is not neutral for competition in the market. We argue that the impact of price cap regulation on market competition depends on the design of cap. More specifically if cap for one (regulated) market depends on the price of the supplier in other (non-regulated) market, there is sub-type of price cap regulation (known in Russian tariff regulation as ‘netback minus’) that enhance incentives to collude in non-regulated market. Traditionally impact of price caps on collusion is analyzed in the framework of focal point problem. Price ceilings might weaken competition serving as collusive focal points for pricing decisions (Schelling, 1960; Scherer & Ross, 1990). According to the Folk Theorem (Tirole, 1988) any individually rational prices can occur as a Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated games with sufficiently high discount factor. In collusive equilibrium, companies face a coordination problem so that price ceilings may become a focal point on which companies may coordinate. It means that price ceilings may facilitate tacit collusion, increase its stability and lead to higher prices on the market. In addition, price ceilings may become a signal that if firms charge prices below that level than they would not be investigated for collusion by government authorities. Thus, it becomes less risky to maintain collusion at price level that government assess as binding. There is a strand of literature providing the empirical evidence for a collusive focal-point effect of price ceilings in different markets. Knittel and Stango (2003), studying data on state-level price ceilings on credit card charges during the 1980s, find that companies used state-level price ceilings as focal points to sustain tacit collusion. Ma (2007) investigates price ceilings in Taiwan’s flour market and argues that firms set prices above competitive levels during most of the regulation period. Moreover, all flour firms set their prices equal to ceilings. Some studies try to explain the existence of asymmetric retail price adjustments to crude oil price or wholesale price shocks by market power and possible collusion effects (Deltas, 2008; Borenstein, Cameron, & Gilbert, 1997). Sen, Clemente and Jonker (2011) evaluating the effects of price ceiling on retail gasoline prices in Eastern Canada 1999-2007 find the evidence that the enactment of such regulation is significantly correlated with higher prices. A potential explanation is that price ceilings serve as focal points stimulating firms to set higher prices. In contrast, laboratory experiments do not find a collusive focal-point effect of price ceilings. Coursey and Smith (1983) find convergence to the competitive equilibrium prices and no collusive effects of price ceilings in posted-offer markets. Despite in the design of Coursey and Smith (1983) the incentives to collude are small, Engelmann and Normann (2009) also find the evidence against the focal-point hypothesis, who study posted-offer markets with four symmetric sellers but larger incentives for collusion at the price ceiling. Finally, Engelmann and Muller (2011) results again fail to support the focal-point hypothesis. Collusion is as unlikely in markets with a price ceiling as in markets with unconstrained pricing. The possible explanation for different results in the laboratory and in the field is the lack of the focal-point effect in the field. The field results might be driven by other factors. These might include explicit collusion (which might either be triggered by the introduction of the price ceiling or might be easier to keep up in its presence) or other reasons that the empirical studies failed to control for (Engelmann & Muller, 2011). However the design of our research differs from ‘focal point’ approach. It is much closer to the literature on the multimarket contacts (Bernheim & Whinston, 1990; Spagnolo, 1999). Multimarket contacts was also analyzed in the context of multimarket rivalry (Phillips & Mason, 1996) but not from the point of view of cap design as we do. The goal of this paper is to show the mechanism by means of which the establishment of the domestic regulated prices ceiling can promote the stability of collusion and conditions at which it occurs. Intuition of the paper is the following. Under price cap which depends on price in deregulated market deviation from collusion in this market decreases profit in regulated market (in the punishment phase). In the model we think about regulated market as domestic and about completely deregulated market as world market. Under certain conditions the establishment of a price ceiling of domestic market by the principle price would not excess of the world price can promote the collusion stability in the world market. We argue that there is an unexpected ratio between the principle of the internal price establishment based on a world indicative and collusion incentives: the difference between the world and internal price to which the regulator aspires is higher, the negative impact of this practice on the competition is higher. Not all the versions of price cap which are based on the world market benchmark provide the same impact on the incentive to collude. Other important variables which reflect transport cost (or more generally all cost of trade). Price cup under model ‘world price plus trade (transport) cost’ provides no impact on the incentives to collude under some level of trade (transport) cost. Price cap under model ‘world price minus trade (transport) cost’ supports the collusion to the greatest extent. This paper represents an interesting focus for the marketing field. The price cap for domestic customer influences companies` incentives to collude in the world markets. Thus, marketing needs to recognize the incentives for cooperative behavior as a strategic marketing tool under soft price cap. Important implication is that pricing remedies imposed on Russian exporting companies will affect prices for the customers of their international competitors.

