The Present and Future of the Non-Proliferation Regime

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The non-proliferation regime currently faces an unprecedented challenge: managing growing demands for nuclear disarmament at a time when nuclear energy is expected to spread widely. Although superficially unrelated, the tension between these two objectives is much greater than generally recognized. Specifically, recent cases of non-compliance, North Korea and Iran most notably, have demonstrated serious weaknesses in the existing non-proliferation regime. If new and more robust rules are not enacted to prevent nuclear facilities, materials and knowledge being subverted for military ends, the spread of nuclear weapons will become ever more likely. In turn, nuclear weapon states will become even more reluctant than they currently are to work toward the elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Many non-nuclear weapon states, however, state that they will only assist in strengthening the regime after the weapons states have fulfilled their promise to work in good faith toward disarmament. Breaking this circularity will be a considerable challenge. This paper explores the role that disarmament has to play. A vital component of an effective non-proliferation strategy is to increase the willingness of the vast majority of non-nuclear weapon states-those that are in compliance with their international obligations and not seeking nuclear weapons-to agree to tougher non-proliferation rules. However, many non-nuclear weapon states view such rules as an unnecessary burden and so co-opting them will require a quid pro quo, namely fulfillment of the pledge made in article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to work in good faith toward the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons. A key issue in pursuing a policy of `disarmament for non-proliferation` is ensuring that the nuclear weapon states do get credit for the disarmament actions they take. They must convince non-nuclear weapon states that their actions are part of a long-term effort aimed at eventually eliminating nuclear weapons. One way of achieving this is for all states to initiate a serious conversation on the challenges of abolishing nuclear weapons and their potential solutions. Such a conversation would also help non-nuclear weapon states to realize the roll that they have to play in creating a security architecture robust enough to enable nuclear weapons to be safely prohibited. Such a conversation would need to include India, Israel and Pakistan and facilitating it will involve creating a new forum-probably on the non-governmental level. The paper concludes by discussing two examples of the challenges with which states will have to engage if they are truly to take disarmament seriously: the role of extended deterrence in preventing proliferation and the future of the civilian nuclear industry.

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