생명의료윤리학에서 방법론 논쟁과 서사윤리

이상형 대동철학회 2019 大同哲學 Vol.88 No.-

이 논문의 목적은 생명의료윤리학에서 도덕적 판단과 행동을 정당화하는 방법을 모색하는 것이다. 생명의료윤리학에서 적절한 방법론이 무엇인가에 대한 논쟁이 하향식 방법론, 상향식 방법론, 정합론 간에 존재해 왔었다. 필자는 비첨과 췰드리스의 주장에 어느정도 동의하면서 정합론적 방법론을 생명의료윤리학에서 정당화하고자 한다. 그러나 생명의료윤리의 가장 전형적인 장소인 임상현장에서 의사와 환자의 관계를 고려할 때 정합론을 구체화시킬 수 있는 방법은 원칙주의와 함께 서사윤리임을 입증하고자 한다. 왜냐하면의사가 고려할 수 있는 도덕원칙인 선행/악행금지의 원칙은 서사윤리적 접근법을 취할 때환자의 자율성을 존중하면서 동시에 간섭주의적 정당성을 획득할 수 있기 때문이다. 또한환자가 고려할 수 있는 자율성 원칙 또한 간섭으로의 해방이나 결정과 선택의 자유만을 의미하는 것이 아니라 자신의 삶을 이해하고 공동체와의 관계 속에서 자신의 정체성을 형성할 수 있는 능력으로서의 자율성으로 이해될 때 진정한 자율성의 권리로 요청될 수 있다. 이뿐만 아니라 자율성 존중의 원칙은 의사와 환자의 관계를 상호 독립적으로 고려하는 것이 아니라 상호관계의 차원에서 고려하는 관계적 자율성으로 해석되어야 하며, 이 관계적자율성이 서사적 접근법에서 가능함을 주장하고자 한다. 따라서 하향식 방법론인 원칙주의의 장점과 하향식 방법론인 온건한 결의론의 장점을 결합하면서 서사윤리적 정합론의방법을 생명의료윤리학에서 정당화하고자 한다. The purpose of this paper is to seek methodology to justify moral judgment and behavior in biomedical ethics. There has been a debate about what a proper methodology is in biomedical ethics. I am in favor of some of the claims of Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, and I want to justify the coherent methodology in biomedical ethics. Principlism can be helpful as a guide to action in the uncertain situation of the area of biomedical ethics. But these principles, especially the principle of respect for autonomy, should be revised when considering the relationship between doctors and patients. In other words, an narrative approach is needed to maintain a coherent relationship between principles and for the relationship between doctors and patients to be recognized as a reciprocal relationship. Therefore, I would like to propose the narrative ethics to supplement the principlism. For narrativists, understanding an individual s life as a narrative and deploying narrative methodologies to read and interpret it, broadens and enriches our understanding of that life and deepens our insight into the relationship between the unravelling of human life and moral agency. Therefore, I conclude that a good principlist has narrativist tendencies and a good narrativist is inclined toward principlism.

