방역작업자의 브롬화메틸(methyl bromide) 노출수준과 생물학적 모니터링

이종성,이용학,신재훈,최정근,오차재,정호근 한국산업위생학회 2001 한국산업보건학회지 Vol.11 No.3

This study was performed to estimate environmental and biological monitoring of worker exposed to methyl bromide through quarantine fumigation. Airborne methyl bromide and it's metabolites were analyzed by gas chromatography and ion chromatography, respectively. The results are as followings; airborne concentration of methyl bromide(TWA) was 2.08±1.56 ppm(N=8). Dispersion and setting/degas groups were 0.67±0.12 ppm(N=2) and 2.54±1.53ppm(N=6), respectively. Bromide ion concentration in serum was 23.40±14.91㎎/ℓ(N=10) in the exposed workers and 4.74±0.82㎎/ℓ(N=21) in the non-exposed workers. Bromide ion concentration in urine was 35.56±26.89㎎/ℓ(N=11) in exposed group and 6.62±2.31㎎/ℓ(N=21) in non-exposed group. Good correlation was observed between concentration of serum and urine(r^2=0.890 p<0.01). No significant correlations of other determinanats were observed. Calcuated from a regressive curve. the biological half lifes of serum and urine were 10.7 and 5.9 days. In these results, biological monitoring of bromide ion of serum and urine provided useful information for evaluating exposure of workers to methyl bromide, so that an availability of bromide ion of biological samples was showed as biological monitoring indices for methyl bromide.

The Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Clients` Audit Opinion Shopping Behavior

( Jong Hag Choi ),( Heesun Chung ),( Catherine Heyjung Sonu ),( Yoonseok Zang ) 한국회계학회 2016 회계학연구 Vol.41 No.3

This study investigates whether the tendency for audit clients to engage in opinion shopping becomes weaker after the enforcement of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). While Lennox (2000) provides evidence that U.K. firms successfully engage in opinion shopping, there is limited evidence on the mitigating effect of SOX on opinion shopping. Using observations collected from the period before and after the enforcement of SOX (year 2001, 2004 and 2005), we find that, for our sample period, firms are likely to switch (retain) their incumbent auditors when the likelihood of receiving a going concern opinion is lower (higher) from a successor auditor, suggesting evidence of opinion shopping. More importantly, we find that firms are less likely to engage in opinion shopping after the enforcement of SOX. These findings suggest that more stringent legal and audit environment in the post-SOX period, at least partially, restricts firms’ opportunistic behavior of shopping for a better audit opinion and enhances auditor independence. These findings provide valuable implications to regulators as well as academicians and practitioners.

Research Articles : Editor`s Note

( Jong Seo Choi ),( Jong Hag Choi ) 한국회계학회 2014 회계학연구 Vol.39 No.6

Audit Market Concentration and Audit Fees: An International Investigation

Jong-Hag Choi,Jeong-Bon Kim,Eugenia Y,Lee,Hee-Yeon Sunwoo 한국회계정보학회 2018 한국회계정보학회 학술대회발표집 Vol.2018 No.1

[Purpose] Several large auditor consolidations in the late 1980s and early 1990s, along with Arthur Andersen’s collapse in 2001, facilitated concentration in the global audit market. Subsequently, regulators have expressed serious concerns regarding the potential detrimental effects of this market concentration, including potential cartel pricing by dominant large auditors. However, several practitioners and academics do not agree with such concerns. To provide answers for such controversies, our study investigates the association between audit market concentration and audit fees. [Methodology] We use international data from 25 countries and proxy for audit market concentration using the Herfindahl index. [Findings] Our study yields two principal findings. First, there is, on average, no significant association between audit market concentration and audit fees. Second, a country’s legal regime changes this association dramatically: while the association is significantly positive in countries with a weak legal regime, it becomes weaker and eventually turns negative as the legal regime becomes stronger. [Implications] These findings will provide regulators and other stakeholders with important insights into the effects of audit market structure on audit pricing.

