신탁법제와 유동화법제 관련 최근 쟁점 지적재산권신탁의 한계와 활성화 방안 -일본신탁업법상의 제도와 비교를 통하여-

권종호 ( Jong Ho Kwon ) 건국대학교 법학연구소 2014 一鑑法學 Vol.0 No.28

This article is to discuss “Corporate Group Trust” which is to effectively manage the intellectual property of corporate group and “TLO Trust” which is to transfer technology. In case of intellectual property trust, delegation of some of trust affairs to third parties may need to be allowed to meet with the trustor’s interests and also to activate intellectual property trust. Such cases would be where the trustee of Corporate Group Trust and TLO Trust for transfer of technology discussed in this article is a licensed trustee business entity. However, the Capital Markets Act prohibits trustee to delegate trust affairs to third parties. Accordingly, it is necessary to amend the Capital Markets Act to allow delegation of trust administration to third parties (i.e. outsourcing). Korea has not adopted Corporate Group Trust system. Corporate Group Trust system has a distinctive character from other ordinary trusts that trustor, trustee and beneficiary are all within the same corporate group. This type of trust does not need to mandate strict entry requirements or conduct regulations on trustee. Considering this, it would be important to lower entry requirements and conduct regulations on trustee so that corporate group can manage intellectual properties owned by its affiliates more efficiently, not only for a particular corporate group but also for Korea to enhance its national competitiveness. For TLO Trust, whereas the government supports superior ones among technologies entrusted to technology trust management organization with a part of expenses to protect the rights such as patent fees, there is no such support for technologies entrusted to trustee. If technology has been entrusted with the same purpose and is also superior one, differentiating governmental incentive depending on who is trustee, let alone regulatory arbitrage, may have issues of equal treatment. Therefore, even if trustee is a licensed trust business entity, it shall be provided with incentives same with the case where the trustee is the technology trust management organization, which will also contribute the activation of intellectual property trust.

주니어 피셔스케이팅의 더블루프 기술동작에 대한 운동학적 분석

권종호(Kwon, Jong-Ho),강영석(Kang, Young-Seok),김대근(Kim, Dae-Geun) 한국체육과학회 2013 한국체육과학회지 Vol.22 No.4

The purpose of this study is to provide the scientific data that will increase the performance of junior figure skater and improve technology. The target of this study was four junior figure skating players and the analysis of three-dimensional images of double-loop operation and the analysis of the kinematic variable for the upper and lower limbs segment will provide scientific basic information of double-loop operation. The double-loop operation time in one phase is found to have a favorable effect of the jump without reducing the skating slide speed and with the large angular momentum of the lower part of the body. The changes of the center of body towards the rapid skating in the position of the front and the upper limb in the vertical by making projection speed rapid increase jump, and float body upward and twist must be performed rapidly and at the same time making the changes of left and right position of center of body small was desirable to perform favorably. The change in the angle of the body segments in E2 by the flexion of ankle, knee, hip angle significantly added power to the ground and stretched the transferred momentum on E2 to project in the vertical direction.