생명윤리에서의 넓은 반성적 평형과 판단력

최경석 한국법철학회 2008 법철학연구 Vol.11 No.1

Wide reflective equilibrium (WRE) was first presented by John Rawls and developed by Norman Daniels. It was thought of primarily as a method for evaluating theories of justice (Rawls) or ethical theories (Daniels). Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress then considered WRE as an explicit methodology for biomedical ethics, that is, moral reasoning for the justification of moral judgments. Thus, I characterize the method of WRE as practical moral reasoning. The process of reaching a conclusion using the methods of WRE is characterized as a back-and-forth process of revision aimed at coherent comprehensive personal or group belief systems without incorrect beliefs. The question arises, however, as to whether the methods of WRE can give us determinate answers about what to do. But there must be different ways of revising beliefs depending on the exercise of judgment as a faculty of thinking. There is no algorithmic decision procedure. Some may expect a mechanical decision procedure by which to reach answers to the above questions, but this is misconceived. Our decision in unprecedented or unpredictable situations and circumstances cannot help calling for judgment. Judgment is not unique to the methods of WRE. Other methods, such as principlism and casuistry, also rely on judgment. When principlists attempt to apply moral principles to a particular case, they must decide which of their moral principles covers the case, just as a judge would have to decide which law or regulation is relevant to a given case. Because principles are abstract and general, they must be interpreted in the light of the details of the particular case. Thus, we arrive at conclusions from the interaction between universal knowledge(major premise) and particular knowledge(minor premise) in a practical syllogism. Casuists also call for the use of judgment. They usually suggest the use of analogical thinking employing paradigm cases. Similarities must be sought between a given case and paradigm cases. However, the recognition of similarity is not a mechanical procedure it requires judgment to determine which features of two cases being compared are relevant. The need for judgment implies that there are no determinate answers for resolving a conflict between two arguers following same method of reasoning. But the exercise of judgment is not a matter of mere taste or arbitrary preference. It requires its justification. There may be some principles and values to guide and regulate the exercise of judgment required in the methods of WRE. First, coherence, comprehensiveness, and the number of incorrect beliefs are not only criteria for comparing competing belief systems, but will also be values for a revision process. Second, we will pursue the maximization of coherence and comprehensiveness while minimizing revision, by revising peripheral beliefs rather than core beliefs in our belief system. Third, the efficiency of a revision process may be one of the important considerations tied to the choice of provisionally fixed beliefs. Wide reflective equilibrium (WRE) was first presented by John Rawls and developed by Norman Daniels. It was thought of primarily as a method for evaluating theories of justice (Rawls) or ethical theories (Daniels). Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress then considered WRE as an explicit methodology for biomedical ethics, that is, moral reasoning for the justification of moral judgments. Thus, I characterize the method of WRE as practical moral reasoning. The process of reaching a conclusion using the methods of WRE is characterized as a back-and-forth process of revision aimed at coherent comprehensive personal or group belief systems without incorrect beliefs. The question arises, however, as to whether the methods of WRE can give us determinate answers about what to do. But there must be different ways of revising beliefs depending on the exercise of judgment as a faculty of thinking. There is no algorithmic decision procedure. Some may expect a mechanical decision procedure by which to reach answers to the above questions, but this is misconceived. Our decision in unprecedented or unpredictable situations and circumstances cannot help calling for judgment. Judgment is not unique to the methods of WRE. Other methods, such as principlism and casuistry, also rely on judgment. When principlists attempt to apply moral principles to a particular case, they must decide which of their moral principles covers the case, just as a judge would have to decide which law or regulation is relevant to a given case. Because principles are abstract and general, they must be interpreted in the light of the details of the particular case. Thus, we arrive at conclusions from the interaction between universal knowledge(major premise) and particular knowledge(minor premise) in a practical syllogism. Casuists also call for the use of judgment. They usually suggest the use of analogical thinking employing paradigm cases. Similarities must be sought between a given case and paradigm cases. However, the recognition of similarity is not a mechanical procedure it requires judgment to determine which features of two cases being compared are relevant. The need for judgment implies that there are no determinate answers for resolving a conflict between two arguers following same method of reasoning. But the exercise of judgment is not a matter of mere taste or arbitrary preference. It requires its justification. There may be some principles and values to guide and regulate the exercise of judgment required in the methods of WRE. First, coherence, comprehensiveness, and the number of incorrect beliefs are not only criteria for comparing competing belief systems, but will also be values for a revision process. Second, we will pursue the maximization of coherence and comprehensiveness while minimizing revision, by revising peripheral beliefs rather than core beliefs in our belief system. Third, the efficiency of a revision process may be one of the important considerations tied to the choice of provisionally fixed beliefs.