주택시장 간의 가격구조에 관한 연구

임정호(Lim Jeong Ho) 한국부동산학회 2006 不動産學報 Vol.28 No.-

1. CONTENTS (1) RESEARCH OBJECTIVES Korean tenure market has three major sectors; housing ownership market, Chonsei market, and monthly rental market. The housing stability policy has been stressed on the prices of the market directly, ignoring its structural relationship between them. The object of this study is to define the driving forces and relationship among the three different prices of tenure markets. And defining the price structure of its market will contribute the better understanding of structural mechanism for a more market oriented housing stabilization policy. (2) RESEARCH METHOD This study concentrates on two main parts; the first one is theoretical part which is study of macro and micro economic over view of Korean housing market and review of precedent papers. As a completion of the theoretical study, this study established two hypothesis; the constraints theory and the discount theory, either might explain the price structure of present Korean housing market, and the second part of the study is to prove the established hypothesis through quantitative analysis. Granger Casualty Test was adopted to define the causal relationship among the prices. The Cross Correlation Coefficient Test is for the verification and confirmation of result of Granger Casualty Test and to measure the degree of advance and postal relationship between the prices. Vector Auto Regression analysis was practiced to define the function and relativity among ownership price, Chonsei price, and monthly rental price. Due to least one cointegression vector was found, Vector Error Correction analysis was exercised. The estimation of coefficient, impulse response analysis, and decomposition analysis were done for the define relationship of the prices. Before the test, the unit root test was exercised to stabilized the time series data, and properly treated. As a result of the Granger Casualty Test, the housing price has a causual relationship to the Chonsei price, and the Chonsei price has a causual relationship to the monthly rental price. The Cross Correlation Coefficient Test showed that the housing price is advance to Chonsei price and monthly rental price, so as verifying the result of the Granger Casualty Test. The endogenity of the prices was tested through Cholesky impulse test and variance decomposition test as a part of Vector Error Correction analysis. The endogenity of the housing price is prominent to the Chonsei price and monthly rental price. The housing price can"t be explained by Chonsei price or monthly rental price, but mostly explained by its own price. The influence of the housing price is greater than the sum of Chonsei price and monthly rental price to its own price. (3) RESEARCH RESULTS As a Result of analysis, we found that housing ownership price is still the driving force to Chonsei Price and monthly rental price. So the Korean residential market is worked by the Constrained Choice theory, and result following study, like cross correlation coefficient analysis and Error Correction Model analysis, supports the result good enough but not in every case. In general, Constrained Choice theory is prevailing in housing market, and the residential housing price is major driving force and influences to Chonsei market, and monthly rental market. So the housing policy and tax policy should be concentrated on stabilizing residential ownership market. 2. RESULTS Though the Korean housing market is very composite so one theory can not define the market. Especially after the Foreign Exchange Crisis, the structural change has been experienced in residential market in Korea. So, we might be in transferring period. But in general, Constrained Choice theory is prevailing in housing market, and the residential housing pri

