푸틴-아베 재집권(2012)이후 러·일 관계변화 동인과 전략적 함의

김정기 국가안보전략연구원 2017 국가안보와 전략 Vol.17 No.1

The purpose of this paper is to look at the backgrounds and intentions of both Russia and Japan in taking active moves to improve their bilateral relations through active summit diplomacy and economic cooperation, under the situations that western countries including US and even Japan keep imposing economic sanctions against Russia. Based on that, this paper suggests possible implications of these changes to Northeast Asia and Korean Peninsula. In particular, Russia and Japan, both countries can exert huge influence on building the East Asian order, and there are several situations that might tighten infraction security in the East Asian region, such as an increasing tension and conflict between US and Russia, an escalating US-China rivalry over the East Asian region, Russia’s return of geopolitics, Japan’s legislation for peace and security, and North Korea's nuclear and missile provocations. In this sense, it is important to predict what steps Russia and Japan would take in the future in terms of establishing stable order in the East Asian region, especially in the Korean Peninsula. Improvement of Russia-Japan relations requires both countries to adjust its own position by solving their territorial conflicts and their dilemmas over China in geopolitical aspects. Accordingly, the improved Russia-Japan relations would lead to following results: Improvement of both countries’ images in the East Asia, enhancement of US-Russia relations through Japan, counterbalance China, success of Russia’s Eastern policy, expansion of both countries’ influences in the Northeast Asian region, improvement of Japan’s strategic position, and promotion in development cooperation in the Far East and the Arctic. However, it should be kept in mind that Russia-Japan relations will be affected by US-Russia relations and US-China relations. Under these circumstances, Korea should be able to take advantage of the strengthened Russia-Japan relations in a way to foster the atmosphere for Korean Unification. In addition, Korea should have an exact understanding about the dynamics in the composition of the East Asian order in order to figure out possible strategies to strengthen its own position in the region. 이 글은 러·일이 미국 등 서방의 대러시아 경제제재가 지속되고 있고 일본도 경제제재에 참여하고 있는 상황에서 활발한 정상외교와 경제협력을 통해 관계개선에 적극 나서고 있어 그 배경과 의도, 동북아 및 한반도에 미칠 정책적 함의 등을 살펴보는 데 목적이 있다. 특히 양국이 동아시아 질서구축에 영향력이 큰 데다, 시기적으로 미·러간 대립 심화, 러시아의 지정학적 회귀, 일본의 안보법제 완료, 미·중간 질서 주도권 다툼 심화, 북한의 핵 및 미사일 도발 등으로 동아시아 역내 안보경색이 깊어지고 있는 상황에서 향후 어떤 행보를 보일지를 가늠하는 것은 역내 정세안정 여부와 함께 한반도에 중요한 의미가 있다고 본다. 러·일의 관계강화는 영토문제 타결 등 국익·안보 측면에서 서로 조율이 필요한데다 양국 모두 중국 딜레마를 해소해야 하는 지정학적 전략 구상과 맞닿아 있으며, 결과적으로 동아시아 역내 위상 제고, 중국에 대한 견제, 일본을 통한 러시아의 대미 관계 개선, 러시아의 동방정책 성공과 동북아 영향력 확대, 일본의 전략적 위상 강화 등을 가능케 하고 극동·북극 지역 개발협력을 촉진시킬 것으로 보인다. 그러나 미러 및 미중 관계 수준에 따라 영향을 받게 될 것이라는 점도 염두에 두어야 한다. 한국으로서는 러·일 관계 강화를 한반도 통일여건 조성에 활용하고, 역내 역학구도 변화 흐름을 정확히 파악하여 우리의 입지를 보다 강화시킬 전략적 방안을 강구해 나가야 한다.

