불공정거래행위의 유형에 따른 위법성 판단 - 불공정성을 중심으로 -

홍명수 경희대학교 법학연구소 2015 경희법학 Vol.50 No.3

Monopoly Regulations Act has been based on the dual system, market dominant position regulations and unfair trade regulations, on the single illegal practices. The decisions of illegality of unfair trade practices will be accomplished on the grounds of the restraints of competition and unfairness. That is to say, an infringement of fair trade would be comprised of unfairness of trade, too. For decision of unfairness of trade, it would be required to confirm the factors that damage the profits of trade partners, which should belong to them reasonably. Specially it is significant to value a degree of the violation or the distortion of the reasonable choice of the trade partners. KFTC(Korean Fair Trade Commission) understands the unfairness from the perspectives of competitive means and trade matters. Among the details of types of unfair trade practices, Unfair drawing of customer, Forced Trade, Obstruction of business activities will be determine unfairness by competitive means, and Abusing the trade position by trade matters. But such a formal application could be results in difficulties in determinations of unfairness. In other to understand the nature of unfairness of unfair trade practices, it is needed to avoid the formal approaches and keep the practical and comprehensive perspectives. 독점규제법상 단독행위 규제는 시장지배적 지위남용행위와 불공정거래행위 규제로 이원화 되어 있으며, 이러한 규제 체계에서 불공정거래행위 규제는 단독행위 규제의 한 축을 이룬다. 또한 독점규제법상 불공정거래행위의 위법성 판단은 경쟁제한성과 불공정성 등 다양한 관점에서 이루어진다는 점도 중요한 특징을 이룬다. 이와 같은 규제체계에 대하여 다양한 논의가 이루어지고 있다. 단독행위 규제체계의 문제, 불공정거래행위 위법성 판단의 중층적 구조 등은 입법론까지 포함하여 다양한 논의의 대상이 되고 있다. 이러한 논의는 독점규제법 규제체계의 개선의 관점에서 의미 있는 것이지만, 논의의 기초를 올바르게 하기 위하여 현행 독점규제법상 불공정거래행위 규제에 대한 이해가 중요하다. 특히 불공정거래행위 위법성 판단에 있어서 경쟁제한성이 아닌 불공정성에 의하는 부분은 상대적으로 명확하게 정립되지 않은 상황이다. 특히 거래내용과 경쟁수단의 측면에서 형식적으로 불공정성을 파악하고 있는 공정거래위원회의 규제 실무는 불공정성에 대한 실질적인 이해를 모색하는데 지장을 초래하고 있다. 따라서 불공정거래행위 위법성의 판단 기준으로서 불공정성의 의의를 명확히 하고, 구체적인 법적용에서 드러나는 문제점을 면밀히 검토할 필요가 있다. 이를 위하여 거래 과정에서 발생하는 불이익에 초점을 맞추고 있는 불공정성의 의의를 밝히고, 불공정성의 관점에서 위법성 판단이 이루어지고 있는 불공정거래행위의 세부 유형, 즉 부당한 고객유인, 거래강제, 거래상 지위의 남용, 사업활동 방해 등을 구체적으로 분석하여 규제 법리를 개선할 필요가 있을 것이다.

