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      • KCI등재

        폐쇄회사에서의 소수주주의 보호

        양만식 한국경영법률학회 2019 經營法律 Vol.29 No.2

        Decision-making in a corporation is generally based on a majority rule. Therefore, a minority shareholder investing in the corporation is bound by the will of the controlling shareholder, and unless the manager's judgment is illegal, he or she must obey it. If these facts make it clear that the investment can not continue, it is sufficient for the shareholder to transfer the shares he holds to recover his capital. However, the free transfer of such shares is applicable to listed companies. The situation is different for the shareholders of closed companies that have no market in which they can freely transfer their shares. In other words, the principle of majority rule is applied in a closed company, whereby a minority shareholder is bound by management judgment of a manager who belongs to a majority (or controlling shareholder) with a large number of shares. In this case, the way to recover the capital that you have dropped is blocked, and you are in a disadvantageous position economically. The concept of oppression of minority shareholders in a closed company needs to discuss in the field of commercial law in the sense of relieving a minority who is treated unfairly by the majority who is the controlling shareholder among the investors by applying for dissolution order, shareholder representative suit. This study we focus on some aspects of the theory of salvation in the developed countries which address protecting minority shareholders in a closed company which has a controlling shareholder who works as an employee or director and I will also point out some implications. 주식회사에서의 의사결정은 일반적으로 다수결의 원칙에 근거하여 이루어지기 때문에 그 회사에 투자하고 있는 소수주주는 지배주주의 의사에 구속되고, 경영자의 경영판단이 위법하지 않는 한 그것에 따를 수밖에 없다. 이러한 사실들로 인해 투자를 계속할 수 없다고 판단되면 주주는 자신이 투자한 자본을 회수하기 위해 보유하고 있는 주식을 양도하는 것으로 충분하다. 그러나 이러한 주식의 자유로운 양도는 상장회사에나 해당되는 것이다. 실질적으로 주식을 자유롭게 양도할 수 있는 시장이 형성되어 있지 않은 폐쇄회사의 주주에 대해서는 사정이 다르다. 즉 폐쇄회사에서도 다수결의 원칙은 적용되는 것이며, 그에 의해 소수주주는 다수의 주식을 가진 다수파(또는 지배주주)에 해당되는 경영자의 경영판단에 구속을 받게 된다. 이 경우 자신이 투하한 자본을 회수할 길이 막히고, 경제적으로 상당히 불리한 입장에 처하게 된다. 폐쇄회사에서의 소수주주에 대한 억압이라는 개념은 출자자 중에서 지배주주라고 할 수 있는 다수파에 의해 부당하게 취급당하는 소수파를 해산명령신청, 주주대표소송, 주식매수청구권 등에 의해 구제할 필요가 있다는 점에서 우리 상법에서 진지하게 논의할 필요가 있다. 이러한 점에 중점을 두고 본 연구에서는 종업원 또는 이사 등의 임원으로서 보수를 받고 있는 지배주주가 존재하는 폐쇄회사에서 소수주주를 보호하기 위해서 논의된 선진국에서의 구제이론에 관해 약간의 고찰과 더불어 우리 상법에의 시사점을 얻고자 한다.

      • KCI등재

        종류주식의 다양화가 기업지배에 미치는 영향

        양만식 한국상사법학회 2011 商事法硏究 Vol.30 No.2

        It is natural for shareholders to have rights to have dividend payments, to have a share in the remaining corporate assets upon litigation, and to vote in the shareholder meeting. However not every shareholder can demand the same degree of these rights. There are shareholders who have different needs and interests. For example there must be shareholders who are only interested in the recovery of dividends not voting rights or those interested in making specific decisions. In this case, if the company can appropriately respond to those needs, it can expand possibility to secure funds in a faster and more favorable way. Given the diverse needs, the new corporation law implies its agreement with issuing class shares containing different rights. Shareholders should be treated equally, but there are arguing points when it comes to the principle of the equal treatment of shareholders in deciding the contents of the class shares. The class shares that exclude or limit the voting rights are being discussed in terms of defense measures of hostile takeover bids and corporate governance. There is an argument that the shares indicating different rights in proportion to the ownership for the same sort of stock are against the principle of the equal treatment. It is critical to respect the principle of proportionality including one share-one vote rule, and complacency in applying the principle can cause diverse damages. The class shares for different voting rights can be a strong defend measure, and so, they imply a lot of risks such as damaging the interests of minority shareholders or abusing the executive director status and its power. To reduce the problems of the class shares for voting rights,active execution of shareholder rights is necessary, and yet, minority shareholders should exercise their voting rights, which need relatively small expense. The advantage in actively exercising these voting rights is to be able to realize hostile takeovers for low cost. If the interest in exercising voting rights through a public announcement rises, it is expected that hostile takeovers for low prices will increase and effective monitoring on management with low cost will be possible.

