미국 상해보험의 면책조항

노일석 ( Il Seok Noh ) 한양대학교 법학연구소 2014 법학논총 Vol.31 No.1

The term “accident” lends itself to differing interpretations. Indeed, few issues so confound courts and litigants as when deaths are to be considered accidents within the meaning of insurance policies affording accidental death coverage. The Wickman v. Northwestern National Insurance Co. framework is perfectly suitable, so long as courts apply it carefully and without modification. Under Wickman, again, a court first analyzes the insured`s reasonable expectations. If the insured did not expect to suffer an injury similar to that suffered, the court must “examine whether the suppositions which underlay that expectation were reasonable.” If the insured`s suppositions are judged to be unreasonable, then the injuries will be deemed non-accidental. In determining the reasonableness of the insured`s suppositions, the court should view matters from the insured`s perspective and take into account the insured`s personal characteristics and experiences. The first prong, therefore, is essentially subjective. Second, if the insured expected to survive, or if the court cannot ascertain the insured`s subjective expectations because of insufficient evidence, then it should objectively analyze the insured`s expectations. In this analysis, one must ask whether a reasonable person, with background and characteristics similar to the insured, would have viewed the injury as highly likely to occur as a result of the insured`s intentional conduct. The objective prong does not permit simplistic reasonable foreseeability analysis, as the requirement that a court consider whether the injury was “highly likely” makes clear. Drunk driving is a scourge. Most motor vehicle crashes are traceable to some failure of judgment that fully reveals its dangers only when it is too late. The fact that drunk drivers` deaths may be publicly perceived as senseless, as the natural cost of obvious negligence or recklessness, or as reprehensible acts of stupidity, does not mean that they are not accidental. The reasoning of courts that hold that the death of a drunk driver is not “accidental” is frustrating, in part because it is often unnecessary. Some policies even contain clauses that specifically preclude coverage for deaths that result from the insured`s driving while intoxicated. Insurer`s exclusion for the drunk drive should be under the exclusion that specifically precludes coverage for deaths that result from the insured`s driving while intoxicated. Some of the most difficult causation issues arise when the insured suffers injury or death in circumstances which indicate that the harm suffered may be attributable, in whole or in part, to disease or disorder which arguably preceded any accident that may have occurred, and/or from medical procedures that have been performed on the insured because such a disease or does, or is suspected to, exist. The resolution of coverage disputes in such circumstances implicates the full range of policy language, from the basic coverage triggers of an accident and the like, to requirements of bodily injury and causation and, may call into play a wide array of specific exclusions, from broad attempts to avoid coverage when any condition that can be classified as a disease or ailment plays any role in producing the harm for which recovery is sought, to narrow exclusions that exclusions that specifically target named diseases or ailments. There is a distinction between death caused by a disease which was itself induced by the accidental injury, and the aggravation of existing disease by an accident, with the former being regarded as within the provisions of policies limiting covery to injuries solely from accident or the like, as disease is then itself an effect of an accidental injury, a mere link in the chain between the accident and its ultimate effect of bodily injury or death. Where the accident is itself the cause of the disease, the accident is manifestly deemed the cause of the death even though the disease contributed thereto, and the death is solely from accidental injury. A pre-existing disease does not prevent recovery on an accident policy if the accident would still have happened had the disease not existed. for, in such a case, the pre-existing condition cannot be regarded as a cause or as the proximate cause of the accident or of the harm sustained. Under the principles of causation generally applicable to determinations of insurance coverage, injury or disability resulting from medical treatment for an accident that was itself within the coverage of an accident insurance policy is proximately caused by the accident, hence also within coverage of the policy, even fi the policy also contains an explicit cxclusion for death or injury from medical treatment. When the insured undergoes medical treatment for the purpose of curing a disease or other unhealthy or abnormal condition which has not itself been produced by a covered accident, the mere fact that insured dies or is injured as a result of such treatment does not bring the loss within coverage. Injury or death from a medical procedure has been found to be within coverage despite the fact that there was no discernible negligence or mishap during the procedure. There is considerable authority that where an event occurs in the course of medical procedures which is from an error or mishap, rather than from the normal procedure itself, the harm is unusual or unexpected and not likely to be foreseen, hence there is an accident, or the event is accidental or is produced by accidental means, within the coverage of the policy.