Editor`s Note

( Jong Seo Choi ),( Jong Hag Choi ) 한국회계학회 2015 회계학연구 Vol.40 No.1

SK에코플랜트의 신사업 전환과 자본조달: 하이브리드 증권의 활용

최종학(Jong-Hag Choi),안혜진(Hyejin Ahn) 한국경영학회 2024 Korea Business Review Vol.28 No.3

This case examines the M&A and financing process of SK Ecoplants transformation from a general construction company into an eco-friendly energy company. Over the past three years, SK Ecoplant has raised large amount of funding by issuing bonds and borrowing from financial institutions to finance the acquisition of a number of environmental and energy companies. In this M&A process, SK Ecoplants borrowings have rapidly increased, resulting in a deteriorating financial structure and the increased burden of financial cost. In this situation, SK Ecoplant issued two types of hybrid securities, KRW 400 billion of redeemable convertible preferred stocks (RCPS) and KRW 600 billion of convertible preferred stocks (CPS), to improve its financial structure, increasing its capital by KRW 1 trillion. According to international financial reporting standards (IFRS), the RCPS can be classified as capital since the right to claim reimbursement is with the issuer in this case. The CPS is also classified as capital because the conversion rate to common stock is fixed. However, a closer examination of its issuance contract reveals that the economic substance of the RCPS and CPS is more close to liability. Recently, hybrid securities that have both equity and debt characteristics are widely used in the capital market. It is expected that this case is helpful for external information users such as investors to thoroughly understand the issuance structure and economic substance of hybrid securities, and further properly judge the financial soundness of the company.

사례논문 : 현대건설의 구조조정과 부활 무상감자와 대출금 출자전환을 중심으로

최종학 ( Jong Hag Choi ),최아름 ( Ah Rum Choi ) 한국회계학회 2012 회계저널 Vol.21 No.5

현대건설은 아시아 금융위기 때 유동성 위기를 겪은 이후 이를 성공적으로 극복한 사례로 꼽힌다. 정주영 회장 등 지배주주들은 적자가 지속되고 부채비율이 폭증하여 생존위기에 빠진 회사를 구하기 위해 여러 자구노력을 실시하였으나 성공하지 못했다. 이때 채권자들은 두 차례에 걸쳐무상감자를 실시함으로써 재무상태표의 누적결손금을 제거하였고, 대출금 출자전환을 통해 자본을 추가적으로 투입함으로써 현대건설의 재무상태를 개선시켰다. 이 과정에서 기존 주주들의 지분율이 희석되고, 채권자협의회가 대주주가 되었다. 또한 경영상태 개선을 위한 원가절감과 인원감축 등 다른 여러 구조조정 절차가 수행되었다. 이런 과정을 거치면서 한때 생존위기에 처했던 현대건설은 위기를 극복하고 회생에 성공했다. 그리고 2011년 채권단은 현대건설을 현대자 동차에 매각했다. 현대건설의 사례를 통해 무상감자와 대출금 출자전환 및 전환사채의 전환으로 인한 자금의 추 가적인 투입이 (1) 재무제표에 어떠한 영향을 미치는지, (2) 주가에 어떠한 영향을 미치는지, (3) 기존 주주와 채권자들에게 어떠한 영향을 미치는지에 대해 공부할 수 있다. 또한 간접적으로 기업구조조정 절차와 구조조정의 성공 요소는 무엇인지에 대해서도 알아본다. Hyundai Engineering & Construction Co. , Ltd. (Hyundai E&C) is a successful case of corporate restructuring after falling into a liquidity crisis during the Asian Financial Crisis. When the original controlling shareholders, Chairman Jung and his family, failed to save the firm, creditors carried out two rounds of reverse stock splits and subsequent equity injections, including debt-equity swaps, to revive the firm. In the process, existing shareholders` ownership was diluted while creditor banks became majority shareholders. Reverse stock splits and subsequent equity injections strengthen the balance sheet of the firm by cancelling out the accumulated deficit and increasing shareholders` equity. Hyundai E&C also reduced production cost and its workforce as a part of restructuring, Eventually, Hyundai E&C overcame a crisis and successfully revived the firm. In 2011, creditors bank sold Hyundai E&C to Hyundai Motor Group. This case study examines the impact of reverse stock splits and equity injections - in the form of debt-equity swap and conversion of convertible bonds - on (1) financial statements, (2) stock price of the firm and (3) its existing shareholders and creditors. The case concludes with a brief analysis of the success factors of corporate restructuring and a description of the divesture of the firm in 2011 by the creditor banks. In the process, students also can learn the procedures for the corporate restructuring.