공정거래법상 특수관계인에 대한 부당이익제공행위의 의미 및 판단기준

홍대식(Dae Sik Hong) 한국비교사법학회 2014 비교사법 Vol.21 No.1

특수관계인에 대한 부당이익제공행위는, 대규모기업집단 내부의 계열회사 간의 거래를 통한 경제상 이익의 부당한 이전을 규제하는 부당지원행위 규정의 운용 경험에 비추어, 사회적 으로 규제 요구가 제기되고 있으나 부당지원행위 규정의 포섭 범위에 포함되지 않는 행위 유형을 포섭하기 위한 취지로 신설되었다. 첫째, 편제상으로 불공정거래행위의 한 유형이 아니라 독립된 행위 유형으로 규정한 점, 둘째, 이익제공행위에 해당하는 행위 유형을 부당지원행위 유형보다 확대한 점, 그리고 셋째, 위법성 기준으로서 불공정거래행위에서의 공정거래저해성이나 부당성이 아니라 부당한 이익 귀속성이라는 구별되는 용어를 사용한 점에 그러한 취지가 반영되어 있다. 이러한 입법 취지는 어느 정도 그 성과가 기대될 것으로 보인다. 행위유형으로서 사업기회의 제공 행위와 합리적 고려나 비교 없는 상당한 규모의 거래 행위는 기존의 부당지원행위 유형과 반드시 중복되지 않는 새로운 유형이라는 점, 불공정거래행위로부터 독립된 행위 유형으로 규정하면서 위법성 요건을 달리하고 있다는 점에서, 규범적으로 그 요건의 의미와 판단기준을 불공정거래행위에서와 다르게 설정할 해석상 필요가 있기 때문이다. 그럼에도 불구하고 특수관계인에 대한 부당이익제공행위 규정은 기존의 부당지원행위 규정의 그늘에서 완전히 벗어날 수 없다. 이는 일차적으로 요건으로 사용된 개념이 따라야 하는 해석원리에 의한 한계에 기인하고, 이차적으로는 이 규정 역시 공정거래법의 목적을 실현하기 위한 수단적 성격을 갖는 규정으로서 그 목적이 지시하는 바에 따라야 하는 한계에 기인한다. 이 글은 이러한 관점에서 이 규정의 본격적인 시행에 앞서 규정의 해석과 이를 적용한 법적 판단의 지침을 제공하기 위한 것이다. 이 글의 결론은 다음과 같이 요약될 수 있다. 첫째, 상당히 유리한 조건의 거래 및 상당한 규모의 거래 요건의 경우에도 현저히 유리한 조건의 거래 요건과 비교할 때 판단기준과 그 고려사항에는 별다른 변화가 필요하지 않다. 또한 상당히 유리한 조건의 거래는 상당히 낮거나 높은 대가로 제공 또는 거래하거나 상당한 규모로 제공 또는 거래하여 ‘과다하거나 정상적인 수준을 상당히 넘는’ 경제상 이익을 제공하는 행위로 구체화될 수 있다. 제공되는 경제상 이익이 과다하거나 정상적인 수준을 상당히 넘는 것인지 여부의 판단은 조건의 유리함과 관련된 요소인 가격 또는 수량의 정상 수준과의 산술적인 비교와 그로 인한 경제상 이익의 크기를 주된 근거로 하고, 그것만으로 상당성을 판단하기 어려운 사건에서는 조건의 유리함과 관련되지 않은 요소로서 그 사건에 특유한 사정을 종합적으로 고려하는 방식을 취할 수 있다. 둘째, 불공정거래행위의 위법성 요건인 공정거래저해성은 법의 목적에 비추어 허용될 수 있는 보호 대상으로서의 경쟁의 기준으로서 가장 포괄적인 기준이다. 따라서 비록 특수관계인에 대한 부당이익제공행위 규정이 불공정거래행위 규정과는 조문 배열을 달리하지만, 같은 장에 편제된 규정으로서 그 부당성의 내용의 최소한도는 ‘공정거래저해성’이 되어야 한다. 이 규정이 부당지원행위 규정과 차이를 갖는다면, 이는 부당성의 내용으로 지원객체의 관련시장에서의 경쟁저해성과 경제력 집중 야기성을 대등한 비중으로 요구하는 부당지원행위에 비하여 경제력 집중 야기성의 비중이 높게 고려될 수 있다는 것을 의미할 수 있을 뿐이지, 이로써 이규정의 부당성이 공정거래저해성과 다르다거나 부당성의 내용에서 경쟁저해성을 완전히 배제할 수 있다는 해석이 도출되는 것은 아니다. The amendments to the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act(“MRFTA”) on the regulation of providing unfair advantage to specially related persons was made to include new types of unfair support which were not effectively covered by the existing rules, but required to be regulated by the social needs. These are the reasons proving the purpose of amending the law. First of all, the new regulation was not one of the types of unfair trade practices, but an independent clause of violation. Secondarily, the types that can be ruled by the amended law were expended compared to the previous one. Thirdly, the term “ascribing unfair advantage" is different from the term used in the unfair trade practices, such as “impeding fair trade" or “unreasonable." As the government intended, this amendment might result in as it was purposed for two reasons. The types of providing unfair advantage to specially related persons are not necessarily overlapping the types of unfair supports (ie. giving business opportunity, trading in considerable quantity). Moreover, since this new clause is an independent clause and differs in terms determining the illegality, the legal understanding of the new clause has to be construed differently as the previous interpretations of the unfair trade practices. Nevertheless, the interpretation of providing unfair advantage to specially related persons cannot be totally different from that of the unfair support as a unfair trade practice. This is because the term has to meet the principle of interpretation given by the limit of the word itself, and this new clause also serves as a means to the general purpose of the MRFTA, meaning that the new clause also has to follow the purpose of the law defined in the article 1. This paper aimed to guide the right interpretation of the new clause and the conclusion is followed; First of all, interpretations of terms “trading with considerably advantageous conditions" and "trading in considerable quantity" are not much different from the previous term “trading with substantially advantageous conditions." And the term “trading with considerably advantageous conditions" can be shaped as trading with considerably high or low prices or in considerable quantity resulting in providing economic advantage which is superfluous or way above the normal standards. In deciding those elements, should the normal standard be able to be set, comparison between the normal standard and the price or quantity of the matter and the size of subsequent economic advantage are defining factors. When it is difficult to determine the standard, other conditions of the case might also be considered to determine whether it is considerable. Furthermore, the term “impeding fair trade" is the most inclusive standard for protecting competition. Therefore, although the new clause on providing unfair advantage to the related people differ in the actual description, the same term should be the criteria for the new clause as well. The difference between the existing clause on unfair support and the new clause on providing unfair advantage to specially related persons in terms of unfairness is that the latter could consider more on the concentration of the economic power than the former, but it does not mean that the standard of impeding fair trade can be excluded when deciding the unfairness of the new clause.

