1930년대 후반 식민지 조선 농민 생활상의 재구성

조명근(Cho, Myung?keun) 호서사학회 2015 역사와 담론 Vol.0 No.76

1939년 여름 홋카이도제국대학 농학부 학생인 안병렬은 자신의 고향인 오곡리 주민을 대상으로 생활환경과 보건위생 등을 조사하였다. 조사대상은 61호로 가구당 6.8인이 거주하였고 소작농이 절대다수를 점하고 있었다. 각 가구당 평균 부채액이 140원에 달할 정도로 많았는데, 대부분 양식과 생필품을 구입하기 위해 빚을 진 것이었다. 아동(7~15세)의 경우 23%만이 학교를 다녔고 1인당 세 종류 이상의 노동에 동원되고 있었다. 의복의 경우 옷이라고 부를 수 있을 만한 외출복이 10% 밖에 안 되었고 식량은 주식인 쌀의 경우 1인당 소비량이 0.4석으로 당시 조선의 평균치보다 낮은 수치였다. 대부분의 주택이 천정․벽지 등의 미비와 채광 및 통풍의 불량 등으로 인해 비위생적인 환경에서 벗어날 수 없었다. 의료 기관의 절대적인 부족과 높은 진료비로 인해 의료 혜택은 거의 받지 못하고 있었다. 출산에 있어 높은 사망률과 유산, 조산율을 보이고 있는데, 이는 모체의 영양 불량상태와 임신 기간 중 과도한 노동의 결과였다. 특히 90%가 넘는 아동이 기생충을 보유하였는데, 상하수도 등의 위생 시설을 갖추지 못한 농촌지역의 현실을 반영한 것이다. 안병렬의 조사는 단순한 계량화로 환원될 수 없는 조선 농민의 다양한 삶의 양태를 보여주고 있다는 점에서 통치당국의 조사와는 질적으로 다른 의미와 내용을 가진 것이었다. In the summer of 1939, Byeong–ryeol Ahn, a student in the Department of Agriculture of Hokkaido Imperial University, examined the living environment, healthcare, and hygiene of residents in his hometown, Ogok–ri. He surveyed 61 households, and found the average number of residents in the average household was 6.8. Except for one landed farmer, all of the residents were tenant farmers. They were so heavily in debt that the average amount of debt per household was KRW 140. Among 7 to15 year–old–children, only 23% attended school, and each child was involved in more than three types of labor. Only 10% of clothes were wearable outside. Each person consumed only 0.4 seok of rice, below the average of Joseon. Houses were unsanitary due to a lack of ceilings and wallpaper, insufficient light, and poor ventilation. With the lack of medical facilities and the high medical expenses, resident were unable to enjoy the benefits of modern medicine. Maternal malnutrition and excessive physical labor during pregnancy led to high rates of death, miscarriages, and premature births. Parasites were found in more than 90% of children, which reflected the reality of rural areas without sanitary facilities such as water and proper sewage disposal. Ahn’s research differed qualitatively in its significance and content from that of the ruling government in that it showed various aspects of the lives of Joseon farmers that were not quantitatively measurable.