한국테크랜드 분식회계 및 부실감사 사례

최종학 ( Jong-hag Choi ),안혜진 ( Hyejin Ahn ),황인이 ( Iny Hwang ) 한국회계학회 2016 회계저널 Vol.25 No.1

한국테크랜드는 홈페이지 구축 소프트웨어 전문개발업체로 설립되었으며, 네트워크보안기술을 개발하며 벤처기업으로 성장하여 2001년 코스닥시장에 상장하였다. 이후 대테러장비 및 기능성 식약품으로 사업을 확장하고, 일본 및 중국으로 진출하는 등 적극적 인행보를 보였으나 계속되는 영업부진 및 투자손실 등으로 경영난에 시달리게 되었다. 한국테크랜드는 결국 증권선물위원회의 감리 결과 분식회계 사실이 밝혀졌고, 경영진의 횡령ㆍ배임 사실이 함께 드러나면서 상장폐지 되었다. 한국테크랜드는 단기대여금을 과대계상하고, 특수관계자 매출 등을 허위계상, 매출액을 과대계상하는 등 분식회계를 하였으며, 분식회계가 이루어지는 동안의 외부감사인인 A 회계법인과 B 회계법인은 재고자산, 매출 및 매출채권 등에 대한 감사를 소홀히 한 것으로 확인되었다. 본 사례를 통해 성공한 벤처기업의 전형이었던 한국테크랜드가 쇠락해 가면서 생겨난 경영진의 도덕적 해이와 분식회계, 그리고 이를 발견하지 못했던 부실감사에 대해 살펴보고, 경영진의 횡령, 배임과 회계부정에 쓰인 구체적인 방법들을 파악해 볼 수 있다. 또한 외부감사인이 회계감사를 통해 왜 회계부정을 적발하지 못하였는지, 그리고 중소기업 감사 시 외부감사인이 어떤 점을 유의해야 하는지 알아보도록 하자. Korea Techland Ltd. (KTL henceforth) was established in 1997 as a software developer. At initial stage, KTL successfully developed networksecurity software and grow rapidly as internet was widely used and homepage became popular in the late 1990’s. As a successful venture enterprise, the firm was listed in KOSDAQ market in 2001. After the listing, the firm expand its business areas to anti-terrorism equipments, related education and consulting, nutritional supplement delivery system, and clothing shopping mall. In addition, KTL started operations in Japan and China. Although KTL pursued aggressive expansion strategy, KTL’s new attempts turned out unsuccessful. The firm’s operating performance was getting deteriorated and the firm actually suffered continuing losses from its operation and new investment. The firm changed its name when the management switched its main business to another. After all, the post-audit review performed by Korean Financial Supervisory Service revealed that KTL committed accounting fraud to inflate firm performance. The management also committed misappropriation and malpractice. As a result, the firm was delisted eventually. KTL was revealed to have overstated short-term loan, sales to the related parties, account receivables and inventory. The firm asserted that the sales of security equipment occurred via the related party located in Japan and considerable inventories were also kept in Japan. However, all the assertions of the management were found to be false. The sales through related parties were fictitious and the inventory did not exist in Japan. Moreover, the firm did not recognize impairment losses from long-term investment asset and intangible asset. Overall, KTL understated net loss amount by 44.4% in 2008, 8.7% in 2009, and 79.4% in 2010. After reflecting all the adjustments, net asset of KTL decreases from 45,550 million won in 2008 to 15,254 million won in 2010. Throughout the 3 years, adjusted sales were all below 3,000 million won which is the amount of criteria for judging delisting. In spite of such a serious problem inherent in financial statement reporting, two audit firms that audited KTL for 2008 and 2009 failed to find out the accounting fraud and did not perform quality audit. Although the two audit firms recognized that KTL experienced consecutive operating losses and was under the pressure of delisting, they did not conduct appropriate audit process. First, they ignored the importance of audit risk assessment which reflects the risk of business, accounting system, and internal control of the client firm. If they have assessed audit risk as high and thus reflect the risk in the audit process, they would expand audit scope and increase substantive tests. Second, they did not evaluate collectibility of loan and did not assess its collateral, which enables KTL to overstate its short-term loan. Third, the auditors did not focus on abnormally large transactions with related parties and thus miss fictitious sales. In addition, they did not confirm the existence of inventory in Japan. Although the inventory was in the foreign country, the auditors should have request cooperation of accounting firms in Japan to confirm the existence of inventory if the amount of inventory was significant. Lastly, the audit firms did not review financial statement of investee to assess the long-term equity investment and intangible asset(sales right). At that time, the operating performance of investee located in U.S. was deteriorated and the operation of main production facilities was already stopped in 2010. But, the auditors did not notice the facts and just accept the amount of equity investment suggested by KTL. Through this case, students can understand the deteriorating process of a venture firm and accounting frauds occurred in the process. More specifically, students are able to learn the ways that the management of KTL used to commit accounting fraud and why audit firms fail to find the fraud. Also, students can find out features of external audit of small and medium-sized firms. Even though the management of small and medium-sized firms are more likely to commit misappropriation and malpractice, and thus exposed to higher audit risk, auditors tend to input relatively smaller audit efforts due to the small audit fees of such clients. From this case, we need to perceive the importance of thorough audit risk assessment for small and medium-sized firms, sufficient audit efforts based on the assessed audit risk, and the realization of audit fees to support the enough audit efforts.

