[특집 : 부작위범의 주요 쟁점]부진정부작위범의 입법형식과 형법 제18조의 성립경위

오병두(Oh Byung-Doo) 한국형사법학회 2005 刑事法硏究 Vol.23 No.-

특별사법경찰관리제도에 관한 소고

오병두(Oh Byung-Doo) 강원대학교 비교법학연구소 2008 江原法學 Vol.27 No.-

The article deals with the Special Judicial Police Officials (hereinafter "SJPO") in Korea. SJPO mean officials who don't belong to the police but have the investigative authority by "Act on the Persons Performing the Duties of Judicial Police Official and the Scope of Their Duties" (hereinafter "SJPO Act"), which was revised on 2008.6.13. This revision empowered more government officials as SJPO to investigate crimes on their services and vested pre-existing SJPO with more judicial powers. The SJPO have the same authority in investigation as the police officers (so-called "General Judicial Police Officials"). The point is that this revision should be counted as legitimate and thus acceptable, or that it could be theoretically and practically justified by the legislative purposes of SJPO Act. There are two different points of view on SJPO and SJPO Act. The one is that SJPO are the judicial police officials who have the limited power of investigation and should fill up functional vacancies of the police officers in time, space and specialty. This view is mostly espoused by the police. The prosecution takes the opposite position over the SJPO. This standpoint considers SJPO as the 'special' police officials which are superior to police officers in specialty and should have priority in its investigative authority. This revision reflects the view that resembles that of the prosecution. In Korean criminal justice system, under which every investigation agency should obey the 'investigation direction' of the prosecutor(§§ 195, 196 Criminal Procedure Act of Korea), it could strengthening the prosecution's power by way of the SJPO without the knowledge of the citizen. In revision of SJPO Act, the National Assembly of Korea should have provided controling devices over the authority of SJPO and the prosecution more thoughtfully. It is not the authority of the police and the prosecution, but the freedoms of the citizens, who could easily fall victims to the officials' abuses of power in the criminal justice system, that the legislature should make every efforts to guarantee. And the National Assembly should have more thoroughly deliberated how the power of investigation should be distributed among the prosecution, SJPO and the police, in the whole criminal justice system of Korea.

정보경찰 개혁방안 ― 경찰개혁위원회의 “경찰의 정보활동 개혁”권고안을 중심으로 ―

오병두 ( Oh Byung Doo ) 민주주의법학연구회 2018 민주법학 Vol.0 No.68

경찰개혁위원회는 2018월 4월 27일 경찰청에 “경찰의 정보활동 개혁”권고안을 권고하였다. 권고안은 그간 충분히 논의되지 못하였던 정보경찰의 실상을 공식적으로 확인하면서 ① 경찰청 정보국의 기능을 ‘치안정보의 수집·작성·배포’에서 ‘공공안녕의 위험성에 대한 예방 및 대응’ 기능으로 재편하고, 경찰의 정보활동은 경찰의 각 기능별 직무 수행을 위한 필요최소한 범위로 제한하면서 이에 대한 사후 통제를 강화할 것, ② 민간을 대상으로 하는 사찰활동을 즉각 중단하고, 경찰청 정보국의 기구와 인력을 대폭 축소할 것, ③ 개별적 경찰정보활동에 관한 구체적인 수권규정을 두면서 “구체적인 직무 범위와 권한, 직무수행시의 인권침해 우려를 불식할 수 있는 방안 및 권한남용시의 엄중한 형사처벌 등”을 명시할 것, ④ 경찰의 정보활동에 관하여 투명성과 공개성의 원칙을 준수할 것 등의 개혁방안을 제시하였다. 이에 대응하여 경찰청도 권고안을 제도적으로 반영하겠다며 구체적인 이행계획을 내놓았다. 이 글에서는 위 권고안을 비판적으로 검토하였다. 현재 논의되고 있는 정보경찰 개혁문제는 민주주의 국가구조를 전제로 한 정보보안기구의 역할배분과 관련된 것으로 보아야 한다. 즉, 민주적인 경로를 통해 국민의 여론을 취합하고 이를 국정에 반영할 수 있는 국가체제를 재구성하거나 또는 발전시킨다는 관점에서 보아야 할 문제이다. 현행 정보국 체제는 시민을 단순한 통치의 대상 정도로 보면서 통치정보를 밀행적 방식으로 수집하고 이를 토대로 국민을 관리하는 권위주의적 국가구조에 유래한 것이므로 민주주의적 국가질서에서는 더 이상 용납되기 어렵다. 따라서 정보국을 완전 폐지하고 민주주의 국가에 적합한 정상적인 정보의 생산-소비구조를 구축하여 이를 대체해야 한다. 같은 맥락에서, 범죄수사와 위험방지라는 경찰의 임무와 무관한 영역까지 정보활동을 확장하고자 하는 경찰의 ‘정책정보 강화론’에 대해서도 법적인 제한을 가할 필요가 있다. Recently the Police Reform Committee recommended on the “Reform of Police Information Activities” for the reform of Intelligence Police to the National Police Agency as follows: 1) to reorganize the Intelligence Police into the function of “preventing and responding to the danger of public security”, and to restrict the police information activities to the minimum extent necessary to carry out its own duties, while strengthening follow-up control; 2) to stop immediately the police information activities for the private sector and to reduce greatly the organization and personnel of the Intelligence Police; 3) to regulate specifically the scope and authority of the individual police information activities, and to stipulate strict criminal penalties for the abuses of this authority; and 4) to provide reform measures for the transparency and openness about police information activities. In response, the National Police Agency also came up with an implementation plan. This article critically reviews the above recommendations. It starts from the standpoint that the issues of the Intelligence Police reform are related to the role allocation among the national security agencies in the context of democratic state structure. This article also lays emphasis on the point that it is necessary to reconstruct or develop structures which could collect the public opinion in democratic way and reflect it into the government policy. The current Intelligence Police system is derived from the authoritarian state structure that considers its citizens as a mere subject of ruling system and governs its citizens by way of the political information gathered in a secret way. Thus the Intelligence Police is no longer acceptable in the democratic state. Therefore, it is necessary to completely abolish the Intelligence Police system and to replace it by building a new and normal information production-consumption system suitable for the democratic state. In the same vein, it is also necessary to impose legal restrictions on police’s emphasis on ‘policy information’, that aims to expand police information activities even to the area that is not related to police duties such as crime investigation and prevention of danger.