러시아의 대 ASEAN 전략 양자관계의 발전과 러시아의 대외정책에서 ASEAN의 위치

윤영민 한국슬라브․유라시아학회 2024 슬라브학보 Vol.39 No.1

Russia and ASEAN are positioned within South Korea's foreign policy as targets of its northern and southern policies. However, domestic research on the relationship between Russia and ASEAN is not extensive. Particularly, studies on Russia's ASEAN policy are scarce. This study aims to fill this scholarly gap by tracing the development of Russia-ASEAN relations and analyzing the value ASEAN holds in Russia's foreign policy. To achieve this, changes in bilateral relations, institutional mechanisms, and economic ties are briefly examined. While ASEAN may not be a top priority in Russia's foreign policy agenda, its importance has been increasingly emphasized in Russia's regional aspirations and post-Ukrainian conflict foreign policy. ASEAN emerges as a significant partner for Russia in balancing relations with China and India, and it holds its own role and value in Russia's Greater Eurasian Partnership and New Eastern Policy. Based on these discussions, the study explores promising areas of cooperation such as energy resources, counterterrorism, and food security, to assess the direction of Russia's ASEAN cooperation policy. However, physical, institutional, and interpersonal connectivity issues hinder cooperation development between Russia and ASEAN. Addressing these obstacles and enhancing exchanges will require additional research and efforts.

학술논문: 러시아연방의 안보 전략과 대한반도 전략

유영철 ( Young Chul Yu ) 한국군사학회 2011 군사논단 Vol.68 No.-

Russia has been trying to put an end to internal disorder, and enhance diplomatic means and military strength in order to overcome the difficult security environment facing the nation. Particularly, the Russian Federation has been ensuring its security through military reform since Putin came to power in 2000. The most distinguishable feature of Putin`s military reform in comparison to Yeltsin`s military reform is its great emphasis on enhancing military capabilities. In short, the Yeltsin government tried to reshape the military through structural reorganization. On other hand, the Putin government pursued military build-up as the economic recovery in the 2000`s enabled the Russian state to finance it. However, Russia is no longer pursuing to regain its lost influence and power on the world stage through military build-up. Rather, Russia wants to establish stability at home, prevent any disintegration of Russian Federation, and secure its plentiful natural resources. The key objective of Russia`s security strategy is to demonstrate political and diplomatical means for peaceful resolutions of discord and conflict between states while preventing any external aggression against Russia with proper level of military readiness. In matters concerning the Korean Peninsula, we should not underestimate the ever-changing role of Russia in future six-party talks. As Russia does not have security concerns regarding North Korea`s nuclear issue as much as China, Russia has more flexibility in addressing the issue. For these reasons, we need to recognize the importance of Russia in Northeast Asia and make efforts to enhance ties between our two nations. Currently, there is no significant issue that can adversely affect the relationship between ROK and Russia. Nevertheless, the situation is not entirely favorable to us. As the upcoming Putin government is expected to pursue pragmatic diplomacy on basis of national interests, the ROK-Russia relationship can not be advanced without our own effort. Accordingly, we need to enhance trust between our two nations and seek positive changes from the Russian side.