株主代表訴訟에 관한 硏究

노일석(Il-Seok Noh) 성신여자대학교 법학연구소 2003 성신법학 Vol.- No.2

미국보험법에 있어 신체훼손

노일석 ( Il Seok Noh ) 한국금융법학회 2013 金融法硏究 Vol.10 No.1

Accident and health insurance means insurance against death or personal injury by accident or by an specified kind or kinds of accident and insurance against sickness, ailment or bodily injury. Accident insurance helps insured and insured`s family from financial hardships if insured dies or suffers a serious injury in an accident. In general insurer agrees, subject to the provisions of insurance policy, to immediately pay to the beneficiary or beneficiaries, in addition to the other benefits provided by the policy, the amount of additional accidental death benefit specified in the policy specifications, if due proof is furnished to the insure at its home office that the Insured, while this policy is in full force and effect, has suffered the loss of life as direct result of bodily injury, independent of all other causes, effected solely through external, violent and accidental means, as evidenced by a visible contusion or wound on the exterior of the body (except in the case of drowning or internal injuries revealed by an autopsy), and that the date of death occurred within ninety days after such injury. The payment of benefits under policy of accident insurance or the accident provisions of a life policy is typically conditioned upon death or injury resulting from "accident" or "accidental means". To this may be added the further requirement that the misfortune is caused "externally" and "violently". Where the death or injury is occasioned by some force other than a physical impact of a type and magnitude likely to produce the ensuing result, there arises an question these provisions of the policy have been satisfied in such a manner as will permit recovery. There are relatively few cases where the dispute was wether a death or injury resulting from an emotional disturbance, such as shock, fright, or other "psychic trauma," is within purview of such policies despite the absence of causative physical contact between the body of the insured and the force alleged to have produced the death or injury. Some policies expressly define bodily injury to include emotional distress. Most do not. When policies do not some courts have held that a claim for emotional stress still constitutes a claim for bodily injury, but most have correctly held to the contrary, with one proviso. The proviso is that even in those states that have held that emotional distress does not constitute bodily injury, some courts have correctly ruled that if the plaintiff`s emotional distress has resulted in physical manifestations, a bodily injury is involved. Accident insurance policies frequently qualify their coverage by requiring that the accident which triggers or increased indemnity be evidenced in a certain manner, such as by "external visible sign," "visible contusion or wound," "physical contusion or wound" or similar requirements. Under a policy requiring bodily injury effected solely through external, violent, and accidental means as evidenced by a visible contusion or wound on the exterior of the body, it is not required that death be the result of the wounds found on the exterior of the body. In determining what is an visible mark of injury on a body, the term "visible" is used in the broad sense of perceptible, discernable, clear, distinct, and evident. Such a provision requires some manifestation, abnormal in its nature and affecting the physical person, the existence of which may be ascertained by observation or examination. Visible injuries or marks need not be bruises, contusions, lacerations, or broken limbs, but may be internal injuries the existence of which may be outwardly indicated or perceived through observation or examination of the insured. Many jurisdictions adhere to the view that the term "accidental means" is distinct from, and requires a different causal analysis, than the terms "accident," "accidental injury," "accidental death," "accidental result," and the like. As this distinction narrows coverage considerably, it is not currently favored by consumers or by growing number of state insurance departments. Basically, the distinction is grounded on the idea that "means" is synonymous with "cause," that the difference between "accidental means" and the other aforementioned terms is the difference between cause and effect ; that insurance against death or injury by "accidental means" is not insurance against death or injury by accident or as an accident result; and that hence death or injury is not incurred by "accidental means" merely because the effect or result is accidental in the sense that it is unforeseen, undesigned, unusual, and unexpected. The distinction between loss due to "accidental means" and loss due to "accident" was, at one time, generally accepted by most courts. In recent years, however, an increasing number of jurisdictions have rejected the distinction in favor of treating the terms as legally synonymous, at least in the absence of comprehensible and different definition of the relevant terms in the policy. Under this view, the term "accidental" is equally descriptive of means which produce effects which are not their natural and probable consequences, as it is of means which are wholly unexpected.