      • KCI등재

        개인정보보호와 기업의 대응

        양만식 한국금융법학회 2014 金融法硏究 Vol.11 No.1

        In a society where information technology is highly developed, companies are facing a new challenge or a risk. Now we're living in a highly information-based society, so it is clear to ask for a strict managing system for those companies that collect and keep personal information in order to protect the information given a series of the recent private information breach incidents. With the private information protection law going into effect, the risk of getting administrative disposition is imposed on companies that violate the law and cause the information security breach incidents. In the case that companies continuously use private information for business purpose, the organizations as a whole need to respond to the situation. Particularly transactions between businesses ask those in charge of dealing with the information to keep it safely for the protection of personal information. Businesses are supposed to make profits but that's not all. They are related to many others and the range of business is large. In that sense they serve as a social being affecting many different stakeholders. In particular, the information they collect while carrying out their business is a very important resource, but managing the information accompanies an inherent risk of breach incidents led to liability to damages. Therefore it is more important than ever to see personal information as a risk inherent to business and build an appropriate risk management system for the information.

      • KCI등재후보

        敵對的 M&A에 있어서의 理事의 役割 : 理事의 行動基準 Standards of Behavior

        楊萬植 한국기업법학회 2003 企業法硏究 Vol.14 No.-

        A merger and acquisition(M&A) trend has risen in Korea since the IMF economic crisis, and it is also facing the significant turning point recently. IT is a general understanding that M&A is likely to remain on the increase. There are not many problems in a favorable M&A. However, we need to consider possibilities to fix the problems of a hostile M&A since we think it is an immoral behavior against legal minds or current business environments. In other words, there are many difficult problems to solve in the hostile M U because there are many conflicts of interest among the current management, buyers, shareholders and employees. When we consider the protection of the shareholders' interests and the needs to fix the negligence of them in Korea, we need to add the protection of shareholders' interests into the management's role in the case of Take Over Bid. With that concept, it's appropriate that the management should consider all interests of the shareholders, current management, buyer and additional counterparts and the possibility of carrying out the term and so they can choose and carry out the countermeasures against the Take Over Bid but must care about the realization of the shareholders' long term interests. In other words, since the director's duties of care, which are asked for in the relationship between the company and the director, includes the right and duty to consider the shareholders' interests, it's right for the director to have the countermeasures against the hostile M&A but these countermeasures naturally include the desire to maintain his right of control against the corporation and so it is necessary to refrain from overusing these countermeasures. In this study, I focus on the management's role and the criteria of its action in the target company, with reference to the recent mass purchase of SK corporation stocks by one of the foreign funds. Through a review of real law cases in the USA , this paper aims to reconsider the issue in the perception of protecting the interests of the management and the shareholders.

      • KCI등재

        현대 주식회사에서의 이사의 책임범위와 신뢰보호

        양만식 한국기업법학회 2007 企業法硏究 Vol.21 No.3

        It is impossible for some directors always supervise the chief director's job in detail. Different directors have different jobs in the current business practice and business administration has become highly specialized and developed. Therefore directors who have limits in terms of time, information and expertise need to trust in judgments, decisions, advice and reports by other directors, employees and experts. In the US, relative standards of the care level imposed on directors are stipulated in laws and directors have the rights to believe in other directors and employees under the common law. In addition, recently US provincial laws tend to have exclusive terms for director's rights to trust others. Under the current law in South Korea, the relations between a company and directors should follow the terms of mandate, and the directors are understood to exercise their powers with careful attention as good guardians. This fiduciary duty is a general and abstract term so it is not clear what the duty means. However, the specific standard of the duty is different depending on the scale of companies and purpose of jobs. For bank directors, thoughts and experience as bank directors, and for CEOs of trading companies, expertise and experience as a director for trading jobs can become standard of their duty. Therefore directors in large and small companies can be considered to have their own standards for their duty. Even within a company, there is big difference in their fiduciary duty between the director who have the rights to run the company and other directors. Therefore, the level of the duty varies between directors who work full time and those who don't, and directors who get paid and focus on the job and those who don't. And thus for some cases, the former directors can be in the breach of the duty but that doesn't apply to the latter. This idea might sound like a confusion between each director's job and his duty but that's because each director in different position within the company has different job responsibility. Particularly, regarding the responsibility of directors who work occasionally, retirement pay for the directors who hold an additional post, and supervision duty of directors, it is necessary to review director's responsibilities commensurate with their real job position.