"4원칙주의 생명의료 윤리"와 칸트 도덕철학

김종국 ( Jong Gook Kim ) 한국칸트학회 2016 칸트연구 Vol.37 No.-

이 글은 오늘날 영미권의 지배적 생명의료 윤리 프로그램인 4원칙주의의 칸트도덕철학에 대한 비판에 대해 가능한 칸트적 응답을 시도한다. 먼저 4원칙주의의 정체성을 이루는 근본 특징을 정리하고(2-1), 칸트적 기획에 대한 4원칙주의의 비판을 살펴본다(2-2). ‘공통 도덕’을 토대로 하여 ‘반성적 평형’을 추구하는 4원칙주의 기획은 대체로 칸트적 기획을 ‘산출력이 제한적이며 구체성을 담보할 수 없는 하향식 모델’이라고 비판한다. 이에 대해 나는, 칸트 도덕철학의 주요 개념에 대한 4원칙주의의 해석에 문제가 있다고(3-1), 또 이 기획이 칸트가 주목한 반성적 판단력을 놓치고 있다고 반박할 것이다(3-2). 결론적으로 나는, 4원칙주의의 이론적 토대가 실은 칸트 도덕철학이라는 점을 보임으로써 이 기획이 (그들이 의식하건 아니건) 생명의료 윤리 영역에서 칸트 도덕철학의 한 버전이라고 주장할 것이다. In my paper I attempt to seek the Kantian reply to T. Beauchamp and J. Childgress’ critique. First, I sum up the fundamental characteristics of their Principlism which center on common morality and reflective equilibrium, and I introduce their critique against Kant’s moral philosophy i. e. a limited output power and lack of concreteness. Second, against this criticism I will correct their misinterpretation of Kant’s categorical imperative and their ignorance about reflective judgement which in my opinion is the theoretical counterpart of reflective equilibrium. In conclusion, by demonstrating that the theoretical basis of Principlism is Kant’s moral philosophy I argue that the former is a version of the latter in biomedical ethics.

행위지침 제시에 효과적인 생명의료윤리학적 방법론 모색

목광수(Kwang Su Mok) 철학연구회 2014 哲學硏究 Vol.0 No.105

Tom Beauchamp and James Childress’s Principles of Biomedical Ethics has been considered one of the most prominent and important works in bioethics. It has been significantly revised for sophistication between the 1st edition (1979) and the 7th edition (2012). In the 1990 article, Bernard Gert and Danner Clouser criticized that Beauchamp and Childress’s principlism did not suggest a moral reasoning for actionguiding. If this critique is appropriate, it could be a significant fault for Bauchamp and Childress because, as many biomedical scholars do, they also believe that a theory of biomedical ethics should resolve a moral conflicts for action-guiding. In order to respond to this critique, in the 4ed edition (1994) Beauchamp and Childress introduced a strategy of “specification” and “balancing and weighing” for action-guiding and emphasized its theoretical priority over rival reasoning for action-guiding, such as casuistry. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether Beauchamp and Childress’s strategy is effective for action-guiding and, if not, to search for an effective reasoning for action-guiding. I criticize that Beauchamp and Childress’s strategy does not provide the most adequate or justified resolution for action-guiding because it cannot resolve the problem of indeterminacy which the balancing strategy traditionally faces. I argue that Beauchamp and Childress’s strategy should be compensated by casuistic reasoning, especially a argument of agent with moral characters and of education for her. It is to integrate Beauchamp and Childress’s strategy of balancing into a strengthen casuistic reasoning, which is based on common values and education of the society. I claim that a new strategy of specification with casuistic reasoning is effective for action-guiding in the biomedical ethics.

