http://chineseinput.net/에서 pinyin(병음)방식으로 중국어를 변환할 수 있습니다.
변환된 중국어를 복사하여 사용하시면 됩니다.
최용호 ( Yongho Choi ) 전북대학교 인문학연구소 2018 건지인문학 Vol.0 No.23
This paper aims to examine Kripke’s meaning scepticism, or sceptical paradox and sceptical solution about meaning in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, and show an argument against his negative thesis about meaning. Frist, historical background of meaning scepticism will be introduced. Next, each of his negative views about meaning will be reorganized as an argument. Finally, my argument will be provided against the negative prospective of meaning. 1) There is another practical area of language that cannot be regarded as an area depending only on agreement of community. 2) It is true that the sceptic about meaning relies on his memory, which is criticized by himself. 3) Basic principles of logic can be a good candidate of low-level fact for meaning ascription. 4) How much degree of justification do we need to determine whether a candidate is a fact about meaning ascription? 5) Should we admit that the argument of the sceptic is sound? I have suggested my opinions for each of them, 1) ~ 5). And I believe that my argument implies a conclusion that we have a good starting point to go opposite way of the unpromising line about meaning.
최용호 ( Choi Yongho ) 전북대학교 인문학연구소 2017 건지인문학 Vol.0 No.20
This paper aims to resolve a problem with Frege’s sense/reference distinction: a sentence employing empty name has thought as a sense. First, I will outline Frege’s theory of reference and how he had tried to solve the problem, what was the solution of B. Rusell, and why did G. Evans point out what the distinction has no coherence, especially in a thesis: a sentence without truth value has thought as its sense. Then, I will illustrate my idea that each of views can be adjusted to maintain Frege’s sense/reference distinction. Russell was correct on what there is, but we do not need his radical theory because I believe that if we can say that empty name refers what does not exist in this world, or fictional, a sentence with the empty name is false; Evans was correct, but Frege can hold his distinction if we can say the sentence with the empty name is false.
최용호(Yongho CHOI) 프랑스학회 2017 프랑스학연구 Vol.82 No.-
Dans la présente étude, je me propose d’attaquer un des avatars du concept ‘actant’ dans l’histoire de la sémiotique française, à savoir l’idée d’un corps-actant proposée dans les années 2000 par Jacques Fontanille, qui, depuis la mort de Greimas(1992), dirige de front la sémiotique française. Né d’un geste consistant à accorder à la fois la corporalité à l’actant et l’actantialité au corps, le corps-actant se divise en deux types: le Moi et le Soi, plus précisément en trois types: Moi-chair, Soi-idem et Soi-ipse. Alors que cette nouvelle typologie actantielle doit beacoup soit à la phénoménologie de Merleau-Ponty qui fait valoir une distinction entre corps et chair, soit à l’herméneutique de Paul Ricoeur qui se propose de distinguer entre identité-idem et identité-ipse, il est important de mettre la lumière là-dessus surtout dans le cadre de la sémiotique française. Dans cette étude de caractère introductif, je me contente de présenter d’abord les grandes lignes de trois types du corps-actant avec les exemples concrets avant de mesurer ensuite leur portée théorique. Pour fournir une vue d’ensemble théorique à l’idée de corps-actant, je me concentre entre autres sur les deux notions suivantes, qui caractérisent la sémiotique française: narrativité et sémioticité.