http://chineseinput.net/에서 pinyin(병음)방식으로 중국어를 변환할 수 있습니다.
변환된 중국어를 복사하여 사용하시면 됩니다.
- 中文 을 입력하시려면 zhongwen을 입력하시고 space를누르시면됩니다.
- 北京 을 입력하시려면 beijing을 입력하시고 space를 누르시면 됩니다.
RISS 인기검색어
- 검색키워드
- 저자 : 황동하 ( Dong Ha Hwang ) (검색결과 25 건)
- 무료
- 기관 내 무료
- 유료
-
ZrTiO<sub>4</sub>계 Gray 안료 합성과 형성기구
황동하,이병하,Hwang, Dong-Ha,Lee, Byung-Ha 한국세라믹학회 2012 한국세라믹학회지 Vol.49 No.1
Attempts were made to develop a stable gray pigment at reducing atmosphere, substituting Ti in $ZrTiO_4$ with Mn, Fe, Co and Cu The pigment synthesized at $1300~1500^{\circ}C$ by solid state method with the composition of $ZrTi_{1-x-y}A_xB_yO_4$ (x = y = 0.005, 0.015, 0.035, 0.055, 0.075, 0.095, 0.115, 0.135, 0.155, 0.175 and 0.195 mole, A = Mn(III), Fe(III), Co(II, III) and Cu(II) (chromophores), B = Sb (counterion). The pigments were fired at $1400^{\circ}C$ for 3 h with substitute amount changes of Mn, Fe, Co and Cu to $ZrTiO_4$ crystals, and analyzed by Raman spectroscopy to figure out substitute limits. Results indicated 0.035 mole for Mn, 0.115 mole for Fe, 0.015 mole for Co and 0.015 mole for Cu as substitute limits, respectively. Figs. 1, 2, 3, and 4 represent each substitute pigments of Mn, Fe, Co and Cu. Synthesized pigment was applied to a lime and a lime-magnesia glaze at 7 wt% each, and fired at reducing atmosphere of $1240^{\circ}C$, soaking time 1h. Gray color was obtained with CIE-$L^*a^*b^*$ values at 44.55, -0.65, 1.19(Mn), 40.36, -0.90, 0.30(Fe), 42.63, -0.03, -1.49(Cu) and -40.79, -0.28, -0.91(Co), respectively.
-
Co-Doped Willemite 파란색 안료의 합성과 생성기구
황동하,한경섭,이병하,Hwang, Dong-Ha,Han, Kyong-Sop,Lee, Byung-Ha 한국세라믹학회 2010 한국세라믹학회지 Vol.47 No.6
Turquoise blue pigment of Vanadium-zircon blue (DCMA number 14-42-2), which was already commercialized, was stable to be reproduced but insufficient to give strong blue. However, it possible to obtain more intense blue by partially substituting cobalt ions into the willemite($Zn_2SiO_4$) lattice classified into DCMA number 7-10-2 for blue ceramic pigment. By the composition of willemite $Co_xZn_{2-x}SiO_4$(X=0.01, 0.03, 0.05, 0.07, 0.09 mole), this study used reagent grade zinc oxide, cobalt oxide and silicon dioxide as starting materials, carrying out the synthesis with solid reaction method by adding $H_3BO_3$ as a mineralizer. The firing temperature was between $1200^{\circ}C$ and $1400^{\circ}C$. The characteristics of synthesized pigment were analyzed by X-ray diffraction, Raman spectroscopy and SEM and the characteristics of color tones were analyzed by UV-Vis spectroscopy and CIE-$L^*a^*b^*$ measurement. As a result, the optimal composition was $Zn_{1.95}Co_{0.05}$ with 1wt% of $H_3BO_3$ as a mineralizer and firing condition was $1350^{\circ}C$/3 h. $L^*a^*b^*$ value was 29.25, 41.03, -59.93 for on glaze pigment and 37.03, 36.41, -60.03 for under glaze pigment.
