17~18세기 전반 인삼무역의 변동과 개성상인의 활동

양정필 ( Yang Jeong-pil ) 제주대학교 탐라문화연구원 2017 탐라문화 Vol.0 No.55

조선후기 개성상인은 국내 상업활동뿐 아니라 국제 무역을 통해 크게 성장하였다. 본 연구는 17~18세기 전반기 개성상인의 국제무역 특히 인삼 무역을 고찰하였다. 조선후기 인삼 무역은 국내외 여건의 변화에 따라 큰 변동을 겪었다. 임진왜란 시기에는 明의 군인, 상인들이 직접 조선 영내로 들어와서 군사 활동 외에 상업에도 종사하였다. 그들은 다량의 인삼을 명으로 갖고 갔다. 임란 직후에는 조선에 들어온 명의 사신들이 인삼 획득에 혈안이 되었다. 그들이 징색해간 인삼은 막대하였다. 임란과 임란 직후의 인삼 무역은 명의 군사 지원이라는 조건 속에서 이루어진 특수한 형태였다. 명·청 교체기의 인삼 무역 역시 새로운 것이었다. 청의 발상지인 만주는 인삼 자생지였다. 후금 성장의 경제적 배경에는 인삼 교역이 있다. 따라서 후금은 조선에서 인삼을 수출하려 하였다. 당시까지 조선은 인삼 수출국이었는데 수입국이 된 것이다. 조선 인삼의 대 중국 수출이 부진해지자 조선의 인삼상인들은 일본으로 인삼 수출을 시도하였다. 당시까지 인삼의 對日수출은 극히 제한된 범위에서 이루어졌는데, 이때부터 대일 인삼 수출이 활기를 띠게 되었다. 이 시기에 활약한 대표적인 인삼 상인으로 개성상인을 들 수 있다. 당시 정부가 인삼관련 대책을 마련할 때마다 반드시 언급되는 곳이 개성이었다. 개성은 인삼 산지가 아님에도 언급된 이유는 개성상인들이 인삼 교역을 장악하고 있었기 때문이다. 1685년에는 국경을 넘어 만주에서 인삼을 채취하던 조선인이 청국 관리에게 放銃하여 상처를 입히는 사건이 발생하였다. 사안의 심중함을 인식한 조선 정부는 이듬해 인삼 채굴과 무역 모두를 금지하였다. 전면적인 인삼 금지령으로 인삼 채굴인들이 생계의 곤란을 겪는 문제가 발생하였다. 불법화되었음에도 인삼상인들의 활동이 멈춘 것도 아니었다. 결국 정부의 禁蔘정책은 차츰 이완되어 갔다. 1694년에는 부분적으로 인삼 채취를 허용하고, 1693년 무렵에는 동래의 왜관에서 인삼 禁令을 해제하고, 1707년에는 평안도와 함경도의 禁蔘도 해제하였다. 이에 인삼 무역은 다시 활기를 띠었다. 이 시기 인삼의 주요 수출국은 일본이었다. 1640년 무렵 허가된 대일 인삼 무역이 이 시기에 와서 만개한 것이다. 이러한 인삼 무역의 변동 속에서 개성상인은 핵심 인삼 상인으로 활동하였다. 그들은 인삼 산지에 직접 들어가서 인삼을 구입했을 뿐 아니라 그것을 직접 외국으로 수출하기도 하였다. 개성상인은 이러한 노력으로 인삼 무역 호황기의 최대 수혜자가 될 수 있었고, 조선후기를 대표하는 상인으로 성장할 수 있었다. Gaesung merchants in late Joseon period have significantly expanded their operations domestically and internationally. This research has examined the international trade of Gaesung merchants, notably ginseng trade, from 17th century to early 18th century. Ginseng trade in late Joseon era went through great transformations according to internal and external conditions. During the Hideyoshi invasion of Korea, Chinese soldiers and merchants came to Korea and engaged in commerce other than military operations. They eventually gathered large amounts of ginseng back to China. After the invasion came the envoys from Ming China, eager to obtain ginseng. They have also collected immensely as a result. During and in the aftermath of the Hideyoshi invasion, the nature of ginseng trade was uniquely determined under the condition of Chinese military aid. Ginseng trade during Ming-Qing transitional tmes of China witnessed dramatic change as well. Manchuria, the birthplace of Qing dynasty, also happened to be the wild growth place of ginseng. The economic background of Later Kum growth was none other than Ginseng trade, so that Kum tried to export ginseng to Joseon Korea. The position of Joseon was reversed, as it now became the importer of ginseng, which was the exact opposite of the previous. As the Joseon ginseng export to China was at a low ebb, the merchants tried to find a breakthrough by commercializing with Japan. Until then, ginseng export to Japan was strictly limited, but became more active from this time. During this period, Gaesung merchants played a major role of ginseng trade, as Gaesung was always mentioned whenever the Korean government made ginseng measures. Gaesung merchants were dominating ginseng trade, thus the reason why the city was treated important despite the fact that it was not a production center. In 1685, a Korean who crossed the border and collected ginseng in Manchuria shot and injured a Chinese official. Due to the seriousness of the incident, Joseon government banned both ginseng extraction and trade the following year. Because of an all out ginseng prohibition, ginseng gatherers faced immediate problems in their livelihood. This situation led to some illegal activities of ginseng traders, which eventually caused the government to loosen its prohibition. The Joseon court allowed partial extraction in 1694, lifted the ban in Japanese residential area of Busan around 1693, and cancelled the measure itself in Pyeongan and HamKyeong provinces in 1707. Such developments led to a reflowering of ginseng trade. At this age, Korea`s main exporting country was Japan, as ginseng trade permitted circa 1640 came to flourish during this epoch. During this time of ginseng trade transformation, Gaesung merchants were crucial in terms of its operation. Not only did they purchased ginseng directly from the production areas, they also exported the commodity directly to outside Korea as well. Thanks to their endeavors, Gaesung merchants became the prime benefactor of the booming ginseng trade, and ultimately managed to be the leading merchants of late Joseon period.

