자금조달결정, 배당정책 및 소유구조간의 상호관계와 이러한 재무정책들이 기업가치에 미치는 영향

신민식,신찬식,김지영 한국기업경영학회 2009 기업경영연구 Vol.16 No.1

In this paper, we analyse empirically the interrelations among financing decision, dividend policy and ownership structure, and these financial policies' effects on market value of firms listed on Korea Exchange. The main results of this study can be summarized as follows. Dividend policies and ownership structure both have negative effects on financing decision. Financing have negative effects on dividend policy, and ownership structure have positive effects on dividend policy. Financing decision have negative effects on ownership structure, and dividend policy have positive effects on ownership structure. Accordingly, financing decision, dividend policy, and ownership structure have the significant effects on simultaneous interrelations. In case of robust test using 3SLS, financing decision, dividend policy and ownership structure have the significant effects on simultaneous interrelations. Financing decision, dividend policy, and ownership structure have the significant effects on market value of firms. Accordingly, managers have to considers simultaneous interrelations for financing decision, dividend policy, and ownership structure to improve the market value of firms. Conclusively, managers have to considers simultaneous interrelations for financing decision, dividend policy, and ownership structure, and carry out these financial policies for maximization of value. However, this paper is only early study of the effects of interrelations among financing decision, dividend policy, and ownership structure on market value of firms. It is necessary to expand sample firms and use more elaborate analysis methods. 분석 결과, 배당정책과 소유구조는 자금조달결정에 유의한 음(-)의 영향을 미치는데, 이는 잉여현금흐름이 많은 기업이 대리인비용을 감소시키기 위해 부채를 감소시키고 배당을 증가시키며, 대주주지분율이 높을수록 경영위험 회피성향이 높아지기 때문에 레버리지 비율을 감소시킴을 의미한다. 자금조달결정과 소유구조는 배당정책에 각각 유의한 음(-)과 양(+)의 영향을 미치는데, 이는 잉여현금흐름이 많은 기업은 대리인비용을 줄이기 위해 부채를 감소시키고 배당을 증가시키며, 주주와 경영자간의 대리인 갈등을 완화시키기 위해 배당지급을 증가시킴을 의미한다. 자금조달결정과 배당정책은 소유구조에 각각 유의한 음(-)과 양(+)의 영향을 미치는데, 이는 대주주지분율이 높을수록 경영위험 회피성향이 높아지기 때문에 레버리지 비율을 감소시키며, 주주와 경영자간의 대리인 갈등을 완화시키기 위해 배당지급을 증가시킴을 의미한다. 그리고 재무정책의 구성요소인 자금조달결정, 배당정책 및 소유구조는 기업가치에 각각 유의한 음(-), 양(+) 및 음(-)의 영향을 미친다. 이는 레버리지 비율이 증가하면 자본비용 증가와 경영자의 도덕적 위험에 따른 과도한 레버리지 사용으로 인한 투자위험의 증가로 기업가치가 하락하고, 배당이 증가하면 기업의 미래전망에 관한 신호효과로 작용하여 기업가치가 증가하며, 대주주지분율이 증가할수록 대주주들이 소액주주의 이익을 침해하는 방향으로 사적 이익을 추구할 경우 기업가치가 하락함을 의미한다