증권 불공정거래 피해 투자자의 사적 구제 수단에 대한 제 고찰 - 불공정거래 손해배상 청구소송의 활성화 방안을 중심으로

최자유 은행법학회 2022 은행법연구 Vol.15 No.1

Unfair securities trading disturbs the capital market by damaging the fairness and soundness of the stock market. Unfair securities trading could undermine the trust in the capital market, and at the same time, it could harm some investors. Investors’ harm is being relatively neglected. Recently, improvement of the system in various directions is being discussed for efficient and prompt sanctions, such as the expansion of penalty surcharges for all types of unfair securities trading or the introduction of the leniency system that provides incentives for voluntary reporting. This study outlines the sanctions system against unfair securities trading and examines private remedies for harmed investors. Private remedy means the methods by which the harmed investor recovers the damage caused by unfair securities trading through a lawsuit for damages. In the United States, harmed investors can file a private securities class action, which works effectively with the discovery. In order to discover the substantive truth during the litigation process, the evidence requested by the other party should be disclosed. This study would analyze the discovery system that can even result in a loss in the lawsuit and propose the Korean-style discovery. This study considers the ‘system of support for a lawsuit against unfair securities trading for the harmed investor’, which supports investors by identifying the harmed investor and providing data when a court finds guilty of unfair securities trading in the first instance judgment. This study also suggests compensating the harmed investor as a sentencing factor. Relieving harmed investors from unfair securities trading should be essential to countering unfair securities trading. The significance of this study is to suggest a private remedy for the harmed investor. 증권 불공정거래는 주식시장의 공정성ㆍ건전성을 훼손하여 자본시장을 교란하고, 동시에 특정 투자자에게 피해를 입힌다. 증권 불공정거래를 효율적이고 신속하게 제재하기 위해 모든 유형의 불공정거래에 과징금 확대나 자진 신고에 인센티브를 부여하는 리니언시 제도 도입 등 여러 방향의 제도 개선이 논의되고 있으나, 자본시장의 신뢰 훼손에 대한 제재와 관련된 것이고 피해 투자자의 구제는 도외시되고 있다. 본 연구는 증권 불공정거래 제재 체계를 검토하고 피해 투자자의 사적 구제 수단을 제언한다. 미국의 피해 투자자는 증권 관련 집단소송(securities class action)을 제기할 수 있고 이는 실체적 진실 발견을 위하여 상대방이 요구한 증거를 개시하도록 하는 디스커버리 제도와 결합하여 실효적으로 작동한다. 이를 토대로 한국형 디스커버리 제도 도입을 제안한다. 법원의 1심 판결에서 불공정거래 혐의가 인정되면 피해 투자자를 식별하여 자료를 제공하고 소송을 지원하는 ‘불공정거래 피해 투자자 소송지원’ 방안을 제언한다. 형사처벌 대상인 불공정거래의 피해 투자자에 대한 배상을 양형 인자로 두는 방법도 제시한다. 피해 투자자 구제는 증권 불공정거래 대응의 중요한 목표가 되어야 한다. 피해 투자자의 사적 구제 수단을 제언하는 것이 본 연구의 의의이다.