Russia and North Korea’s Second Nuclear Crisis

주승호 사단법인 한국평화연구학회 2008 평화학연구 Vol.9 No.4

Putin sought to make a dent in resolving North Korea’s nuclear crisis. In the process, Russia sought to cultivate its image as an honest broker, mediator, or facilitator. This article examines Russian policy on the second crisis over North Korea’s nuclear issue. Specifically, the research raises the following questions and tries to answer them: What role has Russia played at the six-party talks? What is Russia’s policy on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program? What are Russia’s contributions to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula? With the convening of the six-party talks in 2003, Russia acquired the first opportunity to make its imprint on North Korea’s nuclear issue. Russia facilitated dialogue and offered suggestions for compromise. Russia at the same time exerted a moderating influence on both the U.S. and North Korea, constantly urging them to return to the negotiating table whenever the talks stalled and patiently reminding them to take into consideration the other side’s concerns and needs during negotiation. North Korea’s denuclearization and peaceful resolution of North Korea’s nuclear crisis coincide with Russia’s interests. Russia’s influence in the six-party talks has been indirect and marginal. The U.S. and the DPRK were the principal actors in this showdown and the DPRK as a host and mediator played a key role in inducing agreements. Putin sought to make a dent in resolving North Korea’s nuclear crisis. In the process, Russia sought to cultivate its image as an honest broker, mediator, or facilitator. This article examines Russian policy on the second crisis over North Korea’s nuclear issue. Specifically, the research raises the following questions and tries to answer them: What role has Russia played at the six-party talks? What is Russia’s policy on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program? What are Russia’s contributions to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula? With the convening of the six-party talks in 2003, Russia acquired the first opportunity to make its imprint on North Korea’s nuclear issue. Russia facilitated dialogue and offered suggestions for compromise. Russia at the same time exerted a moderating influence on both the U.S. and North Korea, constantly urging them to return to the negotiating table whenever the talks stalled and patiently reminding them to take into consideration the other side’s concerns and needs during negotiation. North Korea’s denuclearization and peaceful resolution of North Korea’s nuclear crisis coincide with Russia’s interests. Russia’s influence in the six-party talks has been indirect and marginal. The U.S. and the DPRK were the principal actors in this showdown and the DPRK as a host and mediator played a key role in inducing agreements.

북핵문제에 대한 주변국의 입장과 정책 ; 러시아의대북정책과과제: 푸틴시대를 중심으로

최영훈 평화문제연구소 2003 統一問題硏究 Vol.15 No.2

Since the ascension of President Vladimir Putin to power, the Korean peninsula has become a priority issue in Russia``s foreign policy. The Russian approach to Korean affairs became more rational and balanced. In the Putin era the Russian strategy in Korea is directed at the creation of a balance of interests for all the parties concerned, in order to build a solid foundation for peace and stability, and to provide room for cooperation in the name of economic prosperity. This tendency became obvious in 2000 after the signing of the new Russia-North Korea basic treaty. The crisis over the North Korean nuclear problem put the situation in Korea into the constant attention of the Russian leadership. The current situation is also different from that of the 1993-1994 nuclear crisis, when Russia played a secondary role. But in the situation of the present nuclear crisis Russia is positively playing efforts in the settlement of the North Korean problem. Russia proposed a package solution to the Korean problem on January 2003. The plan provides first of all for ensuring the nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula, strict compliance with the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and fulfilling all commitments resulting from other international dialogue between all interested parties, which is to guarantee North Korea``s security. The third condition is resumption of humanitarian and economic programs that funct! ioned on the Korean peninsula. Russia advocate a peaceful political and diplomatic way out of this crisis. This is Russia``s consistent standpoint on the problem. Russia``s the position remains unchanged and Moscow believes in a package solution. In sum, at present, Moscow has no instruments to influence North Korean Secretary General Kim jong-il. Russia could only consult the North Korean party. Russia connot render direct military support to North Korea as had been envisaged by the former agreement between North Korea and the USSR. Russia could influence North Korea policy if Moscow could guarantee security of North Korea. Yet it would not be wise or realistic to ignore the still-considerable political influence of Russia on Pyeongyang in the Putin era. To have more influence on the North Korean authorities in settling particular issues, Russia must closely co-operate with North Korea in many political and economic fields.