비상장주식 거래시 시가산정의 문제와 상속세법상 보충적 평가방법의 효력

崔先集(Sun Jip Choi) 한국세법학회 2004 조세법연구 Vol.10 No.2

비상장주식의 거래는 현실세계에서 빈번히 발생하지만 상법 등에는 주식거래시 매매가격을 산정하는 방식에 대한 규정이 전혀 없다. 이 경우 선례가 될 다른 거래가 없는 경우에는 적정한 거래가격을 파악하기 위한 노력을 하게 되는데, 그 중의 하나가 상속세법상 보충적 평가방법이다. 외국사례를 살펴보면 일본에서는 시가가 형성되지 아니한 비상장주식거래가격에 대하여 주식에 대한 평가방법(구체적인 방식은 변천이 있으나 최근에는 배당환원방식을 채택함)에 따라 시가를 산정하여야 한다는 점을 인정하고 있다. 한편 우리나라의 경우에는 비상장주식의 평가에 대하여 일본과 같은 분명한 기준이나 선례가 없는바, 이 논문에서는 상속세법상의 보충적 평가방법이 시가로 인정될 정도의 객관성과 합리성이 있는지 여부 및 나아가 보충적 평가방법을 시가로 인정하는 것이 법리상 문제가 없는지 여부 등을 검토하고자 한다. 상속세법상의 평가기준은 시가주의를 대전제로 하고 있으며, 보충적 평가방법의 변천을 보면 시가에 근접하도록 끊임없이 관련 규정이 개정되어 왔고, 판례도 보충적 평가방법이 시가를 반영하므로 이를 함부로 변경할 수 없다고 판시하고 있다. 세법이 규정하는 시가는 객관적으로 존재하는 가격이 아니라 완전시장조건이 갖추어진 뒤에 이루어질 수 있다고 인정되는 당위가격인바, 부동산이나 비상장주식 등 시장조건의 제약이 많은 경우에는 엄밀한 의미의 시가는 현실적으로는 존재한다고 보기 어렵다. 세법은 거래의 실례 및 감정가격 등이 없는 경우에는 보충적 평가방법에 따르도록 규정하고 있고, 시가로 인정받을 가격이 사후적으로 있는 경우에는 예외적으로 이를 시가로 인정하고 있다. 이 논문은 보충적 평가방법이 가지는 법률상의 효력이 무엇인지 검토하고 나아가서 보충적 평가방법을 따른 납세의무자의 행위는 적법한 것으로 추정되며 법원은 편견 없이 이를 받아들여야 하는지 여부를 살펴본다. 보충적 평가방법이라는 것은 이미 재산의 종류, 규모, 거래상황 등 객관적이고 합리성을 담보할 수 있는 사유를 충분히 고려한 끝에 대통령령이 인정한 재산가액 산정방법으로서, 이는 보충적 평가방법으로 산정한 가액이 시가에 근접한 가액임을 의미하는 것이므로, 대상판결이 보충적 평가방법에 더하여 시가 산정의 객관성과 합리성을 요구하고 있는 것은, 이미 입법자가 객관성과 합리성이 갖추어진 시가산정 방법으로 보충적 평가방법을 인정하고 있음에도 불구하고, 다시 동일한 사유를 들어 자의적인 해석을 하고 있는 것으로 세법의 입법취지에 반한다. 대상판결은 시가에 대한 평가를 법령의 내용과 다르게 판단하고 있으나, 이는 국민들에 대한 행위규범으로서의 측면에서 그 간의 법적 안정성 일체를 부인하는 것으로서 부당하며, 보충적 평가방법에 따라 선정된 가액을 시가와 가까운 가격으로 보지 않은 것은 시가산정에 대한 법인세법과 상속세법의 입법취지 및 대법원의 판례에 반하는 것으로 보충적 평가방법의 법리를 오해한 것이다. 결국 대상판결은 비상장주식의 매각과 관련하여 보충적 평가방법이 시가산정에 대한 법규범으로서 행위규범이자 재판규범의 성질을 가지고 있으므로 상법상의 비상장주식 거래시시가산정의 기준이 될 수 있다는 점을 오해한 근본적인 잘못이 있다. While transfers of non listed shares occur frequently in the real world. there is no provision specifying the calculation of the transfer price in the Commercial Code or other laws. If there is no actual case of transfer that can serve as precedent. efforts are made to determine the appropriate transfer price. one of which being the supplemental valuation method under the Inheritance Tax Law. A study of cases in foreign countries reveals that. in Japan. it is recognized that the transfer price of non listed shares for which no market price is formed should be calculated pursuant to a valuation method (the specific method of such valuation has changed over time, but the most recent one adopted is the dividend-yield method). In this country, there is no clear standard or precedent as in Japan concerning valuation of non listed shares. Accordingly, this paper intends to review whether the supplemental valuation method under the Inheritance Tax Law possesses sufficient objectivity and rationality to be recognized as market price determination method and, further, discuss issues such as whether there is any problem in legal theory in accepting a price rendered by the supplemental valuation method as the market price. The valuation standard in the Inheritance Tax Law is premised on the market price principle, and the evolution of the supplemental valuation method shows constant revisions of the relevant provisions to approximate the market price more closely. Further, court precedents have held that the supplemental valuation method reflects the market price and one should not deviate from it arbitrarily. The market price specified by the tax law is not an objectively available price. Rather, it is a normative price. which is considered possible only if conditions of a perfect market are satisfied. Accordingly, it is difficult to say such a price in a strict sense exists in reality where there are many restrictions on market conditions such as markets for real property or non listed stock. In the case where no actual case of trade or appraisal value is available, the tax law requires the valuation in compliance with the supplemental valuation method and, by way of exception. recognizes as market price such qualifying prices that are available after the transaction. This paper studies the legal effect of the supplemental valuation method and, further. whether the taxpayer's actions in compliance with the supplemental calculation method should be presumed legitimate and the court should accept it without any criticism. Further, the supplemental valuation method is an asset value determination method endorsed by the Presidential Decree that already takes into account factors with verifiable objectivity and rationality such as types of assets, size, trading status, etc. sufficiently. This means a price rendered by the supplemental valuation method is already the one closely approximating the market price. Accordingly, the subject decision's requirement of the objectivity and rationality of the price determination method in addition to the supplemental valuation method itself is essentially questioning the objectivity and rationality of the supplemental valuation method based on an arbitrary interpretation in spite of the legislator's recognition of the supplemental valuation method as one equipped with objectivity and rationality and, thus, is contrary to the legislative intent. The subject decision is approaching the market price valuation in a manner different from the relevant laws and regulations. This is improper, as it would be denying the legal stability in its entirety that has long been promoted from a perspective of presenting law as rules of behaviorto the people of the nation. Not recognizing a price rendered by the supplemental valuation method as one closely approximating the market price is contrary to the legislative intent concerning the market price determination in the Corporate Income Tax Law and

