The Present and Future of the Non-Proliferation Regime

( James M. Acton ) 국방대학교 안보문제연구소 2008 The Korean Journal of Security Affairs Vol.13 No.2

The non-proliferation regime currently faces an unprecedented challenge: managing growing demands for nuclear disarmament at a time when nuclear energy is expected to spread widely. Although superficially unrelated, the tension between these two objectives is much greater than generally recognized. Specifically, recent cases of non-compliance, North Korea and Iran most notably, have demonstrated serious weaknesses in the existing non-proliferation regime. If new and more robust rules are not enacted to prevent nuclear facilities, materials and knowledge being subverted for military ends, the spread of nuclear weapons will become ever more likely. In turn, nuclear weapon states will become even more reluctant than they currently are to work toward the elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Many non-nuclear weapon states, however, state that they will only assist in strengthening the regime after the weapons states have fulfilled their promise to work in good faith toward disarmament. Breaking this circularity will be a considerable challenge. This paper explores the role that disarmament has to play. A vital component of an effective non-proliferation strategy is to increase the willingness of the vast majority of non-nuclear weapon states-those that are in compliance with their international obligations and not seeking nuclear weapons-to agree to tougher non-proliferation rules. However, many non-nuclear weapon states view such rules as an unnecessary burden and so co-opting them will require a quid pro quo, namely fulfillment of the pledge made in article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to work in good faith toward the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons. A key issue in pursuing a policy of `disarmament for non-proliferation` is ensuring that the nuclear weapon states do get credit for the disarmament actions they take. They must convince non-nuclear weapon states that their actions are part of a long-term effort aimed at eventually eliminating nuclear weapons. One way of achieving this is for all states to initiate a serious conversation on the challenges of abolishing nuclear weapons and their potential solutions. Such a conversation would also help non-nuclear weapon states to realize the roll that they have to play in creating a security architecture robust enough to enable nuclear weapons to be safely prohibited. Such a conversation would need to include India, Israel and Pakistan and facilitating it will involve creating a new forum-probably on the non-governmental level. The paper concludes by discussing two examples of the challenges with which states will have to engage if they are truly to take disarmament seriously: the role of extended deterrence in preventing proliferation and the future of the civilian nuclear industry.

핵비확산의 국제정치학과 정책대안

최아진 국가안보전략연구원 2012 국가안보와 전략 Vol.12 No.1

세계적으로 핵비확산이 중요한 이슈가 되고 이에 대한 연구도 활발하게 이루어지고 있는 반면, 국내에서는 세계적 차원에서 핵비확산을 주제로 다루는 연구가 상대적으로 부족하다. 본 연구는 핵비확산에 대한 최근의 주요 연구 동향을 소개하고 정책적 함의를 살펴보는 것을 목적으로 하며, 이 과정을 통해서 핵비확산에 있어서의 핵심적인 문제에 대한 이해를 높이고 동시에 효과적인 정책대안을 개발하는데 기여하고자 한다. 이를 위해서 첫째, 역사적으로 핵무기의 역할과 관련한 새로운 연구결과를 소개하고 핵비확산 정책에 대한 의미를 살펴본다. 둘째, 핵확산이 국제체제의 안정과 국가전략에 미치는 영향에 대한 이론과 정책적 함의를 살펴본다. 셋째, 핵확산의 경로 및 핵비확산의 조건과 정책대안들을 소개한다. 넷째, 핵비확산을 위한 새로운 도전과 과제로서 핵테러리즘 방지와 “핵무기 없는 세계”에 대한 평가를 제시한다. 마지막으로 위에서 살펴본 연구결과와 정책적 함의를 요약하면서 한국의 핵정책의 방향을 포함하여 연구결과와 정책개발 사이의 긴밀한 관계의 중요성을 강조하고 이를 발전시키기 위한 대안을 논의한다. Nuclear non-proliferation has become more important in global affairs, yet this topic remains understudied as a global issue in Korea. This study reviews recent research on nuclear non-proliferation and presents their policy implications. Through this process it pursues a better understanding of the core issue of nuclear non-proliferation and to develop relevant policy. First this study introduces new research findings on the use of nuclear weapons and discusses their implication for nuclear non-proliferation policy. Second, it explores the debate on the impacts of nuclear proliferation on international stability and national strategy and their relevance with policy alternatives. Third, it examines research on the causes of nuclear proliferation and the conditions for nuclear non-proliferation and evaluates their policy alternatives. Fourth, it identifies nuclear terrorism and the world without nuclear weapons as a new challenge and task in promoting nuclear non-proliferation. Finally, it presents the summary of key points of each section and the direction of future research and policy.

