기업지배구조에서 대주주간 경쟁가능성과 기업가치의 관련성 분석

안홍복(Ahn Hong-Bok) 한국국제회계학회 2009 국제회계연구 Vol.0 No.25

본 연구는 선행연구에서 보편적으로 사용하는 대주주1인 또는 1인 지배주주의 가정에 따른 기업지배구조의 문제점을 분석하기 위해 복수의 주요대주주 존재와 그에 따른 기업가치 관련성을 실증분석 하였다. 특히 본 연구는 복수의 주요대주주 존재와 이들이 기업에서 수행하는 2가지 상이한 역할에 그 연구적 초점을 둔다. 즉, 한편으로 보면 주요대주주는 상당한 투표권을 보유함으로써 경영자를 감시할 의지 및 능력을 가지고 있어 경영자의 이익약탈을 용이하게 막을 수 있는 능력을 갖고 있다. 그러나 다른 한편으로는 주요대주주는 다른 주요대주주와 연합을 형성하여 약탈한 이익을 공유할 수 있다. 주요대주주의 첫 번째 역할과 관련하여 기업가치는 주요대주주 사이의 상호 견제능력 즉, 지배권의 경쟁가능성(contestability)의 감소와 음(-)의 관련성을 갖는다는 가설을 검증하고자 한다. 자료를 분석한 결과는 복수의 주요대주주 존재와 기업가치 사이에 통계적으로 유의한 관련성이 존재한다는 실증증거를 제시하였다. 즉, 본 연구는 기업지배구조에서 주요대주주 사이의 지분율 차이가 클수록 기업가치는 감소한다는 결과를 제시하였다. I present a model of the effects of having multiple large shareholders on the valuation of firms. Using a sample of Korean listed firms over the period from 1998 to 2002, Ie show, consistent with the model, that a more equal distribution of the votes among large blockholders has a positive effect on firm value. This result is particularly strong in family-controlled firms suggesting that families (which typically have managerial or board representation) are more prone to private benefit extraction if they are not monitored by another strong blockholder. We also show that the relation between multiple blockholders and firm value significantly depends on the identity of these blockholders.

기업지배구조, 투자기회 및 조세회피

안홍복(Hong Bok Ahn) 경북대학교 사회과학연구원 2015 사회과학 담론과 정책 Vol.8 No.2

본 연구에서는 기업지배구조 중 지배주주의 소유지배권괴리와 투자기회수준이 회계이익과 과세소득의 차이(이익조정)의 변화에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다. 본 연구는 지배주주의 기회주의적 동기의 대리변수인 소유지배권괴리 수준이 회계이익과 과세소득 차이에 미치는 영행을 분석하고, 이 과정에서 기업의 투자기회가 차별적 영향력을 보유하고 있는지를 연계하여 분석하여 회계이익-과세소득 차이에 대한 원인에 대한 복합적 시각을 제공하고자 한다. 실증분석결과를 살펴보면, 가설 1에 대한 분석결과는 소유지배권괴리와 회계이익과 과세소득 차이 사이에 유의한 관련성을 확인할 수 없었고, 즉, 소유지배권괴리가 높을수록 조세회피를 위한 기회주의적 이익조정 규모에 대한 차별적 동기를 보유하고 있다는 연구가설을 지지하는 실증증거를 확인할 수 없었다. 특히 이러한 결과는 지배주주가 자신의 소유권이상으로 간접통제권을 통해 기업이익을 사적으로 추구할 수 있는 경우 보고이익보다 과세소득에 더욱 큰 의미를 부여함을 시사한다. 또한 가설 2에 대한 분석 결과는 투자기회에 따른 회계이익과 과세소득 차이에 통계적으로 유의한 관련성이 존재한다는 실증증거를 확인하였다. 즉 기업이 보유한 투자기회가 회계이익과 과세소득 차이를 결정 짓는 데 유의한 영향변수로 작용하고 있음을 의미한다. The governance disparity is a common form of ownership around the world. Numerous studies report that controlling blockholders have power over their firms significantly in excess of his cash flow rights. It has been known that Investment opportunities set(IOS) is very related with various accounting policies including choice of accounting procedure which are in turn largely involved with contracting costs. Prior research suggests that differences between book and taxable incomes reflect firms’ underlying economic fundamentals and their opportunistic earnings management activities. In this study, I examine more high the earnings management of high governance disparity and investment opportunities set relative to their counterparts. A firm with high governance disparity and investment opportunities set is likely to face different types of agency problems from a firm with low governance disparity and investment opportunities set. The governance disparity of firms face severe agency problem due to the separation of ownership and management and IOS severe agency problems that arise between controlling and noncontrolling shareholders. Using a book-tax difference(BTD) measure to capture earnings management and to find an appropriate IOS proxy variable, this study works with four IOS candidate variables used in Baber et al.(1996). The sample consists of manufacturing firms listed on Korean Stock Exchange for 8 years from 2001 to 2008. I do not find that a firm with high governance disparity is more high the difference between book income and tax income than their counterparts in Korea. The positive relation between BTD and IOS exhibits more evidently when we measure BTDs based on Factor analysis to be conducted for the sets which include more than two IOS candidate variables. This result suggests that the owner with the high IOS are willing to forgo tax benefits in order to gain agency benefit.