연구개발지원제도와 소유구조의 상호작용이 연구개발투자에 미치는 영향

권명자,조군제,송신근,신성욱 한국회계정보학회 2012 회계정보연구 Vol.30 No.1

The purpose of this study is to effectively analyze how R&D incentives systems and ownership structure would respectively affect on R&D expenditures by enterprises, and to explore the interaction effect of R&D incentives systems and ownership structure on the R&D expenditures. The following are the results of this study. First, for R&D incentives systems, since both variables of tax support (tax deduction, reserve fund deduction) and subsidy have meaningful and positive relationship with R&D expenditures. Second, ownership structure(foreign ownership, institutional investor ownership) except managerial stock ownership have meaningful and positive relationship with the variable of R&D expenditures. Third, the interaction of tax deduction and ownership structure have meaningful and positive effect on R&D expenditures. Fourth, for analysis results of the interaction effect of the reserve fund deduction and ownership structure on R&D expenditures, since only the interaction variable of the reserve fund deduction and institutional investor ownership has meaningful and positive correlation. Finally, for analysis results of the interaction effect of the subsidy and ownership structure on R&D expenditures, since the interaction variable of the subsidy and managerial stock ownership has positive effect on R&D expenditures. The interaction variable of the subsidy and foreign ownership also has positive effect on R&D expenditures. But the interaction variable of the subsidy and institutional investor ownership has no meaningful correlations. This finding suggests that R&D incentives systems and ownership structure respectively affect on R&D expenditures by enterprises. Furthermore, interaction of these variable also positive effect on the R&D expenditures. Therefore, it is important to push enterprises' R&D expenditures to increase R&D incentives and to improve ownership structure. 본 연구의 목적은 연구개발 지원제도와 소유구조가 기업의 연구개발투자에 어떠한 영향을 미치는지를 각각 분석하고, 이들 간의 상호작용이 연구개발투자에 미치는 영향에 대해 분석하는데 있다. 이러한 목적을 달성하기 위해 본 연구에서는 연구개발 지원제도로 세액공제, 준비금 손금산입, 보조금 지원을 고려하였고, 소유구조로는 경영자 지분율, 외국인 지분율, 기관투자자 지분율을 사용하였으며, 기업의 연구개발투자에 미치는 영향을 통제하고자 기업규모, 부채비율, 영업현금흐름, 매출액증가율, 투자기회집합 변수를 추가적으로 고려하였다. 2006년부터 2009년까지 금융업을 제외한 증권거래소에 계속 상장된 기업을 대상으로 설문을 통해 자료를 수집하였으며, 회수된 129개 기업 설문자료 중 불성실 응답기업 16개를 제외한 총 113개 기업, 3년, 452개 기업-연도자료를 활용하여 다중회귀분석을 통해 분석한 결과를 먼저, 정부에서 제공하는 다양한 연구개발 지원제도(세액공제, 준비금 손금산입, 보조금지원)는 기업의 연구개발투자를 증가시키는 것으로 나타났고, 경영자 지분율을 제외한 외국인 지분율, 기관투자자 지분율이 높은 기업에서 더욱 활발히 연구개발투자자 일어나는 것으로 나타났다. 마지막으로 연구개발 지원제도와 소유구조 사이의 상호작용이 연구개발투자에 미치는 영향에 대해 분석한 결과, 기대와는 달리 혼재된 결과를 보여주었는데 우선 세액공제와 소유구조(경영자 지분율, 외국인 지분율, 기관투자자 지분율) 간의 상호작용은 모두 기업의 연구개발투자에 긍정적인 영향을 미치는 것으로 분석되었고, 준비금 손금산입과 소유구조 간의 상호작용 효과는 준비금 손금산입과 기관투자자 지분율 간의 상호작용만이 연구개발투자에 긍정적인 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났으며, 보조금지원과 경영자 지분율, 보조금지원과 외국인 지분율은 상호작용 효과가 있는 것으로 나타났으나, 보조금지원과 기관투자자 지분율은 상호작용 효과가 없는 것으로 분석되었다. 이상의 분석결과는 세액공제 등 연구개발 지원제도들이 기업의 연구개발투자를 유인하는 효과가 있으며 효과적인 소유구조를 지니고 있는 기업의 경우 그 효과가 더욱 확대될 수 있다는 것을 암시한다. 현재 시행되고 있는 연구개발 지원제도의 유지 및 보완, 실제 기업의 연구개발투자를 적극적으로 유도할 수 있는 다양한 지원제도의 확충이 필요할 것으로 판단된다.

지배구조 및 소유구조가 회계정보의 보수성에 미치는 영향

김성환(Sung Hwan Kim),채수준(Soo Joon Chae),이호영(Ho Young Lee) 한국경영학회 2010 經營學硏究 Vol.39 No.3