불공정거래행위의 사법상 효력

서정 민사판례연구회 2009 民事判例硏究 Vol.- No.31

In studying the enforceability of unfair trade practices proscribed in Section 23 of Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Law (hereinafter “MRFTL”), its legal nature must first be examined. There are two main body of thoughts regarding the legal nature of unfair trade practices: one school of thought argues that unfair trade practices should be understood in the limited context as only those acts that harm competition while the other school of thought argues that unfair trade practices include not only anticompetitive behavior but also any behavior in which unfairness exists (even if such behavior is not necessarily anticompetitive). Between these two thoughts, currently, the latter is the majority view among scholars. As such, the discussion on the enforceability and the scope of unfair trade practices is closely related to the discussion of its nature. If we follow the second school of thought, unfair trade practices encompass both acts that restrict competition as well as acts that, although not anticompetitive, are nonetheless considered unfair. The latter acts can be further divided into those acts subject to Article 103 of the Korean Civil Code and those acts that are not. In terms of enforceability of anticompetitive practices, acts that are anticompetitive are simply null and void; this is because competition forms a part of social order in the sense that it constitutes one of the core values behind the Constitution and helps society achieve the principle of self determination. Therefore, in principle, any activities harmful to competition should be rendered void. On the other hand, regarding acts, which, while not anticompetitive, are considered unfair, I believe if the degree of unfairness is so severe that it is against public policy, those acts should also be rendered void. Although a person can question whether there is a separate need for the Korean Fair Trade Commission (hereinafter “KFTC”) to intervene in such cases, court decisions so far generally hold in favor of KFTC intervention in such cases. In cases where an act is considered to constitute unfair trade practice but does not rise to the level of violating public policy, it is hard to say that such activity should be rendered legally void. However, MRFTL allows the KFTC to apply sanctions such as issuing cease and desist order, or imposing fine and criminal penalties to parties engaged in such act. Hence, in terms of formulating legal policy, we need to carefully study this kind of discrepancy between civil law and competition law. 독점규제 및 공정거래에 관한 법률(이하 '공정거래법') 제23조에 규정된 불공정거래행위의 사법상 효력을 논함에 있어서는 그 본질에 대한 검토가 선행되어야 한다. 불공정거래행위의 본질에 대해서는 경쟁질서를 침해하는 행위로 국한해서 이해하는 견해와 거래질서를 침해하는 행위로 확장해서 이해하여야 한다는 견해가 대립되고 있다. 전자를 경쟁질서침해설, 후자를 거래질서침해설로 칭할 수 있는데, 후자가 현재 다수설이다. 이처럼 본질론에 관한 입장에 따라 불공정거래행위에 포섭되는 행위태양이 달라지게 되고, 이것은 다시 사법상 효력론에 영향을 미치게 된다. 거래질서침해설에 따르게 되면, 현행 불공정거래행위는 경쟁을 제한하는 행위와 경쟁은 제한하지 않지만 불공정하다고 평가되는 행위, 즉 성격이 다른 두 종류의 행위유형으로 구성되어 있다고 할 것이다. 그리고 후자는 다시 민법 제103조 등의 적용을 받는 행위와 민법 제103조 등의 적용을 받지 않는 행위로 구분된다. 사법상 효력과 관련하여 먼저 경쟁제한적 불공정거래행위에 관하여 보건대, 경쟁질서는 헌법이 추구하는 가치일 뿐만 아니라 사적자치를 실질화한다는 측면에서 사회질서의 일부분을 구성한다고 할 것이다. 따라서 이러한 법률행위는 원칙적으로 무효라고 보아야 할 것이다. 경쟁은 침해하지 않지만 불공정한 행위 중에서 공정성 침해의 정도가 현저하여 공서양속에 반하는 경우에도 그 행위를 무효라고 보아야 할 것이다. 다만 이 경우에 과연 경쟁당국이 별도로 개입할 필요성이 있는지에 대해서 의문이 제기될 수 있으나, 현재 판례는 이를 긍정하고 있다. 한편, 불공정거래행위의 요건에는 해당하지만 공서양속에 반한다고 보기 어려운 경우에는 섣불리 법률행위의 효력을 부정할 수는 없을 것이다. 그렇지만 이 경우에도 시정조치, 과징금, 형벌 등의 제재를 가하는 것이 가능한 바, 과연 공정성 심사를 통과하여 사법상 유효하다고 인정되는 법률행위에 대해서 다시 경쟁당국이 동일한 잣대로 심사를 해서 제재를 가하는 것이 법정책적 측면에서 타당한지는 재검토가 필요하다.

불공정거래행위 규제의 의의와 개선 논의의 기초

홍명수 ( Myung Su Hong ) 안암법학회 2014 안암 법학 Vol.0 No.45

The Regulations of unfair trade practices are an axis of the regulations of single-firm conducts with the regulations of abuses of market dominant power in Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act in Korea. And the regulations of unfair trade practices should be determined in perspective of the restraints of competition as well as the unfairness. Such a regulation system of unfair trade practices is not uncommon as compared to the competition law in other countries. For example the competition law systems in U. S. A., Germany and Japan have the multiple legal provisions about the regulations of single-firm conducts. And as can be seen at the applications of article 19 in Monopoly Prohibition Act in Japan and article 5 in the FTC Act in U. S. A., the perspectives of unfairness have effectively functioned for the regulations of unfair trade practices. So current the regulations of the single-firm conducts or the unfair trade practices in Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act would not be problem systematically. More importantly, the current regulation systems must be reviewed in light of real competition in the market and regulatory necessity. From this point of view, it would be sufficient to meet the demand of competition policy. So it may be premature to integrate the regulations of single-firm conducts or remove the unfairness in judgement of illegality of unfair trade practices. And it is necessary to discuss the improvement of regulations of unfair trade practices in this point, to clarify the meaning of the regulation of single-firm conduct and unfair trade practice, or the criteria of the determination of unfairness.