-
근현대 동아시아에서 지성과 담론의 교류 ; 한국 사회주의운동의 전환, 레닌을 어떻게 보았는가 -변혁적 활동가들의 러시아혁명 인식의 과거와 현재-
황동하 ( Dong Ha Hwang ) 수선사학회 2013 史林 Vol.0 No.45
This article deals with the perception and acceptance of Russian Revolution in Korea`s Socialist Movement during 1980`s∼2000. After the defeat of Kwangju uprising, beginning in 1985, Marxism started to introduce in earnest. Also Lenin`s Work is starting to circulate. Naturally extra attention was focused on the Marx-Leninist Revolution ideology and the Russian Revolution as it`s historical practice. The Russian Revolution was a compass so as to expose the absurdity and contradictions of the Korean Society, and to change this society a better place. The task of revolutionary movement was settled in the liberal-democratic framework no longer. The world could be change, and must to change. For this realization, the revolutionary movement was applied concretely the Marx-Leninist Ideology in korean society. ``Professional Revolutionaries`` was born and tried to construct ``Vanguard party``. Like this, ``Leninist craze`` in the 1980`s grew from the practical task in Korea`s socialist movement. But the Russian Revolution is accepted as the ``model`` of the revolutionary change, not as the vividly historical experience. After the collapse of the ``real socialism``, the activist, who the socialism accepted as a ``model``, get into uncontrollable confusion. In the Korea`s socialist movement the most of revolutionary activist laughed ``revolution`s motherland`` and forgot utterly. Consequently they go into liquidation the socialist movement. But as the contradiction of the neoliberalism is raging, a few activist try to succeed to the legacy of Russian Revolution, that is the experience and its significance of Russian Revolution. After the collapse of the ``real socialism``, it is at this point that Russian Revolution is considered as ``vividly experience``. In that respect after 1980`s Russian Revolution was the thought of the times.
-
-
-
독·소 불가침 조약 ( 1939. 8. 23 ) 의 성립 - 소련 측의 동기 분석을 중심으로 -
황동하(Dong Ha Hwang) 한국서양사학회 2001 西洋史論 Vol.68 No.1
This article sets out to analyse some points as follows. When Germany decided to attack on Poland in the spring of 1939, the Western powers wanted to restrict German aggression. The British and French response was to secure Polish borders. On the other hand the Soviets proposed a triple alliance, which protected peace to all the states between the Baltic and Black Seas. Both sides had sharp differences on the national security problems of the Eastern Europe. The triple alliance negotiations started with much considerations. The key issues were over guarantees of the Baltic states and negotiations for a military convention tied to the political agreement. The triple alliance negotiations dragged on, haggling over endless wordings of these problems. From the Soviet`s point of view, the experience of negotiating with the British and French had not exactly been encouraging. They had dragged their feet throughout the triple alliance negotiations. In this atmosphere the Soviet government began to contemplate the possibility of an agreement with Nazi Germany. From about the mid-April Germany let the Soviet government know that they were ready to improve relations. The Soviets had suspected that German`s approaches were the part of some kind of petit jeu aimed at disrupting the triple alliance negotiations. However it was not by the end of July that the Soviets were seriously considering German`s approaches. From 11th August, therefore, the Soviets developed `double diplomacy`. The triple alliance negotiations were interrupted because the Western allies could not guarantee that Rumania and Poland would allow Soviet troops to pass through their territory. The Soviets knew that in early August German diplomatic initiatives toward the Soviets became more pressing as German military preparations for an invasion of Poland became matured. It seems that the Soviet leadership up to the last minute did not chose its course, but simply kept its options open. By the middle of August, however, the international situation changed suddenly. The German war plans called for an invasion of Poland on August 17 and the Soviets knew it. Now the Soviets had to choose. While the triple alliance negotiations was brought to a deadlock over this problems, Germany offered a Soviet-German `condominium` in Eastern Europe. In the situation that the likelihood of reaching the triple alliance was uncertain, the Soviets had to avoid the impending war. That is, the Soviets might have the aim of avoiding a war with Nazi Germany in Eastern Europe while Britain and France stood on the sidelines. And so, the Soviets accepted Hitler`s offer. (Sookmyoung Women`s University)
-
-
황동하 ( Hwang Dong Ha ) 한국서양사학회 2003 西洋史論 Vol.0 No.79