Conservatism is defined as the tendency of selecting the accounting alternatives that will result in less net income and/or less asset amount. Accounting conservatism plays an important role in mitigating the agency costs. For example, management may have less incentives to select investments with negative net present value, but favorable earnings in the short run. This is because accounting conservatism influences firms to recognize expenses/losses earlier than revenues/gains. The agency costs may also be affected by the characteristics of corporate governance. Firms with well diversified ownership may face the agency problem between shareholders and management. Thus, firms with management who possess share ownership may experience lower agency costs. On the other hand, firms with owner-managers such as founding managers may face different types of agency costs. In such a case, agency costs arise as a result of information asymmetry between owner-managers and minority shareholders. Many Korean firms tend to have family oriented ownership structure which is different from most of firms in western countries. Korea does not have as strong protection for minority shareholders as western countries and, therefore, accounting conservatism may be affected by the interest of majority shareholders. In particular, the majority shareholders of Korean firms can influence accounting conservatism stronger than those in western countries because of more complex cross-ownership structure with affiliated companies. This study examines the effect of corporate governance and ownership structure on accounting conservatism. In particular, this study empirically tests whether there is an association between family-owned firms with acting board of director members from the family and accounting conservatism. La Porta et al.(1998, 1999, 2000) find that countries with weak protection of minority shareholders experience the expropriation of minority shareholders by primary shareholders. If this tendency reported in La Porta et al. (1998, 1999, 2000) is affected by corporate governance structure, accounting conservatism is likely to vary dependent upon corporate governance structure. Unlike the United States and some western countries, a family and its affiliates own a large portion of shares and have a significant influence over management decisions. in this environment, the agency problem between majority shareholders and minority shareholders is more severe than that between managers and shareholders. Using 1,690 firm-years from 2005-2007 listed in Korea Stock Exchange, we find inconsistent results of the effect of governance structure on accounting conservatism when family firms are defined without incorporating ownership structure in the empirical analyses. In examining the effect of corporate governance and ownership structure on conservatism, we utilize the three conservatism models used in Ball and Shivakumar(2006): cash flow model, Dechow and Dechev(2002) model, and Jones(1991) model. We define family firm as those satisfying certain conditions such as (1) a CEO or boards of director member(s) from family with majority ownership (2) a CEO and boards of director member(s) from family with majority ownership (3) a CEO from family with majority ownership (4) boards of director member(s) from family with majority ownership, respectively. When family ownership is divided into 5, 20, and 50 percent, the effect is the strongest for those sample firms in the 50 percent or higher ownership range suggesting that the effect of ownership on accounting conservatism varies depending on the proportion of ownership by family members in Korea. Family firms whose board of directors include the family member tend to be concerned with a long term value maximization and, therefore, they are less likely to exercise opportunistic accounting accruals. Instead, they are more likely to consider long term financial stability, cash flows, and potential litigation cost. Th

지주회사 전환이 외국인지분율에 미치는 영향

이현주 ( Hyun Ju Lee ),정현욱 ( Hyun Uk Jung ),이강일 ( Kang Il Lee ) 한국회계학회 2014 회계학연구 Vol.39 No.1