군형법의 문제점과 개정방향

오병두 ( Byung Doo Oh ) 한국형사정책학회 2008 刑事政策 Vol.20 No.1

｢보험사기방지 특별법｣에 대한 평가와 개선방향

오병두(Oh, Byung Doo) 한국형사정책학회 2016 刑事政策 Vol.28 No.3

This paper deals with the criminal provisions in “Special Act on Insurance Fraud” (hereinafter as “SPIF”), which was promulgated on March 2016. It is explained that its main purpose is to facilitate the prevention of the insurance fraud by introducing the criminal provisions to punish it more harshly from the standpoint of the general prevention, and by making it easier to investigate it. The author examines the criminal provisions in SPIF, both substantially and procedurally, and finds out its legislative purpose is not fully accomplished owing to its shortcomings. Substantially this Act is almost the same as the existing criminal provisions against the insurance fraud in “Criminal Act” and “Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes”, except for the amount of fine. And it is true that SPIF may newly stipulate the procedures for investigation of the insurance fraud, but in reality this provisions would make really no material differences in the present practice. Consequently, it is foreseeable that SPIF would be called for revision sooner or later, because of its legislative flaws. Finally, the author criticizes the biased criminal policy in the interests of the insurance companies that leads to the inherent shortcomings of SPIF, and makes several legislative proposals as conclusion.