대형종합병원의 선택진료비 및 치료재료비의 부당징수 행위에 대한 연구

서석희 ( Suk Hee Suh ) 한국경쟁법학회 2010 競爭法硏究 Vol.22 No.-

On 28th September 2009, the KFTC imposed the surcharge of 3.04 billion won with the order of correction on 8 large general hospitals for levying unfair expense of selecting doctors or medical materials by using their superior position to the patients. The target hospitals of the order of correction include the Korean prominent general hospitals, such as Seoul Asan Hospital, Sin-chon Severance Hospital, and Sam-sung Seoul hospital, and the order was the result from the investigation that had been preceded from July to September 2008. There were several types of acts that violated the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act such as unfair charging fees for selecting a doctor(8 hospitals) or materials for medical(2 hospitals). KFTC judged that this violation were under the Offering Disadvantage which is one of the type of Unfair trade practices under the Article 23.1.4 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (Unfairly Taking Advantage of One`s Position in Trade). In the large general hospitals, doctors had more access to information than patients, and patients had limitations in selecting their hospitals and doctors. In this situation, the hospitals unfairly took the advantage of their position to patients in trade. As a result, the trade between the hospitals and patients became abnormal therefore patients couldn`t expect the unfair charging fees and should have paid fees unfairly. In this respect, the KFTC judged that the hospitals violated the law. The KFTC imposed the surcharge of 3.04 billion won with the order of correction on 8 large general hospitals for levying unfair expense of selecting doctors, and gave the order of correction on 2 hospitals for levying unfair charge of medical materials. This judgment was meaningful, because it was the first time applying Fair Trade laws to Korean prominent general hospitals` process of charging fees. However selecting doctors were caused by the dissymmetry of information between doctors and patients. Charging fees on medical treatments also were the kind of ``actual cost compensation`` for the patients. According to these facts, even though the structural and systematic improvement of the hospitals was necessary, the judgment, that these actions were under the Offering Disadvantage which was one of the type of Unfair trade practices under the Article 23.1.4 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (Unfairly Taking Advantage of One`s Position in Trade), should be carefully examined.

발표논문(發表論文) : 미공개중요정보이용행위 규제에 대한 소고

김돈순 ( Don Soon Kim ) 단국대학교 법학연구소 2011 법학논총 Vol.35 No.1

The Capital Market Act constituted to guarantee a more fair and reliable market trade in capital markets and protect rights of investors controls and regulates the unfair trade practice institutionalized as the single provisions in the Securities Law, as each independent provision, according to the Insider Short- Term Arbitrage Trading Returns(Article 172),the Nonpublic Important Information Use Practice Prohibition(Article 174) the Market Price Manipulation Practice Prohibition (Article 176) and the Unfair Trade Practice Prohibition (Article 178) stipulated in the current law. The law on the Nonpublic Important Information Use Practice Prohibition designed to protect investors from asymmetric information rules that any insider shall not take advantage of nonpublic important information that he or she acquires in the process of exercising his or her rights or carrying out his or her duty, under the intention to trade certain securities or financial investments goods issued by listed corporations, and etc, or induce other people to intervene in these illegal trade actions in a bid to get his or her interests and avoid upcoming loss. Most nations prohibit any insiders from doing ``nonpublic important information practice``, one of typical unfair trading practice types, in order to establish a fair and reliable culture in capital markets. But, these nations prescribe a little different provision as to ``targets of such control and regulation``, ``information on targets of such control and regulation`` and ``securities to be controlled and regulated``, according to the economic volumes or capital market development. As to categories of such control and regulation, the U. S and Japan take tougher countermeasures against the illegal information use, setting the standard of such control and regulation according to corporate relations, while, the UK and EU take such countermeasures, according to illegal information held. The use of illegal information is set as the standard of such control and regulation in Australia and Germany. The U. S has the longest history of the control and regulations on Insider Trading. The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) constituted rules on the SEC, in1942, according the Securities and Exchange Act in 1934. As the special legislative bills on the control and regulation on Inside Trading, the U. S institutionalized Insider Trading Sanctions Act in 1984 and Insider Trading Securities Fraud Enforcement Act in 1988. In August 2000, the SEC provided rules of the SEC, 10(b)5-1(b)5-2, in order to prohibit the announcement on information on securities issue corporations and corporate relations and make a more clear definition on the control and regulation on Inside Trading. The U. S prohibits any insiders from taking advantage of nonpublic information, according to rules and cases of the Securities Exchange Act constituted in 1934. As to theories on the control and regulation on illegal information use, there are possession of information theory, fiduciary duty theory and misappropriation theory. The Capital Market Law defines insiders, quasi-insiders, and the primary information receivers and as the targets of the control and regulation on nonpublic important information use. Such law extended the coverage of insiders and covered corporate affiliate employees and negotiators, who sign contracts with listed corporations, as the category of insiders, according to the law related to monopoly and fair trade. But, they are not defined as insiders according to the Securities Exchange Act. Nonpublic information is controlled and regulated on listed corporations` duties which can have important influences on what investors will determine. Here, information on listed corporations` duties cannot be stated, in details. But, it can be mentioned that there is information on "Report on Major Duties", such as finance structure, sale, production and investment plans and any other business areas, required by the Finance Commission and, information on duties on announcement of report required by the KRX. The public purchase and massive acquisitions and disposals on voting stock targeting uncertain majority people are neither controlled nor regulated. Those who violate the control and regulation law on nonpublic important information use shall be subject to criminal and civil liabilities at the same times. Such violators who are subject to administrative sanctions shall be imposed penalty. Some argue that in order to apply the substantial sanction on the regulation violation, penalty should be imposed on unfair trade practice, just as such penalty shall be imposed on finance investors who violate the law related to the announcement of information.