기업지배구조, 통제환경 및 회계정보 투명성의 관련성 분석

안홍복(Ahn Hong-Bok) 한국국제회계학회 2007 국제회계연구 Vol.0 No.19

본 연구는 (1)기업지배구조와 회계정보 투명성의 관련성, (2)기업지배구조와 회계정보 투명성의 관련성에서 통제환경의 효과에 대한 실증적 검증을 실시하였다. 또한 본 연구는 우리나라 기업의 지배구조의 대표적인 특징인 계열 또는 특수 관계자간에 복잡한 상호출자, 본사를 중심으로 한 피라미드 지분구조를 통해 통제 또는 집중화된 경우의 기업지배구조와 회계정보 투명성 문제에 대해 집중 분석한다. 분석결과는 회계투명성(즉. △DA)과 기업지배구조(즉, Govern) 사이에 유의한 관련성을 보여주고 있고, 이러한 결과는 지배주주의 소유-지배권의 괴리 심화가 이익정보의 투명성에 영향을 미치고 있음을 가정한 본 연구의 가실을 지지하고 있다. 그러나 통제환경 변수인 기관투자지분율(IIH), 사외이사비율(OUT) 그리고 감사위원회(AUD)는 본 연구의 회계투명성 변수인 △DA의 변화를 유의하게 설명하지 못하였다. This paper investigates how firm governance and a control structure vary with firms accounting information transparency. We explore two hypotheses: (1) firm governance decreases in the quality of a firm's financial accounting system; (2) a control structure for specific information impact in the quality(e.g. transparency) of a firm's financial accounting system. The idea is that firm governance and control environment are key determinants of how transparent a firm's operations are to outside investors, and that when a firm's operations are relatively less transparent to outsiders. the benefits of utilizing costly monitoring mechanisms are relatively high. We predict that where the transparency of financial accounting information is relatively low. firms will substitute towards relatively more costly monitoring and specific information gathering activities to at least partially compensate for poor accounting information. We find that the threat of expropriation by ultimate owner have a positive effect on earnings management as measured by accruals. Our results also show that the ownership-governance structure problem associated with ultimate owner have a negative impact on the relationship of earnings-return.