기업지배구조에 관한 한일간의 차이점과 시사점 -경제민주화법안·방어수단을 소재로-

권종호 ( Kwon Jong-ho ) 건국대학교 법학연구소 2018 一鑑法學 Vol.0 No.40

기업지배구조에 대한 우리나라 규제의 특징은 경영자책임 추궁시스템의 부작동과 기관구성 등에 대한 과도한 간섭으로 정리할 수 있다. 즉 경영자 책임성 제고에 가장 실효적이고 직접적인 효과가 있는 책임추궁시스템이 작동하지 않음으로써 ① 경영자를 통제하는 방법으로 적대적 M&A의 중요성이 필요 이상으로 강조되고 - 즉 적대적 M&A를 저해할 방어수단의 도입에 대해 매우 비판적이며 -, ② 기관구성 등에 대한 기업의 자율성을 제한하는 것에 대해 무감각하며, ③ 3% 룰과 같은 세계에서 유례를 찾을 수 없는 편법적인 규제가 난무하게 된 것으로 생각된다. 그런 의미에서 우리나라는 위법적이고 부당한 경영에 대해 가장 실효적이고 직접적인 효과가 있는 책임추궁시스템(주주대표소송이나 의결권행사방법)에 대해서는 그 개선을 모색하지 않으면서 실효성은 그리 크지 않으면서 기업에 부담만 주는 기업지배구조에만 매달려 문제를 해결하려고 하는 나라이다. 따라서 이러한 문제의 해결을 위해서는 ① 주주대표소송이나 다중대표소송을 실효적인 제도로 개선하고, ② 주주에게 의결권행사기회를 확실히 보장하는 것을 전제로, ③ 기관구성 등에 대해서는 기업의 자율성을 대폭적으로 확대하고, ④ 남용방지장치를 마련하는 것을 전제로 방어수단을 다양화할 필요가 있다. 물론 방어수단 마련이 순서에 있어서는 최우선이 되어야 할 것이다. 일감몰아주기, 회사기회유용, 편법적인 경영권승계 등 재벌문제는 집중투표제, 감사위원 분리선출과 같은 기관구성이나 기관구성방법을 통하여 해결하려고 할 것이 아니라 공정거래법을 통해 정공법으로 해결하여야 할 것이다. 기업지배구조에 대해 우리나라처럼 법률로써 엄격히 규제하고 있는 나라는 드물다. 그럼에도 불구하고 지배구조가 문제된다면 그것은 법의 문제가 아니라 법의 실효성과 기업현실의 문제이다. 이 점을 간과하고 지배구조에 대한 규제를 강화하면 결국에는 실효성은 없으면서 기업에 부담만 주는 제도만 양산하게 될 것이다. This is a review of the differences between Korea and Japan regarding corporate governance. Regulations on corporate governance are exactly the opposite in the main content, although it is believed that Korea will be very similar to Japan. First of all, it is a system to inquire the responsibility of the management. The Japanese system is real and efficient. A derivative suit can be filed by a shareholder with one stock. Multi-derivative suit has been enacted for the first time in the world. The opportunity to exercise voting rights is strictly guaranteed. However, in Korea the derivative suit is a minority shareholder right. Multi- derivative suit has not yet been introduced. The opportunity to exercise voting rights is very limited. Second, It is a regulation on the governance structure and how to organize governance structure. Japan has left everything to its corporate choices. But Korea strictly has been regulating them. Third, it is a regulation on defensive measures in hostile takeover. Japan has a U.S. level of defensive measures by diversifying its classes of stock and introducing the new shares purchase right and unit shares. However, there is no system in Korea that is mindful of defensive measures. No country is more strictly regulated by law than Korea. Nevertheless, if corporate governance is a problem, it is not a matter of law but a matter of law’s effectiveness and business reality. If the government ignores this point and strengthens regulations on the corporate governance structure, it will eventually create a system that would not work but would only burden companies.

적대적 M&A 방어수단의 도입 필요성 -2008년 경영권방어법제 개선위원회의 입법초안을 중심으로-

권종호 ( Jong Ho Kwon ) 한국상사판례학회 2009 상사판례연구 Vol.22 No.4

기업내부통제제도의 바람직한 입법방향

권종호(Jong-Ho Kwon) 한국기업법학회 2011 企業法硏究 Vol.25 No.4

The internal control system in Korea is potentially lacking not only in unity and consistency but also in conformity among systems, which were caused by respective and gradual adoption of foreign legislative cases into the Commercial Law and various business laws such as the Capital Markets Act. In consideration of it, this study reviews the proper direction of legislation on the internal control system in light of the foreign legislative cases. The main features of an internal control system in Korea are as follows: 1) The implementation of an internal control system is mandatory under the law; 2)The internal control system applicable to all areas of corporate businesses is regulated under financial laws as special laws, not under the Commercial Law as general law; and 3)incentive program that can lead to the company’ active implementation of the internal control system is limited. This feature negatively affects the implementation of the internal control system tailored to the characteristics of the company, and it is difficult to bring out the company’s voluntary efforts as to the implementation of the internal control system. To solve this problem: 1)incentive program shall be adopted while the implementation of the internal control system is mandated by law; and 2)as to regulations on the internal control system, the Commercial Law shall provide more general provisions while business laws (financial laws) shall stipulate more specific ones. Furthermore, proper measures shall be taken into account in order to avoid potential conflicts of interests among different systems.