한진그룹의 ‘특수관계인에 대한 부당한 이익제공 행위’ 사건 대법원 판례 검토

최난설헌 한국상사판례학회 2022 상사판례연구 Vol.35 No.3

On May 12, 2022, the Supreme Court made a final decision on the Hanjin Group case in which the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) imposed an administrative penalty by applying the ‘prohibition of unfair benefits to related parties’ (Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA), Article 47, Paragraph 1). In 2017, the Seoul High Court ruled that the KFTC should prove whether the act in question attributes ‘unfair benefits’ to a related person. It has been five years since the KFTC appealed against this decision. Since its enforcement on February 14, 2014, the regulation prohibiting unfair benefits to related parties—i.e., the so-called ‘regulation for exploitation of private benefits’—has significantly impacted related party transactions of large corporate groups. Contrary to the KFTC’s active will to enforce the law, however, when the KFTC lost in a lawsuit against the KFTC's disposition, it was argued that the requirements for proof of unfairness should be relaxed. According to the KFTC, in light of the legislative purpose, it is argued that the regulation was enacted to allow the regulatory authorities to easily regulate the activities of exploitation of private benefits without active and concrete proof of unfairness. In other words, the KFTC’s position is that it does not have to directly prove that the concentration of economic power has occurred or has been strengthened due to the unfairness caused by the exploitation of private benefits. The problem has emerged because the expression ‘unfair benefits’ appears in Article 47 (1) of the MRFTA. Regarding the elements of illegality, the main issues of discussion were whether it is necessary to determine the unfairness of attributable benefits and, if necessary, what the meaning of unfairness is. Furthermore, there was also the question of whether the KFTC had to prove ‘unfairness’. In the Hanjin Group case, the Supreme Court ruled that the KFTC had to prove unfairness. According to the Supreme Court, however, ‘unfairness’ in prohibiting unfair benefits differs from unfair trade practices. In other words, based on the ruling of the Supreme Court in Korea, unfairness does not require a risk of impeding fair trade by restricting competition or concentrating economic power in the market to which the object of action belongs through the act of providing benefits. After comprehensively considering various factors (such as the relationship among the subject of the action, the object of the action, and specially related persons, the purpose and intention of the action, the circumstances of the action, and the economic situation the object of the action faces, the size of the transaction, the size of the private benefits attributable to a related person, and the duration of the act of providing profits, etc.), unfairness should be judged according to whether there is a risk that the concentration of economic power will be maintained or deepened centering on the ‘specially related persons’ of large conglomerates through the anomalous transfer of wealth, etc. The Hanjin Group case is expected to serve as an important precedent for the interpretation of the provisions of the controlling family shareholder’s exploitation of private benefits. However, in consideration of the legislative purpose, continuous review and efforts are needed for a more sophisticated and rational interpretation and application of the law. 2022년 5월 12일 대법원은 공정거래위원회가 구 공정거래법 제23조의2(현행 공정거래법 제47조 제1항)의 ‘특수관계인에 대한 부당한 이익제공 금지 조항’을 적용하여 과징금을 부과한 한진그룹 사건에 대해 최종 판결을 내렸다. 동 판결은 2017년 서울고등법원이 문제된 행위가 특수관계인에게 ‘부당한 이익’을 귀속시키는지 공정위가 증명하라는 취지의 판결을 내리고, 공정위가 이에 불복하여 상고한 지 만 5년 만에 이루어진 것이다. 특수관계인에 대한 부당한 이익제공 금지 규정, 즉, 소위 ‘사익편취 규제’는 2014년 2월 14일 시행된 이래 대규모기업집단의 내부거래에 상당한 영향을 미쳐왔다. 그러나 공정위의 적극적인 법 집행 의지와는 달리, 공정위 처분에 대한 불복의 소에서 공정위가 패소하자 부당성에 대한 입증요건을 완화해야 한다는 주장이 제기된 바 있으며, 공정위는 사익편취 규정의 입법취지에 비추어 볼 때 동 규정은 규제당국이 적극적이고 구체적인 부당성 입증 없이도 손쉽게 사익편취 행위를 규제할 수 있도록 하기 위해 제정된 것이므로, 공정위가 당해 사익편취 행위로 인한 부당성으로 경제력집중의 발생 또는 강화 우려를 직접적으로 입증할 필요는 없다는 입장을 취하였다. 이와 같은 문제가 대두된 이유는 법 제47조 제1항에서 ‘부당한 이익’이라는 표현이 등장하기 때문인데, 법에서 ‘부당한’ 이익으로 명시하고 있으므로 위법성 구성요건과 관련하여 귀속 이익의 부당성 판단이 필요한지, 그리고 필요하다면 부당성의 의미가 무엇인지가 논의의 쟁점이 되었으며, 나아가 공정위가 ‘부당성’을 입증해야 하는지도 문제되었다. 대법원은 한진그룹 사건에서 공정위가 부당성을 입증해야 한다는 취지로 판결을 내렸으며, 다만, 부당한 이익제공 금지에서의 ‘부당성’은 불공정거래행위와는 달리, “… 이익제공 행위를 통하여 그 행위객체가 속한 시장에서 경쟁이 제한되거나 경제력이 집중되는 등으로 공정한 거래를 저해할 우려가 있을 것까지 요구하는 것은 아니고, 행위주체와 행위객체 및 특수관계인의 관계, 행위의 목적과 의도, 행위의 경위와 그 당시 행위객체가 처한 경제적 상황, 거래의 규모, 특수관계인에게 귀속되는 이익의 규모, 이익제공 행위의 기간 등을 종합적으로 고려하여, 변칙적인 부의 이전 등을 통하여 대기업집단의 특수관계인을 중심으로 경제력집중이 유지·심화될 우려가 있는지에 따라 판단하여야 한다”고 판시하였다한진그룹 사건은 향후 총수일가의 사익편취 조항의 해석과 관련한 중요한 선례가 될 것으로 보이며, 다만, 입법취지를 고려하여 보다 정교하고 합리적인 법 해석 및 법 적용 방향에 대한 계속적인 고민과 노력이 필요할 것이다.