무보험자동차에 의한 상해보험특약과 중복보험

노일석(Noh, Il Seok) 인하대학교 법학연구소 2011 法學硏究 Vol.14 No.3

우리 대법원은 무보험자동차에 의한 상해보험특약에도 중복보험에 관한 상법 제672조 제1항이 준용되는지 여부에 관하여 적극적인 입장을 취하여 “피보험자가 무보험자동차에 의한 교통사고로 인하여 상해를 입었을 때에 그 손해에 대하여 배상할 의무자가 있는 경우 보험자가 약관에 정한 바에 따라 피보험자에게 그 손해를 보상하는 것을 내용으로 하는 무보험자동차에 의한 상해담보특약(이하 ‘무보험자동차특약보험’이라고 한다)은 상해보험으로서의 성질과 함께 손해보험으로서의 성질도 갖는 손해보험형 상해보험이므로, 하나의 사고에 관하여 여러 개의 무보험자동차특약보험계약이 체결되고 그 보험금액의 총액이 피보험자가 입은 손해액을 초과하는 때에는 손해보험에 관한 상법 제672조 제1항이 준용되어 보험자는 각자의 보험금액의 한도에서 연대책임을 지고, 이 경우 각 보험자 사이에서는 각 자의 보험금액의 비율에 따른 보상책임을 진다.” 라고 판결하였다. 위 대법원 판결은 “배상할 의무자가 있는 상해보험에서 복수의 상해보험계약이 체결된 경우 그 보험금액의 총액이 피보험자의 손해액을 초과한 때”라고 하여 ① 배상할 의무자가 있을 것, ② 보험금액의 총액이 피보험자의 손해액을 초과한 때라는 것을 조건으로 무보험자동차특약보험에 중복보험에 관한 규정의 준용을 긍정하고 있다. 이 판결에 대해서는 1) 배상할 의무자가 있을 것을 중복보험에 관한 규정의 준용요건으로 할 수 있는지, 2) 무보험자동차특약보험의 경우 지급되는 보험금액은 사망보험금, 후유장해보험금, 입원보험금, 간병보험금 등 여러 가지 형태의 보험금이 지급되는 데 그 중에서 수술비 등 몇 몇 예외를 제외하고는 지급되는 보험금은 ‘손해’액이 아니라 ‘손실’액이라고 할 수 있으므로 중복보험에 관한 규정을 적용하는 것이 타당한지 의문이 제기될 수 있다. 동 판결은 무보험차에 의해 상해를 입은 피보험자가 가해자에 대하여 손해배상청구권을 가지는 경우 피보험자와 가해자 사이의 손해배상의 문제가 되고 그것을 담보하는 상해보험은 손해보험의 성질을 가지므로 여러 명의 상해보험자가 있는 경우 그들 사이에는 중복보험의 규정이 적용된다고 하는 것이다. 그러나 상해보험에 중복보험에 관한 규정이 적용되느냐는 피보험자가 제3자에 대하여 손해배상청구권을 가지느냐에 의해 결정되는 것이 아니라 보험자의 피보험자에 대한 급부가 정액배상의 성질을 가지느냐 손해배상의 성질을 가지느냐에 의해 결정된다고 할 것이다. 상해보험의 경우 보험회사가 가해자에 대하여 피보험자의 손해배상청구권을 대위한다 하여 상해보험에 중복보험에 관한 규정이 적용된다고는 할 수 없고 상해보험으로 인한 피보험자에 대한 급부가 어떠한 성질의 것이냐에 따라 중복보험규정의 적용여부가 결정된다고 할 것이다. 원래 중복보험은 손해보험에서 문제가 되는 것이고 손해보험의 일종인 책임보험에 대해서도 상법 제725조의2(수개의 책임보험)에 의해 중복보험에 관한 상법 제672조가 준용되고 있다. 무보험차에 의한 상해이든 보험차에 의한 상해이든 상해를 입은 피보험자가 수개의 상해보험에 가입한 경우 중복보험에 관한 규정이 준용되는지는 그 상해보험이 손해보험성을 가지느냐에 의해 결정될 것이다. 무보험차상해보험에 중복보험에 관한 규정이 적용되는지 여부는 그것이 정액보험인지 손해보험인지에 따라 그 결론이 달라진다고 할 수 있다.