본 연구는 지주회사 전환 이후 지주회사 집단에 소속된 기업의 외국인지분율이 증가할 것이라는 가설을 설정하고 다변량회귀분석을 이용하여 실증분석을 수행하였다. 지주회사 체제로 전환하게 되면 공정거래법의 행위제한 규정 때문에 기업집단의 소유구조 및 출자단계가 단순해지고, 지배주주의 자(손자)회사에 대한 지분 율이 높아지고, 지분율괴리도가 낮아지고, 계열사 간 상호출자와 순환출자가 감소되는 등 전환 이전에 비해 소유구조가 현저하게 개선될 것으로 기대된다. 본 연구의 가설은 국내 기관투자자나 개인투자자에 비해 정보의 수집 및 분석능력이 뛰어난 것으로 알려진 외국인투자자가 투자 종목을 선택함에 있어 지주회사 전환 기업을 선호할 것이라는 기대에 근거하여 설정되었다. 2003-2008 기간 동안 공정거래위원회에 일반 지주회사로 신고한 계열기업군에 소속된 기업을 대상으로 실증분석을 수행한 결과, 지주회사 전환 이후 기간에 외국인지분율은 전환 이전 기간보다 통계적으로 유의하게 증가하는 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구는 기존 선행연구에서 보고된 외국인지분율에 영향을 미치는 변수를 통제한 후에 지주회사 전환 전·후 기간의 소유구조 변동이 외국인지분율을 증가시키는 데 기여한다는 실증분석 결과를 보고한다는 점에서 공헌점이 있다고 판단된다. 본 연구의 결과를 달리 해석하면, 외국인 투자자는 지주회사 전환 이후 높아진 지배주주 지분율과 낮아진 지분율괴리도를 소유구조의 개선으로 받아들이는 것으로 판단된다. 또한 지주회사 전환을 권장하고 있는 규제당국에 참고할 수 있는 지주회사 전환의 긍정적 측면을 제시한다고 판단된다. This study examines the effect of conversion to holding company (hereafter ``conversion to HC``) on foreign equity ownership. The research hypothesis predicts that foreign ownership of shares would increase after the conversion to HC. The sample consists of firms which belong to holding company group for the period of 2003-2008. The data on holding company were collected from Fair Trade Commission`s(FTC) database. The empirical results suggest that foreign equity ownership increased statistically significantly after conversion to HC. Foreign investors held 34.7% of stocks traded on the main bourse(Korean Exchange, KOSPI) as of December year-end 2012. They typically are mutual funds or other institutional investors. Anecdotal evidence suggests foreigners outperform domestic institutional and individual investors in fundamental analysis. Thus they appear to earn excess investment returns when compared to their counterparts. They also play a monitoring role on their investees. Therefore, factors affecting foreign investors` stock selection draw attention from both academics and practitioners. We examine whether the change in ownership structure caused by conversion to HC affects foreigners` portfolio selection decisions. The Korean government revised fair trade rules in April of 1999 thereby allowing the conversion to HC for domestic firms. The revised rules on holding company enforces a few restrictions before the conversion to HC. First, the amount of total asset has to exceed 100 billion won. Second, the holding company has to own equity shares of subsidiary companies in excess of 50% of total asset. Third, the holding company cannot own shares of firms which are not classified as subsidiary company under the fair trade rules. Fourth, the fair trade rules forbid circular investments among holding company and its subsidiaries. Lastly, the fair trade rules also forbid cross holdings of shares between any two firms that belong to holding company group. As a result of these stringent restrictions, the ownership structure of a holding company and its subsidiaries become very simple as compared to the ownership structure before the conversion to HC. Even though the pyramidal ownership structure remains after the conversion as compared to the complicated chaebol group style ownership structure before the conversion, large shareholder`s direct ownership increases dramatically and ownership wedge decreases in large scale after the conversion to HC. This study is motivated by this dramatic change and improvements in ownership structure caused by the restrictions of fair trade rules about holding company. Ownership structure has been known to have the strongest influence on corporate governance. Therefore we expect the dramatic improvements in ownership structure caused by conversion to HC would influence the foreign investors` portfolio selection decisions. Kang and Stulz(1997) examined variables that affect foreign investors` portfolio selections in Japan`s stock market for the period of 1975-1991. They document manufacturing industries, large firms, firms with good accounting performance, low unsystematic risk, and low leverage as factors affecting foreign investors` portfolio selection. Dahlquist and Robertsson(2001) followed Kang and Stulz`s research and examined Swedish listed firms. Their results suggest that foreign investors prefer large firms, firms paying low dividends and firms with large cash positions on the balance sheet. Lin and Shiu(2003) examined foreign ownership in the Taiwan stock market for the period of 1996-2000. They reported that foreigners prefer large firms, low book-to-market stocks and firms with high export ratios. After controlling for variables appearing on three studies mentioned above, Ahn et al.(2005) examined whether information asymmetry variables(number of analysts, analyst forecast error and discretionary accruals) affect foreign equity ownership. They concluded that foreigners prefer firms with low information asymmetry. Baek and Moon(2010), using same control variables used in Ahn et al.(2005), tested whether audit quality(audit hours, audit fee and audit firm size) affects foreign equity ownership. Their results suggest that foreigners favor high audit quality firms. Ko et al.(2012) examined whether independence of the board of directors (BOD) affects foreigners` stock selection. Their results suggest that the independence of BOD, measured by the ratio of outside directors to total directors, is positively related with foreign equity ownership. Our study incorporates variables reported in the prior studies listed above as control variables in the multiple regression analysis. After controlling for variables reported in previous studies, our empirical results suggest that conversion to HC affects foreigners` portfolio decisions. More specifically, foreign stock ownership increased statistically significantly after conversion to HC. Due to restrictions enforced by FTC`s holding company rules, large shareholders` equity ownership increases and ownership wedge decreases after conversion to HC. These changes are interpreted as significant improvements in ownership structure and corporate governance. The empirical results suggest that foreign equity ownership increased statistically significantly after conversion to HC. This study contributes to extant literature on foreign equity ownership by providing evidence about the effect of conversion to HC on foreign equity ownership. Foreign investors appear to interpret the conversion to HC as signals of improvements in ownership structure. They also reflect this interpretation on their portfolio selection decisions. The results may help policy makers in supporting their rationale to recommend holding company conversion.