북한의 시장가격 결정 요인 분석

김일한 ( Il Han Kim ) 북한연구학회 2011 北韓硏究學會報 Vol.15 No.2

논문은 북한의 시장 가격 결정 메커니즘을 분석했다. 북한 당국은 시장의 대표적인 상품인 쌀 가격의 결정요인으로 원가, 시장의 수요와 공급, 국제시장가격 및 환율시세를 꼽고 있다. 이러한 변화를 분석하기 위해 북한의 가격정책 변화를 추적하고, 이를 검증하기 위한 경험적방법으로 다중회귀분석(Multiple Regression Analysis)을 실시했다. 다중회귀분석에 필요한 종속변수와 4가지 독립변수를 채택했다. 종속변수는 북한의 시장 쌀 가격, 독립변수로는 북한의 대중국 수입총액, 미국산 쌀 수출가격, 태국산 쌀 수출가격, 북한원/달러 시장환율 등 4가지 변수를 사용했다. data의 수집범위는 북한이 경제개혁을 시작한 2002년 7월 이후부터 2009년 7월까지 7년이다. 분석결과 시장가격의 결정메커니즘 즉, 북한의 시장 쌀 가격결정에 가장 많은 영향을 미치는 요인은 국제시장가격으로 분석되었다. 북한의 시장 쌀 가격은 국제곡물가격이 폭등하기 시작한 2007년을 전후로 국제시장 시세와 동일한 패턴을 보이며 등락을 거듭했다. 북한은 시장 가격을 조절하고 시장을 안정화시키기 위해 다양한 정책수단을 동원했다. 시장가격의 상한선을 규정하는 한도가격의 설정, 통화량 조절을 위한 강제 저축과 재정검열 강화, 시장에 국영 도매반 설치, 국가배급체계 강화를 위해 곡물에 대한 국가양곡전매제를 실시했다. 그리고 마지막 방법으로 시장을 직접 단속했다. 이 같은 결과는 다음 두 가지로 해석할 수 있다. 첫째, 북한 당국은 시장을 공식화한 이후 시장의 수요와 공급, 국제시장가격과 환율변화를 고려해서 시장의 쌀 가격을 조절하고자 했다. 즉 시장 가격이 북한 당국에 의해 일정한 수준의 통제와 조절을 받았음을 의미한다. 둘째, 북한 시장의 글로벌 시장과의 연계이다. 북한의 시장도 상품뿐만 아니라 정보가 유통되고, 거래되는 공간이다. 따라서 국제시장에서의 곡물가격에 대한 정보가 북한의 시장에 유통되고 상품은 국제시세에 직접적인 영향을 받는다. 결국 북한의 시장 가격은 북한 당국의 조절기능과 시장 참여자들 사이에 유통되는 정보에 의해 조절되는 것이다. This dissertation focused on the operating mechanism about market and price system by using the Multiple Regression Analysis during the period of economy reform in North Korea. North Korean government have insists that the four factors effect the market price of rice; the prime cost, demand and supply, the international market price and exchange rate. However, the previous literature did not explain that which independent variable is significant as to decide the rice price in market. In this research, the dependent variable is the rice-price in the North Korea market, and four independent variables are North Korea to China`s total imports, the export price of short grain from United States, the export price of long grain (100% grade B) from Thailand, and market exchange rate of North Korea`s won against U. S. dollar. I collected the prices and exchange rate information between July 2002 and July 2009 that as North Korea implement an economy reform policy in 2002. As a result of the multiple regression analysis, the significant independent variable is the export price of long grain from Thailand so called international rice price. North Korea`s market rice price fluctuated and coupled with the international grain price, even the pattern is similar with each other in 2007 off and on. This result could be explain that firstly, North Korean government have adjusted market rice price that they considered the demand and supply in the market, international price and exchange rate since allowed the market officially. They made full use of four kinds of policies; impose a ceiling price on rice, a forced saving and financial control to adjust the amount of currency in circulation, to open the state-operated wholesale shop [domaeban] in the market and the government`s purchasing policy about the grain to strengthen the national distribution system. Moreover, these four policies failed they directly crackdown on the market. Secondly, North Korean`s market linked with global marketplace. This market is that the commodity is distributed and the price information share with international market. North Korea`s market changed from the closed domestic distributed place to economy place as to share the international business information. Therefore, international grain price information directly affected the North Korean`s grain price, especially the rice price in market. The signal of international grain price sent a message to the North Korean`s market through the market mechanism. Eventually, the North Korea`s market price adjusted official direction by government and the price information by participant of business. However, these policies cannot solve the fundamental economic problems before the increasing of commodity supply in the market. To sum up, North Korea`s government can make the price stabilization in the market until limit leverage before currency reform in 2009. However, these adjustment programs cannot solve the fundamental problems and it could cause the insecure system and made the black market in North Korea.