복합파생상품의 가격결정과 회계처리 이슈 및 개선방안 : 무이표수의상환채권(Zero-Coupon Callable Bond)의 사례

양정필 ( Jeong Phil Yang ),장욱 ( Uk Chang ),최영수 ( Young Soo Choi ) 한국파생상품학회(구 한국선물학회) 2018 선물연구 Vol.26 No.2

본 연구는 복합파생상품의 가격결정과 회계처리를 연결해서 회계처리를 고려한 가격결정(공정가치 평가)대안을 제시함으로써 일관된 수렴안을 제시하고자 한다. 대표적인 복합파생상품으로서 무이표수의상환채권(ZCCB)을 선정해서 사례연구를 실시한다. ZCCB의 기대만기 추정과 관련해서, 역사적 기대만기를 기본으로 내재기대만기를 조정하는 방법이 필요하다. 시뮬레이션과 실증분석 결과, 내재기대만기 분포의 매우 큰 특징은 Non-Call 직후나 무이표채권(ZCB) 만기시점에 상환하는 쌍봉분포임을 알 수 있다. 따라서 내재기대만기를 사용할 경우, 평균값을 사용하는 것보다 Non-Call 직후 만기나 ZCB 만기를 사용하는 것이 회계처리에서 유의미할 것 같다. ZCCB의 SPPI test 충족여부와 관련해서, ZCCB 수익률은 시장입력변수와 채권 발행조건에 따라서 결정되어 발행할 때 이미 원리금이 고정되고 ZCCB 발행이후 매입/매도 시점에서도 이자율관련 곡선/변동성이 시장 입력변수로 주어지고 ZCCB의 현금흐름은 이미 원리금으로 고정되어 있으므로 SPPI 조건을 만족한다고 판단할 수 있다. This study aims to deal with the valuation and accounting of complex derivative instruments. This study attempts to propose a convergence plan by presenting a pricing (fair value evaluation) alternative that considers the accounting process. In this paper, we choose a ZCCB as a representative structured derivative and conduct a case study. Regarding the expected maturity of ZCCB, there is a need to adjust the historical expected maturity by reflecting the implied expected maturity. As a result of simulation and empirical analysis, it can be seen that the greatest feature of the expected maturity distribution is the Bi-Modal distribution redeemed immediately after the non-call period or at the maturity of the ZCB. Therefore, when using expected maturity, it would be more meaningful to use ZCB maturity date or just after non-call period date rather than the average. Regarding whether ZCCB's SPPI test is satisfied, the ZCCB return rate is determined according to market input variables and bond issuance conditions and is already fixed at issuance, so it can be judged that the SPPI condition is satisfied.

