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This article aims to examine why East Asian Peace Community is needed for common security and peace in the region and what are the conditions for its attainment. In the recent years the North Korean nuclear problem has become one of the most important and urgent issues in international politics. Nonetheless, the cogent theoretical discussions for this issue in the academic circles have been rare in the context of how to build a stable peace and common security system. Considering that the discussions about East Asian community building with a focus on regional economic integration are numerous, this is quite paradoxical. The subject can be approached from many perspectives, but this article examines from the Korean Peninsula's perspective, particularly focusing on the relationships among South Korea, United States, and Japan. In doing so, this article emphasizes the positive role of Japan in the common efforts to build a regional peace community during the post-Cold War period, criticizing the negative role under the U.S.-Japan alliance during the Cold War era and asking her to take a more responsibility and a stronger initiative. For this new role Japan is needed to make a positive choice supported by a clear political vision and the goals and values which are coexistensive with peace, means that she continues, Unfortunately, however, the chance for Japan to take a new course quite different from that in the previous era is highly unlikely. Therefore, the prospects for building a peace community in the region under the second Bush administration are quite gloomy. At the same time, this article does put the emphasis on the concept of common space of meaning which means a sharing understanding among peoples and elites in the region that the most important among many interests is the security interest and the value of peace, rather than a sharing consciousness of East Asian identity as such.
This essay addresses tasks and prospects of a second South-North Korea summit that is expected to take place through the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-Il``s visit to Seoul. Tasks confronting a second inter-Korean summit are huge mostly because of the changing U.S. policy toward the North after the inauguration of the Bush administration. The 2000 historic South-North Korea summit was a combined outcome of the Kim Dae-Jung government``s “Sunshine Policy” and the Clinton administration``s “Engagement policy” toward the socialist country. Both governments`` effort to cultivate a better relationship with North Korea also reflected the changing international relations of Asia that have been left behind Europe in shedding the frame of the Cold War. Peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas is a precondition for a long overdue dismantling of the Cold War international order. The lingering danger of military conflict between the U.S. now controlled by hawkish Republicans and its asymmetrical challengers such as North Korea seems to sharply reduce the chances of cooperative partunership between the two Koreas. Many critics of the Bush administration``s foreign policy promoting National Missile Defense(NMD) and Theater Missile Defense(TMD) systems also point to close connection between the neoconservative-led administration and the high-tech defense industry as a possible source of “Regime change” approach to North Korea. There is also the domestic side of “Reverse couse,” and it is more critical for inter-Korean relations and East Asian regional order in the gears to come. Domestic critics of reconciliatory policy toward the North focus on the lack of reciprocity on North Korean side and continued weakening of U.S-South Korea alliance since the Bush administration came into office. The Pyunggang summit meeting of June 2000 showed that the two Koreas were ready to handle their problems independently, and the message is still to be taken seriously by surrounding powers that are envisioning a bid for regional hegemony. It is a current government``s responsibility to reduce military threat posed by North Korea while offering the North enough security guarantees. To achieve ends, South Korean government should engage in a close and open dialogue with the North and simultaneously direct more attention to drawing diplomatic support from the larger international community. So doing the South Korean government should be able to distinguish two issue areas of U.S-Korea alliance: one is regarding a more equal relationship between two countries and the other North Korean problems. It is crucial to keep debates over the former from unduly affecting the course of dealing with the latter. A second inter-Korean summit would be an important occasion in which South Korean government proves that U.S-Korea alliance and a more independent role for the South are not incompatible.
이 글은 문재인정부가 제시한 개헌안의 내용에 관한 것이 아니라, 개헌을 추진했던 방법에 대한 비판을 주제로 한다. 저자는 국회가 아닌 대통령이 중심이 돼추진하는 개헌 자체가 삼권분립의 원리와 충돌하기 때문에 민주주의의 원리와 상충한다고 주장한다. 또한 제헌헌법에 비유될 정도의 의제의 광범함과 헌법심의의 짧은 기간은 위험할 정도로 내용의 부실함을 불러올 수 있다. 동시에 이러한 개헌방식은 개헌안을 중심적으로 다루어야할 국회와 정당은 물론 시민사회 공론장에서 광범한 논의를 필연적으로 어렵게 한다. 이 글은 한국헌법의 틀로서 제헌헌법이 중심적으로 기초하고 있는 미국헌법과 그 제정과정 그리고 헌법수정과정의 사례들로부터 비교의 준거를 찾는다. This paper is a critique concerning the procedural aspect of the constitution amendment in Korea that the President has driven. The scope of amendment agendas also matters because it is as broad as that of the first constitution making, and the time span for deliberation is surprisingly short. As a consequence, they might cause the contents of amentment to bear some serious shortcomings. Furthermore, the amendment procedure, being driven by the President, not the National Assembly, may somehow contradict the principles of separation of power and checks and balances as the basic tenets of constitutional democracy. Such a way necessarily discourages the National Assembly and the party politicians from actively participating in broader discussions and deliberations concerning the agendas of the various amendment proposals, and also minimizing a broader citizen participation in the public sphere of civil society. In order to support his argument the author draws many theoretical and comparative references from America’s constitution making and its amendment processes.