핵확산의 추세 vs. 비확산의 방책

조동준 ( Dong Joon Jo ) 경남대학교 극동문제연구소 2011 한국과 국제정치 Vol.27 No.1

이 글은 1945년 이후 핵확산의 추세와 비확산의 방책을 검토한다. 대규모 핵확산을 예상하던 비관론과 다르게, 핵확산은 완만하게 진행되어 현재 9개국만이 핵무기를 보유하고 있다. 냉전기 핵무기 수가 증가하고, 핵무기의 운반체계가 정교화되고, 핵무기의 파괴력이 늘어났지만, 냉전 이후 미국과 러시아는 핵통제는 물론 핵감축을 통하여 수직적 핵확산도 제어하고 있다. 국제체제 차원에서 핵확산의 우려는 현실화되지 않았다. 비확산은 핵무기 제조에 필요한 물질, 부품, 기술을 통제하는 방책, 핵보유 야망의 정치적 동인을 약화시키거나 제어하는 방책, 규범 또는 일방적 선언으로 핵무기의 사용 가능성을 낮추는 핵봉쇄로 나뉠 수 있다. 핵확산금지조약(NPT)은 핵물질의 이전과 핵기술의 군사적 전용을 어렵게 하여 핵확산의 기회를 줄이지만, 핵보유의 정치적 야망을 제어하지는 못한다. 국제사회는 특히 비정부단체에 의한 핵확산과 핵테러를 방지하기 위하여, 핵물질과 핵무기의 이전을 적극적으로 차단하며 핵테러 방지를 위한 국제협약을 강화하고 있다. This paper shows that horizontal nuclear proliferation does not deepen as much as pessimists predicted and vertical nuclear proliferation has been weakened in the post-Cold War era. It groups a variety of measures of non-proliferation into three categories: decreasing opportunities to nuclear proliferation, neutralizing or bridling political willingness for nuclear proliferation, and ``nuclear containment.`` Also, it reviews Proliferation Security Initiative(PSI) and the nuclear terrorism convention, which curb the possible nuclear proliferation by non-governmental organizations.

Suggestions for the Role of AI in the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation of WMD

Hyunsoo Kim(Hyunsoo Kim) J-INSTITUTE 2022 Robotics & AI Ethics Vol.7 No.2

Purpose: The purpose of this study is to explore the possible contribution of AI technology in the field of arms control and non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. This is to alleviate international security threats that have risen again since the post-Cold War and to promote international cooperation. For this purpose, we explore the potential of AI as a tool to provide trust-building and cooperation that is the basis of arms control. Method: This study first explores the basic concepts related to arms control and prevention of proliferation of military technology using the method of literature study. At this time, the scope of research is set as prior research related to AI and military technology. Next, using the method of research study, international issues related to arms control are investigated. In this case, the target of the investigation is the current status data reported through international organizations and press releases known through the media. Finally, using the methods of development research, we develop a model in which AI can intervene and play a role in arms control and preven-tion of proliferation. In this case, the model is designed to take into account the technical aspects of AI and the application of ethical content at the same time. Results: The use of AI in disarmament through bilateral and multilateral international cooperation is signifi-cant in that it explores the possibility of mutual cohesion between AI ethics and military ethics. Such AI can be utilized in the process of collecting and analyzing information provided in the form of big data at each stage of the trust-building model. And based on this, it is possible to secure the basis for policy decision-making in the process of making decisions related to arms control. Conclusion: In arms control and non-proliferation, AI functions as a tool to provide bilateral or multilateral trust and performs the following roles: First, information that is the basis for policy decision-making is collected and analyzed. Second, the basis for policy judgment is provided according to the analysis result of the collected and analyzed information. Third, it functions as a rational tool to justify decision-making and predict the future in the process of internal and external discussions that will continue in the future according to this judgment.