해외 패시브하우스의 건축구조유형별 계획특성 연구

양정필(Yang, Jung-Pil) 한국생태환경건축학회 2013 한국생태환경건축학회 논문집 Vol.13 No.3

한말-일제 초 근대적 약업 환경과 한약업자의 대응 : 매약'제조업자의 등장과 성장을 중심으로

양정필(YANG Jeongpil) 대한의사학회 2006 醫史學 Vol.15 No.2

16세기 제주도의 위기와 流民 증가 그리고 출륙금지령

양정필(Jeong-Pil Yang) 제주학회 2023 濟州島硏究 Vol.59 No.-

15세기에 제주도의 경제적 상황은 나쁘지 않았다. 그러나 16세기 들어서 제주도는 위기에 처하였다. 16세기 초반에 제주도에서는 흉년이 계속되고 전염병이 빈발하였다. 그 결과 굶어주고 병들어 죽는 사람이 많았다. 또 제주도 지방관들의 失政과 탐학도 이어졌고, 進上도 가중하여서 제주도인의 삶은 피폐해졌다. 무엇보다 여러 재난이 짧은 기간에 연이어 발생하여서 위기를 극복할 수 있는 시간적 여유가 없었던 것이 상황을 악화시켰다. 위기의 여파로 제주도에서 살 수 없다고 판단하고 본토로 떠나는 유민이 증가하였다. 16세기 전반에 사망자와 유민의 증가로 제주도의 인구는 격감하였다. 당시는 왜적의 침입이 빈발하여서 제주도를 방어하는 것은 중요하였다. 조정에서는 제주도의 인구 격감을 심각하게 받아들이고 인구를 회복시키기 위한 정책들을 추진하였다. 우선 제주도를 떠나 본토에서 떠도는 유민들을 쇄환하였다. 그리고 삼남 지방의 사람들을 제주도로 들여보내 인구를 늘리려는 논의도 있었다. 이러한 대책에도 불구하고 제주도의 위기와 인구 감소는 극복되지 못했다. 16세기 후반에 제주 목사들은 제주도인의 본토 출입을 통제하였다. 제주도인은 목사가 자신의 부정행위가 알려지는 것을 우려해서 출입을 막는다고 생각하였다. 그렇지만 그 시책은 결과적으로 제주 유민의 발생을 막고 제주도의 인구 감소를 억제하는 효과가 있었다. 그래서 정부에서는 1629년에 제주 목사의 시책을 공인하여 출륙금지령을 내린 것으로 이해된다. In the 15th century, the economic situation in Jeju Island was not bad. However, in the 16th century, famine continued and infectious diseases occurred frequently. So many people starved and died sick. Also, local officials in Jeju Island did not manage well. In addition, the tax burden increased, making the lives of Jeju Islanders even more impoverished. Jeju Island was unable to escape the crisis as several disasters occurred in a short period of time. Those who judged that they could not live in Jeju Island began to leave Jeju Island. As the number of deaths and displaced people increaseds, the population of Jeju Island decreased sharply. The Government took this seriously. Because at that time, invasions of Japanese pirates were frequent, so it was important to defend Jeju Island. So the government pushed for policies to restore the population. First of all, the refugees who left Jeju Island and wandered from the mainland were repatriated. There was also a discussion to increase the population by bringing people from the southern regions into Jeju Island. Despite these measures, Jeju Island's crisis and population decline had not been overcome. Meanwhile, in the late 16th century, local officials of Jeju controlled Jeju Islanders from entering the mainland. the policy had the effect of preventing the occurrence of Jeju refugees and curbing the population decline in Jeju Island. Therefore, in 1629, the government authorized the Jeju official's policy and imposed a ban on Jeju people from leaving the island.