대한제국기 중앙은행 제도의 도입과 변용

조명근(Cho, Myung-Keun) 연세대학교 국학연구원 2021 동방학지 Vol.196 No.-

대한제국은 1900년의 특립제일은행, 1903년의 대한제국중앙은행 등 두 차례에 걸쳐 중앙은행 설립을 추진하였다. 대한제국은 기본적으로 일본의 제도를 모방하였으나 중앙은행의 핵심 기능인 국고금 취급과 은행권 발행에 있어서는 다른 방향으로 변용하였다. 대한제국은 일본이 장악한 해관세 징수권을 환수하여 재정의 충실히 기하려 하였고, 은행권 발행도 탄력적인 통화 공급이 가능하게 하여 독자성이 발현될 수 있는 제도를 채택하였다. 한편 일본은 대한제국의 재정 상황과 운영 주체의 무능력 등을 들어서 자립적인 중앙은행 설립을 반대하고, 그 대안으로서 ‘대한중앙은행’안을 제시하였다. 이 안에 따르면 일본인 주주와 고문을 중심으로 중앙은행을 운영하도록 하여 대한제국의 독자성을 부정하고 있었다. 대한제국 중앙은행 설립안은 재정 건전성 및 정화준비의 실태 등 문제가 있는 것은 사실이다. 그러나 새로운 제도를 도입하여 적용하는 데에는 시행착오의 유예기간이 어느 정도 필요하다. 일본도 여러 차례 시행착오를 거치면서 안정적인 제도를 확립한 것이 사실이다. 그러나 대한제국은 이런 시도조차 하지 못한 채 자주적 화폐금융제도의 수립은 좌절되고 말았다. The Korean Empire promoted the establishment of a central bank twice: the Special First Bank in 1900 and the Central Bank of the Korean Empire in 1903. The Korean Empire basically imitated the Japanese system but transformed it in different directions in terms of handling the national funds and issuing bank notes, which are the core functions of a central bank. The Korean Empire tried to redeem the sea customs tax collection rights held by Japan in order to secure the stability of its finances. On the other hand, Japan opposed the establishment of an independent central bank, citing the financial situation of the Korean Empire and the incompetence of the operating entity, and proposed a plan for the “Korea Central Bank” as an alternative. According to this plan, Japanese shareholders and advisors would run the central bank of the Korean Empire, thereby denying the independence of the Korean Empire. It is true that there were problems in the plan to establish the Central Bank of the Korean Empire in terms of the capability of its operating entity and the actual gold coverage situation. However, a certain grace period length for trials and errors is normally required to introduce and apply a new system. Japan eventually established a stable system while undergoing several trials and errors, while the Korean Empire failed to establish an independent monetary and financial system without even making such an attempt.

1920년대 조선은행 정리 과정 연구

조명근(Cho, Myung-keun) 한국사학회 2013 史學硏究 Vol.- No.112

조선은행은 1910년대 제1차 세계대전의 호황을 틈 타 일본 및 만주에 진출한 기업들을 대상으로 방만한 대출을 실시하였는데 전후 반동공황이 내습하자 불량채권이 양산되었다. 1922년 상반기 주주총회에서 조선은행의 부실 문제가 세상에 공개되었는데, 이를 주도한 세력은 대련지역 주주들이었다. 이들이 문제를 제기한 것은 대련거래소 금건화 실패 등 조선은행의 대만주 금융정책의 총체적 실패와 깊은 관련이 있다. 조선은행은 자체 정리계획을 세웠으나, 실제보다 불량채권의 액수를 터무니없이 낮게 산정함으로써 우선 세간의 의혹을 모면하려고만 하였다. 또 부실의 책임을 져야 할 당사자들이 정리를 주도하게 됨으로써 애초부터 철저한 정리는 불가능한 것이었다. 조선은행은 자체 정리에 있어 비현실적이고 무책임한 태도로 일관하고 있었다. 결국 조선은행 정리는 일본 정부가 주도하였다. 조선은행 만주 진출의 주역이었던 전총재 쇼다(勝田主計)가 대장대신으로서 주도한 1924년의 정리에서는 자금지원만 실시되었다. 그러나 1925년에 다시 시행된 정리에서는 자본금 50% 減資, 무배당 실시, 인원 감축 등을 통해 조선은행에게도 그 책임을 지게 하였다. 계속되는 경제 불황 등으로 인해 정리는 진척되지 못한 채 다시 1927~28년의 일본은행의 특별융통을 통해 정리를 일단락 지을 수 있었다. 정리 과정은 조선은행이란 존재를 재확인하는 과정이기도 하였다. 금융 위기시 발권력을 동원하여 구제금융을 실시해야 할 중앙은행이 오히려 그 구제를 받는다는 역설은 여전히 영리를 추구하는 사적 금융기관으로 변용된 식민지 발권은행의 모습을 적나라하게 보여주었다. 조선은행은 식민지 조선의 ‘중앙은행’으로 이해되고 있지만 이 정리 과정을 통해서 이 명칭에 합당하지 않은 존재라는 것을 확인할 수 있었다. During the economic boom caused by the First World War, the Bank of Joseon carried out overbearing bank loans. This loans, however, could not be recovered under the economic depression in rebound after the war. The problem of these uncollectible loans were first discussed at the general meeting of the stockholders in the first half of 1922. The main reason that the stockholders in Dalian brought up this problem was strongly related to continuous failures of the Bank of Joseon"s expansion toward Manchuria, such as the failure in changing Dalian Commodity Exchange"s trading unit in to the gold standard. In other word, it implied their anger toward the failure that created overwhelming economic damage to the Japanese in Manchuria. Although the Bank of Joseon set up their own plan to mend the damage, it was hardly realizable since they calculated bonds too low. Furthermore, that fact that the ones who had to take the responsibility maintained their posts only showed their irresponsible respond to the situation. In the end, the Japansed government was tasked with the organization of the Bank of Joseon. When they launched organization of the bank in 1924, Shoda Gazue(勝田主計), who was a main figure in the Bank of Joseon"s expansion toward Manchuria, did not hold anyone responsible but only decided fund support to the bank from the government. In 1925 however, a new plan of organization was drawn up which held the Bank of Joseon responsible by reducing the half of the capital, implementing non dividend, and reducing workforce. Still, a continuous recession in the Japanese financial world delayed the organization"s completion until the Bank of Japan"s special loan from 1927 to 1928. This process of the organization signifies the true nature of the Bank of Joseon. While it was a central bank holding the responsibility to release bailout during financial crisis, the Bank of Joseon, in reality, was supported by other banks" fund. This paradox illustrated an issuing bank in a colony"s usual characteristic as a personal financial institution. Even if commonly the bank was understood as a central bank, this organization proved that it was inappropriate to carry out the role.