증권 시세조종의 구성요건에 대한 고찰 및 대안적 해석의 제언

최자유 금융감독원 2022 금융감독연구 Vol.9 No.2

작전세력은 자연적 수요·공급에 의하여 결정되어야 하는 주가를 특정 방향으로 견인하여 투자자에게 손해를 입힌다. 작전세력이 주가를 인위적으로 형성하여 시장이 기울어진 운동장이 되면 일반 투자자는 시장에서 이탈할 것이다. 자본시장법은 시장의 공정성·건전성 유지를 위해 시세조종을 규제한다. 주문을 제출하는 방식에 의한 시세조종은 위장거래에 의한 시세조종과 현실거래에 의한 시세조종이 있다. 위장거래에 의한 시세조종은 매매 성황의 외관 형성 목적으로 가장매매·통정매매의 행위 양태, 현실거래에 의한 시세조종은 매매 유인 목적으로 매매 성황의 외관 형성·시세 변동 매매의 행위 양태로 규정된다. 본 연구는 일련의 판례를 중심으로 시세조종의 성립 요건을 고찰한다. 시세조종은 시세관여형 시장질서 교란행위·부정거래와도 관련이 있다. 시세조종은 목적성을 요구하고 목적성이 증명되지 않으면 시장질서 교란행위가 문제될 수 있고 부정거래로 해석할 여지도 있다고 본다. 이에 대한 문제 의식을 토대로 처벌의 공백을 해소하고 합리성을 제고하는 대안적 해석론을 제언한다. The stock price should be determined by natural supply and demand. A concert party artificially drives the stock price in a specific direction, causing losses to investors. If a concert party artificially shapes the stock price and the market becomes an unlevel playing field, ordinary investors would leave the market. The Capital Markets Act regulates artificial price fluctuation to maintain fairness and soundness of the market. Trading-based market price manipulation includes market price manipulation by fictitious transactions and market price manipulation by real transactions. Market price manipulation by fictitious transactions could be defined as the wash sales and matched orders with the intent to mislead anyone to misapprehend that the trading of listed securities is in a bull market. Market price manipulation by real transactions could be defined as misleading anyone to misapprehend that the trading of listed securities is in a bull market or selling or purchasing of such securities to cause a fluctuation in market price with the intent to attract anyone to trade listed securities. This study examines the requirements for establishing market price manipulation, focusing on a series of precedents. Market price manipulation might also be closely related to unfair trading and market disturbances. Market price manipulation requires a specific purpose, and if the purpose is not recognized, market disturbances might become a problem and be interpreted as unfair trading. Based on the awareness of the problem, this study would like to propose an alternative interpretation theory that resolves the gap in punishment and enhances rationality.