회계발생액의 이상현상과 그 원인에 대한 새로운 탐색

안홍복(Ahn Hong Bok),도상호(Do Sang Ho) 啓明大學校 産業經營硏究所 2008 會計情報리뷰 Vol.- No.13

최근 Desai et al.(2004)과 Fairfield et al.(2003)은 회계학적인 발생액 이상현상과 재무관리 분야의 이상현상이 서로 관련성이 존재한다는 실증증거를 제시했다. 특히, 최근까지 오도가격(mispricing)가설에 기초한 연구는 자본시장에서 이러한 발생액 이상현상의 존재에 대해서는 대체로 확인하였지만, 이것이 자본시장의 효율성 문제 때문인지 아니면, 이들 연구에서 사용되는 자본자산가격결정모형(capital asset pricing model)의 불완정성에 기인한 것인가에 대한 명확한 결론을 제시하지 못하고 있다. 따라서 본 연구는 발생액의 이상현상에 대한 전통적인 오도가격 가설이외에 또 다른 대안적 설명 논리로서 기업성장가설에 기초한 발생액 이상현상을 설명하려고 한다. 특히, 이것은 기업의 성장단계에 따라 발생액의 인식 규모에 차이가 발생기키는데, 예를 들어 기업이 성장단계인 경우 생산능력을 확대하고, 재고자산을 더욱 등가되므로 이들 계정에 영향을 받는 발생액의 규모는 더욱 증가하지만, 기업의 성장단계가 정체 또는 감퇴기인 경우 재고자산의 할인 처분, 매출채권 상각, 매입채무에 대한 압박 등과 같은 상황이 발생하고, 따라서 이에 영향을 받는 발생액의 규모도 감소한다는 논리이다.

기업지배구조와 회계 : 연구동향과 미래 제언

안홍복 ( Hong Bok Ahn ),이연희 ( Yeon Hee Lee ) 한국회계학회 2021 회계저널 Vol.30 No.5

Over the past three decades, the corporate governance literature in accounting and auditing has grown rapidly. To better understand this body of work, we discuss the literature review and summarize selected results (i.e., clusters of papers with new and interesting results) from recent empirical research papers. Many recent studies deepen our understanding of the link between corporate governance characteristics and accounting outcomes, such as fraudulent financial reporting, restatements, earnings management/accruals quality, and accounting conservatism. Specially, the studies provide deeper, more current insights into the relation between governance characteristics and fraudulent financial reporting. Overall, these studies continue to find governance quality and fraud to be negatively related, but there are questions about the magnitude of the effects. Recent studies reinforce the notion that companies with stronger governance are more likely to select and retain high-quality external auditors. Finally, research also has addressed the role of audit committee quality in shareholder ratification of the auditor, once the audit committee has selected the auditor. This study has following purposes. First, we need to incorporate multiple actors in firms’ governance into the analyses, as most studies associate governance variables with accounting/auditing variables, but paid little or no attention to multiple actors. Second, we need to address governance processes (what boards and audit committees actually do and how they do it), not just governance characteristics such as independence or financial expertise. Third, we need to further examine on the relation between corporate governance and accounting/auditing in other theory than agency theory, such as stewardship theory, stakeholder theory, resource dependence theory, institutional theory, managerial hegemony theory that do not follow agency theory in governance model. Fourth, as the examination of governance characteristics deepens, we need to develop better measures of board and audit committee characteristics, and need to explore interactions among governance characteristics, as opposed to simply the effect of each individual characteristic. Fifth, we need to be much more careful in dealing with endogeneity in governance research, as governance characteristics and outcomes of interest(accounting, auditing, and internal control) may be affected by some of the same variables. We believe that the findings to date have a number of important implications for practice. First, the weight of evidence suggests that weak governance is associated with an increased likelihood of adverse financial reporting outcomes(in particular, fraud and restatements). Thus, perhaps the most fundamental practice implication is that the governance research findings to date are, on an overall basis, consistent with the focus on improved corporate governance(e.g., board independence and audit committee expertise) founded through SOX and related regulatory reforms. That is, the governance reforms in SOX have empirical support and are not simply unsupported reactions to a crisis. Second, since the board and the audit committee are primary mechanisms for the internal monitoring of top management’s financial reporting behavior, external auditors need to very carefully examine corporate governance characteristics and processes in assessing the control environment. Third, many research indicates that external auditors assess risk higher and plan more audit hours for firms with weak governance. However, whether auditors adequately adjust for weak governance has not been examined. Figure 1 presents our organization framework for reviewing firms’ governance and accounting literature in Korea.

