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      • KCI등재

        방어행위의 적법성 판단에 관한 국내 판례의 법리- 현대엘리베이터 결정의 재평가 -

        유영일 한국기업법학회 2009 企業法硏究 Vol.23 No.1

        This paper aims to revaluate the Hyundai Elevator Case(2003). The Hyundai Elevator Case Law has a very important meaning in Korea. It set up a general standards regarding review of the legality of the defensive tactics for the first time in Korea. In this Case Law, the court considers a various factors in reviewing the legality of the defensive tactics. It includes the motive or purpose of the defensive tactics, interests of company and shareholders, reasonableness of defensive tactics, and the appropriateness of the defensive procedures. It is the writer's opinion that Hyundai Elevator standard is almost the same standard as the Unocal standard. However, at the present time Hyundai Elevator Case Law seems to have little binding on the other case law in Korea. So, the writer suggests that Korean Supreme Court adopt the Hyundai Elevator Case Law as soon as possible. Then it will be the leading case law in Korea, as Unocal case law was in U.S.A. This paper consists of as follows: Ⅰ. Introduction Ⅱ. Previous Korean Case Law Ⅲ. Hyundai-Elevator Case Ⅳ. Importance of the Hyundai-Elevator Case Law Ⅴ. Conclusion

      • KCI등재

        방어행위의 적법성 판단에 관한 국내 판례의 법리

        劉榮一(Young-Ihl You) 한국기업법학회 2009 企業法硏究 Vol.23 No.1

        This paper aims to revaluate the Hyundai Elevator Case(2003). The Hyundai Elevator Case Law has a very important meaning in Korea. It set up a general standards regarding review of the legality of the defensive tactics for the first time in Korea. In this Case Law, the court considers a various factors in reviewing the legality of the defensive tactics. It includes the motive or purpose of the defensive tactics, interests of company and shareholders, reasonableness of defensive tactics, and the appropriateness of the defensive procedures. It is the writer's opinion that Hyundai Elevator standard is almost the same standard as the Unocal standard. However, at the present time Hyundai Elevator Case Law seems to have little binding on the other case law in Korea. So, the writer suggests that Korean Supreme Court adopt the Hyundai Elevator Case Law as soon as possible. Then it will be the leading case law in Korea, as Unocal case law was in U.S.A. This paper consists of as follows: Ⅰ. Introduction Ⅱ. Previous Korean Case Law Ⅲ. Hyundai-Elevator Case Ⅳ. Importance of the Hyundai-Elevator Case Law Ⅴ. Conclusion

      • KCI등재

        적대적 M&A와 이사회기능

        손영화(Young-Hoa Son) 한국기업법학회 2009 企業法硏究 Vol.23 No.2

        In the case of our country the defense means against hostile M&A is very inferior relatively compared with foreign legislation. It is not an overstatement although there is no defense method which the corporate management can choose against hostile M&A substantially. Therefore, it is necessary to legislate the defense method refer to foreign M&A legislation. Hostile M&A is giving a feeling of tension so that it may become flattery to a manager about corporate management. Moreover which is essentially accepted to an open corporation. Therefore, the introducing defense act for hostile M&A which made to distort original function of a capital market cannot agree. The director of a target company has authority which will defend against hostile M&A under the present statute and the category of articles-of-association regulation until legislating the defense method. However, such a director's defense act must becomes profits to a company and a whole stockholder. When hostile M&A becomes profits in a stock¬holder and a company. a director must not take a defense act to this. Moreover. it is necessary to make a director pay the burden of proof for the legitimacy and reasonableness of an defense act. Because the director who conducts a defense has the relationship of gain and loss about the conducts. A director must not intervene in the control quarrel between stockholders in principle. May be it is thought the American Delaware judicial precedent law - Unocal standards. Blasius standards and Revlon standard etc. - is helpful.