대량파괴무기의 비확산 관련 국제의무의 효율적 이행을 위한 포괄적 국내 입법의 필요성

신창훈(SHIN Changhoon) 대한국제법학회 2013 國際法學會論叢 Vol.58 No.4

우리나라는 대량파괴무기 비확산과 관련한 다자간 조약체제는 물론 이들의 수출통제와 관련한 주요 자발적 다자간 체제에 모두 참가하고 있는 성실한 비확산체제 준수 모범국 중 하나라 할 수 있다. 이러한 다자간 조약체제는 NPT, BWC, CWC로 대변되고 있으며, 자발적 다자간 체제로는 쟁거위원회, 원자력공급국그룹(NSG), 호주그룹(AG) 바세나르 체제(WA)와 미사일기술통제체제(MTCR) 등이 있다. 이외에도 2004년에는 비국가행위자로부터 및 비국가행위자로의 대량파괴무기 확산을 방지하기 위해 UN안전보장이사회에서 통과된 결의 1540호가 있다. 이러한 경성법과 연성법의 혼재로 구성된 비확산체제를 통해 우리나라는 법적 구속력이 있는 여러 국제의무와 정치적 의무를 부담하고 있으며, 이러한 의무를 국내적으로 성실하기 위해 여러 국내법도 제정한 바 있다. 그러나 대량파괴무기 전반을 관통하는 포괄적 입법을 제정하지는 못하여 비확산의 목적과 정책이 명확하지 못하다는 지적이 전문가들 사이에서 제기되고 있으며, 우리의 이행 수준을 더 높이기 위해 소위 “비확산 기본법”을 제정하자고 제안하는 정치적 움직임도 등장하고 있다. 이 글은 이러한 사정하에서 대량파괴무기 비확산 관련 국제체제상 존재하는 국제의무를 분석해 보고, 이를 실효적으로 이행하기 위해 포괄적 입법을 제정하고 있는 호주, 인도 및 남아공의 입법례를 분석하여 우리나라에서도 포괄적 입법이 필요한지의 여부와 필요하다면 그 방향은 어떠해야 하는지를 제시해 보고자 한다. 이를 통해 이 글은 특히 조약과는 달리 UN안보리의 결의상의 의무를 집행할 수 있는 근거 마련도 시급하다는 지적을 통해 포괄적 입법을 통해서든 관련 입법의 개정을 통해서든 안보리 결의의 집행근거를 마련을 위해 호주의 UN헌장법이라는 예를 참조할 것을 권고한다. The Repulic of Korea (ROK) is one of the exemplary States that comply in good faith with the obligations or commitments under mandatory or voluntary regimes for non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. While the mandatory regimes are represented by the international treaties such as NPT, BWC and CWC, the voluntary regimes include Zangger Committee, NSG, Australia Group (AG), the Wassenaar arrangement (WA), and MTCR. In addition, in 2004 the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1540 under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means to and from non-State actors. The non-proliferation regimes comprised of the mixture of hard laws and soft laws impose various international obligations or political commitments upon the ROK which has actively participated in all the regimes mentioned above. The ROK has also passed national implementing legislations to fully comply with the obligations and commitments. However, the implementing laws or enforcement laws are so fragmented that the experts and practitioners have campaigned for a comprehensive legislation that deals with all the weapons of mass destruction in a law titled as “Non-proliferation Basic Act” in order to enhance the level of our compliance with the international obligations and commitments. Under this circumstance, this paper will analyze the international obligations and commitments imposed upon the ROK by the non-proliferation regimes in general, and then look into whether a comprehensive national legislation is necessary in the ROK for effective implementation of the regimes, and then suggest a desirable direction for the legislation after analyzing the legislative precedents in Australia, India and South Africa that have enacted the law using the term “non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” as its title. This paper will also recommend that the prospective comprehensive legislation should refer to the “Charter of the United Nations Act 1945” in Australia in order to establish a legal justification for the direct application of the United Nations Security Council resolutions that have legally binding force.