이익정보의 유용성과 기업소유지배구조의 관련성

안홍복(Ahn Hong Bok) 한국산업경영학회 2005 經營硏究 Vol.20 No.4

외환위기 이후 학계 및 규제기관은 우리나라 기업소유지배구조의 주요 특징으로 경영권을 행사하는 지배주주의 존재 및 지배주주의 소유권과 자신이 실질 영향력을 행사하는 지배권 사이에 상당한 괴리의 존재가 있음을 주장하였다. 더욱이 지배주주의 소유 -지배권 괴리의 심화 문제는 이익정보에 대한 기회주의적 회계조정 가능성 및 이익정보 유용성에 대한 자본시장의 가치변화와 관련되어진다. 따라서 본 연구는 이러한 지배 주주의 소유-지배권의 괴리 정도와 이에 따른 이익정보 유용성의 상호 관련성을 실증적으로 검증하였다. 특히, 본 연구는 이러한 지배주주의 소유-지배권 괴리에 따른 이익정보의 유용성을 신뢰성과 목적적합성의 차원에서 분석하였고, 이익정보의 신뢰성 차원은 기업의 이익조정, 그리고 이익정보의 목적적합성은 이익-주가의 관련성 분석을 통해 분석하였다. 본 연구결과는 지배주주의 소유-지배권의 괴리가 심화될수록 이익정보의 신뢰성에 부정적인 영향을 주는 이익조정이 심화됨을 보여주었고, 또한 이익-주가의 관련성을 통한 이익정보의 목적적합성 분석은 지배주주의 소유-지배권의 괴리가 심화될수록 이익정보의 목적적합성인 이익정보의 기업가치 관련성이 감소한다는 실증증거를 제시하였다. 따라서 본 연구결과는 기업의 이익정보의 유용성과 해당 기업의 지배주주의 소유-지배권의 괴리 정도는 상호간에 유의한 관련성이 존재함을 시사하고 있다. The objective of this paper is to examine how the threat of expropriation by ultimate owner affects earnings management and informative of earnings. The ultimate owners' incentives to expropriate minority shareholders increase as the separation of their cash flow and voting control rights becomes larger. This is because larger voting rights give the ultimate owners more power to expropriate their companies, while smaller cash flow rights reduce the owners' share of losses from the extraction of wealth. We find that the threat of expropriation by ultimate owner have a positive effect on earnings management as measured by accruals. Our results also show that the ownership-governance structure problem associated with ultimate owner have a negative impact on the relationship of earnings-return.

지배주주의 지배-소유권 차이와 이익조정의 관련성 분석

안홍복 ( Hong Bok Ahn ) 한국회계학회 2004 회계학연구 Vol.29 No.4

The objective of this paper is to examine how the threat of expropriation by ultimate owners affects earnings management and auditing quality. The ultimate owners typically have control over firms considerably in excess of their cash flow rights. This is so, in part, because they often control firms through pyramidal structures, and in part because they mange the firms they control. Accordingly, the ultimate owners` incentives to expropriate minority shareholders increase as the separation of their cash flow and voting control rights becomes larger. This is because larger voting rights give the ultimate owners more power to expropriate their companies, while smaller cash flow rights reduce the owners` share of losses from the extraction of wealth. As our definition of ownership relies on both cash flow and voting control rights, the cash flow rights that support the control by ultimate owners need to be further identified. Firm-specific information on pyramid structures and cross- holdings are used to make the distinction between cash flow and voting rights. We find that the threat of expropriation by ultimate owners have a positive effect on earnings management as measured by accruals. Our results also show that the agency problem associated with ultimate owners have a negative impact on earnings management.