      • KCI등재

        일본 회사법에 있어서의 주식제도와 코포레이트 거버넌스 - 신주예약권제도의 활용을 중심으로 -

        양만식 한국경영법률학회 2009 經營法律 Vol.19 No.2

        In the view of legitimateness of M&A defence system, if the purpose beforehand or afterwards remains same, the legal evaluation would be considered same. However, the situation refers a big difference depending on beforehand or afterwards. In the defence system after struggle for control is occurred, the certain shareholder who became the majority shareholder might be disadvantageous. In the beforehand defence system, there would not be any certain shareholder who would be disadvantageous as referred the same meaning. In consideration of a person who will be a future shareholder as an investor, not a shareholder, he is not a subject to protect its direct interest under company law. In the point of view to protect the investor from a hostile takeover, if an opportunity to consider whether they continue to invest expecting a risk or stop to invest are given by notifying the defence system beforehand, it is certain that chances for damage will be decreased. In case of the beforehand defence system, there is a benefit having a sufficient time to concern the shareholder's determination throughout approval of general meeting of shareholder on introducing the defence system. Under this circumstance, build the beforehand defence system extends a scope that the legitimate defence system would be initiated. On the other hand, the beforehand defence system reveals a problem being abused because the hostile takeover which is the subject to be defence is not specified. The beforehand defence system is able to allow the hostile takeover for the company's benefit according to its structure. As a result, it effects to hesitate buying related to the company's benefit, and therefore, it could be used for an excessive wide range of the defence system. In case of the afterwards defence system, a judicial review could be taken on the legitimateness of defence regarding the certain hostile takeover. In comparison, a strong beforehand defence system such as issuing a call option in advance, there is a high possibility that the scope to proceed the judicial review such on a period of filing a lawsuit would be narrowed down although there was an unfair management at the time allowing the hostile takeover. Due to this, the company blocks the beneficial buying under its duty to defence the disadvantageous buying and raises a possibility used it as self protection for management.

