The Korean Armistice System and the Origins of the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Incidents

( Park Tae Gyun ) 서울대학교 규장각한국학연구원 2011 Seoul journal of Korean studies Vol.24 No.1

In spite of the intermittent serious clashes between South and North Korea, few scholars have paid attention to the Armistice Agreement and the system it put in place since its conclusion in 1953. This paper argues that the Armistice Agreement produced a security system, which will be called the “Armistice System,” which needs to be clarified in order to illuminate the structural and fundamental causes of two incidents that took place in 2010, the sinking of the Cheonan corvette and the shelling of Yeonpyeong island. Especially, we have to pay attention to the following questions: what are the basic characteristics of the agreement; what has changed in the agreement and the system since 1953; and why have military conflicts continued to erupt under the system, which prohibits hostility on the peninsula? Through a historical analysis, this paper has uncovered several crucial problems and loopholes in the agreement and the system. First of all, it has failed to put an absolute end to hostilities and does not guarantee permanent peace due to the lack of a final settlement. Although the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) were organized based on the agreement in order to block the escalation of clashes, neither of them has been operating since early 1994. Second, the armistice has a crucial defect: there is no agreed demarcation line on the sea. The areas where the 2010 incidents occurred are claimed by both North and South Korea as their own maritime territory. These kinds of incidents did not occur for the first time in 2010. There were two naval clashes in 1999 and 2002, and before that, in the 1960s and 1970s there were major incidents: the sinking of patrol vessel no. 56 in 1967, the Pueblo Incident in 1968, and the sinking of patrol boat no. 863 in 1974. Finally, another critical problem in the armistice is derived from the invalidation of some paragraphs in the Armistice Agreement. Paragraph 13 (d), prohibiting the importation of upgraded weapons from outside was declared null and void in 1956 and nuclear weapons were introduced to South Korea in 1958, which might be at the origin of the nuclear problem in North Korea.

한반도 정전 60년, 실패한 정전협정 혹은 성공한 정전체제?

김재한 국가안보전략연구원 2013 국가안보와 전략 Vol.13 No.2

Since the Korean armistice agreement was signed in 1953, the Korean armistice has been evaluated in almost every July. In South Korea, most evaluations were politically made depending on the government’s policies toward North Korea. This paper discusses the ambivalent effects of the Korean armistice. The armistice could be argued to be a state of war because a peace treaty, ending the war, has not been concluded while many clauses of the armistice agreement have been violated. Too many armed attacks and intrusions are a failure in the Korean armistice. The Korean War, however, has not resumed at least for sixty years. The Korean armistice may be counted as the longest cease-fire among modern wars. In view of this fact, the Korean armistice is a success. A breach of the armistice agreement has been very reciprocal as both parties have believed that reciprocity deters another breach. The war has been deterred from resuming by capability of the nations, not by the scratch of armistice agreement paper. The side effects of the Korean armistice also are ambivalent. The military demarcation line as well as the demilitarized zone, established by the Korean armistice, has been a barrier to the exchange between North and South Korea. On the other hand, the ecological resource of the Korean demilitarized zone is an unintended but good consequence of the Korean armistice as it has kept civilians out of its natural ecology areas. 매년 7월 정전협정 체결일을 전후하여 한반도 정전체제에 대한 평가가 이루어져왔다. 60년 동안 이루어진 평가의 내용은 보수정권이냐 진보정권이냐에 따라 북한에 대한 태도가 다른 것 말고는 유사하였다. 이 글은 60년 동안의 정전을 새롭게 평가한다. 한반도 정전 60년의 실패적 측면은 정전협정이 제대로 준수되지 않았다는 사실이고, 성공적 측면은 정전협정 이후 전면적 전쟁이 재발되지 않았다는 사실이다. 즉 정전협정이 성공적으로 준수되지 못하고 있는 반면에, 정전체제는 전쟁 억지라는 소기의 성과를 거두고 있다고 평가된다. 6.25전쟁은 재발 없이 정전을 가장 오래 유지한 근현대 전쟁으로 기록되고 있다. 정전협정 위반은 매우 상호적이었고, 그러한 상호적 행태의 이면에는 상대의 위반을 자제시키려는 전략적 고려도 있는 것이다. 전쟁 재발 억지는 정전협정 문구 자체에 의한 것이라기보다 남북한과 주변 강대국을 포함한 현상파괴에 대한 강력한 억지가 작동했기 때문에 가능했다. 또 정전 60년의 부수 효과도 양면적이다. 정전협정에 의한 군사분계선과 비무장지대가 남쪽 주민과 북쪽 주민 간의 교류를 금지시키는 분단선으로 작동했다는 점에서 부정적 효과가 있었다. 동시에 비무장지대가 자연생태에 대한 인간 간섭의 보호막으로 작동하여 의도하지 않은 긍정적 효과도 있었다.