This Article intends to examine Stalin s role in the outbreak of the Korean War with newly released Russian documents, particularly in the historical and political context of Sino-Soviet Relations. In 1949, Stalin insisted that the unification of the Korean peninsula had to be realized in a peaceful manner. In early 1950, however, he suddenly approved North Korean War Kim Il Sung s proposal for an invasion of South Korea. The only clue to the reason for this major policy shift was found in Stalin`s telegram to Mao Zedung on 14 May 1950. In it Stalin simply stated that in light of the altered international situation, we agree with the proposal of the Koreans to move toward reunification. What Stalin meant by the phrase altered international situation has remained a mystery. However, in the mid-1990s, the Russian government declassified a number of crucial documents on the Korean War. These documents illuminated the change in Stalin` view toward Korea, if not completely. By the altered international situation in January 1950, it suggests that thc Korean War was made possible without the direct participation of the Soviet Union. This resulted from Stalin s view about the recently established People`s Republic of China. Nevertheless the situation, in Stalin s view, was far more complex. Stalin was not entirely pleased with the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and he was reluctant to embrace a full-fledged strategic alliance with the newly established People s Republic of China(PRC). The birth of the PRC and the signing of the Sino-Soviet alliance positively could be affect Stalin`s assessment of the balance of power in Asia and give him the confidence he need to confront the United Stated in Asia. But it is also possible to argue that Stalin perceived the rise the CCP as a potential threat to Soviet dominance of the international Communist movement. For Stalin, the success of the CCP was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it enlarged the Soviet Union s buffer zone and helped spread Communist influence in Asia. On the other hand, once the Chinese gained military strength, they had the potential to become a rival power in the East. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of February 1950 created an important strategic bulwark for the Soviet Union in East Asia, but it also forced Stalin to abandon most if the privileges he had obtained from Jiang Jieshi in the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. Stalin crafted a new Korea policy with these considerations in mind. Stalin cleverly manipulated the Chinese position on Korea. Stalin knew that Mao would bo opposed to taking military action on the peninsula in the near term. The reconquest of Taiwan, as Stalin was well aware, was the CCP leader s top priority. But Stalin also knew that the Chinese Communists wanted Soviet aid for the Taiwan campaign. The Soviet leader took three crucial steps to force China to consent to a North Korean military attack. First, he refrained from discussing the matter directly with Mao and instead dealt with Kim I1 Sung. Second, he asked Kim I1 Sung to inform Mao of the decision to go forward with an attack against the South. Faced with this fait accompli, Mao could only acquiesce. Finally, Stalin did not divulge any details about North Korea s military preparations and operational plans to China. The Soviet Union and China had no further discussions on Korea before the outbreak of the Korean War. In sum, The shift in Stalin s Korea Policy was intimately connected with evolving Sino-Soviet relations, revealing Stalin s complicated attitude toward the newly established Chinese Communist state. The Soviet leader certainly understood that the addition of China to Communist camp meant that the balance of power in East Asia shifted from the United States to the Soviet Union. But Stalin also feared that China s emergence as a Communist power could challenge the Soviet Union s dominant position in the international Communist movement. Stali
-
황동하(Hwang Dong-ha) 가천대학교 아시아문화연구소 2010 아시아문화연구 Vol.19 No.-
The aim of this paper is to examine the Korean intellectual’s image of the Soviet Union during the Cold War eras through analysis of some writings on anti-communist ideologues. It has therefore been observed that Soviet regime marks the darkest age in the history of mankind as it bears witness to violence, poverty and nihilism. The attitude towards Soviet Union was far from objective. North Korea was portrayed as the national antagonist, deliberately emphasizing on the negative image of Soviet Union, North Korea in turn served as a suzerain state as it remains an allusion for South Korean government to be established on such perceptions. As such, the stand off between South and North Korea was led by Korean intellectuals whose discernment shaped their anticommunist ideology. At some point, these areas of thought interfered with sound judgment regarding the Soviet Union and the philosophical balance.
-
KISS연관 검색어 추천
이 검색어로 많이 본 자료
활용도 높은 자료