      • KCI등재

        일본 회사법상 주주총회의 IT화

        양만식 한국경영법률학회 2020 經營法律 Vol.31 No.1

        Japan amended their commercial law in 2002, they became possible to announcement of settlement, voting rights of stockholders and noti- fication of the convocation by electronically for planning the digitalization of corporate management. Digitalization of general meeting is not coercive, but each company takes different system which is preferable for their cost-effective. There are limited number of usages of digital based system that for exercising vote and sending notification of the convocation, which are necessarily approved by individual stockholder. Digitalization for shareholders' meeting can be divided into three types. First, digitalization of documents regarding shareholders' meeting. Current commercial law can also afford their notification of the convo- cation, reference documents, business report and so on as digitalized if there is an individual approval of shareholder. The important point of revised commercial law in 2019 can be found in digitalization of those documents. In other words, it means the digitalizing notification of the convo- cation and reference documents of shareholders' meeting and includes the digitalization of settlement announcement. Secondly, we may consider the digitalization of voting rights of stockholder. If a company has more than 1000 shareholders, the company let their holders to make their vote in written form when holders cannot attend stock- holder meeting. In that case, the company let their shareolders to use digitalized method to exercise voting rights. Thirdly, “virtual” shareholders’ meeting which means that conducting meeting of shareholder in a digital manner can be considered. Currently, it conducts partially, but complete virtual shareholders’ meeting needs further development. Japan repeatedly revised the policy of digitalization of shareholders’ meeting and starts to obligate a listed company to follow the rules of electronic provision system on documents of shareholder based on the revised las on 2019. Usage of electric voting is insignificant in Korea and we need admittance of individual shareholder before sending electric based noti- fication of convention even when considering commercial regulation. Hence based on these points, we need further improvement to stimulate shareholders’ meeting itself as well. Korea is one of the powerful IT industry countries and already has enough technological infrastructure to conduct not only sending noti- fication of convention of shareholders but also resolve the problem of electric based voting exercise. However, we are still struggling the progressing of systems for stimulating shareholders’ meeting. We may learn from Japan’s experience which trying to stimulate shareholders meeting by providing various conveniences to shareholders. 일본은 2002년 상법을 개정하면서, 고도정보화사회에 대응하여 회사운영의 전자화를 도모하기 위해 회사관계서류의 전자화 외에 전자적 방법에 의한 결산공고, 의결권행사, 소집통지의 송부가 가능하게 되었다. 주주총회의 전자화는 강제적인 것은 아니었고, 각 회사가 비용 대비 효과를 감안하여 해당 회사에 상응한 제도를 선택하여 채택하는 형식을 취하고 있었다. 특히 개별주주의 승낙을 얻을 필요가 있는 전자적 방법에 의한 의결권행사나 소집통지의 발송에 관한 이용상황을 보면 그렇게 많지 않은 것을 알 수 있다. 주주총회의 전자화는 다음 3가지로 분류할 수 있다. 첫째로 주주총회와 관련된 문서의 전자화를 들 수 있다. 현행 회사법에서도 주주총회의 소집통지, 참고서류, 계산서류, 사업보고 등은 주주의 개별적 승낙이 있으면 전자적 방법에 의한 제공이 가능하다. 2019년의 개정 회사법의 주요 포인트는 이러한 문서들의 전자화를 들 수 있다. 즉 주주총회의 소집통지 및 주주총회의 참고서류를 전자화한 것으로, 문서의 전자화에는 이에 더하여 결산공고의 전자화도 포함되게 되었다. 둘째로는 의결권행사의 전자화라고 할 수 있다. 회사법에서는 주주가 1.000명 이상의 회사의 경우 주주총회에 출석할 수 없는 주주에게 투표할 수 있는 기회를 확보해 주기 위해 서면에 의해 의결권을 행사할 수 있도록 하고 있으며, 이에 더하여 전자적인 방법으로 의결권을 행사할 수 있도록 하고 있다. 셋째로는 주주총회 그 자체의 전자화, 즉 전자적인 방법으로 주주총회를 개최하는 것으로서, 이른바 버츄얼(Virtual) 주주총회라고 할 수 있는데, 이것은 기술발전에 따라 어느 정도의 부분적 개최가능성은 가능하겠지만, 현재 상황에서 완전한 버츄얼 주주총회의 개최는 장래의 기대사항이라고 할 수 있다. 일본에서는 주주총회의 전자화에 관한 수정을 거듭하여 2019년 개정법에서 상장회사의 경우 의무적으로 주주총회자료의 전자제공제도를 정착시키기에 이르렀다. 우리나라에 전자투표제도가 도입된 이래 그 이용실적은 미미한 수준에 불과한 것으로 보이며, 현재의 상법규정을 보더라도, 전자적 방법에 의한 소집통지서를 발송하기 위해서는 사전에 주주의 개별적 승낙을 얻어야 하고, 전자투표 또한 이러한 승낙이 전제되고 있는 형편이라는 점에서 주주총회의 활성화를 도모하려는 당초의 목적은 아직까지도 요원하다고 하겠다. 우리나나라는 세계에서 주목을 받고 있는 IT강국으로서 전자적인 방법으로 주주총회의 소집통지의 발송은 물론이고, 전자적 방법에 의한 의결권행사 또한 충분히 해결할 수 있는 기술적 인프라를 충분히 구축하고 있다. 이러한 상황에서 아직까지도 주주총회의 활성화를 도모하기 위해 도입된 각종 제도에 대한 진척이 이루어지고 있지 않은 것은 문제가 있다는 점에서 현재 일본에서 여러 가지 방법을 통해 주주에게 편의를 제공하여 주주총회를 활성화시키려는 노력은 우리에게 시사하는 바가 상당하다고 본다.