공통 도덕과 규범윤리학

최경석 ( Kyungsuk Choi ) 한국윤리학회 2020 윤리학 Vol.9 No.2

이 논문은 생명윤리적 쟁점들과 같은 실천적인 윤리 문제를 해결하는 데 있어 기존 규범윤리이론에 한계가 있음을 밝히며, 공통 도덕(common morality)을 기반으로 한 규범윤리학 이론이 개발될 필요가 있음을 주장한다. 실천적 문제해결에 기여할 규범윤리학은 다원주의 사회에서 직면하는 다양한 윤리적 문제를 해결하는 데 기여하고, 사회적 합의 도달에 기여함으로써, 개인적 차원에서 하나의 일관된 윤리적 시각을 제시하는 것만이 아니라, 가치 갈등을 해결하는 이론이어야 한다. 가치 다원주의가 시사하듯이, 우리가 추구하는 가치들은 어느 하나로 환원되거나 어떤 위계적 질서를 지니고 있지 못하다. 공리주의든 칸트의 의무론이든 덕 윤리든 어느 하나의 이론이 생명윤리의 문제를 해결하는 데 지배적인 역할을 하지 못함은 분명하다. 소위 “원칙주의”를 제시한 비첨과 췰드리스는 공통 도덕의 규범들을 네 가지 무리의 원칙으로 명명하면서, 해결해야 하는 사안의 맥락에서 이들 규범의 구체화, 비중주기, 균형잡기의 과정을 반성적 평형의 구체적 과정에 포함함으로써, 도덕 추론의 방법론으로서의 반성적 평형의 내용을 좀 더 발전시켰다. 또한 비첨과 췰드리스 그리고 거트가 이해하는 도덕은 도덕적 규칙, 이상, 그리고 성품의 덕으로 구성된 체계다. 사회적으로 수용되거나 용인되는 도덕적 판단은, 윤리위원회와 같은 그룹의 의사결정에서 목격하듯이, 결과적으로는 우리들이 공유하는 윤리이론과 규범, 숙고된 도덕 판단, 나아가 공유된 배경적 믿음과 정합적인 판단이다. 따라서 필자는 공유된 다양한 도덕적 규칙, 이상, 덕으로 구성된 공통 도덕을 기반으로 하는 규범윤리학이 다원주의 사회에서 작동할 수 있는 규범윤리학의 유의미한 후보라고 주장한다. In this paper, I argue that there are limitations of the current normative ethical theories to solve practical ethical problems like bioethical issues and that a normative ethics based on common morality needs to be developed. A normative ethics to contribute to solving practical problems should be a theory to solve the conflicts of values beyond a theory to provide a coherent ethical perspective in the level of an individual by helping our reaching a social consensus as well as contributing to solving various ethical issues we face with in a pluralistic society. As value pluralism implies, values we pursue cannot be reduced into the one value neither have a hierarchy order among them. It is clear that any normative theory among utilitarianism, Kantianism, and virtue ethics cannot have played a dominant role in solving bioethical issues. Beauchamp and Childress providing so-called “principlism” name clusters of norms in common morality “principles” and develop reflective equilibrium as a method of moral reasoning by including the processes of specifying, weighing, and balancing norms in the context of particular issues in the concrete process of reflective equilibrium. In addition, morality consists of moral rules, ideals, and virtues for Beauchamp and Childress as well as Gert. As we observe in a group decision-making like ethics committee, the moral judgment that is socially accepted or allowed finally should cohere with ethical theories and norms, considered moral judgments, and their background beliefs that we share. Thus, I argue that a normative ethical theory based on common morality consisting of shared various moral rules, ideals, and virtues is a good candidate as a theory to be able to work in our pluralistic society.

생명윤리학의 방법론 小考

吳世赫(Oh, Se-Hyuk) 中央大學校 法學硏究所 2010 法學論文集 Vol.34 No.1

Nowadays there are so many approaches to bioethics including traditional deontology and utilitarianism, modern principlism and casuistry as well as virtue bioethics, care bioethics, narrative bioethics, feminist bioethics, communitarian bioethics, pragmatism bioethics, phenomenological bioethics etc. Although the methods of bioethics would never resolve every legal problem resulting from bio-science and bio-technologies, they could provide methodological basis for finding a way to resolve the problems. The methods for bioethics are not going to differ from those for ethics or moral philosophy in general. Like another applied ethics, main ethical theories of bioethics are not different from those of ethics in general. Above all, deontological theories and utilitarian theories are intermingles with each other in bioethics. The structure & process of resolution of bioethical problems is also analogous to that of another applied ethics or practical ethics. The resolution mechanism of bioethical problems will not work by simple case study without appeal to ethical theories. But mere application of ethical theories to particular cases can not resolve bioethical problems properly. In these respects, every method in bioethics has it's strengths and weaknesses. Futhermore some approaches are overlapped, converged and complementary to each other. Nearly all bioethicists reject the extreme approaches in favor of more moderate views that concede much to the other camp. The methodological debate has now moved to a more mature and reflective stage, in which confrontation has begun to be superseded by accommondation and reconciliation.