기업혁신성에 기초한 R&D 투자와 기업가치 관련성 분석

안홍복 ( Hong Bok Ahn ),권기정 ( Gee Jung Kwon ) 한국회계학회 2006 회계학연구 Vol.31 No.3

What is the effect of innovation on productivity? How is the introduction of innovation related to R&D? We try to provide answers to the above questions in this paper, using very rich panel of data for Korean firms. This study presents novel empirical evidence on the effect of R&D innovations on productivity, as well as on the role played by R&D investment in enhancing the likelihood of introducing innovations at the firm value. Our paper contributes to the empirical literature that has tried to measure the impact of innovation on productivity using aggregate, industry or firm level data. The standard approach has been to estimate the output elasticity of the R&D stock and the rate of return to R&D investment, typically by using a production function that includes the R&D capital stock as a separable factor of production. In order to assess the effect of innovation on productivity, we estimate a Cobb-Douglas production in long differences, augmented with materials, capital and labor. One distinguishing feature of our paper is the focuson both R&D innovation effect and firm valuation. Our data contains about 900 manufacturing firms and information was collected overfive years(1999-2003). We excluded from the sample firms with incomplete information or with extreme observations for the variables of interest. Details of the sample selection procedures are contained in Table 1(the list of sample firms). Table 2 (The summary statistics of production function) reports means for the regressors that will enter our productivity equation together with a set of variables proxying for R&D innovation. In particular ln(Yt/Lt-1), ln(Mt/Lt-1), ln(Kt/Lt-1) denote respectively the (log of the) output, material, and capital to labor ratios. Table 4 (the relation between firm value and R&D innovation) summarizes additional information about the effect of R&D on innovation by our sample of Korean firms and about the relation between R&D innovation and firm`s valuation. A main comment report CAR proxying firm value is higher for firms that have also introduced R&D innovation in the same time period. In Table 6 we report the main results of estimating equation (4). The coefficient of the production variables for materials, capital and labor have a significant coefficient around the 1% level. In our econometric work, we find a positive, statistically significant and sizeable effect of R&D innovation on productivity when we include a variable in a standard Cobb Douglas production function. This implies that there may be an important role for R&D innovation in favoring firms` valuation process. Let us concentrate now onthe effect of R&D innovation. In the first column of Table 7(the regression results about the effect of R&D innovation on firm value), the R&D intensity represents whether R&D is related to firm value. The coefficient of R&D intensity is significant at the 1% level. In column 2 we include R&D intensity and book-market ratio proxying intangibles assets. The coefficient of R&D intensity is significant at the 1% level, while the book-market ratio is not. In column 3 also R&D innovation variable (FIRMCI) is also included whereas in column 2 only the book-market ratiois included. Again we obtain the result that the coefficient for R&D intensity variable is significant, at the 1% level, while the book-market ratio is not. Note that size of the FIRMCI coefficientin the specification with R&D innovation, not only is significant at the 1% level, but is also reasonably large. One obvious criticism of the results presented so far is that the effect of an R&D innovation on firm value has been imposed to the same, independently of the size of the R&D innovation, macro economics environment and of the sector in which it operates. To address this legitimate concern, we also estimate additional sets of equations where the coefficients on R&D innovation variables are allowed to vary by size (Small versus Large R&D innovation) and by industry (High-Tech versus Low-Tech industries) respectively. In Table 9 and 10 Regression tests on the significance of size and industry effect are reported. The null hypothesis of equality of coefficient about industry is never rejected at the usual confidence levels. However, the size ofR&D innovation points out that the effect of R&D innovation on firm value is positive and significnat for the sub-sample of Large-firms. Our results imply that R&D innovation has a large impact on productivity. Our paper contributes to the empirical literature that has tried to measure impact of R&D innovation on productivity using aggregate or firm level data. Obviously R&D has still a crucial role to play since it is an important factor, but not necessarily the only one, that affects firms` value. The results presented show: (1) the impact of innovation on the economic value of firm, in terms of productivity, (2) in particular, the level of R&D expenditure in industry, is positively affected the firm`s value.