식민지 자본주의의 전개와 3·1운동에 대한 시론적 검토

조명근(Cho, Myung-Keun) 역사학회 2020 역사학보 Vol.0 No.245

This article is an introductory study of the correlation between the colonial capitalism implanted by the Japanese Empire and the March 1st Movement. The body of this article approaches the foregoing correlation from three aspects: the structure of colonial capitalism, changes in daily life due to colonial capitalism, and people’s perception of capitalism. Through the hierarchical structure formed between the empire and colonial capitalism, the colony was indirectly linked to world capitalism through the colonial power, and the colonial economy was unilaterally reorganized according to the interests of the colonial power and capital. The Japanese Empire enforced policies that ignored the practices that had been passed down from ancestors and the profits of farmers, and Korean farms were incorporated into the circulation system of Japanese capitalism by force. As a result, the rural community, which was a reproduction unit of farmers and directly connected to survival, was being dismantled. Whereas Koreans had to seek only survival as isolated individuals before the March 1st Movement, they showed united power through the movement rather than being isolated. After the 1920s, Koreans began to make independent voices based on solidarity as a collective subject.

추천 시스템의 Embedding을 위한 Hybrid 구조의 Near-memory Processing

조명근(Myung-Keun Cho),이채은(Chae Eun Rhee) 대한전자공학회 2021 대한전자공학회 학술대회 Vol.2021 No.6

일제 말(1937~45) 조선에서의 戰時公債 소화 실태와 성격

조명근(Cho Myung-keun) 고려사학회 2012 한국사학보 Vol.- No.47

This paper analyzes how the war bonds issued by Japan following the Sino-Japanese War were absorbed. Once target amounts were set for each region of Japan, Joseon, Taiwan. etc., the Joseon Governor General Office divided the allocated amounts for each Do (province), which, in turn, further distributed the allotments to sub-provinces: Bus (府) and Guns (郡). The Do-specific amounts were generally based on each Do's income. and the household -specific amounts on household income taxes. War bonds were absorbed in the forms of direct and indirect taxes. Japan attempted to increase the government bond absorption rates by actively taking advantage of the points where income and consumption took place. Given that the war bonds Joseon citizens were forced to purchase had no real value due to the inflation and were not redeemed upon maturity, the bonds were therefore no different from taxes. Although the war bonds were basically featured as compulsory, they also appealed to the public's patriotism and speculative spirit. While claiming that purchasing of the bonds was the sacred obligation of the citizens. the colonial office advertised the huge amount of money the winners would get. This, however, contradicts the ideology that Japan used to mobilize resources to wage wars: the nation forced its people to sacrifice their private interests for the good of the country on one side while encouraging them to buy bonds by campaigning on a dream of fortune on the other. This clearly shows the inherent limitations of the war bonds with no economic value.