상사의 윤리적 리더십이 부하의 윤리적 의사결정 의도에 미치는 영향 -조직 분위기의 조절효과-

한진환 ( Jin Hwan Han ) 한국인적자원관리학회 2014 인적자원관리연구 Vol.21 No.3

본 연구는 상사의 윤리적 리더십이 부하의 윤리적 의사결정 의도에 미치는 영향과 조직 분위기의 조절효과를 검증하였다. 자료의 수집은 충청남ㆍ북도, 대전시 소재 제조업의 총무부서, 자재조달부서, 회계부서의 구성원을 대상으로 2013년 10월 1일부터 동년 동월 30일까지 295명에 대하여 조사하였다. 본 연구의 결과를 요약하면 다음과 같다. 첫째, 상사의 윤리적 리더십이 부하의 윤리적 의사결정간에 유효한 정(+)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 둘째, 조직 분위기의 이기주의는 상사의 윤리적 리더십이 윤리적 의사결정 의도에 미치는 영향에 있어 유의한 부(-)의 조절효과가 있으며, 원칙주의는 상사의 윤리적 리더십이 윤리적 의사결정 의도에 유의한 정(+)의 조절효과가 있는 것으로 나타났다. 따라서 기업의 리더는 자신의 윤리적 행동과 의사결정 과정의 윤리성을 다시 점검하여 부하에게 매력적이고 모범적인 역할 모델이 될수 있도록 노력해야 하며, 부하와의 의사소통을 통해 윤리적 행동의 필요성을 인식시키고 명확한 윤리적기준을 수립하여 보상과 통제를 해야 할 것이다. 이러한 윤리적 리더십이 정착되면 부하의 윤리적 의사결정을 향상시킬 수 있을 것이다. 또한 모든 구성원이 공감하고 공유할 수 있는 가치기준이나 행동규범이 정립되고 윤리성이 높은 조직 분위기를 조성하는 것이 구성원의 윤리적 의사결정을 높이는 지름길이라고 할 수 있다. This study aimed to verify the effect of ethical leadership of leaders on the ethical decision making of subordinates and the moderating effect of organizational ethical climate in order to develop a plan of ethical decision making of employees of organizations and also to prove certain implications. Research was conducted on 295 employees from cooperation in Chungcheongnamdo/bukdo and Daejeon-si. Summary of this research is as follows. Firstly, the relationship between ethical leadership of leaders and ethical decision making of subordinates had significantly positive (+) effects. Secondly,egoism of ethical climate had negative (-) moderating effect in the effect of ethical leadership of leaders on ethical decision making of subordinates. principlism had significantly positive (+) moderating effects. Accordingly, leaders of organizations must endeavor to be attractive and exemplary role model to subordinates by reflecting ethical behavior and ethical decision making and also need to instruct necessity of ethical behavior through communication with subordinates and to establish clear ethical principles for compensation and control. Once such ethical leadership is settled it could develop ethical decision making of subordinates. And, the short-cut of ethical decision making of members is to settle value criteria and code of conduct for all members to agree with and to share, and also to develop highly ethical organization climate.

특수체육실천영역에 관한 윤리학적 고찰

조가람 ( Ga-ram Jo ) 한국스포츠정책과학원(구 한국스포츠개발원) 2020 체육과학연구 Vol.31 No.2

특수체육학 분야에는 실천영역에서 발생하는 윤리이슈에 관한 비판적 탐구를 시도한 연구가 매우 부족한 실정이다. 실천영역에서 윤리적 고찰이 필요한 이유는 특수체육지도자들이 자신의 의도와는 무관하게 지도현장에서 장애학생과 같은 타인의 삶에 부정적인 영향을 미칠 수 있기 때문이다. [목적] 따라서 본 연구의 목적은 특수체육실천 영역에서 나타날 수 있는 윤리이슈에 대한 윤리이론을 적용하고 시사점을 고찰하는 것이다. [방법] 본 연구자는 공리주의, 의무주의, 원칙주의, 덕윤리, 돌봄의 윤리이론을 통해 특수체육실천 영역에서 무엇이 옳고, 그른 것이지, 또는 무엇이 좋고 나쁜 것인지에 관한 비판적 고찰을 시도하였다. [결과] 연구 결과로 윤리이론을 고찰하고 각 이론이 특수체육실천에 제시할 수 있는 기여와 한계점을 논의하였다. In the field of Adapted Physical Activity, there is a dearth of research that has attempted to critically explore ethical issues arising in the field of practice. The reason why ethical considerations are needed in the field of practice is that adapted physical activity instructors can negatively affect other people's lives, such as students with disability, regardless of their intentions. [Purpose] Therefore, the purpose of this study is to apply ethical theories on ethical issues that may appear in the adapted physical activity practice field and consider their implications. [Methods] Through ethics theory, researcher attempted to critically examine what is right, wrong, or good or bad in the field of adapted physical activity practice. [Results] As a result of the research, ethical theories were considered and the contributions and limitations that each theory could offer to adapted physical activity practice were discussed.