선제적 사업재편 지원법으로서 기활법의 역할 강화방안 -기활법의 제도적 문제점 및 사업재편 활성화를 위한 개선과제-

권종호 ( Kwon Jong-ho ) 건국대학교 법학연구소 2021 一鑑法學 Vol.0 No.48

기업활력제고를 위한 특별법(기활법)이 개정되어 2019년 11월 13일부터 전면적으로 시행되고 있다. 개정법은 적용범위를 확대하고, 지원제도를 보완하는 등 기활법의 문제점를 개선하기 위하여 많은 노력을 기울였지만, 기활법이 안고 있는 본질적인 문제에 대해서는 전혀 개선되지 않음으로써 종래부터 지적되어 왔던 문제점은 여전히 과제로 남겨두고 있다. 그리하여 본고에서는 선제적 사업재편을 지원하는 법률로써 기활법이 제 역할을 다하기 위하여 필요한 사항으로서 현행 기활법의 문제점, 즉 협소한 적용범위를 확대하고, 엄격한 적용요건을 완화하며, 중견기업이나 대기업의 진입을 가로막는 과잉공급업종요건을 폐지하고, 그리고 민간자본의 참여를 이끌어 낼 수 있는 제도를 마련하는 것을 제시하는 한편, 시급히 보완되어야 할 사항으로 사후설립에 대한 특례신설, 종류주식의 다양화 및 사업 재편 PEF의 창설을 제안하였다. 본고에서 제안하는 제도들은 오래전부터 재계가 도입을 강력히 원해 왔던 것이고, 우리와 경쟁하고 있는 국가에서는 대부분이 도입하고 있는 제도들이다. 이런 제도들을 일반법이 아니라 특별법 그것도 한시법에서 도입하는 것에 대해 주저해서는 안되는 이유는 글로벌 스탠다드를 이야기하면서 도입을 강력히 추진하고 있는 공정경제 3법에 대한 시장의 불만을 해소하고, 이들 법이 갖는 경직성과 획일성을 보완하고 완화하는 데에도 일정부분 기여할 수 있기 때문이다. 그리고 지금은 코로나19라는 미증유의 사태를 맞이하고 있고 뉴노멀의 새로운 질서가 형성되고 있는 시기이다. 산업정책 뿐만 아니라 입법정책에 있어서도 혁신과 새로운 발상이 필요한 시기이다. The Special Act on the Corporate Revitalization(SACR) has been revised and has been in force since November 13, 2019. Although the revised law has made great efforts to improve the problems of SACR, such as expanding the scope of application and supplementing the support system, the problems that have been pointed out from the past remain challenges. Therefore, as a law to support preemptive business reorganization, this article proposes to establish a system that can expand the scope of SACR application, ease strict application requirements, and induce private capital participation. The systems proposed by this articlel have long been strongly wanted by the business community, and most of them are being introduced in countries competing with us. We should not hesitate to introduce these systems in SACR. because it can partially contribute to resolving the market’s dissatisfaction with the three fair economy laws. And now is the time when the new order of New Normal is being formed, facing the unprecedented outbreak of Covid-19. It is time for innovation and new ideas not only in industrial policy but also in legislative policy.

사이버증권거래상의 불공정거래

權鍾浩(Kwon, Jong-Ho) 한국증권법학회 2001 증권법연구 Vol.2 No.2

일본의 투자신탁제도(CIS)