해방 이후 1950년대 홍삼 수출 연구

양정필(YANG, Jeongpil) 한국사학회 2022 史學硏究 Vol.- No.148

본고에서는 해방 이후 1950년대까지 홍삼 수출이 어떻게 이루어졌는지를 살펴보았다. 미군정 시기에는 미군정 자체의 소극적인 무역 정책과 중국 본토에서 홍삼 수입 금지 등 여러 요인이 복합적으로 작용해서 홍삼수출은 매우 침체되었다. 새로 수립된 정부는 미군정 시기에 제조되었지만 수출하지 못한 10만 근 이상의 홍삼을 넘겨받았다. 이 홍삼은 정부 재정에 크게 기여할 것으로 기대를 모았다. 그러나 이승만 정권은 홍삼 수출 방법을 둘러싸고 시행착오를 겪었다. 우여곡절 끝에 백낙승의 대한문화선전사에 홍삼을 불하하였다. 대한문화선전사는 3만근 이상의 홍삼을 홍콩으로 갖고 가서 판매를 시도하였지만 제대로 판매하지 못하였다. 그래서 전매청은 1952년에 그 계약을 파기하였다. 1950년대 초반 전쟁 중에는 홍삼 생산이나 수출이 힘들었다. 그러나 전쟁 말기인 1953년 6월부터 홍삼이 다시 수출되기 시작하였다. 1954년까지 두 번에 걸쳐 3만근 가까운 홍삼이 수출되었다. 그럼에도 3만5천여근의 홍삼이 남아 있었다. 정부는 이 홍삼을 판매할 업체로 설경동의 대한산업를 선정하였다. 그 과정에서 논란과 특혜 시비가 있었다. 대한산업은 3만5천근의 홍삼 중 1만여 근 이상을 판매하지 못하는 부진을 보였다. 1958년부터 수출된 홍삼은 전쟁 중에 혹은 그 직후에 제조된 것들이었다. 당시 홍삼 제조 수량은 1천근 내외로 이전과 비교하면 매우 적었다. 따라서 정부는 매해 공개 입찰에 의해서 업체를 선정하여 홍삼을 판매하였다. 한편 1950년대 말이 되면 한국 홍삼 생산량이 급감하면서 홍콩 시장에서는 경쟁 상품이 입지를 넓히고 또 한국 홍삼을 위조한 가짜 홍삼이 등장해서 큰 우려를 샀다. 이에 대해 전매청은 포장 방법을 일신하는 등의 방식으로 대응하면서 홍삼의 성가를 유지하려고 하였다. This paper examined how red ginseng exports were carried out from liberation to the 1950s. During the U.S. military administration, exports of red ginseng were very sluggish due to a combination of factors such as the U.S. military government’s passive trade policy and the ban on imports of red ginseng from mainland China. The newly established government took over more than 100,000 pounds of red ginseng that was manufactured during the U.S. military regime but failed to export. The red ginseng was expected to contribute greatly to the government’s finances. However, the Rhee Syng-man administration went through trial and error over how to export red ginseng. After many twists and turns, red ginseng was offered to Baek Nak-seung’s Korean Culture Propaganda. The Korean Culture Propaganda Company brought more than 30,000 pounds of red ginseng to Hong Kong and tried to sell it, but it failed to sell it properly. So the monopoly agency broke the contract in 1952. During the war in the early 1950s, red ginseng production and exports were difficult. However, red ginseng began to be exported again in June 1953 at the end of the war. By 1954, nearly 30,000 pounds of red ginseng were exported twice. Nevertheless, more than 35,000 pounds of red ginseng remained. The government selected Korean Industries in Seolgyeong-dong as the company to sell the red ginseng. In the process, there were controversies and disputes over preferential treatment. Korean Industrial showed a slump in sales of more than 10,000 of its 35,000-geun red ginseng. Red ginseng exported from 1958 was manufactured during or shortly after the war. At that time, the amount of red ginseng produced was around 1,000 roots, which was very small compared to the previous one. Therefore, these red ginsengs were sold by selecting companies through open bidding every year. Meanwhile, as Korean red ginseng production plunged in the late 1950s, competitive products expanded their presence in the Hong Kong market and fake red ginseng, which forged Korean red ginseng, caused great concern. In response, the resale agency tried to maintain the sacred value of red ginseng by responding to the packaging method by renewing it.