This Study aims to analyze the failure of Japan Socialist Party (SP) in terms of the nature of party system in Japan. the 1955 system which has allowed the Liberal Democracy Party (LDP) to sustain its long and stable dominance in the Post-WWII Japanese politics was finally disintegrated in 1993 when the LDP fell so far short of a majority that it was unable to form a government in lower house election. One of the most important features of party system in Japan is that the organized labor cannot represent their interests and passions through a united party in the Japanese politics. In this regard, we can characterize the nature of party system in Japan as ‘democracy withou labor.’ An important point is that the failure of Socialist Party cannot be analyzed without considering the nature of party system in Japan as democracy without labor.<br/> This study focuses on the two variables, the effect of Cold War and the role of the state with a well-developed bureaucracy in analyzing the failure of Socialist Party. The political competition between LDP and SP under the 1955 system was not simply a political competition between two rival parties but a political competition between a pro-system party to have strong commitment to the preservation of the existing constitutional structure and an anit-system party to represent particular interests from a radical wing of the organized labor. Thus, the nature of LDP as a hegemonic party can be understood in this context of ideological dominance of anti-communism under the Cold War. With the effect of Cold-War, another important factor influenced the nature of LDP as a hegemonic party is the role of strong state and bureaucracy. They have played a crucial role in making the Cold War and anti-communism to have hegemony beyond functioning as a mainstream ideology as well as constructing the Post-WWII party system in Japan.
이 글은 현재 한국사회에서 통용되는 정치언어와 민주주의에 대한 상식화된 이해방식, 그로부터 만들어진 정치적 갈등이 얼마나 민주주의 발전에 기여할 것인가에 대해 비판적으로 논평한다. 특히 진보파 일각에서 이명박 정부는 민주주의가 아니다 라는 전제 위에 민주 대 반민주로 양분화해서 진영 간의 대결구조로 이해하는 문제와, 이른바 “반 MB전선”을 기초로 민주대연합을 주창하는 슬로건 내지는 정치 전략에 함축된 의미를 분석한다. 이 글은 민주주의에 대한 최소주의적 정의의 관점에서 이러한 인식의 문제점을 조명하면서, 민주주의의 실천과 관련하여 오늘날 한국정치와 시민사회의 공론장에서 가장 중요하다고 생각하는 열 개의 주제를 골라 짧게 논평하는 형식으로 쓰인 단편적인 삽화들로 구성된다. 지금 정치적 갈등은 대결적이고 격렬하게 공격적인 언어의 홍수로 뒤덮이고, 보수파와 진보파 사이에 엄청난 이념적 차이와 중대한 정치적 이슈를 둘러싼 타협불가능의 투쟁처럼 나타나고 있다. 그러나 그것은 한국 민주주의의 발전방향과 보통사람들의 사회경제적인 삶의 문제를 둘러싼 중심적인 갈등이라는 측면에서 볼 때, 단지 가식적인 것이거나 부차적인 중요성을 가질 뿐이다. 한국 민주주의의 가장 심각한 문제는 다른 어떤 것도 아닌 참여의 위기이다. 민주화 이후 지난 20년 동안 투표율은 지속적이고 가파르게 하락해온 결과 투표불참자는 현재 시민유효투표자의 절반에 이르게 되었다. 진보파들이 강조하는 시민운동이 정당이 하지 못하는 참여를 확대하고 소외계층의 의사를 대표하는 것처럼 생각하지만, 진실은 그렇지 않다. 오늘날 한국사회의 중심적인 갈등구조는 대표된 영역과 대표되지 않은 영역, 즉 사회경제적으로 안정적인 중산층 이상의 제도 내로 통합된 사회계층과 서민으로 통칭되는 제도에 통합되지 못한 노동자, 사회적 약자, 소외세력 간의 갈등을 특징으로 한다. 오늘날 격렬하고 공격적인 언어와 레토릭을 앞세운 정치적 대립과 투쟁은 제도권 내에서 발생하는 갈등을 반영할 뿐이다. 이 점에서 진보적 운동을 통해 강화돼왔던 민주/반민주, 진보/보수의 대립구도가 아닌, 한국사회를 구성하는 모든 사회적 층위의 실제 사회경제적 문제를 다루기 위한 이념과 방법의 차이에서 발생하는 새로운 진보/보수, 좌/우의 구분이 필요하다. 정치경쟁의 새로운 패러미터가 요구된다. These days Korean politics is flooded with aggressive and confrontational political languages and mood, thereby intensifying political conflict between the conservatives and the progressives. This situation is to some extent exacerbated by the way in which some sections of the progressive intellectuals and civic movment's activists understand democracy. This paper is a collection of ten vignettes on separate questions which critically comment on this problem. Since the Lee Myung -bak government inaugurated, the progressives have mounted on criticisms and oppositions against it, defining that it is not a democratic government. On this assumption they put forward a political slogan "a great democratic coalition for electoral victory" against the current conservative government based on the conception of political conflict and struggle between the two competiting blocs, namely, democratic forces and anti-democratic forces. In Korean society thanks to the fact that the democracy movement played a central role in democratic transition the legacy of movement is very strong, contrasting with the weak tradition of political party. Some progressive groups are fond of arguing democracy in terms of a maximalist definition rather than a liberal representative minimalist one. This paper examines why such a view is wrong and how they confuse democracy as a regime type with a particular government's characteristics including leadership style, policy contents, patterns of use of law, and so forth. The stylized understanding of democracy taken by some progressives who cherish a moralistic, romantic and ideal view of democracy is ever more encouraged since the Candlelight Vigil and advocates civic movements and direct democracy rather than political party and representative democracy. Under the circumstances political participation is in crisis as shown in the steady and sharp decline of voter turnouts