한국전쟁 정전협정의 의미와 특징: 정전협정, 평화협정, 지역 평화프로세스와의 비교

김학재 경남대학교 극동문제연구소 2023 한국과 국제정치 Vol.39 No.1

This article examined the characteristics of the Korean War Armistice Agreement compared with other Armistice Agreements at that time, recent peace agreements, and the case of German unification and European integration. First, the Korean War Armistice Agreement was a relatively comprehensive agreement, and the extensive DMZ prevented further conventional warfare, but failed to produce additional political-diplomatic outcomes. Next, recent peace agreements include agendas such as trust-building methods, handling security issues, governance, justice and war heritage, and socio-economic issues, showing the tasks of future peace negotiations. Finally, in the German case, unification and regional integration were achieved in the order of easing tensions, exchange and cooperation, pan-regional security conferences, socio-economic integration, political integration, peace treaties, and constitutional revision. This was the result of the convergencist efforts to resolve "systematic confrontation and division" at the divided German cities, East-West Germany, East-West Europe and pan-European levels. Therefore, the 70-year-old problem of the armistice system and the consideration of alternatives should be used as a starting point for pan-regional efforts to accurately understand and resolve the aspect of East Asia's "system confrontation."

The Korean Armistice System and the Origins of the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Incidents

박태균 서울대학교 규장각한국학연구원 2011 Seoul journal of Korean studies Vol.24 No.1

In spite of the intermittent serious clashes between South and North Korea, few scholars have paid attention to the Armistice Agreement and the system it put in place since its conclusion in 1953. This paper argues that the Armistice Agreement produced a security system, which will be called the “Armistice System,” which needs to be clarified in order to illuminate the structural and fundamental causes of two incidents that took place in 2010, the sinking of the Cheonan corvette and the shelling of Yeonpyeong island. Especially, we have to pay attention to the following questions: what are the basic characteristics of the agreement; what has changed in the agreement and the system since 1953; and why have military conflicts continued to erupt under the system, which prohibits hostility on the peninsula? Through a historical analysis, this paper has uncovered several crucial problems and loopholes in the agreement and the system. First of all, it has failed to put an absolute end to hostilities and does not guarantee permanent peace due to the lack of a final settlement. Although the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) were organized based on the agreement in order to block the escalation of clashes, neither of them has been operating since early 1994. Second, the armistice has a crucial defect: there is no agreed demarcation line on the sea. The areas where the 2010 incidents occurred are claimed by both North and South Korea as their own maritime territory. These kinds of incidents did not occur for the first time in 2010. There were two naval clashes in 1999 and 2002, and before that, in the 1960s and 1970s there were major incidents: the sinking of patrol vessel no. 56 in 1967, the Pueblo Incident in 1968, and the sinking of patrol boat no. 863 in 1974. Finally, another critical problem in the armistice is derived from the invalidation of some paragraphs in the Armistice Agreement. Paragraph 13 (d), prohibiting the importation of upgraded weapons from outside was declared null and void in 1956 and nuclear weapons were introduced to South Korea in 1958, which might be at the origin of the nuclear problem in North Korea.