감사의견 구매 목적의 감사인 교체와 감사품질 하락

최종학(Jong-Hag Choi),정희선(Heesun Chung) 한국경영학회 2015 經營學硏究 Vol.44 No.6

초도감사보수 할인이 감사품질에 미치는 영향: 감사인 강제교체기업과 자율교체기업의 차이

최종학 ( Jong-hag Choi ),안성희(교신저자) ( Sung Hee Ahn ),황문호(공동저자) ( Mun Ho Hwang ) 한국회계학회 2016 회계학연구 Vol.41 No.2

일반적으로 감사인은 신규 감사고객을 유치하는 과정에서 일정의 보수할인을 제공하는 것으로 알려져 있다. 선행연구에 따르면, 이러한 초도감사보수할인은 교체 첫 연도의 감사품질에 부정적인 영향을 미칠 가능성도 존재하는 한편 이들 간에는 유의한 영향관계가 나타나지 않을 가능성도 제기된다. 이에 본 연구는 초도감사보수할인과 감사품질의 관련성이 감사인 교체사유(강제교체 vs. 자율교체)에 따라 달리 나타날 수 있음을 연구가설로 설정하고, 이를 실증적으로 분석하였다. 감사인 강제교체제도가 적용되던 2006년부터 2010년 중 외부감사인을 교체한 1,100개 표본을 분석한 결과, 자율교체 기업에서는 초도감사보수의 할인규모가 클수록 감사품질이 유의하게 하락하는 결과가 발견되었으나, 강제교체 기업에서는 초도감사보수 할인과 감사품질 간에 유의한 관련성이 없었다. 이는 초도감사보수할인과 감사품질과의 관계가 감사인을 교체하는 사유에 따라 다르게 나타날 수 있음을 의미한다. 특히, 자율교체 기업에서는 후임감사인이 non-Big 4인 경우에 초도감사보수할인이 감사품질에 미치는 부정적인 영향이 뚜렷히 나타났는데, 이는 감사의견 구매와 같은 경영자의 기회주의적인 의도가 감사인 교체 의사결정에 반영되어 있음을 시사한다. Prior studies suggests that both frequent auditor switches and long auditor tenure could impair audit quality, through the impairment of auditor expertise and independence, respectively. Although the regulators abolished the 6-year mandatory rotation policy in 2010, it is still debating among politicians and media that the policy should be re-introduced to increase auditor independence. To resolve these conflicting views, Korean regulators adopted 3-year mandatory auditor retention and 6-year mandatory auditor rotation rules in 2003. Under the rules, after auditor change, clients need to hire the same auditor for at least 3 years, but have to change auditor after 6 years of auditor tenure. In this study, we define ‘mandatory auditor change’ as the change after 6 years of auditor tenure, while ‘voluntary auditor change’ as the change that occurred when auditor tenure is 3, 4, or 5 years. Unlike in the U.S. where the potential reasons for auditor change and circumstances surrounding auditor change are publicly reported through Form 8-K report, in Korea, any information that are potentially related to the reasons for auditor change is not disclosed. However, one can guess that there must be some reasons that clients voluntary change auditors before 6th year of maximum auditor tenure. Especially, clients have strong incentive to change auditors for the opinion shopping purpose. In that case, they are going to hire new auditors who are willing to acquiesce to client pressure (Choi and Chung 2015). In such a case, the low-quality auditors are likely to offer initial audit fee discounts. In contrast, it is less likely that mandatory auditor changes are related to opinion shopping motivations of clients, suggesting that the mandatory changes are less likely to lead to poor audit quality even in the case of low-balling. Thus, in this study, we try to examine the association between initial audit engagement year audit fee discount (i.e., low-balling) and audit quality in the auditor change