미국통상정책에 나타난 공정무역과 불공정무역의 탐색적 연구

박종은(Park, Jong-eun),송양호(Song, Yang-Ho) 전북대학교 법학연구소 2017 法學硏究 Vol.53 No.-

트럼프 대통령은 취임 직후 교역상대국의 ‘불공정 무역관행’(unfair trade practices)에 공세적으로 대처할 것을 주문하였다. 그러나 우리는 그의 주문에서 과거 미국정부가 통상정책상 ‘불공정무역’을 상대국의 시장개방 압력수단으로 활용하였으나, 새로 시작한 트럼프행정부는 상대국의 시장개방 압력수단과 병행하여 자국 내 산업보호 명분으로까지 확대하고 활용하려는 의도를 엿볼 수 있다. 트럼프행정부는 이를 위하여 향후 ‘불공정 무역’관행에 대한 일방적인 무역제재조치 권한을 빠르게 강화해 나갈 것으로 예상된다. 따라서 미국의 ‘불공정무역관행’에 대한 이와 같은 날선 태도에 한국도 물론 비껴갈 수 없을 것이다. 그러므로 한국은 미국의 일방적인 무역제재조치에 대응하기 위하여 첫째, 對 미국 무역에서 분쟁이 발생할 경우, 한국은 미국 법원을 이용한 분쟁해결보다도 WTO의 ‘무역정책검토제도(trade policy review mechanism)’에 적극 참여하고 이를 의도적으로 활용할 필요가 있다. 한국은 ‘공정무역’(fair trade)을 앞세워 일방적으로 취하는 한국에 대한 미국의 무역보복 조치의 부당성을 WTO에 제기 해야 한다. 둘째, 한국은 미국이 한국 상품에 대해 자의적 기준을 적용하여 징벌적 관세를 부과하는데 그 근거가 되는 AFA · PMS를 WTO에 제소하여 미국의 부당한 관세부과에 대응해 나가야 할 것이다. 셋째, 한국은 미국이 주장하는 ‘공정무역’과 ‘불공정무역’의 개념과 기준이 아직 다자규범으로서 합치성 여부가 결정되지 않았으므로 이를 국제사회에서 다자간 협상을 통해 국제규범화해야 할 필요가 있다. 그래서 ‘공정무역’이라는 이름아래 미국이 자의적이고 일방적으로 결정하는 각 국에 대한 무역제한 혹은 무역보복 조치에 대항하여 세계 각 국들은 상호 협력하여 적극적으로 공동 · 대응해야 한다. U.S. President Donald Trump, right after he took office, ordered his administration to deal with the unfair trade practices with U.S. trade partners aggressively. In this process, We are able to know that a fair trade of the United States under trade policies was used as means of market opening pressure of trade country in the past but recently, it is used to protect industries in the United States and to attain this end, the domestic industries in the United States and to this end, the Trump administration has strengthened unilateral trade sanctions against unfair trade practice. South Korea must do the following things in order to fight with America’s unilateral trade sanctions. First, in trade with the United States South Korea must participate in WTO Trade Policy Review Mechanism actively and must make good use of it. Through this process, South Korea must present the injustice of the loss of American trade which the U.S government takes unilaterally by giving priority to fair trade to the WTO. Second, South Korea must react strongly to an unfair imposition of duties of the United States at government level by bringing disputes to the WTO, if South Korea think that its rights under the AFA · PMS are being infringed. Third, South Korea needs to respond properly to a trade restriction or a trade embargo against certain countries of the U.S which the U.S acts autonomously and rashly, by standardizing multilateral international norms about Concepts and standards of fair trade.