A Study on the Relationship between Ownership Structure and Financial Risk in Chinese Manufacturing Companies

Li, Wen-Ning(이문녕),Lee, Dong-Young(이동녕) 글로벌경영학회 2018 글로벌경영학회 학술대회 발표논문집 Vol.2018 No.2

최근에 몇 년 동안 상장기업들은 경제적인 이익을 지나치게 추구하고, 재무리스크를 무시하여, 심지어는 자신의 재정위기로, 심지어는 파산을 선고한 예가 이미 셀 수 없이 많다. 회사의 재무위험에 영향을 주는 요소가 매우 많은데, 예를 들면 비이성적 담보, 관리자의 도덕적 문제, 역선택 및 부당 관련 거래 등과 같은 것들을 분석하면, 이러한 요인을 분석하면 부당한 지분구조가 근본 원인에서 회사의 전체구조에 영향을 미친다는 것을 알 수 있다. 회사가 재무리스크를 심층적으로 발생시키는 원인이다. 상장회사는 주식시장의 혈액으로서 그 주식구조가 불합리한 것은 투자자들의 중요한 이익에 큰 영향을 미치며, 전체주식시장과 자본시장의 지속적인 안정성과 직접적으로 관련이 있다. 따라서 본 연구는 우선 제조업상장회사의 지분구조와 재무리스크의 관계를 지분구조 차원에서 연구하고 있으며, 본 연구는 우선 2011~2017년 중국의 상장제조기업에 1377개를 지 분구조와 재무위험에 관한 이론을 결합하여 선정한다. 지분의 유통성구조, 지분의 성질, 지분집중도, 지분균형의 네 가지 측면을 제시하고, 연구가 가정적으로 회귀모델구축, 통계분석기법으로 중 국제조업상장기업의 지분구조와 재무리스크구조에 대한 기술적방법을 회귀분석. 사용합니다. 회귀모델을 구성하기 위한 가설을 세우고, 중국 제조기업의 상장기업의 지분구조 및 재무리스크구조에 대한 기술 통계하여 상관관계분석 및 회귀분석방법을 사용한다. 실증연구결과, 지분집중도와 재무위험의 상관관계가 유의성를 가장 높이고 지분집중도가 높을수록 회사의 재무위험수준을 통 제하는데 유리하다는 결과가 나왔다. 지분균형도는 재무리스크의 수준과 역상관되며, 상장제조업 체의 지분구조는 재무리스크 사이에 유의성을 높이게 있으며, 유통주식의 비율은 재무리스크 수준의 역상관이 되어 있지만 유의성이 거의 없다. 국유주식의 비율은 재무리스크수준과 역상관이 있다. In recent years, listed companies have been caught in financial crisis and even declared bankruptcy because of ignoring financial risks in pursuit of economic benefits. There are many factors that affect the financial risk of a company, such as irrational guarantee, managers ethical problems, adverse selection and improper related transactions. By analyzing these factors, it can be found that the unreasonable ownership structure influences the overall structure of the company from the root and it is the deep-rooted reason for the company which generate financial risks. As the blood of the stock market, the unreasonable share structure of the listed company affects the investors vital interests to a great extent and directly affects the continuous stability of the whole stock market and capital market. Therefore, this paper studies the relationship between the ownership structure of listed companies and financial risks from the perspective of ownership structure. Based on the theory of ownership structure and financial risk, the article firstly selects 1377 listed manufacturing enterprises in China from 2011 to 2017. And then from the four dimensions of ownership concentration, equity balance degree, equity liquidity, type of state-owned shares, the article puts forward the research hypothesis and build regression model. The statistical analysis method is used to describe the ownership structure and financial risk of listed companies in China s manufacturing industry. Finally, descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and regression analysis were conducted on the ownership structure and financial risks of listed companies in China s manufacturing industry by statistical analysis. The empirical results show that there are significant relationships between the ownership structure and financial risk of listed manufacturing enterprises. the relationship between ownership concentration and financial risks is significantly positive, the equity balance is negatively correlated with financial risk level, and the equity liquidity is not significantly negative correlated with financial risk level. The type of state-owned shares is positively correlated with the level of financial risk. The relationship between ownership concentration and financial risk is significantly positive, equity balance is negatively correlated with financial risk , and the proportion of outstanding shares is not significantly negative correlated with financial risk . The type of state-owned shares is positively correlated with the level of financial risk.