      • KCI등재

        경영권 방어수단으로서 신주의 제3자 배정에 관한 연구

        안효섭 ( Hyo Seop Ahn ) 한국상사판례학회 2014 상사판례연구 Vol.27 No.4

        Because the issuance of the new shares to a third party for the protection of its management encroach preemptive right, the issuance of the new shares to a third party during the takeover battle was enjoined by the Supreme court in 2009. If the attacker is to destroy the target company, there is a need for the court to recognize a takeover defense by the issuance of the new shares to a third party for the protection of its management within a limited range, such as the United States, Germany and Japan. In addition, the capital increase by ordinary public offering and also the disposal of treasury stocks shall be allowed selectively by legitimacy judgment standardBecause the purpose of the capital increase by ordinary public offering is not limited to business purpose, the court can not use the Primary Purpose Test (previously used for legitimacy judgment standard by the court). Therefore, in this case, the legality of the stock issuance should be determined by the legitimacy judgment which is based on the American Unocal standard.

      • KCI등재후보

        企業引受契約상 去來保護條項의 有效性 - 미국 판례의 태도와 시사점을 중심으로 -

        송종준 대한변호사협회 2009 人權과 正義 : 大韓辯護士協會誌 Vol.- No.394

        The deal protection clauses are referred to as a series of inserted clauses, like covenants concerning no-shop, lock-up, and break-up fees, to protect the original corporate mergers and acquisitions agreement from the third party’s bidding contest. Recently validity of the deal protection clauses have been increasingly disputed and judicial general standards for testing the validity have been formulated especially in Delaware courts. The standards are classified as two approaches in the perspectives of contract law and corporate law. In determining validity of the deal protection clauses, the doctrine of liquidated damages and unconscionability has been applied under the contract law, and business judgement rule, entire fairness test, Unocal and Revlon test, shareholder coercion standard and bidder preclusion standard have been done under the corporate law. Each standard depends on the facts and circumstances in the M&A agreement. In this paper the facts and courts decision of some leading cases are introduced somewhat in detail, which might be useful to negotiating the M&A agreement practices and to understanding the legal theories on the individual deal protection clause. And the general standards are based on the most of the precedents including the leading cases. In conclusion, although the American standards are not completely consistent with the interpretation of Korean law, some of which might be implicative. Most important thing is that deal protection clauses can not disregard the director’s fiduciary duty to the company, which is composed of duty of care and duty of loyalty under corporate law, because the clauses have only contractual binding forces to the contracting parties not corporate board of directors. Moreover public policies and the invalidating doctrine of excessively unfair contract as a general normative ruling under the private law are able to be applied to the clauses. Especially it is very impressive that traditional Unocal and Revlon test applied to the context of defending hostile M&A are already used for determining the validity of the deal protection devices. 기업인수계약상 거래보호조항(deal protection clauses)이라 함은 경합하는 제3의 인수자로부터 우호적 인수자와의 거래를 보호하기 위하여 인수계약에 삽입하는 우선협상의무(no-shop), 경쟁인수의 제한(lock-up), 위약금의 지급(break-up fee)에 관한 조항 등과 같은 일련의 규정을 말한다. 미국에서는 이와 같은 거래보호조항의 법적 효력에 관한 판례가 증가하고 있고 그 판단을 위한 일반원칙이 형성되 어 왔다. 거래보호조항의 유효성 판단에는 계약법상으로 손해배상액의 예정이론(liquidated damages)과 비양심성 법리(doctrine of unconscionability)가 적용되며, 회사법상으로는 경영판단원칙(business judgement rule), 완전공정성 기준(entire fairness test), Unocal 기준과 Revlon 기준, 주주강압기준(shareholder coercion standard), 경쟁인수자배제기준(bidder preclusion standard) 등이 적용되고 있다. 이 논문에서는 거래보호조항의 효력을 결정하기 위한 일반기준을 정리하기에 앞서 거래보호조항의 개별 유형에 대한 지도적인 미국 판결례를 중심으로 그 사실관계와 판결요지를 비교적 상세하게 소개하여 기업인수계약실무는 물론 법리 분석의 이해에 참고가 될 수 있도록 하였다. 그리고 거래보호조항의 유효성 판단을 위한 일반기준은 개별적인 판결례를 포함하여 미국의 다양한 판례에서 제시된 법이론을 종합하여 체계화하였다. 미국의 판례법에서 형성된 법리가 우리나라의 계약법이나 회사법의 정신과 완전히 일치하는 것은 아니지만, 우리 법의 해석에도 시사하는 점이 있다고 본다. 가장 중요한 시사점은 기업인수계약 당사자 간에 합의한 거래보호조항은 계약법적 효력에 그치므로 회사법상 이사가 기업인수와 관련하여 회사에 대하여 지는 선관주의의무와 충실의무에 반해서는 아니 된다는 점이다. 그 밖에도 사법의 일반원칙으로서 거래보호조항의 효력 정도에 따라 신의칙, 불공정행위의 무효원칙도 적용될 수 있을 것이다. 특히 우호적 인수계약에 포함되는 거래보호조항이 제3자의 경쟁적 인수를 배제하는 내용으로 구성된 경우에는 적대적 기업인수 방어의 적법성에 관한 일반기준으로서 Unocal 기준과 Revlon 기준이 적용된다는 점은 특기할 만하다고 여겨진다.