registering about 30% in the last twenty years. At the same time while straddling the strong state Korea's presidents enjoy no effective checks and balances, thereby bringing the presidential system into a hyper-presidentialism combined with "instant politics". At the core of problems is the weakness or underdevelopment of the Korea's parties and party system which are not capable of effectively dealing with social and economic problems which have been arising from the time honored growth-first economy led by the state. Finally an alternative strategy to this predicament is presented that the present left/ right, or conservatives/progressives dividing line which is clearly outmoded, also carrying heavily ideological connotation is reshaped. It would be to allow for a new political parameter in which parties compete and conflict in order to deal with the real social and economic issues and formulate policy alternatives.
The purpose of this article is to examine preconditions of institutional reform that would nurture the development of Korean democracy. Proposals and suggestions have been made since the country's transition to democracy in 1987 to introduce institutional arrangements for redressing the polity's defects. They have been brought up on political discourse in the context of partisan calculation, anti-corruption, neoliberal rendering of politics, and anti-regionalism. As a result, discussions on institutional reform tend to ignore deeper sources of the new democracy's instability such as a cartelized party system with tenuous ties to social cleavages. Instead of searching for a remedy from the institutional menu, I provide an account of three principles for institutional design-participation, representation, accountability--that would serve as yardsticks against which the quality of democracy is measured. Emphasis on those three principles indicates my understanding that institutional reform should not be directed toward specific institutional alternatives imported from outside the existing polity. Rather, our attention must be paid to democracy as a complex set of partial regimes that address various dimensions of social conflict. Preoccupation with institutions themselves can be misleading in our search for better government. Institutions need to be working as well as democratic. For us to have workable institutions it is important to deliberate on social and political conditions into which exogenous institutions are embedded. Institutional reform must be pursued in a minimalist way, and how to organize a reasonable deliberation on institutional reform is an open, more important question.
This paper aims to reexamine the meaning of the Kwangju Uprising from the vantage point of the Korea's experience of new democracy for twenty years. The Uprising in 1980 is evaluated by the three stages for the evolving democracy. The first of the three is the transition from the authoritarian rule to democracy; the second is the consolidation of democracy; and the third is the Kwangju's legacy that can be interpreted in terms of a prospect which to bring about a robust development of Korea's democracy. No doubt, the view that the Uprising was the principal source of democratization in Korea is widely shared, and it is definitely correct. But the important question is the way in which how the Uprising is understood. In this sense the discourse regarding the Uprising is crucially important and is closely related with the current feature and the state of today's democracy. The spirit of the Uprising has been the source hardly to be dried up for the social movement not only in the course of democratization during the 1980s but also in its aftermath. With the demobilization of movement for democracy the grand discourses like 'nation(Minjok),' 'de mocracy(Minju),' and 'people(Minjung)' have inevitably declined. Nevertheless, among others the discourse of 'people' has been almost disappeared after the democratic consolidation. The paper emphasizes that the people discourse is the most important one for making Korea's democracy more robust and take root in the broader social strata. Today the disenchantment with democracy is widely spreading out general public. Democracy has not been so efficacious that it has failed to bring about substantive results more or less to redress the economic difficulties caused by the neoliberal globalizaton. The meaning and ideal of democracy is not circumscribed by the meaning attended with the notions of democratic transition and consolidation. The spirit of the Uprising does also exert an enduring influence on the people's efforts to realize and broaden socio-economic citizenship. And this effort can centrally be carried out by political parties whose development is on the political agenda of the high priority. This is the most important legacy of the Kwangju Uprising, with a particular emphasis on the discourse of people.