Russia’s Policy on Nuclear Proliferation and National Unification on the Korean Peninsula

주승호 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2014 Pacific Focus Vol.29 No.2

As a Northeast Asian power sharing a 17-Km border with North Korea, Russia has a keen interest in Korean affairs. The future of Korea is of great concern to Russia both because of the Korean peninsula’s geostrategic importance and South Korea’s alliance relationship with the United States. This article addresses three primary questions: (i) How has Russia’s Korea policy evolved over the years? (ii) What position does Russia take on North Korea’s nuclear ambitions? and (iii)Will Russia support Korean unification? Russia professes its support for Korean unification. But there are important caveats. Given all the caveats, Russia will be neither active nor positive in supporting Korean unification, especially since it is likely to be achieved on South Korean terms. Will Russia then tolerate a Korean unification, which is likely to follow the German model of the South’s absorption of the North? Under the right circumstances, Russia might. In the German case, Mikhail Gorbachev as the Soviet leader and the cooperative relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union were the keys to the smooth sailing to Germany’s unification in 1989–1990. As with the German case, the state of US–Russia relations and the type of leader in the Kremlin will prove the most crucial factors in Russia’s acceptance or non-acceptance of a unified Korea. In this article, the author argues that Russia’s interests in and policy toward the Korean peninsula have been consistent over the years in two important ways. First, Russia opposes any power’s dominance in Korea. Second, Russia prefers a status quo on the Korean peninsula to a Korean unification. The author also argues that Russia will acquiesce to North Korea’s status as a de facto nuclear weapons state for lack of a viable alternative.

트럼프 정부 출범 이후 미-러 관계와 한국의 대러정책 지향

우평균 국방대학교 국가안전보장문제연구소 2018 국방연구 Vol.61 No.1

This article has a purpose to evaluate and foresee the phenomenon that why the prospect of US-Russia relationship is not be better than the past, and then to suggest the considerations for Korea’s policy toward Russia. US-Russia relations are more acrimonious than at any time since the end of the Cold war. US sanctions against Russia have been strengthened. The structural characteristics of American politics also deeply affected negatively to rapprochement between two countries. Nevertheless, a significant rapprochement between the United States and Russia is improbable if Trump will overcome the difficulties from the ‘Russia Scandal’. Korea’s foreign policy has to prepare the future with this tendency. Therefore, Korea need to respond the effect of interaction and collaboration that will change the current adversarial nature of US-Russia. Secondly, it is need to get support from Russia on the issue of North Korean nuclear program. Thirdly, restoring the previous partnership between Russia and US should affect to the cooperation between two Koreas and Russia, so it is need to review of the mega project. 본 논문은 2017년 1월 미국의 트럼프 정부 출범을 전후하여 나타나기 시기한 미국과 러시아 간 관계 개선에 대한 전망이 왜 기대와 달리 진전되지 않고 있는지, 이에 대한 평가와 전망을 하는 것을 1차적인 목적으로 하고 있다. 또한 미·러 관계의 진전 가능성과 현실에 대한 평가로부터 도출될 수 있는 의미를 한국 외교가 대러 관계와 관련하여 지향해야 할 점을 제시하고 있다. 트럼프 집권 이후 대러 관계는 국내 정치 스캔들이 비화하면서 미국 조야에서 대러 감정이 악화되었으며, 이를 반영하듯 미국의 대러 제재가 강화되었다. 이와 같은 상황적 요인 외에도 미국 정치의 구조적 특성에 의해 양국 관계가 전면적으로 개선되기 어려운 측면을 갖고 있다. 그럼에도 불구하고 트럼프 대통령이 스캔들을 둘러싼 의혹을 극복한다면 대러 정책은 탄력을 받을 가능성이 크며, 한국의 대외정책 역시 이점을 염두에 두고 대비할 필요가 있음을 지적할 수 있다. 이 점을 주시하면서, 한국 대외정책의 지향성은 다음과 같이 제시할 수 있다. 첫째, 미·러관계의 개선 효과에 대비하는 대응 전략이 필요하다. 둘째, 북핵문제에 대한 러시아의 역할을 긍정적으로 확보하는 노력이 요구된다. 셋째, 미·러관계의 개선이 남·북·러 3각 협력 사업에 미칠 효과에 대한 검토가 필요하다.