기업지배구조와 이익조정: 주요대주주와 지배권경쟁가능성을 중심으로

안홍복 ( Hong Bok Ahn ),서란주 ( Ran Ju Seo ) 한국회계학회 2013 회계학연구 Vol.38 No.1

Recent empirical works show that ownership is typically concentrated in a small number of large shareholders. This evidences shift the focus from the traditional conflict of interest between managers and dispersed shareholder to an equally important agency conflict between large controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. A few large shareholders can have positive side and negative side in control. The main risk is that the large shareholders can pursue their own goals against firm`s profit maximization. Some of these goals can come at the expense of minority shareholders. But, in most studies, they have assumption there is one largest shareholder in firms. So in this paper, we address a different question: Do the multiple large shareholders have an advantage or disadvantage for minority shareholders? And we examine the role of the multiple large shareholders and the relationship contestability among them and earning management. For these purpose we derive the condition equation including multiple large shareholders contestability. In a model, multiple blockholders can have two different roles in the firms. Blockholders have the power and the incentives to monitor the largest shareholder by holding a substantial voting block, therefore they have the ability to reduce profit diversion. On the other hand, the blockholder can form a controlling coalition with other blockholders and share the diverted profit. The presenting and analyzing condition equation about earning management under circumstance with multiple blockholders and with a single blockholder is the key contribution of this paper. So we develop the hypothesis that the contestability between major shareholders has relationship with earning management and verify this by using the condition equation. To test these hypotheses, we analyse the relative voting power and the type of multiple blockholders. The sample covers non-financial Korean companies that have at least one large shareholder (with more than 5% of the votes) over the period 2005-2007. Total 758 firm-year observations are used in the regression analysis. We measure the contestability of major shareholders by using three different way(based on the Herfindahl index). First of all, we measure the sum of squares of the difference between the percentage of first major shareholder`s holdings and the second plus the sum of squares of the difference between the percentage of second major shareholder`s holdings and the third as the Hi_difference variables, the sum of squares of each holdings of the first, the second and the third major shareholder as Hi_concentrate variables. The higher these two variables are, the lower the contestability are. The Third variables is measured if the percentage of the first and the second shareholders` holdings is less than 20%, there are at least one more major shareholders then 1, else 0 as the Hi-D variables. There are advantages because the prior two variables are continuous variables, but there could be the problems of measurement errors. So we select the third dummy variables. And we measure the discretionary accruals to examine the earning management. To do this, we adopt revised Jones model(Dechow et, al., 1995)) that is generally known as the better measurement than Jones model(1991). As a result of the empirical research, we find that the contestability of the largest shareholders has a positive effect on firm earnings management that is measured by accruals. The higher the contestability, the less earning management there is. Namely, blockholders have a role to monitor the largest shareholder and protect small shareholders` wealth. We conduct additional analysis for verifying the robustness and sensitivity of the results. We reexamine the relationship of the earning management and contestability by using the earning section around “0”. We reconsider the type of blockholders (Family, Bank, Institute, Group), other earning management through real activities manipulation and the relationship with persons with a special relationship. We conduct the sensitivity analysis according to the other accruals variables, holding rate of the blockholders and the study method relating to the data. Also, we examine the endogeneity analysis to investigate a casual relationship between the earning management and the contestability. As a result of additional analysis considering the different situations and measurement problem about the variables, we can get the same conclusion at the results of the main analysis. This paper investigate the corporate governance reflecting the real and practical environment that there are blockholders over one and present mathematical model as well as the theoretical model based on the prior study. We propose the explanation of process about the relationship between the corporate governance and firms` value. This means that the accounting information is the link between the corporate governance and firms` value. So, It need to consider the contestability as well as the existence, the type, the holding rates of the blockholders in future study relating to the corporate governance.

R&D지출정보가 B/M 효과를 설명할 수 있는가?

안홍복(Hong Bok Ahn) 한국경영학회 2002 경영학연구 Vol.31 No.3

This study Postulates the book-to-market ratio reflects investor`s assessment of the future abnormal proofs of the firm. We identify and estimate the value of the major off-balance sheet investment expected to generate such abnormal profit-the R&B capital -and examine the association the between this fundamental variable and sequent stock returns. Our major findings are : (a) R&D capita is significantly associated with subsequent returns, when fundamental(book-to-market) is accounted for. (b) For firms intensive in R&D. the R&D capital subsumes the book-to-market effect. That is, for these firms the book-to-market ratio is no longer associated with subsequent returns. when the R&D capital is present in the regression. (c) The above findings are not the results of a survivorship bias. (d) The association between R&D capital and subsequent returns do appeals to be due to a risk factor associated with R&D.