      • KCI등재

        연구논문 : 적대적 M&A 방어행위에 대한 적법성 판단기준

        박한성 ( Han Sung Park ) 단국대학교 법학연구소 2014 법학논총 Vol.38 No.2

        The possibilities and incentives of M&A are being raised by the improvedmerger system on the revised commercial code in 2011 in the current M&A environment of Korea regardless of they are friendly or hostile. For example, they are the introduction of cash-out merger (revised commercial code article 523 section 4), freeze-out (revised commercial code article 360 section 24) and triangular merger (revised commercial code article 532 section 2). In particular, cash-out merger can act as incentives to activate M & A because the largest shareholder can merge without diluting their shares when it is most important issue to secure shareholding. It could be used as a variety of means against hostile M&A to allow cash-out merger and triangular merger for the maximization of corporate synergies and efficient restructuring. Therefore, the problem could be legality standards for defense act against hostile M&A due to activation of hostile M&A. Until now, the mainstream of precedent is to guarantee mainly the right of management through the classification of purposes. Of course, for such reason it is not legality standards that the purpose of the management is denied or to conclude uniformly as the issue of significantly unfair way. On the other hand, with regard to the legality standards for defense act against hostile M&A, it is also worth considering adopting the legality standards in the legislative aspects. There is a variety of interests and are complex transactions. And the reality of hostile M&A can have a huge impact on the national economy. In this respect it can be a way to resolve the current situation surrounding legitimacy criteria. Korea can also judge the legality of defensive actions especially based on Unocal standard in the United States mentioned earlier. Although the rationality and proportionality of Unocal standard shows abstract judgment criteria, it will be standard that we can consider enough destination company’s overall considerations relating to a power struggle. However, there are the abuse of rights or destructive corporate M&A attempt, improvement of corporate governance according to the exit of incompetent executives and etc. Those will be an important future challenges need to be solved.