직권남용죄의 성립범위 -법관·검사의 형사책임 논의를 위한 단초-

오병두 ( Oh Byung-doo ) 건국대학교 법학연구소 2019 一鑑法學 Vol.0 No.44

최근 ‘사법농단’사태와 검찰 과거사위원회의 활동 등으로 판사와 검사에 대한 직권남용죄(형법 제123조)의 적용 가능성이 논의되고 있다. 이 글은 그 논의의 단초로서 직권남용죄의 연혁, 비교법적 자료, 한국 대법원의 판결을 살펴보고, 직권남용죄의 핵심표지인 ‘직권의 남용’을 중심으로 그 성립범위의 해석론을 다루고 있다. 직권남용죄의 실효성과 예측가능성 확보를 위해 합리적 규율범위를 확보할 필요가 있고, 그 수단으로 ‘일반적 직무권한’과 ‘남용’의 단계적 검토와 양자의 적정한 구체화가 필요하다고 보았다. 일반적 직무권한의 외연을 확정하기 위해 형법의 보장적 기능의 관점에서 일정한 제한이 필요하다. 여기에서는 직권남용죄가 가지는 공무원범죄로서의 기본성격을 우선 고려하여야 한다고. 일정한 ‘직무’과 직권남용죄에서의 ‘직권’ 내지 ‘일반적 직무권한’으로 인정되기 위해서는 직무로서의 외관·형식을 일차적 기준으로 하면서 ‘직권’의 유형별로 엄격한 해석이 필요한 경우와 완화된 해석이 가능한 경우를 나누어 접근할 필요가 있다. 이때 공무원이 담당하는 ‘직권’과 관련된 ‘직무’의 기능과 성격(법률상의 명시적 근거가 있는지 아니면 법질서 전체를 종합적·합리적으로 판단하여야 하는지, 법령이 정한 엄격한 형식을 취하고 있는지, 상대방에게 침해적인지 아니면 수익적인지, 기속행위인지 아니면 재량행위인지 등), 그리고 실행하는 ‘직권’이 미치는 사실상·법률상 효과와 범위(공익적 효과와 그 범위와 크기, 정책결정의 영향력이 가지는 지속성, 대상자의 범위, 국민의 자유와 권리에 미치는 효과와 범위 등)가 고려될 수 있을 것이다. 최근 문제가 되고 있는 ‘판사 블랙리스트’ 등 사법농단 사태나 검찰의 과거사 문제에서 실체법적으로는 직권남용죄가 충분히 적용될 여지가 있다. 판사와 검사에게는 일반 공무원과 구별되는 광범한 재량과 큰 권한이 인정된다. 따라서 재량의 폭과 함께, 일반적 직무권한과 그에 대한 책임이 인정되는 영역이 넓어진다. Recently, the criminal responsibility of judges and prosecutors, by way of applying the “abuse of authority”(Article 123, the Korean Criminal Code) to them, is being actively discussed, due to the Scandals of the Judicial and the Prosecution, such as Judge Blacklist cases and corruption cases in the Prosecution. In this vein, this article deals with the interpretation of this provision. We make the historical and comparative study of “abuse of authority”, analyse the Korean Supreme Court’s rulings on this provision, and seek to find out more reasonable criteria for the Article 123. It is needed to punish officials who abuse their authority and are criminally liable for it to prevent corruptions of officials and to enhance the function of the state. At the same time, it is important to set limitations on the requirements of this offense to guarantee functional autonomy of officials and effective operation of administration. These two values are conflicting in criminal law and enforcement system. Hence, we endeavor to find out what criteria are advisable and practical for determining criminal responsibility of the officials. The central requirements of this provision are “abuse” and “authority”. Only when a public official “abuses” his authority in performing official duties within “general competency” allowed by law, he could be punished according to this provision. Thus, these two requirements should be examined in phase. First, the action of the official should be proved by its official characters in appearance whether they were done with “general competency”. And then the level of wrongfulness of this action also ought to be checked, and estimated that it could be considered as an “abuse” in a substantial and material sense. The judges and prosecutors are also the subjects of the criminal liability, the same as the other officials, according to the Article 123, “abuse of authority”. Normally judges and prosecutors have broader discretion and more power in criminal justice system that distinguishes them from other public officials. Therefore, it is also reasonable that judges and prosecutors should have more legal responsibilities in proportion to the size of their discretions and powers.

독일의 컴퓨터범죄대응을 위한 제41차 형법개정법률 - 배경, 내용 및 시사점 : 독일의 컴퓨터범죄대응을 위한 제41차 형법개정법률

오병두(Oh Byung-Doo) 한국형사법학회 2007 형사법연구 Vol.19 No.3

탄소 나노 튜브- 실리콘 고무 합성 소재를 이용한 고효율, 신축성 마찰대전 발전 소자

김진아(Jinah Kim),김기용(Giyoung Kim),김성열(Sung yeol Kim),박진형(Jinhyong Park) 대한기계학회 2021 대한기계학회 춘추학술대회 Vol.2021 No.4