      • KCI등재후보

        지속가능발전을 위한 중소기업에 대한 지원정책- 일본의 최근 동향을 중심으로 -

        양만식 아주대학교 법학연구소 2014 아주법학 Vol.8 No.3

        세계의 시장경제화, 경제의 글로벌화에 수반된 경쟁의 격화, 정보·통신기술이 가속되고 있는 가운데 작금에 와서는 지 구환경을 중시하는 가치관이 세계의 중심적인 화제를이루고 있다. 이러한 시장경제화, 글로벌화, 정보화의 급속한 흐 름이 상호간에 촉진되면서, 다국적 기업의 합병·매수·제휴 등에 의해 세계적으로 기업재편이 끊임없이 발생하고있다. 즉 국경을 초월한 “자본결합”을 통해 세계시장을 독점하는 기업의 등장·형성이 촉진되고 있는 것이 현재의 상황이다. 이러한 글로벌기업의 활동은 구매, 제조, 판매, 연구·개발 등의 사업전개를 세계 모든 지역으로 전개하면서 자본과 생 산의 세계적 집약의 새로운 단계, 자본의 세계적 경쟁의 단계에 있다고 할 수 있다. 미국을 비롯한 유럽, 일본,최근 중 국에 이르기까지 이들 국가를 축으로 한 다국적 기업의 세계시장에서의 독점체제형성은 자본이 지배하는 새로운 국제 적 무대로의 진화임과 동시에 우리나라 경제를 크게 뒤흔드는 요인으로 작용되고 있으며, 이러한 상황은 우리나라의 경제구조·산업구조의개혁이 시급하다는 것을 내포하고 있다. 독점적인 지위를 점하고 있는 대기업들의 본격적인 글로벌화의 진전과 세계적인 독점체제의 형성은 국내 독점과 세계 독점과의 대항과 협조를 기조로 삼고 있지만, 지금까지의 국민경제구조로 규정되고, 그 범위 내에서 발전되어 온 우리 나라 중소기업의 존립조건과 활동의 장을 세계 경제구조로부터 직접적으로 규정되는 것으로 변화시켰다. 중소기업이 세계경제에 편입되고 깊게 관련되어 그 존립이 세계시장에 규정되게 되었다. 각국에서 중소기업은 대량적이고 광범위한 분야에서 존재하고 있으며, 그 중소기업의중요성은 날로 세계적으로 높아 지고 있다. 중소기업의 경제적 역할뿐만 아니라, 사회적·문화적 역할을 반영하여 각국의 문제의식이나 정책상의 관심 에 의해 각각 다른 복잡하면서 다양한 정책이 각국에서 시행되고 있다. 이러한 상황에서 우리나라에서도 여러 가지측 면에서의 중소기업육성을 위한 정책을 실시하고 있지만, 앞으로도 그 지속적인 성장을도모하기 위한 지원정책을 강구 할 필요가 있다는 점에서 일본에서의 중소기업정책의 변화과정을 살펴보는 것도 우리에게 주는 시사점이 많을 것으로 생각된다. While global marketization and its attendant competition along with the fastIT technology development are accelerating further, environmental consciousnesshas become one of the global issues. As marketization, globalization andinformatization triggers interactive reactions in the countries of the world,reorganization of the companies constantly take place through M&A as well astie-ups. Thanks to the combined capital beyond the boundaries of countries,global monopolies are increasingly emerged and fast formed. These globalcorporations develop business activities like purchase, manufacturing, sales,and R&D in every region of the world, reaching a new stage of globally fiercecompetition for capital. Multinational enterprises have a home base in thecountries like the US, Europe, Japan, and China. The global monopoly fromthese multinational enterprises means moving toward the global stage whichis controlled by capital. At the same time the formation of global monopolyhas become a key factor that rocks Korean economy. This situation implies theurgency of economic and industrial restructuring in Korea. Earnest globalization of large corporations and the formation of globalmonopolies are supposed to bring about fierce competition and close cooperationbetween local and global monopolies. This, in turn the existence of SMEs thathave been defined and developed within the national economy until now is to bedependent on the global market economies. Each country has a wide range of SMEs and their importance is gettingstronger across the world. Considering not just economic role but socio-culturalrole, different governments are implementing various policies on SMEs inconsideration of different issues and circumstances. Policies to nurture SMEs areimplemented in Korea too, but there are more to be done to help SMEs continueto grow. In this respect, to review how the policies have evolved in Japan means alot to the Korean economy.

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