남자 청소년 폭력사범 재범 예측 요인

노일석(Noh Il-Seok) 한국형사법무정책연구원 2010 형사정책연구 Vol.83 No.-

중장년 학습자 대상 제2인생 준비 교육의 구현 방안 탐색

노일경(Noh Il Kyoung),이혜연(Lee Hye youn) 한국평생교육학회 2014 평생교육학연구 Vol.20 No.3

본 논문은 최근 들어 사회적 관심이 증가하고 있는 중장년 학습자 대상의 '제2인생 준비 교육'과 관련하여 해당 교육을 바라보는 관점과 구현의 주요 시사점을 모색하는 내용을 담고 있다. 제2인생 준비 교육은 이를 맞는 당사자인 중장년 학습자의 중년 이후의 삶에 대한 관심을 기반으로 특정 영역보다는 전 생애영역에서의 통합적 준비의 관점으로 접근해야 한다. 이에 본 논문에서는 두 가지 접근을 통해 방안 탐색을 추구하였는데, 그것의 하나는 지금까지 상식적 의미로 사용되었던 '제2인생' 및 '제2인생 준비'의 용어를 학습상의 의미로 재규정하는 것이었고, 다른 하나는 제2인생 준비 교육의 주요 수요자인 중장년 학습자의 향후 학습에 대한 주요 요구를 파악하는 것이었다. 그 결과 중장년 학습자의 제2인생 준비 교육의 구현 방안으로 제시된 것은 첫째, 생애발달 과업으로서 인생 후반기 학습과제의 필요성 인식, 둘째, 교육과정 구성 시 세대 및 생애영역에 따른 차별성 고려, 셋째, 전환 경험을 이해하고 접근할 수 있는 학습내용 구성, 넷째, 주체적 전환 경험에 대한 체계적 이해 및 방법론 탐색 지원, 다섯째, 중장년 학습자의 세대 경험적 특성을 반영한 교육과정 구성, 여섯째, 세분화된 중장년 학습자군 구성 및 요구 파악, 마지막으로 통합적으로 제2인생을 규정하고 준비할 수 있도록 부족한 관점 및 능력의 보완 지원 등이었다. Recently, the education for second-life preparation has increasingly attracted social interest. In this regard, this work deals with the point of view on the education and the ways to realize it. For the education, an integrated approach, which covers whole phases of life rather than focus on a specific period, should be taken based on the interest on the learner's life. Under this consideration, second-life preparation is redefined in terms of life-long education, and needs of the middle age learners are figured out. As ways to realize the education, this work suggests (1) the recognition of the need of second-life preparation education as a life-long development task, (2) the program configuration in consideration of the differences among generations and life-wide domains, (3) the program development for understanding of transition experiences, (4) the exploration of systematical understanding and methodology on independent transition experiences, (5) the program development reflecting middle-age learner's characteristics, (6) the diversification of the middle-age learners' group and the understanding on the needs from each group, (7) the support on perspective transition for integrated definition of the second-life preparation.

제올라이트 개질을 통한 VOCs 흡⋅탈착 증진 연구

노영일(Young Il Noh),장영희(Younghee Jang),이예환(Ye Hwan Lee ),김성수(Sung Su Kim),이상문(Sang Moon Lee ) 유기성자원학회 2019 유기성자원학회 학술발표대회논문집 Vol.2019 No.춘계

본 연구에서는 우수한 습도저항성과 VOCs 흡착 성능을 증진하고자 NH4 + -Y zeolite의 탈알루미늄화를위하여 수증기 열처리 및 산처리를 수행하였으며, 상용 소수성 제올라이트와 흡착 성능을 비교하고 VOCs 응축 및 회수 실험을 진행하였다. 수증기처리는 550 ℃, 600 ℃, 650 ℃에서 수행하였으며, 산처리는 0.5 M HNO3 용액을 95 ℃에서 1 g zeolite/10 ml HNO3 비율로 주입하여 교반 후세척 및 건조를 실시하였다. 수증기 처리 온도에 따른 제올라이트 벤젠흡착실험 결과 550 ℃, 600 ℃, 650 ℃에서 각각 38, 77, 61 mg/g의 흡착량을 보였으며, 이는 개질전 NH4 + -Y zeolite의 흡착량보다23 mg/g 증진된 것을 확인하였다. 소수성 개질 정도를 확인하기 위한 지표인 Si/Al 비를 XRF의 분석을통해 확인한 결과 개질전 3.17에서 600 ℃수증기 열처리 및 산처리 후 7.30으로 증진됨을 확인하였다. 또한 상용 제올라이트를 이용하여 톨루엔 간접응축 실험을 수행한 결과 1회(91.9%), 2회(95.2%)의 응축효율을 가짐을 확인하였다. 탈착 후 재흡착 반복 실험 결과 동일한 흡착효율을 나타냈으며, 저비용운전을 위한 탈착 온도, 유량 조건에 따른 에너지 소모 비교를 통한 최적 탈착 운전이 중요함을 확인하였다. 본 연구를 통해 향후 활성탄을 대체할 수 있는 소수성 제올라이트 최적 제조 조건을 도출하였으며, VOCs를 응축/회수하여 자원으로 재사용할 수 있을것으로 판단하였다.

광양만 주변해역에 출현하는 수괴지표성 동물플랑크톤의 분포에 관한 연구

노일(Il Noh),윤성진(Seong Jin Yoon) 한국해양환경·에너지학회 1998 한국해양환경공학회 학술대회논문집 Vol.1998 No.-

미국의 약복용으로 인한 사망과 보험

노일석(Noh Il seok) 한국보험법학회 2015 보험법연구 Vol.9 No.2

지리산 세석 구상나무림의 사면별 생태적 특성

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