러시아의 한반도 정책과 북핵 해결 협력 방향

엄구호 한양대학교 아태지역연구센터 2018 중소연구 Vol.41 No.4

문재인 정부의 북핵 문제 해결의 접근은 이제까지의 양국간 많은 이견에도 불구하고 상대적으로 역대 어느 정부보다 러시아와 공유하는 부분이 적지 않다는 점에서북핵 해결에서의 양국 해결 협력 가능성을 검토해 볼 실익이 크다는 것이 이 연구의기본 의의이다. 이런 맥락에서 이 글은 러시아와의 북핵 해결을 위한 국제 대화에서의 협력 가능성과 북핵 해결을 위한 건설적 중재자 역할 가능성을 중심으로 북핵해결에서의 양국 협력의 가능성과 바람직한 방향을 분석하고자 한다. 러시아의 북핵 전략과 정책 목표는 다음과 같이 정리할 수 있다. 첫째, 역내 NPT 체제는 유지되어야 하며 이를 위한 한반도 비핵화에 대해서는 미국과 제한적이나마공조한다. 둘째, 북핵 해결과정에서 미국의 역내 패권 강화를 막기 위해 다자적 대화에 의한 북핵문제의 평화적 해결을 추구한다. 셋째, 러시아 동북지역의 안정 유지를위해 북한에 대한 고립화 및 봉쇄 반대와 북핵문제의 군사적 해법을 거부한다. 넷째, 한반도에서의 지정학적 영향력 확보를 위해 북핵 6자회담의 주도적 참여를 통한 자국의 정치적 역할 공간 확대한다. 다섯째, 북핵의 해결과정을 동북아 다자안보 및 평화체제에서의 러시아 위상 확대와 연계한다. 한러간 북핵 해결의 전략적 협력의 가능성을 판단하기 위한 논점들은 러시아의 건설적중재자 역할 가능성, 대북 제재의 적극적 참여 가능성, 쌍중단을 출발점으로 하는 러시아의 모르굴로프 로드맵은 실효성, 6자회담이 아닌 새로운 대화 채널 수립의 가능성 등이다. 이상의 논점 판단을 근거한다면 한․러간 북핵해결의 전략적 협력은 UN 북핵제재의성실한 이행과 북한의 대화 참여 유도 협력을 통한 6자회담을 대체하는 UN 주도의새로운 국제적 대화 플랫폼 형성차원에 이루어져야 한다. 또한 단기적으로 한반도위기관리 협력 채널 구축과 중장기적으로 러시아가 중국과 독립적인 입장을 취하는데 도움이 되는 신북방정책의 적극적 추진이 이루어져야 할 것이다. 이런 원칙 하에서 다음의 몇 가지 협력 방안을 고려해 볼 수 있을 것이다. This study starts from a proposition that there is a great opportunity to examine the possibility of cooperation between South Korea and Russia in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue at this time because there are more areas where the two countries share much in common in the Moon Jae-in government’s approach for the North Korean nuclear issue than in any previous governments. In this context, this study analyzes the possibility and the desirable direction of bilateral cooperation in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, focusing on the possibility of cooperation with Russia in international dialogue and Russia’s role as a constructive mediator for the resolution of the issue. As to the North Korean nuclear issue, Russia's strategy and policy goals can be summarized as follows. First, the NPT system in the region should be maintained and for this, Russia can restrictively cooperate with the United States to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. Second, Russia pursues a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue through multilateral dialogues in order to prevent the strengthening of the US supremacy in the process. Third, in order to maintain stability in the northeast region of Russia, it rejects the isolation or containment of North Korea and any military solution of the North Korean nuclear issue. Fourth, Russia expands the space for its political role through a leading participation in the six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue to 188⋅ 제41권 제4호, 2017/2018 겨울secure its geopolitical influence on the Korean peninsula. Fifth, the process of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue will be linked to the expansion of Russia's position in the multilateral security and peace regime in Northeast Asia. The issues to determine the possibility of strategic cooperation between South Korea and Russia in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue include the possibility of Russia’s role as a constructive arbitrator, the possibility of Russia’s active participation in sanctions against North Korea, and the feasibility of Morgulov’s roadmap for Korean settlement, and the possibility to establish a new dialogue channel other than the six-party talk. Based on the above arguments, strategic cooperation between South Korea and Russia for resolving the North Korean nuclear issues should be pursued to form a new UN-led dialogue platform replacing the six-party talks through sincere implementation of the UN nuclear sanctions and cooperation in encouraging North Korea to engage in dialogue. In addition, it will be necessary to aggressively promote the new northern policy that, in the short term, will be conducive in establishing a cooperation channel for crisis management on the Korean Peninsula and that, in the mid to long term, will help Russia to take an independent position from China.