대한제국기 개성지역 삼업(蔘業) 변동과 삼포민의 대응

양정필(Yang Jeong-Pil) 大韓醫史學會 2009 醫史學 Vol.18 No.2

This thesis examines a crisis of ginseng capital and the source of crisis during Daehan empire(大韓帝國). After the China-Japan war of 1894, the Japanese merchants actively engaged in taking over the ginseng fields, so that ginseng-cultivating Koreans suffered substantial economic losses. After the Russo-Japanese war, the Japanese imperialists undertook the ‘Currency Arranging Business’(CAB) in order to set a cornerstone for their invasion of Korea. The CAB eventually provoked a wide depression which in turn produced massive number of Korean merchants going bankrupt. The Kaesong merchants were no exception, since CAB stroke a severe blow on the ginseng industry, which relied heavily on the commercial capitals of the Kaesong merchants. Moreover, the Japanese imperialists broke the previous promise and bought ginseng at a dirt-cheap price, which put ginseng-cultivating Koreans in serious trouble. In order to combat such crisis, ginseng field-owners protested against such injustice by petitioning or stirring up Kaesong popular riot in vain, and consequently the number of ginseng field-owners decreased sharply. A few of the ginseng field-owners survived, and managed to maintain and even flourish more than before. These successful owners were characterized with their strong link with the official circle, utilizing their influence in ginseng industry. Their original background was not identical as some came from the influential families of Kaesong area for generations, while others made their own fortunes and continue to prosper through the difficult times of the late of the Daehan empire period.