行政法上의 不文法源으로서의 條理의 法源則

이재삼 경원전문대학 1999 論文集 Vol.21 No.-

It can be said that logic as an unwritten law on administrative law is the essential principle of things-logic of things, reason, general principles of laws, etc. -which is accepted by the general justice of society, such as a socially accepted idea, public interest, public order and standards of decency, justice, impartiality, truthfulness and sincerity, etc. The contents of logic indicate general principles of proportion, of equality, and of truthfulness and sincerity, which have universal validity in any times and society. The legal status and source of logic, as a general principle of administrative law, is drawn from the basic theory of Constitution-principles of proportion, principle of equality-, all the rules of positive law-principle of truthfulness and sincerity, of trust and protection, on the civil law-, and general theories of other rules, having legal validity in principle. In case there is no written law, common law, and judicial precedents on administrative law, logic is very important; it becomes the final supplementary source of administrative law. It functions to make up for the deficiency of written law on administrative law, becoming a general principle of administrative law. Because administrative law has in itself, complexity, change-ability, and description, causing itself deficient, imperfect, and contradictory; the whole Code of administrative law has not codified until now; its uncertain concepts are being used: its rules are interpreted in several ways; its discretionary power is being exercised in a wide range. Thus, logic has a useful function for the standard of punishment of administrative actions. In a word, logic, as a general principle of administrative law, is a universal principle which can be applied to all branches of administrative law. It has a practical effect and validity; it guarantees individual freedom and right; it fulfills the principle of Constitutionalism. That's why it is extended and applied to all the branches of discretionary and bestowal administration, being accepted as a general principle of administrative law. But, considering that the principles of logic isn't much different from the general principles of administrative law, it is important that we have to distinguish the former from the latter and maintain the peculiarity of the former in interpreting and applying to unwritten law and regulations. And in order to have a practical effect and validity, the principle of logic has to be harmonized with its original value, written law, and the root of case law. That is to say, it is important that it has to interpreted, according to its purpose and function on administrative law, for the perfect achievement of the aims of law and regulations. On the other hand, the general principles of laws has, like the principles of logic, a positive function to achieve concrete validity, but it can cause to weaken the exercise of right and to impair the stability of laws, when it is interpreted in ones favor and applied to in arbitrariness. Therefore, the general principles of laws should be, first of all, strictly interpreted and applied under the abstract situation, and drawn from the judgement of value of a judicial officer, and the general principles of laws-justice, equality, etc. -under the concrete one.