      • KCI등재

        미국 M&A계약상 주요 거래보호약정의 최근 동향에 관한 연구

        남도현(Do Hyun Nam) 한국기업법학회 2017 企業法硏究 Vol.31 No.3

        M&A계약상 거래보호약정은 최종적으로 계약 체결의 확실성을 증가시키기 위한 계약 조항의 일종으로 M&A거래와 관련하여 특정 조건으로 인하여 거래가 성사되지 않을 경우 입찰회사에게 약정한 가치를 제공하도록 하는 약정을 말한다. 즉, M&A계약에서 제3의 경쟁적 또는 우월한 인수희망회사로부터 계약을 체결한 기존의 인수희망회사의 거래를 보호하거나 M&A계약의 어느 한 당사자의 일방적인 계약 파기로 인하여 기업인수합병이 결렬되는 것을 방지하기 위하여 인수희망회사와 대상회사가 거래보호조치에 대한 약정을 하게 된다. 또한, 대상회사 입장에서는 회사 매각을 위한 응찰자를 유인하고 최초 응찰자에게 보다 높은 매수제안을 내도록 유도하는 효과를 갖는다. 본고에서는 먼저 거래보호약정에 대한 의의를 살펴보고, 위약금약정, 권유금지약정, 재교섭권, 이사회권유약정 및 주주총회의결강행조항, 상하한가제한 및 취소가능조항, 자산우선매수권 및 주식매수권, 의결권구속약정, 비밀유지약정 및 불가침조항 등 대표적인 거래보호약정별 구체적인 내용을 알아보고, Unocal 기준 및 Revlon 기준과 같은 거래보호약정의 유효성 판단 기준 및 거래보호약정과 관련하여 이사의 신인의무 위반 가능성을 회피하기 위한 fiduciary-out 조항에 대해 검토해 본다. 그리고 최근 미국 M&A거래 사례를 분석한 결과를 근거로 미국 M&A계약상 거래보호약정의 최근 주요 동향을 파악해 봄으로써 향후 우리나라의 M&A계약 활성화와 대상회사 주주의 이익 보호간의 균형을 도모할 수 있는 거래보호약정의 합리적인 활용 방안을 도출하는데 시사점을 제공하고자 한다. The deal protection agreement can be generally described as contractual provisions that have the effect of increasing deal certainty. In the event that the deal is not consummated due to the certain condition under the agreement the target company provides value to the bidder. The purpose of the deal protection agreement is to deter the third-party competing bidder to interrupt the deal with higher bidding or to prevent the deal from being broken up by either party of the contact. The target company also seek to have the deal protection agreement to encourage the initial bidding and to promote the value-enhancing deal. This paper first reviews the general concept of the deal protection agreement, and then analyzes each of the deal protection agreements in detail, which are termination fee, no-shop provision, matching right, board recommendation covenant, force-the-vote provision, collar provision, walkaway provision, asset lockup provision, stock option, voting agreement, confidentiality agreement, and standstill provision. This paper also discusses the standards for the validity of deal protections agreements including the judicial review of Unocal case and Revlon case, and the fiduciary-out provision to avoid the potential breach of the fiduciary duties of the board of the target company in terms of the deal protection agreement. After considering these historical and practical basis for the deal protection agreement, the current trend of deal protection agreement in the U.S. M&A market is identified by evaluating M&A deals for past decades in order to provide the deeper understanding of the deal protection agreement for the balance between encouraging the M&A deal and protecting the interests of shareholders.