Non-Specific Anti-Proliferative Effect of FTY720, A Derivative of Fungal Metabolite from Iscaria sinclarii

Jae Youl Cho 대한약학회 2008 Archives of Pharmacal Research Vol.31 No.2

FTY720 is a derivative of ISP-1 (myriocin), a fungal metabolite of the Chinese herb Iscaria sinclarii, with agonistic effect for sphingosine-1-phosphate receptor. In this study, we examined the potential adverse effect of FTY720 in terms of cell cytotoxicity and the relevance to its pharmacological action, using cell proliferation assay and functional aspect of activated macrophages producing NO and TNF-α. FTY720 potently blocked the proliferation of allogeneic T cells. However, this compound did not strongly suppress Con A-induced T cell blastogenesis and IL-2 induced CTLL-2 cell proliferation. Furthermore, FTY720 also non-specifically blocked the proliferation or viability of cancerous or primary cells tested, indicating its potential adverse effects. Interestingly, however, the non-specific inhibitory feature of FTY720 seems not to alter its pharmacological action, according to regulatory role of FTY720 on the production of TNF-α and NO from LPS-activated RAW264.7 cells, regardless of serum level. Therefore, our results suggest that FTY720 might have additional non-specific anti-proliferative activity, distinct from its pharmacological activity.

Why Nuclear Non-proliferation Disputes Cannot Be Settled through Judicial or Adjudication Arrangements

( Wenfu Mou ) 한국국방연구원 2020 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.32 No.3

Whilst the NPT regime constituted from several international treaties provides judicial and adjudicatory arrangements for nuclear dispute settlement such as ad hoc arbitration and litigation before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement (CSA) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Statute respectively, such arrangements, in contemporary practice, have remained silent towards nuclear proliferation problems, and the Security Council has dominated the proliferation issues in its own capacity. This phenomenon may be explained by the fact that there is some obstacle in the dispute settlement clause itself: the arbitral clause in the CSA precludes the essential proliferation disputes as being able to be arbitrated, and the dispute settlement clause in the IAEA Statute covers no disputes possibly arising out of the CSA. Even if a better judicial procedure is to be developed, it is hard for them to function effectively because in the event of non-compliance with international adjudications, their enforcement needs support from external authority. On the other hand, the key to the settlement of nuclear proliferation disputes is the continued duty of performance, fulfillment of international obligations ever violated, to a large extent, implementation of international law, which also need legitimate coercive authority. These two elements may justify contemporary international practices in the settlement of proliferation disputes.

The Normative Origins of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles - Opposition to Nuclear Weapons in Japan During the 1950s and 60s -

임상수 서강대학교 동아연구소 2023 東亞 硏究 Vol.42 No.2

Japan adopted a series of policies in 1971 that came to be known as the ‘Three Non-Nuclear Principles’, outlining that Japan will not produce, possess, or introduce nuclear weapons. The Three Non-Nuclear Principles featured an exceptionally high degree of non-proliferation commitment when compared to other states, and they have remained the backbone of Japanese nuclear policy to the present day. Then, what factors motivated Japan to adopt a set of unique non-nuclear policies such as the Three Non-Nuclear Principles in 1971? To answer this question, this paper examined the normative background of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, with an emphasis on the norms that motivated the domestic actors in Japan at the time. The findings show that the following four distinct norms in Japan motivated the domestic actors to advocate the adoption of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles in 1971: 1) Japan’s non-nuclear norms, 2) Japan’s anti-war norms, 3) regional norms in Okinawa, 4) conservative norms in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s leadership.