위기의 한반도, 평화의 길을 묻다

김보영(Kim Boyoung) 역사비평사 2013 역사비평 Vol.- No.104

Armistice talks was a step that would ‘book-end’ the Korean war, and it was also an opportunity to design a new status-quo which came about after the war. The United States and China lead the Armistice talks in terms of their intentions and agreement. South and North Korea were given the responsibility to comply with the implementation of the final agreement. They had no right to decide on armistice talks and conclude agreements, and they were not responsible for implementation of the armistice terms. Truce talks agenda was limited to military issues . cease fire conditions and assurances of future non-hostilities; the political agenda was left until after the war. The final Armistice Agreement, referred to many issues, such as establishment of a military demarcation line and a demilitarized zone, banning of military reinforcement and buildup, organization of a neutral monitoring body, and devising a peaceful resolution for the Korean peninsula through political discussion. Negotiations to discuss the return of prisoners was the last step to end the war. The political agenda to hold talks seeking a peaceful resolution for the Korean peninsula has great significance, when viewed in the framework of the armistice talks. Unfortunately, the political conference ended in failure, and the armistice regime is still maintained in the Powers’ status-quo policies and hostile relations between the two Koreas. It is a still significant and meaningful if the two Koreas keep to the postwar items of understanding between North and South as stipulated in the Armistice Agreement and, in particular, the requirement that South and North Korea willingly strive for a peaceful resolution of the problem.

한반도 평화협정과 안전보장 프로세스

이헌경 ( Hun Kyung Lee ) 한국세계지역학회 2018 世界地域硏究論叢 Vol.36 No.3

한반도는 정전협정 체결 이후 남북한이 법적으로 적대관계를 일시 멈춘 전시 상태에 머무르고 있다. 이러한 상태를 주지하면서 본 논문은 한반도 평화협정과 안전보장 프로세스를 비핵화와 연관해 그 쟁점과 방향을 고찰하고 있다. 이를 위해 조약, 협정, 합의, 성명, 선언, 정전협정, 평화협정, 평화조약의 개념과 사례 그리고 한반도 평화와 평화협정의 의미, 북한의 대미 잠정협정과 평화협정 체결 주장, 한국의 종전선언 제외와 평화협정 체결 주장 등을 분석하고 있다. 그리고 평화협정과 전쟁예방을 위한 협정, 조약의 실패가 주는 교훈을 사례 분석을 통해 진단하고, 평화협정과 연관된 쟁점과 사례 분석을 통해 얻어진 내용을 토대로 한반도가 나아가야 할 방향을 제시하고 있다. The Korean Peninsula remains in a state of war after signing of the armistice agreement with North and South Koreas legally suspended hostile relations. Keeping in mind the situation, this paper discusses the issues and directions of the peace agreement and security process on the Korean Peninsula in relation to denuclearization. To do so, this analyze the concepts and cases as to treaty, agreement, statement, declaration, armistice agreement, peace agreement, and peace treaty as well as meaning of the Korean Peninsula peace and peace agreement, North Korea's interim and peace agreements with the U. S., and South Korea’s claim to signing of the peace agreement and offering of declaration ending of Korean war. And this diagnoses the lessons of the peace agreement, agreements for the war prevention, and failure of the agreements and treaties through case analysis, and suggests the direction that the Korean Peninsula proceeds based on the information obtained issues and case studies in connection with the peace agreement.

1950년대 군사정전위원회의 활동과 정전체제의 형성*― 한강하구 항행(航行) 규칙 제정을 중심으로 ―

한모니까 이화여자대학교 이화사학연구소 2024 梨花史學硏究 Vol.0 No.68

This article analyzes the Military Armistice Commission's (MAC) enactment of the Han River Estuary Navigation Rules immediately after the armistice to examine the military's implementation of the armistice and the creation of boundaries. The MAC established navigation rules for civilian vessels in the Han River Estuary to fulfill Article 1, paragraph 5 of the Armistice Agreement. This article examines the process and issues that led to the agreement between the UN and North and South Korean sides, from differences in perceptions and views to consensus. It is the first study to comprehensively utilize the minutes of the plenary sessions, secretaries' meetings, and staff officers' meetings of the Military Armistice Commission. The demarcation of the Military Armistice Commission was not just about implementing the armistice, but also about how to take into account, reflect, and institutionalize long-standing Korean customs. The “Rules” enacted by the military junta in the immediate aftermath of the armistice stemmed from the implementation of Article 5 of the armistice, but they also sought to codify a way to manage the armistice while recognizing the long-standing custom of navigating the Han River Estuary. The “neutral waters,” which could be used by both North and South Korean civilian ships, were the product of a tension and compromise between custom and armistice.