Stock Ownership Structure and Its Effects on Capital Structure and Corporate Value: Evidence from Indonesia

Siti RAGIL,Sri Mangesti RAHAYU,Suhadak SUHADAK 한국유통과학회 2021 The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Busine Vol.8 No.7

This research (1) examines the effect of stock ownership structure on capital structure; (2) explains the effect of stock ownership structure on corporate value; and (3) investigates the influence of capital structure on corporate value. This research is categorized as a quantitative research, which is directed to test various theories. In this study, the population of all consumption companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) consist of 38 companies. Population data in this study are all consumption companies, which have gone public in the period from 2010 to 2015. In this study, given the objectives and problem formulation and hypothesis, the analysis method used is Generalized Structural Component Analysis (GSCA). Ownership structure has a significant effect on capital structure; ownership structure has no significant effect on corporate value; capital structure has a significant effect on corporate value; corporate value has a significant effect on capital structure. Previous research found different results. Some researchers found a positive relationship and other researchers found a negative relationship, and there are studies that found both significant and non-significant effects. The inconsistency of previous research results prompted the researchers to examine the effect of ownership structure on capital structure and corporate value.

한국기업의 소유구조와 자본구조간의 상호관련성

이지원 ( Ji Won Lee ),오세열 ( Sei Yeol Oh ) 아시아.유럽미래학회 2011 유라시아연구 Vol.8 No.4

오늘날 자본시장의 불확실성과 세계화로 인해 기업지배구조의 개선은 모든 기업이 시급하게 추진해야 할 과제로 부각되어왔다. 한국은 외환위기를 겪으면서 낙후된 기업지배구조가 전면으로 부상하게 되었고 소유구조, 재무구조, 사업구조에 대한 기업구조조정을 겪게 되었다. 그리하여 기업가치제고와 경영투명성강화, 경영자에 대한 감시와 견제기능의 강화가 필요한 조치로 나타났다. 기업지배구조의 개선을 위해서 필수적으로 이해해야할 부분은 소유구조와 자본구조의 유기적인 상관관계이다. 내부자지분율이 기업의 부채정책에 영향을 미칠 뿐 아니라 기업의 부채정책이 거꾸로 내부자지분율에 영향을 미친다는 상호 연계성에 대한 연구가 진행되어 왔지만 일관된 결론에는 이르지 못하고 있다. 본 연구는 2002년에서 2008년까지 기간을 대상으로 한국 유가증권시장에 상장된 기업의 자본구조와 소유구조에 관한 세 가지 가설을 검증하였다. 첫째, 소유구조와 자본구조가 상호 독립적인 관계가 아닌 상호 의존적인 관계를 가지는지를 살펴보았다. 자본구조방정식과 소유구조방정식을 2 SLS 방법으로 분석한 결과 기업의 소유구조와 자본구조는 상호 영향을 미치는 것으로 보여 진다. 둘째, 최대주주지분율은 외국인지분율보다는 수익성과 결합하여 기업의 자본구조에 영향을 미치는 지를 규명하였다. 수익성이 좋은 기업의 경우 최대주주지분율의 증가는 부채비율을 증가시키는 효과가 있는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 수익성이 증가하는 경우 내부경영자는 재무위험을 극복할 수 있는 확신을 가지게 되고 이를 근거로 더 많은 부채를 사용하는 것으로 판단된다. 셋째, 최대주주지분율과 레버리지 간 비선형관계를 분석하였다. 최대주주지분율과 자본구조의 관계는 비선형이며 2차함수의 형태로 나타났다. 최대주주지분율이 71.6%에 이르기까지 부채비율이 낮아지다가 그 이후에는 상승하는 형태를 보여준다. 이는 최대주주가 부채비율의 증가로 인한 재무위험과 경영자자신의 고용위험을 회피하기 위하여 자신의 지분이 71.6%에 이르기까지는 레버리지를 줄여나가는 것을 의미한다. 그러나 그 이상으로 자신의 지분이 늘어나면 긍정적인 레버리지효과를 얻기 위하여 부채를 확대해 나가는 것으로 추정된다. 한편 본 연구의 한계점으로는 첫째, 자본구조에 미치는 소유구조의 영향력을 분석하면서 기업의 배당유무만을 더미변수로 고려함으로써 배당정책의 영향력을 포괄적으로 살펴보지 못하는 한계점을 가진다. 둘째, 본 연구에서 설정한 통제변수와 더미변수 외에 시차를 둔 시계열자료를 보완한 연구가 이루어지면 보다 의미있는 결과가 나올 것이다. Due to the uncertainty and the globalization of the world capital market, the issues of improvement about corporate capital structure in Korean firms have been carved out as the subject which all firms should urgently promote. Korea`s lag behind corporate capital structure have appeared to the surface through the foreign exchange crisis, and it underwent corporate structure adjustment on ownership, financial and business structure. Korea needed to promote corporate value improvement, strengthen business transparency, and reinforce supervision and intervention on managers. In order to improve corporate capital structure, one needs to understand the close correlation between ownership structure and capital structure. Prior literature on the mutual relationship suggested that not only does the major shareholder equity ratio influences corporate debt strategy but inversely, corporate debt strategy affects major shareholder equity ratio. However, these studies have not reached a consistent result. This research verifies three hypotheses based on the term 2002 to 2008. First, I have examined the question whether corporate ownership and capital structures are involved in a mutually dependent, or in a mutually independent, relationship. As a result of analyzing the capital and ownership structure equations in a 2 SLS method, it seems that corporate ownership and capital structures affect each other. Second, I have inquired into whether major shareholder`s equity combines with returns on assets rather than foreigners` equity to affect corporate capital structure. In a company with good profitability, an increase in major shareholder`s equity acts in effect to increase debt ratio. We can infer that with higher return on assets the major shareholders feel convinced that the company can withstand financial risks and are likely to use more debts based on such belief. Third, I have analyzed the non-linear relationship between major shareholder`s equity and leverage. The relationship between major shareholder`s equity and capital structure is non-linear, and is in the form of a quadratic function. The limits to this research are as follows. First, the research is limited in the sense that in analyzing corporate debt strategy, the research considered the existence of corporate dividend as a dummy variable, thus not effectively examining the effects of dividend strategy inclusively. Second, A more meaningful findings will arise from a supplemented study with time series data included time lag which is separate from the variables used in this research, such as control variables and dummy variables.