Russia’s Approaches to the North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program: Between Multipolarity and Breakup Of the Nonproliferation Regime

이고르 흐리프노프 (사) 한국전략문제연구소 2009 전략연구 Vol.- No.46

Russia’s post-Soviet record regarding the DPRK is lackluster and rife with inconsistencies, ranging from the alienation of its former ally in the East to the rapid resumption of cooperation in 2000 and a series of proactive, though mostly unsuccessful moves toward a comprehensive solution of the crisis, with denuclearization as a top priority. This renewed attention to North Korea was largely driven by Russia’s new geopolitical concept of a multipolar world, whose major objective was to counterbalance the hegemony of the United States. This concept became a building block of the rapprochement between Russia and China from the late 1990s through the early 2000s and provided solid ground for bilateral cooperation on defusing the crisis. As Russia reasserted its global interests and restored its economic power during this period of time, the Korean crisis ceased to be a relatively freestanding issue for Russia. Rather, it became closely interwoven with other global problems and concerns that Russia has been dealing, often affecting higher-priority issues for Moscow. On the one hand, Russia’s approach to the standoff on the Korean Peninsula appears to derive from its threat perception of the United States and its regional policy, as well as carefully calibrated moves focused on the potential implications of a Korean solution for Russia’s far more strategically valuable interests in Iran. On the other, they are a careful balancing act in the growing shadow of China, the regional hegemon with a stake in a solution to the Korean crisis on terms consistent with its own interests. There is no doubt that both Russia and China oppose the DPRK nuclear program and are committed to the nonproliferation regime, though they do not feel directly threatened by North Korean nuclear weapons. They believe that a solution to the crisis lies more with Washington than anyone else but wish to avoid near-worst-case scenarios associated with a regime collapse or change, which would likely create a massive flow of refugees into Russia and China. The resultant regional realignment might also bring U.S. troops to both countries’ borders, which would be a frightening scenario for Russia, which already confronts the continuing prospect of further NATO expansion. This business-as-usual routine, a vicious circle in which tough measures to punish the DPRK led only to further escalation from the embattled communist regime, can be broken. It will be possible when Russia and by the same token China grasp the new, serious risks to themselves posed by the geopolitical fallout from the spring 2009 tests. As Japan proceeds on the road to a radical revision of its constitutional fundamentals to allow militarization, South Korea modernizes and expands its armed forces, and the United States reinforces its military presence and preparedness in the region, Russia and China will have to treat the changing geopolitical balance in response to North Korean threats with appropriate urgency, innovative diplomacy, and persistence. The paper will review one future option open to Russia in its new search for a solution. Russia’s post-Soviet record regarding the DPRK is lackluster and rife with inconsistencies, ranging from the alienation of its former ally in the East to the rapid resumption of cooperation in 2000 and a series of proactive, though mostly unsuccessful moves toward a comprehensive solution of the crisis, with denuclearization as a top priority. This renewed attention to North Korea was largely driven by Russia’s new geopolitical concept of a multipolar world, whose major objective was to counterbalance the hegemony of the United States. This concept became a building block of the rapprochement between Russia and China from the late 1990s through the early 2000s and provided solid ground for bilateral cooperation on defusing the crisis. As Russia reasserted its global interests and restored its economic power during this period of time, the Korean crisis ceased to be a relatively freestanding issue for Russia. Rather, it became closely interwoven with other global problems and concerns that Russia has been dealing, often affecting higher-priority issues for Moscow. On the one hand, Russia’s approach to the standoff on the Korean Peninsula appears to derive from its threat perception of the United States and its regional policy, as well as carefully calibrated moves focused on the potential implications of a Korean solution for Russia’s far more strategically valuable interests in Iran. On the other, they are a careful balancing act in the growing shadow of China, the regional hegemon with a stake in a solution to the Korean crisis on terms consistent with its own interests. There is no doubt that both Russia and China oppose the DPRK nuclear program and are committed to the nonproliferation regime, though they do not feel directly threatened by North Korean nuclear weapons. They believe that a solution to the crisis lies more with Washington than anyone else but wish to avoid near-worst-case scenarios associated with a regime collapse or change, which would likely create a massive flow of refugees into Russia and China. The resultant regional realignment might also bring U.S. troops to both countries’ borders, which would be a frightening scenario for Russia, which already confronts the continuing prospect of further NATO expansion. This business-as-usual routine, a vicious circle in which tough measures to punish the DPRK led only to further escalation from the embattled communist regime, can be broken. It will be possible when Russia and by the same token China grasp the new, serious risks to themselves posed by the geopolitical fallout from the spring 2009 tests. As Japan proceeds on the road to a radical revision of its constitutional fundamentals to allow militarization, South Korea modernizes and expands its armed forces, and the United States reinforces its military presence and preparedness in the region, Russia and China will have to treat the changing geopolitical balance in response to North Korean threats with appropriate urgency, innovative diplomacy, and persistence. The paper will review one future option open to Russia in its new search for a solution.