마찰 대전 발전 소자(TENG)는 서로 다른 두 물질 간 접촉-분리 움직임을 통해 마찰 대전 효과와 정전기 유도 간의 결합 효과를 사용하는 기계적 에너지 발생기이다. (Fan, Tian et al. 2012) 마찰 대전 발전 소자는 다기능 및 휴대용 전자 제품에 에너지를 공급하기위한 대체 전원으로 제안된다. TENG는 기계적 에너지를 사용하기 때문에 기계적 움직임에 쉽게 적용할 수 있는 유연성과 신축성이 필요하다. (Liu, Li et al. 2019) 이 연구에서 CNTs-Dragon Skin 실리콘 고무 나노 복합체를 사용하여 고성능을 나타내며 뛰어난 신축성을 보이는 TENG 를 구현하였다. 마이크로/나노 엔지니어링 된 전극을 TENG에서 사용하여 전극의 표면적에 따른 커패시턴스 증가를 유도하고 이에 따른 TENG의 출력 변화를 분석하였다. 전극 물질과 유전층의 접촉이 TENG 출력에 미치는 영향을 분석하기 위하여 유전 물질의 CNT 양과 분석법에 따른 출력 특성의 변화를 측정하였다. 또한 TENG의 출력에 미치는 전극의 두께 효과를 분석하였다. CNTs-Dragon Skin TENG의 CNTs 농도에 따른 인장특성을 확인하고, 다양한 application에 적용을 위하여 인장 후 접촉-분리 움직임에 따른 출력 변화 및 전극의 저항 변화를 확인하였다. The triboelectric nanogenerator (TENG) is the mechanical energy generator using coupling effect between triboelectric effect and electrostatic induction through the contact-separation motion of two different materials. It is strongly proposed as an alternative power source to supply energy for the multi-functional and portable electronics. Since the TENG uses mechanical energy, it requires flexibility and stretchability that can be easily applied to mechanical movements. In this study, high performance stretchable TENG was demonstrated using CNTs-Dragon Skin silicon rubber nanocomposite. A micro/nanoengineered electrode was used in TENG to induce an increase in capacitance according to the surface area of the electrode, and the change in the output of TENG was investigated. The effect of contact between the electrode material and the dielectric layer on the output of TENG was investigated by confirming the change in output characteristics according to the amount of CNT in the dielectric material and the dispersion method. In addition, we investigated the effect of thickness of electrode on the performance of TENG. The stretchability of CNTs-Dragon Skin TENG according to the CNTs concentration were investigated by measuring of stress-strain curve, in addition change in output and electrode resistance according to the stretching were investigated.

공무집행방해죄에 있어서 적법성의 체계적 지위

오병두 ( Byung Doo Oh ) 홍익대학교 법학연구소 2016 홍익법학 Vol.17 No.1

Diese Arbeit geht um die dogmatische Einordnung von der Rechtmasigkeit der Amtshandlung in § 136 Abs. 1 des koreanischen StGB(Widerstand gegen die Staatsgewalt). Trotz dem Fehlen des Merkmal von Rechtmasigkeit der Amtshandlung in demselben Absatz, verlangen dieses die herrschende Lehre und die Rechtsprechung. Und uber die Frage, wie es sich bei der Rechtmasigkeit der Amtshandlung im Verbrechensaufbau behandeln soll, gibt es drei Losungsvorschlagen: (1) Tatbestandslosung, (2) Rechtfertigungslosung, und (3) die theorie der objektiven Strafbarkeitsbedingung. Zum Abschluss hat die Arbeit sowohl de lege lata als auch de lege ferenda gezeigt, das die Rechtmasigkeit der Diensthandlung des Amtstragers zunachst als die Tatbestandsmerkamal(sog. Tatbestandslosung), da der Vorsatz auf die Rechtmasigkeit der Diensthandlung des Amtstragers sich erstrecken und gegen rechtswidrige Amtshandlung die Notwehr(§ 21 kStGB) zulassig sein konnte, aber schleslich bzw. endgultig als die in Fallen fehlender Rechtmasigkeit der Diensthandlung den Tater freizulassende objektive Strafbarkeitsbedingung angesehen werden soll. Ferner hat der Autor auch den Vorschlag gemacht, das der Irrtum uber die Rechtmasigkeit de lege ferenda in § 136 Abs. 1 kStGB geregelt werden soll.

독립적 특별수사기구의 도입방안에 관한 연구

오병두(Oh, Byung-Doo) 한국형사정책학회 2012 刑事政策 Vol.24 No.2

This article deals with the proposal for the bill of 『the Independent Investigation Office against the High-ranking Officials’ Crimes』 in 2010 by People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy(PSPD), and with the 5 bills introduced by the members of the 18th Korean National Assembly. This proposal for the bill was first introduced in 1996, again in 2002, and yet again in 2010, followed by many bills, but it only failed to pass. Now it is already brought up again the new 19th National Assembly. The Independent Investigation Office was, at first, designed against the corruption of high-ranking public official (Anti-Corruption Model). But the situation in Korea has made it as a new choice for the control the power abuse of the Korean Prosecutor’s Office (Checks-and-Balances Model). Its focus has been gradually shifted from the Anti-Corruption Model to the Checks-and-Balances Model, because the Prosecution in Korea is being charged with the uncontrolled power and the political partiality. Naturally the Korean Prosecutors’ Office repulses another investigating organization, because it is mainly based on the mistrust of the Prosecutors’ Office and a new investigation office could drastically reduce its power. In this article, I have scrutinized the proposal and bills and compare them from the viewpoint of the Checks-and-Balances Model. And thereby I suggest, as a conclusion, that the introduction of “the Independent Investigation Office” should enable the prosecution to be more independent from political influences and to be the effective remedy against the mistrust of the criminal justice system.