기업특성에 따른 자본구조 분석

이헌상(Hun-Sang Lee),이인식(In-Sig Lee),홍승표(Seung-Pyo Hong) 한국산업경제학회 2018 산업경제연구 Vol.31 No.2

본 연구는 2000년부터 2017년까지 한국 유가증권시장과 코스닥시장에 상장된 제조기업을 대상으로 기업 특성에 따라 소유구조가 자본구조 및 기업가치에 미치는 영향을 분석하고, 자본구조 조정속도를 통해 자본구조의 동태적 특성을 살펴보았다. 분석결과 전반적으로 최대주주지분율은 부채비율에 음(-)의 영향을, 대기업에서는 부채비율에 양(+)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타나 기존연구를 지지하는 결과를 보여주었다. 또한 시장전반에서 최대주주지분율은 기업가치에 음(-)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났지만, 대기업에서는 영향이 사라졌고, 중소기업에서만 음(-)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 자본구조 조정속도를 측정한 결과 재벌기업은 조정속도가 매우 빠르게 나타났으며, 비재벌기업의 경우 비교적 느리게 나타났다. 본 연구를 통해 기존연구를 지지하는 결과를 확보하였으나, 재벌기업의 경우 전반적인 시장특성과는 구분되는 자본구조행태를 보이고 있는 것을 다양한 측면에서 파악하였으며 재벌기업의 특징을 면밀히 분석해야 할 필요성을 시사한다. This study analyzes the capital structure of Korean manufacturing companies from 2000 to 2017 focusing on ownership and adjustment speed of capital structure. we examined the changes in the capital structure and ownership structure of Korean firms during the sample period. We also analyzed the effects of ownership structure on capital structure and firm value. We measured the adjustment speed of capital structure and examined the dynamic characteristics of the capital structure. The main results are as follows. First, ownership structure negatively affected the debt ratio as a whole. This is the result of supporting existing research. Second, the largest shareholder ownership has a negative effect on the firm value. Finally, the conglomerates showed a very fast adjustment speed, while the large firms showed a relatively slow adjustment speed.