조선전기 정부의 제주도 출륙 포작인 인식과 정책 -포작인의 난민적 성격을 중심으로-

양정필 ( Yang¸ Jeong-pil ) 제주대학교 탐라문화연구원 2021 탐라문화 Vol.- No.67

성종대 이후 바다를 기반으로 살아가던 제주인 이른반 포작인 다수가 육지로 떠났다. 이 글에서는 이 포작인에 대한 정부의 인식과 정책을 살펴보았다. 포작인은 유민의 일종이다. 따라서 그들은 쇄환되어야 했다. 그러나 성종대에는 쇄환 정책을 유보하거나 시행하더라도 한계가 많았다. 쇄환을 하지 않으면 그들을 평민으로 만드는 정책, 즉 齊民化 정책을 시행해야 하는데, 이 역시 제대로 이루어지지 않았다. 그 결과 포작인은 한 동안 호적에 등록되지도 않고 공식적으로 세금과 군역도 부담하지 않는, 국가 통치권 밖의 존재로 남아 있었다. 정부가 포작인을 이런 상태로 둔 이유는 바다를 터전으로 살아가는 그들을 추쇄할 수 없다는 현실적 제약이 컸다. 여기에 연해 고을 수령들이 경제적 측면에서 포작인으로부터 해산물을 조달할 수 있어서 쇄환에 소극적이었다. 아울러 당시까지만 해도 제주도는 인구 과잉이어서 제주도의 지방관들도 출륙 포작인의 쇄환에 소극적이었다. 중종대에는 잦은 왜적의 침입을 방어하고 물리치는 데 포작인의 해상 능력이 필요하였다. 그래서 포작인들 중 일부는 수군으로 등록되어 활동하였다. 그들은 평민으로 편입된 것으로 볼 수 있다. 그러나 다수는 여전히 통치권 밖에 남아 있었다. 또 쇄환 정책도 실시되었다. 그러나 수군으로 편입된 경우 그들의 가족 등이 쇄환에서 제외되는 등 정책 시행 과정에서 한계가 많았다. 이 역시 당시 조선이 포작인의 해상능력을 필요로 하였기 때문이다. 이처럼 포작인은 유민이어서 쇄환되거나 제민화 정책이 시행되어야 하지만, 그것은 유보되거나 한계가 많은 채로 시행되었다. 그 결과 성종-중종 대포작인은 조선의 통치권 밖에서 살아갈 수 있었다. 이러한 포작인의 존재 양태는 지금으로 보면 난민적 성격을 강하게 띠는 것이었다고 하겠다. Since the reign of King Seongjong[成宗], many Jeju people who lived based on the sea had left for the mainland of the Korean Peninsula. They could be callec Pojakin[鮑作人]. This article examines the government's perception and countermeasures against Pojakin. The Pojakins are a kind of displaced persons. Therefore, they should be sent back to Jeju Island. However, during the reign of King Seongjong, the repatriation policy had many limitations, so it postponed or implemented. Then the king should implement policies that make them citizens. However, this had also not been implemented properly. For some time, the Pojakins were not registered in the family register and did not pay taxes or military service. They remained living outside the sovereignty of the state. The reason why the government left the Pojakin in this situation was that they could not catch them living in the sea. At that time, Jeju Island was overpopulated, so even local officials in Jeju were not active in the process of bringing out of the country. During the reign of King Jungjong[中宗], the naval capabilities of the Pojakin were needed to defend and defeat frequent Japanese invasion. Therefore, some of them were registered and active in the navy. They could be seen as incorporated into the common people. However, many Pojakins remained outside their sovereignty. As such, Pojakins were displaced people and should be repatriated, but they were not repatriated. As a result, the Pojakin were not incorporated into Joseon's people for a long time and lived outside of their sovereignty. These Pojakins were, from the present point of view, strongly characterized as refugees.

탐라의 대외 교류와 이어도

양정필(Jeong-pil Yang) 제주학회 2017 제주학회 학술발표논문집 Vol.2017 No.2

The indigenous people of Jejudo Island find the term “Ieodo” very familiar. Ieodo is an imaginary island. However, an ocean research station named after the fictitious island was opened off the southwestern coast of Jeju in 2003, drawing keen attention to the submerged rock in the area ever since. Some argue that Ieodo refers to the very rock. However, it is still generally accepted that Ieodo and the rock are two separate sites and the former only exists in one’s imagination. This paper conducts a comprehensive examination into the orally-transmitted local legend of Ieodo and the foreign affairs of Tamna (the ancient name of Jeju) during the Mongolian intervention period in an attempt to identify if it was possible that the Tamna people had been aware of the existence of Ieodo. The legend of Ieodo takes place during the late Goryeo era while the ancient Korean kingdom underwent the Mongolian interference in its domestic affairs. An elucidatory note in a local folk song about Ieodo details the location of the place. The orally-transmitted tune sings that Ieodo can be reached in four to five days’ voyage to the southwest of Jeju by wind-powered boat (Pungseon). It can be interpreted that the location of the rock currently called Ieodo (and the Ieodo Oceanic Research Station over it) overlaps with that of Ieodo. A possibility does exist that the ancient people of Jeju knew about the existence of the underwater rock. To verify the possibility, this paper investigates the situations around Tamna while it was under the Mongolian influence as well as its interaction with the world overseas. By that period of time, Tamna’s inhabitants had already become capable of building a large vessel. Furthermore, a direct sea route already existed between Jianan (south of Chian’s Yangtze River) and Goryeo during the Southern Song China period, even before the Mongolian Yuan influenced Goryeo’s national affairs. The said seaway, when sailing to and from Gaegyeong (the capital of Goryeo), had a stopover at Heuksando Island off the southwestern tip of the Korean Peninsula. If stopping off in Tamna, the direct route between China’s Jianan and Tamna could easily be navigated. In fact, the leaders of the Yuan Dynasty had understood Tamna resident’s values. At the beginning of the intervention period, they paid attention to the military value of the island. To put it in other words, Tamna drew attention as a military outpost that could be used to subjugate Southern Song China and Japan. Even after the empire’s failed invasions of Japan in the 14th century, the Mongolian Kingdom established a state-run horse ranch, still recognizing the values of the Tamna people. Presumably, Tamna sent the horses from the ranch as a royal tribute to the Yuan Dynasty. The horses were transported to Jianan through a direct sea route. This can be proved easily because many documents still exist that are directly or indirectly related to this historical fact. In short, it can be inferred that Tamna was directly accessible from China in the Mongolian intervention period while the Tamna people used the route to travel to and from China’s Jianan. How would the foreign affairs of Tamna at the time relate to Ieodo? When examining the correlation between the use of the direct sea route and the issues regarding Ieodo, an importance should be placed on the fact that the submerged rock called “Ieodo” is located along that particular route. This paper deduces that some of those Tamna people who sailed to Jianan learned about the existence of the submerged rock when undergoing an accidental wreck caused by the very rock.