      • KCI등재

        신주인수선택권에 관한 상법개정안의 검토

        김경일 한국상사법학회 2019 商事法硏究 Vol.38 No.2

        포이즌 필은 대리인 비용(agency cost) 문제가 있고, 경영진이 지위를 보전할 수 있는 효과적인 수단이기 때문에 남용될 가능성이 있으나, 효율적으로 사용되면 주주의 이익이 증가될 수 있으므로, 포이즌 필의 남용을 억제할 수 있는 방법을 모색하는 것이 중요하다. 제20대 국회에 제출되어 있는 상법개정안 중에서 정갑윤 안, 권성동 안, 윤상직 안이 신주인수선택권 도입을 내용으로 담고 있으나, 신주인수선택권의 남용을 억제할 수 있는 방법을 충분히 갖추고 있는지 문제된다. 먼저, 상법개정안은 신주인수선택권의 행사조건, 소각조건, 판단권자가 불명확하여 문제된다. 우리나라에서도 일본의 신주예약권세칙과 같은 신주인수선택권세칙을 도입하여, 신주인수선택권 발행회사의 이사회에서 신주인수선택권 부여를 결의하면서 신주인수선택권세칙도 함께 결의하고 공표하는 방안을 고려할 필요가 있을 것이다. 신주인수선택권세칙에서 신주인수선택권의 구체적인 행사조건, 소각조건, 판단권자 등을 규정하도록 함으로써, 경영진이 지위 보전을 위해 신주인수선택권 행사를 남용하거나 소각을 거부하는 하는 것을 방지하고, 신주인수선택권의 행사조건, 소각조건이 사전에 명확하게 공표될 수 있을 것이다. 다음으로, 상법개정안의 ʻ회사의 가치ʼ에서 주주 이외의 이해관계자(stakeholder)의 이익도 고려하여, 일부 주주를 차별적으로 취급하는 신주인수선택권을 부여할 있는지 여부가 문제된다. 적대적 기업인수에 직면한 이사회가 주주 이외의 다른 이해관계자의 이익도 고려하여 일부 주주를 차별적으로 취급하는 신주인수선택권 부여를 결정할 수 있도록 해주면, 어느 이해관계자의, 어떠한 이익을, 얼마나 고려할 수 있는지 불명확하고, 이사회가 다른 이해관계자의 이익을 핑계 삼아 자기보신을 위해 신주인수선택권 부여를 남용할 우려가 있다. 결국 적대적 기업인수에 직면한 이사회가 신주인수선택권 부여를 결정함에 있어서는 주주의 이익만 고려할 수 있도록 하는 것이 타당하다 할 것이다. 마지막으로, ① 상법개정안의 신주인수선택권의 적법성 판단기준인 ʻ회사의 가치 및 주주 일반의 이익을 유지 또는 증진시키기 위하여 필요한 경우ʼ는 추상적이어서 그 실효성 확보를 위한 법원의 판단 방법이 문제되고, ② 그 내용이 불충분하여 신주인수선택권의 남용을 억제하기 위한 보완 방법이 문제된다. 상법개정안의 ʻ회사의 가치 및 주주 일반의 이익을 유지 또는 증진시키기 위하여 필요한 경우ʼ라는 적법성 판단기준의 실효성을 확보하기 위해, 법원의 구체적인 판단 방법으로서 대상회사의 이사회로 하여금 공개매수 제시 가격 보다 대상회사의 계속기업 가치가 더 크다는 사실을 입증하도록 요구하는 것과 같은 방안을 고려할 필요가 있을 것이다. 상법개정안은 ʻ회사의 가치 및 주주 일반의 이익을 유지 또는 증진시키기 위하여 필요한 경우ʼ만 규정하고, 상당성 요건을 규정하고 있지 않는바, 미국과 일본의 기준과 유사한 기준을 상법에 명시하여 신주인수선택권의 남용을 억제할 필요가 있으므로, 상법개정안에 상당성 요건을 규정하는 방안을 고려할 필요가 있다. The poison pill has the problem of 'agency costs'. The poison pill is open to abuse because it is an effective entrenchment tool. Nonetheless, the poison pill is an important tool for raising shareholder value. Thus finding ways to curb the abuse of the poison pill is of critical importance. Some member of the National Assembly submitted to the National Assembly three bills to amend the Commercial Act, to allow companies to issue call options for new shares as an anti-takeover measure(hereinafter 'Korean poison pill'). But the question arises as to whether or not bills have enough ways to curb the abuse of Korean poison pill. First, according to the above bills, it is unclear under which circumstances shareholder can exercise Korean poison pill, and the company can cancel it, and who will decide about the exercise or the cancellation of it. There would be a need to consider the way to introduce the detailed regulation of Korean poison pill like Japan. When the board of directors votes to grant Korean poison pill, the board also votes the detailed regulation of Korean poison pill and releases it. By providing specific conditions of the exercise and the cancellation, and the decision maker in the detailed regulation of Korean poison pill, the manager's abuse of the poison pill can be curbed and specific conditions of the exercise and the cancellation, and the decision maker can be made public clearly in advance. Second, when it comes to the bills' phrase of 'the value of the company', the question arises as to whether or not the board can consider the interests of nonshareholder constituencies deciding to grant Korean poison pill. If the board is allowed to consider the interests of nonshareholder constituencies when it decides whether to grant Korean poison pill, then the problem of ambiguity will arise as to whose interests the board will consider, which interests the board will consider, and how much interests the board will consider. There will be a possibility that considering the interests of nonshareholder constituencies can be used as an excuse by the manager for abusing Korean poison pill to protect his tenure. Thus it would be desirable the board is allowed to consider only the interests of shareholders when it decides whether to grant Korean poison pill. Third, ① the bills' requirement of 'the case when it is necessary to maintain or increase the value of the company and the interests of its shareholders in general', which is the standard for judicial review, is abstract, so the question arises as to how the court will decide whether the requirement is being met. ② The above requirement is not sufficient, so the way how to curb the abuse of Korean poison pill matters. To secure the effectiveness of the standard for judicial review, that is 'the case when it is necessary to maintain or increase the value of the company and the interests of its shareholders in general', there would be a need to consider the specific judgement method such as requiring the board to prove that the company's going concern value is higher than the pending bid price. The bills prescribe only the requirement of 'the case when it is necessary to maintain or increase the value of the company and the interests of its shareholders in general', and they don't prescribe the requirement that the Korean poison pill is reasonable in relation to the threat posed(hereinafter 'the reasonableness requirement'). But the Commercial Act is required to prescribe the same reasonableness requirement as that of the US and Japan to curb the abuse of Korean poison pill. Thus there would be a need to consider the way to prescribe the reasonableness requirement in the bills.

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