1920~30년대 대구부협의회·부회 선거와 조선인 당선자

조명근 ( Cho Myung-keun ) 대구사학회 2017 대구사학 Vol.129 No.-

이 글에서는 대구 지역 조선인의 지방의회 참여 실태를 대구부협의회·부회를 통해서 살펴보았다. 일제는 부의 자문기관으로서 1914년도에 부협의회를 설치하여 협의회원을 임명하였다. 1920년부터 협의회원은 선거로 선출되었고, 1930년에 부회로 개칭되면서 의결기관으로 전환되었다. 1920년부터 1939년까지 총 일곱 차례 선거가 실시되었다. 유권자는 일정 이상의 자산을 가진 성인 남성으로 한정되었다. 대구부의 경우, 유권자 수는 전체 부민 중 조선인은 1~2%, 일본인은 4~9% 불과하였다. 대구부 인구 구성에 있어 조선인은 70% 이상을 차지하였지만, 유권자 수에 있어서는 대체로 30~40%선에 머물러 민족 간 경제력의 차이를 여실히 보여주었다. 그 결과 의원 정원에서 조선인이 차지하는 비중은 최저 30%에서 최고 47%, 평균 38% 정도였다. 1920년대 선거의 경우 초선의 비중이 매우 높아 의원 교체가 활발히 이루어졌음을 알 수 있다. 그리고 당선자의 평균 연령은 대체로 30대였고, 특히 1926년의 경우 초선 4인 모두가 20대였다. 1930년대 선거에서도 1939년 선거를 제외하고는 2/3이상이 초선으로 채워졌다. 평균 연령은 1920년대보다 높아져 30대 후반에서 40세까지였다. 임명직이었던 1910년대에는 지역 명망가 중심으로 구성되었지만, 선거제로 변경되면서 지역 사회 활동이 많은 인물 등 신진 인사의 진출이 두드러졌음을 확인할 수 있었다. The purpose of this study was to investigate the participation of Koreans in local councils through the Daegu Pu-Council[府協議會]·Daegu Pu-hoi[府會]. The Japanese government-general of Joseon appointed a council member in 1914 as a advisory board of Pu[府]. Since 1920, the members of the council have been elected, and in 1930, the council was reorganized into Pu-hoi[府會], and it was turned into a legislative organ. From 1920 to 1939, a total of seven elections were held. Voters were limited to adult men with more than a certain amount of assets. The voters accounted for 1-2% of Koreans and 4-9% of Japanese in Daegu population. In Daegu's population, Koreans accounted for more than 70%, but the number of voters stayed at 30~40%. It showed the difference of economic power among the nations. As a result, the proportion of Koreans in the local council accounted for 38% of the total, from a minimum of 30% to a maximum of 47%. In the case of the 1920s election, the proportion of the freshmen in the local council was very high. It was indicating that the replacement of the member was active. And the average age of the Korean elected was generally in the thirties. In 1926, all four of the freshmen were twenties. In the elections of the 1930s, more than two-thirds of the member were filled with the freshmen except for the 1939 election. The average age was higher than that of the 1920s, from the late 30s to 40 years. In the 1910s, the council was composed mainly of local celebrities when it was made up of appointed members. However, after the transition to election after 1920, it was confirmed that young generation who had actively participated in the community had made a lot of progress in the Local council.