미공개중요정보이용행위 규제에 대한 소고

김돈순(金敦淳) 단국대학교 법학연구소 2011 법학논총 Vol.35 No.1

The Capital Market Act constituted to guarantee a more fair and reliable market trade in capital markets and protect rights of investors controls and regulates the unfair trade practice institutionalized as the single provisions in the Securities Law, as each independent provision, according to the Insider Short-Term Arbitrage Trading Returns(Article 172),the Nonpublic Important Information Use Practice Prohibition(Article 174) the Market Price Manipulation Practice Prohibition (Article 176) and the Unfair Trade Practice Prohibition (Article 178)stipulated in the current law. The law on the Nonpublic Important Information Use Practice Prohibition designed to protect investors from asymmetric information rules that any insider shall not take advantage of nonpublic important information that he or she acquires in the process of exercising his or her rights or carrying out his or her duty, under the intention to trade certain securities or financial investments goods issued by listed corporations, and etc, or induce other people to intervene in these illegal trade actions in a bid to get his or her interests and avoid upcoming loss. Most nations prohibit any insiders from doing ‘nonpublic important information practice’, one of typical unfair trading practice types, in order to establish a fair and reliable culture in capital markets. But, these nations prescribe a little different provision as to ‘targets of such control and regulation’, ‘information on targets of such control and regulation’ and ‘securities to be controlled and regulated’, according to the economic volumes or capital market development. As to categories of such control and regulation, the U. S and Japan take tougher countermeasures against the illegal information use, setting the standard of such control and regulation according to corporate relations, while, the UK and EU take such countermeasures, according to illegal information held. The use of illegal information is set as the standard of such control and regulation in Australia and Germany. The U. S has the longest history of the control and regulations on Insider Trading. The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) constituted rules on the SEC, in1942, according the Securities and Exchange Act in 1934. As the special legislative bills on the control and regulation on Inside Trading, the U. S institutionalized Insider Trading Sanctions Act in 1984 and Insider Trading Securities Fraud Enforcement Act in 1988. In August 2000, the SEC provided rules of the SEC, 10(b)5-1(b)5-2, in order to prohibit the announcement on information on securities issue corporations and corporate relations and make a more clear definition on the control and regulation on Inside Trading. The U. S prohibits any insiders from taking advantage of nonpublic information,according to rules and cases of the Securities Exchange Act constituted in 1934. As to theories on the control and regulation on illegal information use, there are possession of information theory, fiduciary duty theory and misappropriation theory. The Capital Market Law defines insiders, quasi-insiders, and the primary information receivers and as the targets of the control and regulation on nonpublic important information use. Such law extended the coverage of insiders and covered corporate affiliate employees and negotiators, who sign contracts with listed corporations,as the category of insiders, according to the law related to monopoly and fair trade. But, they are not defined as insiders according to the Securities Exchange Act. Nonpublic information is controlled and regulated on listed corporations’ duties which can have important influences on what investors will determine. Here,information on listed corporations’ duties cannot be stated, in details. But, it can be mentioned that there is information on “Report on Major Duties”, such as finance structure, sale, production and investment plans and any other business areas, required by th...