1930년대 중반 개성자본가의 만주 진출과 농업 투자 ―공진항(孔鎭恒)의 사례를 중심으로

양정필 ( Yang Jeongpil ) 역사문제연구소 2013 역사문제연구 Vol.17 No.1

Gong Jin-hang was a typical Korean capitalist who ventured outwards into Manchuria between 1934 to 1945 and operated a large-scale farming complex. The phase of Gong`s Manchurian investment can be divided into three periods. The first term was between the fall of 1934, when he initially started Manchurian farming, to 1936. The second was between 1936 to 1938, during which time Gong expanded his investment by founding a joint-stock corporation. Lastly until 1945, when he restructured his company into one-man business and engaged in reclamation of a large-scale farm. A study was conducted about the background and investment patterns during the first term in this paper. Gong Jin-hang was born as a son of a Gaesung multi-millionare. He studied in Europe for 8 years during his twenties and returned home in the spring of 1932. While helping family business for 2 years since his coming back to Korea, Gong eventually arranged family fortunes and businesses to provide a foundation for the Manchurian investment. Economic motive seems to have been the main factor for Gong Jin-hang`s venture. However, he also displayed various and unique motivations to solidify the justification for his new enterprise. For instance, Gong`s reasons included suggesting a new role model for the conservative Gaesung society, chances of more free activities in Manchuria rather than in colonial Korea, and certain anticipations to provide economic security for Korean immigrants in Manchuria. `Restoring public peace` in Manchukuo and solving the dilemma of land ownership were also prime considerations. Finally, being a devout believer in Chundogyo must also have contributed to his decision to build an utopia through running a plantation in a new land. Gong Jin-hang set off on an observation to Manchuria in the autumn of 1934 before making his final decision on the business investment. Through his journey, Gong has managed to acquire information about the realities of Korean cultivators and economic values of Manchurian investment. Successful inspection led to his subsequent venture, and the first fruition was Koryo farmstead, about the size of 100町步. The 100-町步 Koryo farmstead soon developed into over 2 million pyong by the middle of 1937. During that course, there were conflicts between Koreans over irrigation problems, as well as agreements between Korean capitalists to secure lands possible for development of paddy fields. Through such trial and error, Koryo farmstead has grown into massive plantation, with the change of name to `Koryosung` farming complex. Although Gong Jin-hang himself directly supplied more than half of the funds for his Manchurian investment, he also received certain loans from Japanese monetary organizations such as Oriental Development Company, as well as from Korean financiers.