year for voluntary versus mandatory auditor change clients. Through these analyses, we try to shed some lights into the potential reasons of voluntary auditor changes. We collect 1,100 auditor change observations from year 2006 to 2010 for the empirical analyses. It was the period that both mandatory auditor retention and rotation policy was in effect. We remove the observations that auditor was changed due to auditor assignment by Financial Supervisory Service. We also remove the observations from banking and finance industry and non-December fiscal year-end. Among our samples, 732 observations are those with the mandatory changes (after 6 years of auditor tenure) and the remaining 368 observations are those with voluntary changes. We define the low-balling as the case when actual audit fee is lower than estimated normal fee. Additionally, we use the magnitude of discretionary accruals of client firms, estimated by using Kothari et al.’s (2005) method, to proxy for the audit quality. Empirical results are summarized as follows. First, we find that both audit quality and hour of low-balling auditors is lower for the cases of voluntary auditor change. In general, low audit quality combined with smaller audit hour suggest that auditors exert relatively less audit efforts to lower the audit costs. Specifically, we observe that the poor audit quality occurs when success auditor is non-Big 4. However, in contrast to the case of mandatory rotation, we find that the audit quality is not associated with low-balling. We also find that the magnitude of earnings management was not differ between voluntary auditor change samples and mandatory change samples in the year before the auditor change. Thus, audit quality becomes poorer at the year of auditor change for the voluntary change samples when there exist low-balling. These findings can be interpreted as follows. Client firms opt to change incumbent auditors with shorter than 6-year of tenure (before the maximum length of the tenure) due to some specific reasons. For example, the client may fire incumbent auditor and hire new auditor who is likely to acquiesce to the request of the clients. When there exists low-balling, new auditors are not able to provide high-quality audit service due to the lack of enough resources or independence. However, for the mandatory auditor changes, because the changes are not driven by the clients’ incentives to shop for opinion, there is less possibility that even low-balling leads to impaired independence and thus poor audit quality. These findings have several valuable implications. Most importantly, regulators and practitioners need to aware of the potential audit risks of the clients who voluntary change auditors. Regulators may need to consider the disclosures of the reasons for the auditor changes. Investors also need to be watchful for the such firms.