원칙중심 v. 규정중심: 법의 형식에 대한 법철학적 논의

김자봉 ( Jabonn Kim ) 한국금융법학회 2018 金融法硏究 Vol.15 No.2

이 글의 목적은 최근 국내에서 제기되고 있는 금융법 체계 구성형식의 개선요구를 법의 형식에 대한 법철학적 이론에 비추어 평가하고 정책적 시사점을 도출하는 데 있다. 이 글의 논의에서 명확해질 것으로 기대하는 바는, 법철학적 논의에 의하면 원칙을 중심으로 하는 금융규제 체계는 어쩌다 한번 생각해 봄직한 그런 임의적인 것이 아니라 합리적 금융규제 체계를 위한 필수적인 부분이라는 점이다. 법형식에 대한 법철학 논의의 대표적인 사례는 법실증주의와 법해석주의 간 논쟁인 Hart-Dworkin Debate인데, 이로부터 도출되는 정책적 시사점은 다음과 같다. (1) 원칙(principles)과 규정(rules)은 모두 법을 구성하는 요소이어야 한다. (2) 원칙과 규정이 모두 법적 요소로 활용됨으로써 법의 현실 적합성이 높아지고 규정의 절약이 가능해지며, 법이 말하고자 하는 바가 보다 완결된다. (3) 원칙은 규정의 합리적 근거를 밝히고, 규정은 이러한 근거하에 구체적인 법 행위를 표현한다. 원칙과 규정 간의 상하관계에 비추어 원칙이 법체계에서 근간을 이루는 원칙중심(principle-based) 체계가 규정중심(rule-based) 체계보다 더 바람직하다. (4)원칙중심에 기반한 법과 감독체제는 법적 결과를 낳은 원인(legal causation)에 대한 정보비 대칭성으로부터 야기되는 법적 불확실성을 제거하는 데 규정중심 체제에 비하여 더 효과적이다. (5) 규정중심 사전규제는 법적인 결과와는 무관하게 금융활동을 미리 임의적으로 제한하므로 규제의 법적 합리성이 낮은 반면, 원칙중심 사후규제는‘결과’를 야기한 원인을 대상으로 규제하므로 규제의 합리성이 높고 또한 이노베이션 인센티브에도 더 적합하다. (6) common law 체제는 필요에 부응하여 생성되는 판례법을 통해 높은 현실 적합성을 유지할 수 있는 데 반해, 판례의 법 제정 기능을 인정치 않는 규정중심 법 체제는 법의 현실 적합성을 유지하기가 쉽지 않다. 국회의 법 제정 및 개정이 현실의 필요에 부응하여 타이밍 있게 이루어지지 않기 때문이다. 따라서 판례의 법 생성 기능을 인정하지 않는 시스템에서는 현실 적합성을 위해 법을 구성하는 요소로서 원칙을 보다 적극적으로 활용해야 한다. (7) 원칙중심 사후규제를 효율적 및 효과적으로 집행하기 위해서는 감독당국이 사법적 권한을 확보해야 한다. 현재 우리나라의 법체계는 규정중심이다. 규제의 법적 합리성, 현실 적합성과 이노베이션 유인부합을 제고하기 위해서는 원칙중심 사후규제 체제로의 전환이 필요하다. 원칙중심 사후 규제는 규정중심 사전규제에 비하여 보다 높은 자율과 책임을 요구하는바, 사전적인 시장진입을 적절한 수준으로 완화함으로써 경쟁을 촉진하고 동시에 법적 결과에 대한 책임을 강화하는 효과를 낳을 수 있다. Better legal form needs both Rules and Principles as elements in a law. The philosophical debate between legal positivism and legal interpretivism, often called as ‘Hart (Herbert L. A. Hart) - Dworkin (Ronald Dworkin) Debate’ implicates : First, the law consisting of merely one of the elements may deviate from appropriate legal forms. Second, principles guide rules under which rules initiate specific behaviors, henceforth generally speaking, principle-based form may better lead a legal society than rule-based one. Third, regardless of either merit or demerit, principles contribute to laws to say with clarity. Fourth, the appropriate mixture of both principles and rules could best eliminate legal uncertainty that may arise under the information asymmetry about legal causations. Fifth, financial law and regulatory scheme may work better under principle-based mechanism than rule-based mechanism : it will effectively eliminate the information asymmetry problem by rendering the feedback effect of ex post regulation on ex ante behaviors and may incentivize innovative improvements of ex ante economic activities. Sixth, compared to the common law framework, the civil law framework may need to utilize principles more fully. In the common law, new series of cases can complement precedents or legal codes that may lack definitional sufficiency or anything. For example, SEC v. Howey complementarily defines what a security is that is absent in Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934. However, civil law should suffice by itself, otherwise no case law-like continual way of law making to complement is available. For definitional references, principles represent moral (legal intrepretivism) or non-moral (legal positivism) general standards while rules stipulate specific legal demands under the guidance of the principles. One principle may include numerous rules, and hence as a corollary, a rule or part of rules out of the whole sets of rules cannot represent the entirety of the principle. Because of this reason, a rule or part of rules without the related principle in a law may fail to identify what the purport of the law is. Principle-based form adopting both elements will better clarify policy objectives and make reasonable-person-test available than any other legal forms.