Will Donald Trump Overturn US Nuclear Non-proliferation Posture?

( Mark Fitzpatrick ) 국방대학교 안보문제연구소 2016 The Korean Journal of Security Affairs Vol.21 No.2

For over 60 years, the United States has led global efforts to stem the expansion of nuclear weapons, an effort that has succeeded in keeping the number of nuclear-armed states to single digits rather than the 25 that were once direly forecast. For most of this period, the non-proliferation regime has been comprised of treaties, conventions and bilateral agreements, formal arrangements that offered legitimacy at the cost of leastcommon denominator compromises. More recently, the US has favored non-proliferation action through the 15-member UN Security Council and via ad-hoc coalitions of like-minded states. The US has also applied unilateral pressure. These efforts have been directed not just against US adversaries, but also vis-a-vis its friends, including the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, both of which were persuaded to stop their pursuit of plutonium-based nuclear weapons. The US failed to stop Israel, however, as well as India, Pakistan and, of most concern, North Korea. The Iran case may be instructive in fashioning a policy to denuclearize North Korea. US policy is largely focused on sanctions, which have finally reached the intensity of sanctions that were applied against Iran and third parties that engaged with designated Iranian entities. In the case of Iran, which is more susceptible to pressure than North Korea, it took at least a year and a half before severe sanctions contributed to serious negotiations on a deal. But the Iranian deal did not come about solely as the result of severe sanctions. It also took a willingness on both sides to accept compromises. In the coming months, sanctions and other forms of pressure on North Korea will be sharpened. The worst response would be for the ROK and Japan also to seek nuclear weapons. As in the Iran case, incentives should be considered among the tools in the non-proliferation toolbox.

Application of Bayesian Network for Risk Assessment of Export License

Chansuh Lee 한국방사성폐기물학회 2022 한국방사성폐기물학회 학술논문요약집 Vol.20 No.1

Efforts for nuclear non-proliferation have continued since the development of nuclear weapons and the conclusion of the NPT Treaty. Nuclear proliferation requires materials, facilities, and human resources to make nuclear weapons, and it takes a medium to long-term time. There are many restrictions in the current system to obtain nuclear materials and facilities, so it is often done through illegal means, black markets, or confidential transactions. Methods have been developed to evaluate the nuclear non-proliferation regime to strengthen the non-proliferation and solve the problems. The IAEA and the United States DOE initiated the proliferation resistance evaluation in 1980. The DOE conducted the assessment in three main evaluation categories: materials, technical characteristics of facilities, and institutional barriers. In another nuclear non-proliferation evaluation study, some researchers evaluated three main types: current capacity, political situation, and international situation. Detailed indicators include economic capacity, industrial capacity, nuclear capacity, leader’s intentions, political structure, competitive relations, alliances, and international norms. Most of these evaluations are based on the situation at the time of assessment at the national level. Historical examples of nuclear proliferation are rare, and verification is also challenging. The Bayesian probability is widely used when the data is small, experiments are impossible, and the causal relationship is unclear. A Bayesian network is a combination of Bayesian probability and graphics. It is used throughout the industry because it can easily derive results according to causal relationships and weights of various variables, evaluate the risk for decision-making, and obtain changed results through data updates. In particular, to evaluate the proliferation of nuclear weapons, Freeman developed the Freeman network in 2008 and the Freeman-Mella network in 2014. Freeman explained in detail only the process of deriving variables, correlations, and probabilities of factors related to factors such as motivation, intention, and resources. It isn’t easy to view as an objective result value because it does not describe the academic background for path selection, motivation list, intention, and resource variable selection. However, the research was meaningful because he first used the Bayesian network for nuclear proliferation. Although some studies have been done at the macro level, there is no case of applying it in export controls, which is the beginning of the actual spread. Also, there is no quantitative value for factors for risk assessment. There is little data, and verification of causality is difficult, so if the Bayesian network is applied to export control and applied to actual implementation, it will help make decisions such as export license or export denial.