한반도 평화협정 체결에 대한 법적 검토

한명섭 법무부 2019 統一과 法律 Vol.0 No.37

There are many ways to build a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, but the Panmunjom Declaration has adopted a method of negotiation and concluding a peace agreement in either the South or the North or the South and the North. Theoretically, it is not necessary to conclude a peace agreement to establish a peace regime. But the most typical and explicit way to end the current armistice state on the Korean Peninsula is the peace agreement. Also, at the present stage when North Korea completed its nuclear development, the signing of a peace treaty became a more important issue in that it was a useful means of solving the North Korean nuclear issue. This, on the other hand, means that the issue of concluding a peace treaty can only be linked to the denuclearization of North Korea. The various legal issues raised in the process of concluding a peace treaty are mostly policy issues rather than legal issues. However, this article focuses on various legal issues raised in relation to the process and content of the peace agreement. The legal issues raised in the process include the parties to the peace agreement, the legal nature of the peace agreement, the consent of the National Assembly, the signing of a peace agreement, and the national approval of North Korea. The content of the peace agreement should include the declaration of the end of war, the issue of war responsibility, the establishment of confidence in the military sector and the control of arms, the peace regime, and the dispute settlement mechanism. Other issues include UN enrollment issues, United Nations Command and Combined Forces Command, withdrawal of USFK, and the return of wartime operational control. On the other hand, if a peace agreement is signed, domestic laws regulating inter-Korean relations are expected to change. Particularly in relation to the National Security Law, there is considerable debate as to whether North Korea will be regarded as anti-state organization even after the establishment of a peace agreement. This issue should also be carefully considered according to the contents of the peace agreement, the legal binding force, and the degree of fulfillment of the implementation system. 한반도의 평화체제 구축은 여러 가지 방법이 있겠으나 판문점선언에서는 일단 남ㆍ북ㆍ미 3자 또는 남ㆍ북ㆍ미ㆍ중 4자 회담을 통한 평화협정 체결 방법을 선택하였다. 이론상으 로는 평화체제 구축을 위해 평화협정 체결이 반드시 필요한 것은 아니다. 하지만 현재의 한반도 정전상태를 종료하는 가장 전형적이고 명시적인 방식은 평화협정이라 할 수 있다. 또한, 북한이 핵무기 개발을 완성한 현 단계에서 보면 평화협정 체결은 북핵 문제를 해결하기 위한 유용한 수단이기도 하다는 점에서 더욱 중요한 문제가 되었다. 이는 다른 한편으로 평화협정 체결 문제는 북한 비핵화 문제와 연동될 수밖에 없다는 것을 의미한다. 평화협정 체결 과정에서 제기되는 여러 가지 법적 쟁점 사항들은 대부분 법리적인 문제 라기보다는 정책적 판단을 통해 해결되어야 할 사항들이다. 다만 이 글에서는 평화협정 체결 과정 및 내용과 관련하여 제기되는 여러 가지 법적 쟁점을 중심으로 살펴보았다. 체결 과정에서 제기되는 법적 쟁점으로는 평화협정 체결 당사자, 평화협정의 법적 성격과 국회의 비준 동의 문제, 평화협정 체결과 북한에 대한 국가승인 문제 등이 있다. 평화협정에 포함되어야 할 내용으로는 종전선언, 전쟁 책임 문제, 군사 부문의 신뢰 구축 및 군비 통제, 평화체제 관리기구, 분쟁해결 기구 등의 문제가 있다. 그 밖에 유엔 등록 문제, 유엔군사령부와 한미연합사령부 문제, 주한미군 철수 문제, 전시작전통제권 반환 문제 등도 검토대상이다. 한편, 평화협정이 체결되면 남북관계를 규율하는 국내법에도 변화가 예상된다. 특히 국가 보안법과 관련해서는 평화체제 구축 후에도 북한을 반국가단체로 볼 것인지에 대해서는 상당한 논란이 제기될 수 있다. 이 문제 역시 평화협정의 내용과 법적 구속력 및 이행체제의 완비 정도에 따라 신중하게 검토되어야 한다.