Russian Influence on North Korea: Views of Former South Korean Ambassadors to Russia

( Doug J Kim ) 한국국방연구원 2012 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.24 No.3

Russia and North Korea have a historical relationship dating back to the beginning of the Pyongyang regime. The former Soviet Union had participated in the Korean War and its Air Force supported the communist forces on the ground. Moscow was the major donor in the reconstruction of postwar North Korea. The North Korean nuclear program had been initiated with Soviet equipment and training of nuclear scientists. Russia is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. All of these factors make Russia one of the countries with the most influence over North Korea. However, after Moscow had established diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea in 1990, there were ups and downs in the relations between Russia and North Korea. First, the period from 1990 to 1995was the worst time for Russia-North Korea relations. Second, Russia`s influence was regained after the new treaty on Friendship, Good-Neighborly Relations and Cooperation with the North was signed. Moreover, the first trip for a Russian leader, Vladimir Putin, to North Korea was made in 2000. Third, since the beginning of the second North Korean nuclear crisis in 2002, Russia became an active participant in the Six-Party Talks. Russia realized that a balanced diplomacy toward the two Koreas works better for the interests of Russia rather than the pro-South Korean stance in the first few years of the early 1990s. In the 2000s, the overall relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang has improved. The railway connections of the TSR and TKR, and the construction of oil and gas pipelines through the Korean peninsula have been under discussion among Russia, North Korea, and South Korea. However, the process has been slow. The author has inter viewed the former South Korean ambassadors to Russia in order to gain first-hand knowledge of Russia-North Korean relations. As to the overall Moscow-Pyongyang relations, the author shares the same views as the Russian experts about South Korea. However, they emphasized one particular point. North Korea`s debt to Russia. This was an issue that was rarely discussed in South Korea. In June 2012, Russia announced that 90 percent of the North Korean debt could possibly be written off. If the Russian initiative is approved, North Korea could join and initiate new projects with Russia. The Seoul government should be able to join the trilateral cooperation among Russia, North Korea, and South Korea. The Ambassadors` advice needs to be taken seriously.