기업의 소유구조가 자본구조에 미치는 영향

신민식 ( Min Shik Shin ),김수은 ( Soo Eun Kim ) 한국금융공학회 2010 금융공학연구 Vol.9 No.3

본 연구는 1999년 1월 1일부터 2008년 12월 31일까지 한국거래소의 유가증권시장과 코스닥시장에 상장된 기업을 대상으로 소유구조가 자본구조에 미치는 영향을 실증분석 하였으며, 주요한 분석결과는 다음과 같다. 대주주지분율이 증가할수록 대주주들이 이사회 참여를 통한 경영권 통제 등을 통하여, 부채사용을 감소시키는 방향으로 소액주주의 이익을 침해할 수 있다. 또한, 1대주주와 2대주주간의 지분율 차이가 증가할수록, 그리고 대주주들 간의 소유집중도가 증가할수록 부채비율이 감소한다. 경영자지분율은 부채비율에 ‘U자’형으로 비선형적인 영향을 미친다. 즉, 경영자지분율이 32% 수준까지는 부채비율이 감소하지만, 그 이상에서는 부채비율이 완만하게 증가한다. 그리고 소유자지배기업은 경영자지배기업보다 부채비율이 더 감소한다. 이러한 결과는 대주주들이 경영자나 이사회에 영향력을 행사하여 자신의 사적 이익을 추구하는 과정에서, 이자비용의 절세효과를 통해 기업가치를 증가시킬 수 있는 부채사용을 감소시키는 방향으로 소액주주의 이익을 침해할 수 있다는 대주주의 이익침해가설을 지지한다. 그러나 경영자는 자신의 지분율의 변동에 따라 기회주주의적으로 행동하므로, 이익침해가설 또는 경영자참호(안주)가설이 선택적으로 성립하는 절충가설을 지지한다. 결론적으로, 한국거래소의 유가증권시장과 코스닥시장에 상장된 기업들은 대주주와 경영자들이 소액주주의 이익을 침해할 가능성이 많다고 할 수 있다. 세부적으로 보면, 대주주지분율이 증가할수록, 1대주주와 2대주주간의 지분율 차이가 증가할수록, 그리고 대주주들 간의 소유집중도가 증가할수록 부채비율이 감소한다. 그리고 경영자지분율은 부채비율에 비선형적으로 영향을 미치고, 소유자지배기업은 경영자지배기업보다 부채비율이 더 감소한다. 따라서 우리나라에서도 대주주와 경영자가 소액주주의 이익을 침해하는 행위를 예방하고, 소액주주의 이익을 보호할 수 있는 제도적 장치와 소유집중도를 완화시킬 수 있는 지배구조 정책이 절실하다고 생각한다. In this paper, we analyse empirically the effects of ownership structure on capital structure of firms listed on Korea Securities Market and Kosdaq Market of Korea Exchange. The main results of this study can be summarized as follows. Debt ratio decrease as large shareholder` equity holdings increase. Debt ratio decrease as the difference between first largest shareholder`s and second largest shareholder`s equity holdings increase, and Debt ratio decrease as the ownership concentration increase. Managerial ownership exert a non-linear effects on capital structure. So to speak, at lower level of managerial ownership managers hold lower level of debt to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders, but at higher level of managerial ownership the interests of managers and shareholders are aligned. Therefore, indicate a non-linear U-shaped relation between level of managerial ownership managers and leverage. Debt ratio decrease larger in owner-controlled firm than in management-controlled firm. These results support the expropriation of minority shareholders hypothesis that large shareholders can extract private benefits from corporate resources under their control at the expense of minority shareholders. This paper contributes to defining information value of large shareholder`s equity holdings and managerial ownership on capital structure for a firms` other stakeholders such as investors and creditors, and to strengthening a legal and institutional safeguard for external minority shareholders. Ownership concentration might have negatively affected the evolution of the legal and institutional frameworks for corporate governance and the manner in which economic activity is conducted. It could be a formidable barrier to future policy reform.

Idiosyncratic Risk and Ownership Structure: Evidence from the South Korean Market

김지원,장승욱 한국금융공학회 2022 금융공학연구 Vol.21 No.1

This paper analyses whether different ownership structures influence the firm risk in the South Korean markets. To investigate the hypotheses, idiosyncratic volatility was used as a proxy of firm risk. The results present a fixed-effects model to analyse the relation between firm risk and ownership structure. This paper analyses that the subjects of the first largest shareholder were divided into individuals, institutions, foreigners, and companies. This research found that foreigners were at higher risk than the other ownership foam. Dividing chaebol and non-chaebol companies, it was confirmed in the second hypothesis that chaebol companies own lower corporate risks than non-chaebol companies. Furthermore, comparing chaebol and non-chaebol companies by the first largest shareholder, if a foreigner owns a chaebol company as the largest shareholder, the corporate risk is higher than that of individuals or institutions, and the corporate risk is lower than that of other companies. Therefore, this study expects that it will enhance the understanding of idiosyncratic volatility and impact investors' investment decisions through identifying the ownership structure, resulting in a high practical contribution.