권종호(Jong-Ho Kwon) 한국증권법학회 2007 증권법연구 Vol.8 No.1

감사법제의 특징과 쟁점

권종호(Jong-Ho Kwon) 충남대학교 법학연구소 2013 法學硏究 Vol.24 No.1

본고에서는 우리나라 감사제도에 관하여 기업규모별 특징과 쟁점사항을 중심으로 살펴보았다. 우리나라 감사제도는 기업규모별로 다양한 유형의 감사기구를 차별화하고 있는 점은 높이 평가할 만하나, 규정 간에 일관성과 통일성이 부족하고 내용면에서도 부정합이 적지 않다. 대규모상장회사의 경우 사외이사인 감사위원과 사외이사가 아닌 감사위원의 선임 및 해임시의 의결권제한에 관한 불합리, 중규모상장회사에서의 상근감사의 자격요건상의 문제, 소규모상장회사의 감사의 선임·해임시의 의결권제한과 감사의 자격에 관한 불합리는 반드시 개선되어야 할 사항이다. 특히 대규모상장회사의 경우 감사위원회 이외의 감사기구에 대해서는 그 설치를 금지하고 있는데, 이러한 방식이 과연 바람직한지는 생각해 볼 필요가 있다. 물론 대규모상장회사에 대해 감사위원회의 설치를 의무화하고 있는 예는 미국의 Sarbanes-Oxley법이나 뉴욕증권거래소의 상장규정등에서 찾아 볼 수 있다. 그리고 감사의 직무, 즉 업무감사나 회계감사의 경우에는 감사대상(피감회사)의 특성보다는 감사주체의 독립성이나 전문성이 보다 중요하다는 점에서 대규모 상장회사에 대해 획일적으로 특정의 감사기구의 설치를 강제하는 것은 나름의 타당성이 있다. 그러나 감사기구에는 감사위원회 이외에도 상근감사제도나 전통의 감사제도가 있으며, 우리나라에서는 도입하고 있지 않지만 감사회제도도 있다. 이런 다양한 제도들은 나름의 합리성을 가지고 있을 뿐만 아니라 기업의 규모나 업종에 따라서는 바람직한 감사기구가 다를 수도 있다. 이런 점을 고려하면 감사기구에 대해 다양한 선택지를 제공하고, 기업이 그 중에서 가장 적합한 것을 선택할 수 있도록 하는 것도 생각해 볼 필요가 있을 것이다. The audit system in Korea requires various types of audit organization depending on the business size of company. However, the regulations of the audit organization have less consistency and uniformity, and even the contents of those are not suitably matched to each other. The followings must be improved: for large-size listed companies, the irrationality of limitation of a voting right when an auditor is being appointed or discharged ; for medium-size listed company, the issues of standing auditor’s qualification and, for small-size listed company, the limitation of a voting right when an auditor is being appointed or discharged and the irrationality of auditor’s qualification. In particular, the establishment of audit organization is only restricted to audit committee in the large listed company, which needs to be questioned as to its legitimacy. Surely, there are examples that the establishment of audit committee is required to large-size listed company, e.g. the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of the USA or listing rules of NYSE(New York Stock Exchange). And, it has some legitimate reasons to force the establishment of audit organization uniformly to the large listed company, considering that independence and expertise of auditor are more important than a characteristic of the audited subject. However, the audit organization has various systems: the standing auditor system, the traditional audit system and the audit committee. These various systems have their own validity itself, also certain type of audit organization may be more legitimate in accordance with the business scale or the industry of a company. Considering these points, it may need to provide various options to company so that it can choose proper audit system the most suitable for it.

기업지배구조의 획일화

권종호(Jong-Ho kwon) 한국기업법학회 2013 企業法硏究 Vol.27 No.2

The executive officer system has been introduced by the Commercial Law revised in 2011. This system has several characteristics, as follows. First, whether to implement the system depends on the company’s discretion. Second, the executive officer is responsible for the business execution, and the board of directors has the authority to elect and discharge of the executive officer, and to supervise their business execution as well. Therefore, for a company having the executive officer system, the executive officer is responsible for running the company, and the board of directors mainly takes a role of supervisory function. Recently there is a trend to mandate the executive officer system to be implemented to listed companies. This article is a study that the mandatory implementation of the executive officer system by law is not recommendable because: 1) the executive officer system, as a typical business execution body, has not been mandatorily implemented by law in the United States or Japan; 2) considering complexity and diversity of business execution, it is highly recommended to give discretion to companies as to its implementation. The board of directors of listed companies in Korea mainly consists of outside directors. If the implementation of executive officer system is mandated by law, the outside directors will eventually elect the executive officers responsible for running the company. Accordingly, apart from quasi-public finance institutions such as banks, it is not proper to require by law that outside directors appoint the executive officer even for private companies.