한반도 평화체제 만들기의 국제정치적 기원: 북한자료를 통해서 본 정전협정 4조 60항의 합의과정

구갑우 경남대학교 극동문제연구소 2021 한국과 국제정치 Vol.37 No.2

This paper analyzes the micro-process of the formation of Article 4, Paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement, focusing on North Korean data produced during the Armistice Negotiations. Article 4, paragraph 60 stipulated that a political conference should be held after the signing of the Armistice Agreement to discuss the withdrawal of foreign troops on the Korean peninsula, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc. In other words, Article 4, paragraph 60 is the basis for international law that makes the replacement of the Armistice Agreement into a peace agreement on the agenda. Existing research sees Article 4, paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement as the United States’ acceptance of the communists’ proposal or the product of a compromise between the two camps over the withdrawal of foreign troops. The peculiarity of this article is that it refers to the withdrawal of foreign troops, unlike other armistice agreements that include a peaceful settlement within the armistice. It is also noteworthy that the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Korean Peninsula is an agenda that North Korea claimed on even before the Korean War. North Korea, which defined the Korean War as a civil war, insisted on immediate withdrawal of foreign troops along with China during the armistice negotiations, but the U.S. refused to accept it. The agenda of East Asian regional issues related to peace on the Korean Peninsula raised by North Korea and China was dealt with as ‘etc.’ due to the opposition from the U.S.

1953년 정전협정

윤정인(Yun, Jeong-In) 헌법이론실무학회 2017 통일법연구 Vol.3 No.-

1950년 6월 25일 발발한 한국전쟁은 1953년 7월 27일 군사정전협정 체결을 통해 중단되었다. 이 협정은 ‘한국에서의 적대행위와 무장행동의 완전한 정지를 보장하는 정전’의 확립을 목적으로, ‘순전히 군사적 성질’을 가지고 체결된 협정이며, 교전 쌍방에 대하여 ‘최후적인 평화적 해결이 달성될 때까지’ 정전협정의 내용을 준수할 것을 명하고 있다. 문제는, 정전협정문에 한국전쟁의 주된 교전자이며 직접 당사자인 한국의 서명이 누락된 채, 유엔군, 북한군, 중공군 사령관만 서명함으로써, 정전협정의 당사자문제를 야기하고 그로써 정전체제 속에서 한국의 애매한 지위를 초래하였다는 점이다. 한국은 전쟁 중 군사작전권을 유엔군 총사령관에 이양하였고, 휴전에 대하여 강력히 반대하는 입장을 고수하였기 때문에, 정전협상의 전과정에서 배제되다시피 하였다. 정전협정은 우선 전투행위를 중지시키긴 하였으나 정치적 문제에 대하여는 합의되지 못한 채 별도의 정치회담을 통해 보완하기로 하였지만, 그 후속조치로 개최된 제네바 정치회담 역시 성과없이 결렬됨으로써, 결국 1953년의 정전협정이 현재까지 지속되고 있는 한반도의 정전체제를 규정짓는 최초의 유일한 국제법적 문서로 남게 되었다. 정전체제 속에서 남북한은 분단된 상태로 60년이 넘게 군사적 대치상태를 유지하고 있다. 결국, 정전체제를 평화체제로 전환시켜 군사적 긴장을 완전히 해소시켜 한반도에 평화를 정착시키고, 나아가 남북통일이라는 민족적 과제를 실현하기 위하여는, 정전협정의 실질적 당사자인 한국과 북한이 상호협력 하에 자주적 해법을 모색하여야 할 것이다. The Korean War which started on 25 June 1950 has temporarily stopped due to the Korean Armistice Agreement, signed on 27 July 1953. This Agreement was signed in purely military character, with the objective of establishing an armistice which would insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea. The point is that the President of the Republic of Korea did not sign on the agreement, whereas the signatures of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command on the one hand and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People"s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People"s Volunteers on the other hand were affixed. It raised a question whether the Republic of Korean Army is a real party of the Agreement. As Mr. Syngman Rhee, the then President of Republic of Korea, delegated its Operational Control to General Douglas MacArthur, the then Commander of the United Nations Command, on 17 July 1950, immediately after the outbreak of the Korean War and strongly disapproved the armistice, the South Korea was totally excluded from the process of negotiation. The Agreement could not close the war, but stopped the military conflicts in Korea without any political consensus. Even the Geneva Conference on Korea of 1954 as follow-up measures to the Armistice Agreement failed to make any fruitful results. Consequently, the Korean Armistice Agreement of 1953 remains as an only legal document defining and regulating the armistice system in Korea. As it led to military confrontation between South and North Korea on the Korean Peninsula for over 60 years, Korean people are living under an unstable armistice regime. So, South and North Korea as real parties of the Agreement should seek an independent and creative solution to defuse the military tension and to establish the peace system on the Korean Peninsula, and finally, to achieve the reunification of two Koreas.