일제 말(1937~45) 조선 내 민간인을 대상으로 한 전시공채(戰時公債)의 발행 실태

조명근 ( Myung Keun Cho ) 성균관대학교 대동문화연구원 2009 大東文化硏究 Vol.65 No.-

일제의 통계 조사와 조선인의 비판적 해석

조명근 ( Myung Keun Cho ) 수선사학회 2015 史林 Vol.0 No.54

Japan conducted statistical research in order to prepare basic data to rule colonial Joseon. In the early 1920s, The Japanese Governor General of Korea attempted to strengthen the professionalism of civil affairs through statistics exhibitions and workshops. Japan also made major efforts to spread the effect of the statistics it had produced to the colonies. These statistics were widely used for administration. Japan focused solely on quantitative growth in order to emphasize the economic development of Joseon during the colonial period. However, different results were derived from the same statistics by some of the people of Joseon. While Japan aimed to show only quantitative growth during the period, Joseon attempted to expose qualitative inequality in growth between people of different ethnicities. Whereas Japan urged the necessity of colonial policy by comparing statistics between before and after its ruling, Joseon aimed to prove that the accumulation of wealth in area had no connection to the Joseon people. It is inevitable that statistics produced by a colonial power prioritize the vision of the rulers and their own administrative convenience. However, the statistical surveys conducted to investigate the lives of Joseon people were bound to reveal a hidden side of their lives. Without an accurate investigation, a policy based on these surveys would not be fully effective. Hence, differences depending on ethnicity and class were also recorded. Statistics that can be used as aspects of development by a colonial power can also be used as an indicator of inequality in terms of ethnic differences, such as development and underdevelopment. In the case of Joseon, Japanese statistics revealed unintended results, and the people of Joseon did not miss the opportunity to expose them.

조선은행권 발행 제도에 있어서 보증준비의 함의 -국책과 영리의 관계를 중심으로-

조명근 ( Myung Keun Cho ) 고려대학교 민족문화연구원 2013 民族文化硏究 Vol.61 No.-

본 논문의 목적은 조선은행의 발권제도와 영리와의 상관관계를 밝히는데 있다. 조선은행권 발행 제도의 핵심은 일본은행권이 정화준비의 대부분을 차지하고 있는 점이다. 조선은행은 정화준비 부족을 일본 단자시장의 콜과 제한외발행을 통해 해결하고 있었다. 이 방법은 조달 비용이 지출되기 때문에 조선은행에게는 손 실이었다. 따라서 무이자자금으로 은행권을 발행함으로써 수익을 거둘 수 있는 보증준비야말로 조선은행이 가장 선호하는 발행방식이었다. 그런데 보증준비의 한도액은 일본 제국의회에서 결정하였다. 한도 확장은 외부로부터 특별하고 획기적인 계기가 주어지지 않는 한 쉽게 이루어질 수 없는 것이었다. 1911년의 확장 은 강제병합에 따른 조선 재정자금 조달을 위해, 1918년은 조선은행권이 만주에 서 법화로 공인받았던 시기이고, 1937·39년은 중일전쟁 때 군용통화로 사용되었 거나 전비조달 역할을 수행하였기 때문에 확장된 것이다. 조선은행에게 가장 유리한 발행 방식인 보증준비는 일제의 국책 수행을 통해서만 그 한도 확장이 가능 했다. 조선은행에게 있어 국책이란 영리를 보증해주는 가장 강력한 도구였다. 보증준비 발행을 통해 조선은행은 일제 국책수행을 통해 영리를 추구하는 금융기관 임을 확인할 수 있을 것이다. This paper aims to figure out the interrelationship between the Bank of Joseon`s system of note issuance and its profit. The Bank of Joseon`s system of note issue was an elastic limit system with a proportional reserve system and it was the nub of their concern that their gold reserves were mostly taken by Japanese banking industry. Since the Bank of Joseon had difficulties in raising Japanese notes due to the constant trade deficit, it had to fill up the fund shortage with calls in the Japanese call market or solve this problem with an excess issue. Both of these methods were losses for the Bank of Joseon, however, because it had to pay purchasing costs. Therefore, fiduciary issuance, which was profitable entirely by issuing notes with interest-free funds, was the most preferred issuance method by the Bank of Joseon. However, limit of fiduciary issue had to be assessed by the Japanese Imperial Diet. Unless there were external groundbreaking exemptions given, extension of security notes for the Bank of Joseon was not easily considered. One extension in 1911 was for raising its financial funds as Japan`s annexation of Joseon, and another in 1918 was realized when the Bank of Joseon was publicly granted legal tender in Manchuria. From 1937 to 1939, the extension of limit was realized for use as military currency in Sino-Japanese wartime and playing a role in securing wartime expenditure. There were diverse joint methods in issuance of Bank of Joseon notes. Among them, fiduciary issue was the most favorable method for the Bank of Joseon. Fiduciary issue was only able to be extended in carrying out the national policy. Japanese national policy was the most powerful and only way for the Bank of Joseon to guarantee their profits. The Bank of Joseon could make a profit by being an active main participant in carrying out Japanese national policy. In that sense, the bank had a progressive position rather than passive position. This system of fiduciary issue shows clearly that the Bank of Joseon was not merely the colonial central bank but a financial institution which pursued profit through conducting Japanese national policy.